CAMARGO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAREN C.,1

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:23-cv-2794

v. Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the application of Plaintiff Caren C. for Disability

Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Plaintiff

appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying that application.2

After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire administrative record, the

Court decides this matter pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the

reasons that follow, the Court the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands the

matter for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed her application for benefits, alleging that she has been

disabled since December 28, 2017. R. 112, 127, 221–22. The application was denied initially and

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of

the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security

cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs in such cases by only their first names and last

initials. See also D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

2 Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as Defendant in

his official capacity. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 25(d).

1

upon reconsideration. R. 130–34, 136–38. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”). R. 139–40. ALJ Theresa Merrill held an initial hearing on

March 12, 2020; because Plaintiff was not represented, the ALJ advised Plaintiff of her right to

counsel and rescheduled the hearing to provide an opportunity to obtain outstanding medical

records and counsel. R. 46–64 The ALJ held a supplemental hearing on July 9, 2020, at which

Plaintiff, again without counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. R. 65–102. In a decision

dated August 11, 2020, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act from December 28, 2017, Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date,

through the date of that decision. R. 21–34 (“2020 decision”). That decision became final when

the Appeals Council declined review on April 26, 2021. R. 1–7. Plaintiff timely filed an appeal

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and on March 31, 2022, this Court found that substantial

evidence did not support the 2020 decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Caren

C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2:21-cv-10992 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022); R. 1100–12); see also R.

1113.

On September 13, 2022, ALJ Marguerite Toland held a hearing on remand, at which

Plaintiff, who was now represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. R. 1062–99.

In a decision dated February 24, 2023, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from December 28, 2017, Plaintiff’s alleged

disability onset date, through March 31, 2022, the date on which Plaintiff was last insured. R.

1039–55. On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

1383(c)(3). ECF No. 1. On April 5, 2024, Plaintiff consented to disposition of the matter by a

United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules

2

of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 10.3 On April 12, 2024, the case was reassigned to the undersigned.

ECF No. 11. The matter is ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the

authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204

F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to

determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d

Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The United States Supreme Court has explained this

standard as follows:

Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing

administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to support

the agency’s factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in

other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.

Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means –

and means only – such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);

see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citation and internal quotations

omitted); Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and

quotations omitted); K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309, 2018 WL 1509091,

at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018).

The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot

be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different

3The Commissioner has provided general consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in cases

seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. See Standing Order In re: Social Security

Pilot Project (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018).

3

conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli

v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the

factual inquiry differently.”) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)); K.K.,

2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (“‘[T]he district court ... is [not] empowered to weigh the evidence or

substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’”) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d

1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic

or self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)

(“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of

social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”);

see Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9,

2016). The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account

whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (quoting

Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted));

see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that substantial evidence exists

only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”). Evidence is not substantial if “it is

overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or

“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114); see

K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The ALJ decision thus must be set aside if it “did not take into

account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict.” Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp.

at 284-85 (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)).

4

Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular

format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the

record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d

501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.

2000)); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an

expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of

the evidence which was rejected.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705-06; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121

(“Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, [s/]he must give some indication

of the evidence which [s/]he rejects and [the] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.”) (citing

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a

comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short

paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). Absent

such articulation, the Court “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or

simply ignored.” Id. at 705. As the Third Circuit explains:

Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the

weight [s/]he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that [the] decision

is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty

to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached

are rational.

Gober, 574 F.2d at 776; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85.

Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court can

enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or

without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate if the

record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or contains illogical or

contradictory findings. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,

5

221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is also appropriate if the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a

complete review which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the

record. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

A.B. on Behalf of Y.F. v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2016). A decision to “award

benefits should be made only when the administrative record of the case has been fully

developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is

disabled and entitled to benefits.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221-22 (citation and quotation

omitted); see A.B., 166 F. Supp.3d at 518.

B. Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the

Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d

632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007)).

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not

disabled.

