Jessica Servais v. John Caccia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 23-2565

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JESSICA SERVAIS, Administrator ad prosequendum and

Administrator of the Estate of Jacob Servais

Appellant

v.

DETECTIVE JOHN CACCIA, Individually and as an agents, servants and/or

employees of Cape May County Prosecutors Office, State of New Jersey and/or Lower

Township; CITY OF VINELAND; LOWER TOWNSHIP; CHIEF OF DETECTIVES

PAUL SKILL, Cape May County Prosecutors Office, Individually and as an agents,

servants and/or employees of Cape May County Prosecutors Office, County of Cape May

and/or State of NJ; CAPE MAY COUNTY; MICHAEL JEFFERSON; OFFICE OF

CAPE MAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE

OFFICERS 1-100; JOHN DOE DETECTIVES 1-100; JOHN DOE CAPE MAY

COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE EMPLOYEES 1-100; JOHN DOE LOWER

TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICERS 1-100; JOHN DOE SUPERVISORS 1-10,

INDIVIDUALLY and in their official capacity, jointly, severally and/or in the alternative

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 1:20-cv-14601)

District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams

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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on September 13, 2024

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed May 13, 2025)

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OPINION*

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ROTH, Circuit Judge

While effectuating the arrest of Deshyamma Dalton, Cape May County

Prosecutor’s Office detective John Caccia shot and killed