At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or

combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the plaintiff does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not

disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.

6

At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of

impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of

Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination

of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.

at § 404.1509. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four.

At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f).

If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not

disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.

At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC,

age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the ALJ determines that the plaintiff can do

so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the

impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous

period of at least twelve months.

III. ALJ’s 2023 DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES

Plaintiff was 48 years old on March 31, 2022, the date on which she was last insured for

disability insurance benefits. R. 1053. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity between December 28, 2017, Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset

date, and her date last insured. R. 1041.

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease/asthma; post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); chronic

7

recurrent major depressive disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder with panic attacks. R.

1042. The ALJ also found that the following impairments were not severe medically

determinable impairments: hypertension, coronary artery disease, atrial fibrillation, back, neck

and shoulder impairments, neuropathy, migraine headaches, and obesity. R. 1042–43.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. R. 1043–45.

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to

various additional limitations:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,

through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except as follows: she

cannot climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds or work at heights. She cannot operate

dangerous machinery (defined as machines that cut or shear). She can only

occasionally stoop. She can perform no more than occasional overhead lifting and

reaching. She is limited to no more than frequent handling. She must avoid

concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, pulmonary irritants and temperature

extremes. She would be limited to low stress work (defined as unskilled work

involving simple, routine tasks and having no fast production rate pace such as

assembly line work). She should have no interaction with the public, and no more

than occasional, superficial interaction with coworkers.

R. 1045. The ALJ also found that this RFC did not permit the performance of Plaintiff’s past

relevant work as a medical assistant, warehouse supervisor, and merchandise marker. R. 1053.

At step five and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that a

significant number of jobs—e.g., jobs as an electrical assembler, a solderer, and a small parts

assembler—existed in the national economy and could be performed by Plaintiff despite her

lessened capacity. R. 1054–55. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act from December 28, 2017, her alleged disability

onset date, through March 31, 2022, the date on which she was last insured. R. 1055.

Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at steps three, four, and five and argues that the

8

ALJ violated the Court’s 2022 Remand Order; she asks that the 2023 decision be reversed and

remanded with directions for the granting of benefits or, alternatively, for further proceedings.

Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, ECF No. 6; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 9. The Commissioner takes

the position that his decision should be affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ’s decision

correctly applied the governing legal standards, reflected consideration of the entire record, and

was supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 8.

IV. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT MEDICAL EVIDENCE

On April 1, 2021, Christopher Williamson, Psy.D., reviewed the record and prepared the

following report:

At your request, I took the opportunity to review the above mentioned claimant’s

application for disability, her voluminous medical records and subsequent denial

of disability benefits. More specifically, I focused on the mental health records

including but not limited to treatment notes/reports of Dr. Arroyo, Report of Dr.

Rakkar, report of Dr. Sabol and extensive treatment notes from Saint Joseph’s

Hospital. The following is a report of my findings.

After a review of the above noted data, it appears that the claimant, as evidenced

in significant medical documentation, suffers from moderate to severe levels of

psychiatric impairment. It is agreed upon, that the claimant has suffered a horrific

trauma history including being sexually molested by her father in childhood. She

later went on to be involved in two separate long term relationships that resulted

in extensive domestic violence allegations. The above noted trauma resulting in

what was consistently diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

The symptoms exacerbated by the alleged sexual molestation of one of the

client’s children by her prior abuser. Her diagnosis does not appear to be in

question, nor does the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized

Anxiety Disorder (with or without Panic attacks). Her symptoms were so severe,

that she was hospitalized psychiatrically at least three separate times due to

suicidal attempts or ideation. The documents cite that there was improvement

from said hospitalization, one would hope that improvement during the

hospitalization and would be anticipated as a treatment goal for consideration for

discharge and not a contributing reason for denial of benefits.

Medical records would appear to consistently support the diagnosis of PTSD,

Major Depression and Anxiety. Further review of medical documentation and

treatment notes would suggest and indicate that the claimant had difficulties

interacting effectively with others, including coworkers, on occasion having to

9

leave work. These instances became focuses on treatment for conflict resolution

and coping with issues of anger management which were consistent themes in

treatment. It was suggested that her extensive trauma history may have been

contributing to her struggles interacting effectively with others, resulting in work

and social discomfort. It was also indicated that she was reluctant to leave her

house due to persistent fears and anxieties. Records suggest that she struggled

with issues of motivation and lack of joy in activities. She became reclusive as a

results [sic]. It was further documented that she had limited concern with ADL’s

such as a desire to bath and get changed at home. She had to be encouraged by

her children. She had no joy in tasks of daily living. Furthermore, the fact that she

was able to get along with her doctors is not clinically significant. It is the goal to

establish a trusting and nurturing therapeutic environment, especially when

dealing with severe trauma survivors. Furthermore, her ability to relay

information about her health and history, follow instructions from healthcare

providers, comply with treatment outside of a doctor’s office or hospital, are not

suggestive or indicative of a higher level of function, cognitively and/or

emotionally. The medical records may suggest that she has good rapport with

providers (as to be expected), the records also suggest and support impaired

social interactions at home and in the community, to the point where she had to

reportedly be with another family member to leave the home. As noted from a

review of the above documents, and citing but a few examples of the extreme and

chronic nature of her psychiatric illness, it would appear the claimant, based on

a review of relevant dated documentations, consistently exhibited marked

psychiatric impairment impacting on cognitive, emotional, and social realms.

R. 1526–28 (emphasis added).

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges, inter alia, the ALJ’s finding at step three of the sequential evaluation

as it relates to her mental impairments—i.e., that Plaintiff’s mental impairments neither meet nor

medically equal Listings 12.04, 12.06, or 12.15. Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, ECF No. 6, pp. 13–29;

Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 9, pp. 2–11. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes

that this issue requires remand.

At step three, an ALJ considers whether any of the claimant’s medically determinable

impairments, or the combination thereof, meets or medically equals the severity of one of the

impairments in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). An impairment

meets a listed impairment if it satisfies “‘all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that

10

manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.’” Jones, 364

F.3d at 504 (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990)) (emphasis in original). “A

claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing that the overall

functional impact of his unlisted impairment or combination of impairments is as severe as that

of a listed impairment.” Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). “[T]he medical criteria

defining the listed impairments [are set] at a higher level of severity than the statutory standard”

because the “listings define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of h[er] age,

education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just ‘substantial gainful

activity.’” Id. at 532 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a)). Although an ALJ is

not required to use “particular language” when determining whether a claimant meets or equals a

listing, the ALJ’s discussion must provide for “meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505

(citing Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120). Accordingly, if the ALJ’s decision, “read as a whole, illustrates

that the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion that [the claimant] did

not meet the requirements for any listing,” “[t]his discussion satisfies Burnett’s requirement that

there be sufficient explanation to provide meaningful review of the step three determination.” Id.

At step two of the sequential evaluation in the 2023 decision, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff suffered the severe impairments of, inter alia, PTSD; chronic recurrent major depressive

disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder with panic attacks. R. 1042. The ALJ determined at

step three that these impairments, considered singly or in combination, neither met nor medically

equaled Listing 12.04, which addresses depressive, bipolar and related disorders, Listing 12.06,

which addresses anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders, or Listing 12.15, which addresses

trauma-and stressor-related disorders. R. 1043–45. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§

12.04, 12.06, 12.15. In order to meet any of these Listings, a claimant must satisfy the criteria in

11

paragraph A and either the paragraph B or paragraph C criteria of these Listings. Id. The

paragraph B4 criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 are identical and are satisfied when a

claimant has an extreme limitation5 in one, or a marked limitation6 in two, of the following four

mental functional areas: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with

others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. Id. at

§§ 12.03B, 12.04B, § 12.15B.

In considering the paragraph B criteria of these Listings, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

only a “mild” limitation in the area of understanding, remembering, or applying information, and

in the area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and found “moderate” limitations in

the two remaining areas—i.e., interacting with others and adapting or managing oneself. R.

1044–45. Plaintiff specifically challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had only moderate

limitations in these two areas of functioning. Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, ECF No. 6, pp. 13–29;

Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 9, pp. 2–11. The Court addresses these challenges in turn.

A. Interaction with Others

The Listings explain the function of interacting with others as follows:

This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to relate to and work with

supervisors, co-workers, and the public. Examples include: cooperating with

others; asking for help when needed; handling conflicts with others; stating own

point of view; initiating or sustaining conversation; understanding and responding

to social cues (physical, verbal, emotional); responding to requests, suggestions,

criticism, correction, and challenges; and keeping social interactions free of

excessive irritability, sensitivity, argumentativeness, or suspiciousness. These

4 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings regarding the paragraph A or paragraph C

criteria.

5 An “extreme” limitation means that the claimant is unable to function in this area

independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis. Id. at § 12.00F2e.

6 A “marked” limitation means that the claimant is seriously limited in her ability to function

independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in a specified area. Id. at §

12.00F2d.

12

examples illustrate the nature of this area of mental functioning. We do not

require documentation of all of the examples.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00E2 (emphasis added). In the present case, the ALJ

found only a moderate limitation in this area, reasoning as follows:

In interacting with others, the claimant has a moderate limitation. She reported

difficulty getting along with others (Ex. 7E at 5). She testified to no regular social

activities and not going out alone, but goes shopping twice a month, does laundry

outside the house, and goes out to eat occasionally (Ex. 7E; Hearing Testimony).

In December of 2018, she reported she can go to a store or office by herself (Ex.

3F at 2-3). In January of 2020, she reported she can go to a store by herself (Ex.

6F at 2). In late 2021, she reported she goes out as needed for chores (Ex. 14F at

71). Medical evidence shows that the claimant had a good rapport with providers,

was described as pleasant and cooperative, had good interactions with non-

medical staff, and appeared comfortable during appointments, but reported some

irritability (See Exs. 2F; 5F; 10F; 12F; 13F). In light of the foregoing, the

undersigned finds the claimant has no more than a moderate limitation in

interacting with others.

R. 1044.

Plaintiff challenges this finding, arguing that the evidence establishes that Plaintiff has a

marked or extreme limitation in this area of functioning. Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, ECF No. 6, pp.

13–27; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 9, pp. 5–11. Plaintiff specifically contends that the ALJ

omitted relevant evidence regarding Plaintiff’s limitations in her social interactions, which

suggest a greater than moderate limitation of function. Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff further

contends that the ALJ wrongly emphasized irrelevant details, such as Plaintiff’s rapport with her

medical examiners, which Dr. Williamson characterized as “not clinically significant”. Id.

(citing, inter alia, R. 1527). Plaintiff therefore argues that the ALJ failed to adequately explain

this conclusion and that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of only a

moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others. Id. The Commissioner, however,

argues that the ALJ appropriately considered the record and that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was no more than moderately limited in her ability to interact

13

with others. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 8. The Court concludes that the record requires remand

on this issue.

As noted above, the ALJ relied in large part on Plaintiff’s “good rapport with providers”

and “good interactions with non-medical staff, and [the fact that Plaintiff] appeared comfortable

during appointments[.]” R. 1044. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has noted that, for an individual “who suffers from an affective or personality disorder

marked by anxiety, the work environment is completely different from home or a mental health

clinic.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt.

P, App. 1, Subpart P, § 12.00E2 (instructing, inter alia, that the area of mental functioning of

interacting with others “refers to the abilities to relate to and work with supervisors, co-workers,

and the public”); Hull v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-0006, 2018 WL 3546555, at *7–8 (M.D. Pa.

July 24, 2018) (“Morales guidance indicates that ALJ Burock’s reliance on Plaintiff’s ability to

‘relate well in the clinical setting’ and be cooperative and adequately conversant in that setting

does not provide support for his determination at step three that Plaintiff has moderate limitations

in interacting with others.”). Notably, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff “reported difficulty

getting along with others” and that she “testified to no regular social activities[.]” R. 1044. The

ALJ also acknowledged in other parts of her 2023 decision that, in November 2017, Plaintiff

“reported explosive anger with a coworker and leaving work early[.]” R. 1048. The ALJ further

noted that Plaintiff reported “angry outbursts, as well as crying spells,” R. 1049, and “being

easily upset and aggravated, being uncomfortable around crowds of people[,]” id., that “she does

not engage in regular social activities[,]” id., and that she “does not have any friends[.]” Id.

Moreover, although the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s function report as well as to

examination and treatment notes that reflect Plaintiff’s good rapport and interactions with

14

providers and staff, the ALJ was silent as to other information regarding Plaintiff’s difficulty in

interacting with people. For example, Plaintiff indicated in her function report that she has

problems getting along with others, explaining, “sometimes I will get really emotionally [sic] or

really mad[.]” R. 444. She also indicated that she was fired or laid off from one job because of

problems getting along with other people: “I was grab[bed] by a nurse and I scream[ed] at hi[m]

to let me go[.]” R. 446. In January 2018, Michael Melendez, L.C.S.W., Plaintiff’s therapist,

noted that Plaintiff had reported “that she has been ‘referred a package’ by her employer to not

return to work after her allegation of being grabbed by a fellow employee.” R. 498. In therapy

notes from January 2021, Mr. Melendez noted, inter alia, that Plaintiff “reported on a recent

situation during which ‘I lost it’ with a visitor to her home” during which that visitor’s “‘tone of

voice and disrespect’ triggered an aggressive verbal response that included threats of physical

harm.” R. 1473. Although the ALJ found that the record supported “no more than a moderate

limitation in interacting with others[,]” the ALJ did not sufficiently explain this conclusion in

light of the record evidence detailed above—much of which was not discussed by the ALJ at step

three. R. 1044. Notably, the ALJ’s RFC determination at step four—i.e., that Plaintiff “can never

interact with the public,” R. 1045—suggests a greater than moderate limitation in the area of

interacting with others. See Hull, 2018 WL 3546555, at *7–8 (remanding where, inter alia, the

ALJ found a moderate limitation in interacting with others but also limited the plaintiff to no

public interaction, because the ALJ thus “essentially found in his RFC assessment that Plaintiff

had at least a marked limitation in her ability to interact with the general public”). In short, the

Court cannot conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding of only a moderate

limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with people where the ALJ relied on a good rapport

with providers and medical staff and where she selectively cited evidence that supported this

15

assessment but ignored, without explanation, contrary evidence. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505

(stating that there still must be “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings

to permit meaningful review”); Morales, 225 F.3d at 319; Quinn v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-

01698, 2022 WL 178824, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2022) (“A selective approach to the evidence

does not constitute substantial evidence upon which an ALJ may reasonably rely to deny

benefits.”) (citations omitted); Segal v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-8839, 2020 WL

2111229, at *6–7 (D.N.J. May 4, 2020) (remanding where “the Court finds that the ALJ

nonetheless erred in his treatment of medical evidence in the record: although the ALJ did not

entirely ignore treatment notes from Plaintiff’s providers, he selectively cited portions of these

notes, rather than addressing the conflicting evidence within these records”); Sanford v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. CIV. 13-0366 NLH, 2014 WL 1294710, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014) (“The

Third Circuit has held that access to the Commissioner’s reasoning is [ ] essential to a

meaningful court review.”) (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)).7

B. Adapting or Managing Oneself

The Listings explain the area of adapting and managing oneself as follows:

This area of mental functioning refers to the abilities to regulate emotions, control

behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting. Examples include:

Responding to demands; adapting to changes; managing your psychologically

based symptoms; distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable work

performance; setting realistic goals; making plans for yourself independently of

others; maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a work setting; and

7 In finding only a moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others, the ALJ also

relied on Plaintiff’s activities, i.e., that she “goes shopping twice a month, does laundry outside

the house, and goes out to eat occasionally”; “can go to a store or office by herself”: “can go to a

store by herself” and “goes out as needed for chores[.]” R. 1044 (citations omitted). Even if

Plaintiff’s ability to occasionally go out in public supports only a moderate limitation in this area

of functioning—a questionable proposition in light of the present record in this case—it is not

clear to what extent the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s interaction with providers and medical staff

and her failure to discuss contrary evidence at step three infected her conclusion that Plaintiff

was only moderately limited in her ability to interact with others.

16

being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. These

examples illustrate the nature of this area of mental functioning. We do not

require documentation of all of the examples.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00E4 (emphasis added). In the present case, the ALJ

found only a moderate limitation of functioning in this area, reasoning as follows:

As for adapting or managing oneself, the claimant has a moderate limitation. She

reported problems handling stress and changes in routine (Ex. 7E at 7). However,

treatment notes reflect that she is appropriately dressed and groomed for

appointments, cooperative with medical staff, and generally compliant with

prescribed treatment. She reported she requires assistance with personal care due

to physical limitations, goes shopping twice a month, does some household

chores, and can manage her finances (Ex. 7E; Hearing Testimony). Based on the

foregoing, the undersigned finds the claimant has no more than a moderate

limitation in her ability to adapt or manage herself.

R. 1044–45.

Plaintiff challenges this finding, taking the position that the evidence establishes that

Plaintiff had a marked or extreme limitation in this area of functioning. Plaintiff’s Initial Brief,

ECF No. 6, pp. 13–27; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 9, pp. 5–11. According to Plaintiff, the

ALJ improperly focused on irrelevant evidence and omitted relevant evidence regarding

Plaintiff’s limitations which, Plaintiff argues, support a marked or extreme limitation of function.

Id. (citations omitted). The Court agrees.

As detailed above, this area of mental functioning considers a claimant’s abilities to

regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being in a work setting, including, inter

alia, managing psychologically based symptoms. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00E4.

Although the ALJ did not discuss this evidence when considering Plaintiff’s ability to adapt or

manage herself, see R. 1044, this Court has already referred to evidence of Plaintiff’s altercation

with a co-worker and inability to control her anger in a work setting, and of Plaintiff’s loss of a

job because of this issue. The Court also detailed above Plaintiff’s failure to control herself when

17

she “lost it” with a visitor and verbally threatened that visitor with physical violence. R. 1473.

The ALJ noted at step four that Plaintiff reported that she, inter alia, has no friends, has no

regular social activities, has difficulty managing stress, has anxiety around other people, and is

easily upset and aggravated R. 1046, 1049–50. Despite all this evidence, the ALJ concluded at

step three that Plaintiff was only moderately limited in the area of adapting or managing herself,

because she was appropriately dressed and groomed for appointments, was cooperative with

medical staff, was generally compliant with prescribed treatment and, although she required

assistance with her personal care because of physical limitations, she went shopping twice a

month, performed some household chores, and could handle her finances. R. 1044–45. Without

more explanation, the Court cannot understand the ALJ’s reasoning in this regard. See Jones,

364 F.3d at 505; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704–05 (explaining that the ALJ’s decision must include “a

clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests” sufficient to enable a reviewing

court “to perform its statutory function of judicial review”); Sanford, 2014 WL 1294710, at *2;

cf. Fermin-Castillo o/b/o B.J.F. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-01495-RAL, 2022 WL 1774286, at *8

(E.D. Pa. May 31, 2022) (“The contradictory evidence is clearly material to the listing criteria of

adapting and managing oneself. The ALJ erred by failing to address and resolve it. This must be

remedied on remand.”).

Furthermore, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s omission, without explanation, of

certain evidence and her failure to adequately explain her reasoning in connection with these

mental functioning areas is harmless where an extreme limitation in one of those areas or a

marked limitation in both of those areas would result in a finding that the paragraph B criteria of

Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 have been met. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 12.04B,

12.06B, and 12.15B. This Court therefore concludes that remand of the matter for further

18

consideration of these issues is appropriate.8 Moreover, remand is appropriate even if, upon

further examination of the paragraph B criteria, the ALJ again concludes that Plaintiff has not

met or medically equaled a listing and ultimately is not entitled to benefits. Cf. Zuschlag v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-CV-1949, 2020 WL 5525578, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2020)

(“On remand, the ALJ may reach the same conclusion, but it must be based on a proper

foundation.”); Jiminez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 19-12662, 2020 WL 5105232, at *4

(D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020) (“Once more, the ALJ did not provide an adequate explanation that

would enable meaningful review, and the Court once more cannot determine what role lay

speculation played in the ALJ’s rejection of this detailed functional assessment from Dr.

Marks.”); Cassidy v. Colvin, No. 2:13-1203, 2014 WL 2041734, at *10 n.3 (W.D. Pa. May 16,

2014) (“Nevertheless, that the ALJ may have misinterpreted or misunderstood Dr. Kaplan’s

findings with regard to Plaintiff's postural activities does not absolve her of her error. Rather, it

highlights the need for an ALJ to fully explain her findings. Otherwise, the district court is left to

engage in this sort of speculation about how an ALJ arrived at her decision.”).

In remanding this case for further proceedings rather than for an award of benefits, the

Court is mindful of the lengthy procedural history of Plaintiff’s application for benefits.

However, to decide otherwise would require this Court to make findings that should be made by

the ALJ in the first instance. Finally, and although Plaintiff asks that this Court remand this

8 Plaintiff asserts other errors in the Commissioner’s final decision. Because the Court concludes

that the matter must be remanded for further consideration of the paragraph B criteria,

particularly the areas of interacting with others and adapting and managing oneself, the Court

does not consider those claims. However, although not raised by the parties, the Court notes that

the ALJ omitted any reference to supervisors in the 2023 decision. On remand, the ALJ should

address Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors. See Grinolds v. Colvin, No. 15-30, 2015

WL 5178184, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015) (“The public, supervisors, and co-workers are

distinct groups, and are separately addressed on the mental RFC forms. Thus, limitations on one

type of interaction in the RFC does not account for limitations on the others.”).

19

matter to a different ALJ, Plaintiff’s Initial Brief, ECF No. 6, p. 29 (“Respectfully, plaintiff

requests this matter be remanded to the Commissioner to render a fully favorable decision or in

the alternative remand this matter to a different ALJ for an oral hearing with instructions the new

ALJ not substitute their own lay opinion as evidence and apply all of the relevant and probative

evidence contained in the treating doctor’s and therapist’s patient charts and all 3 Social Security

experts reports to all steps of the Sequential Evaluation Process and not play doctor by giving

medical significance to the claimant’s ability to interact with doctors.”), Plaintiff has not

persuaded this Court that this record warrants such an order. See Correa ex rel. Correa v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. Supp. 2d 386, 398 (D.N.J. 2004) (refusing to remand action to a

new ALJ where the assigned ALJ did not engage in “the level of offensiveness and

unprofessional conduct established in” prior case authority, there was “no evidence that the ALJ

acted in an unfair and biased manner”, the ALJ “did not display extreme impatience or

condescension during the hearing”, and “[t]he attorneys did not endure the verbal taunts”).

VI. CONCLUSION

WHEREUPON, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS

the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.

The Court will issue a separate Order issuing final judgment pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 13, 2025 s/Norah McCann King

NORAH McCANN KING

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

20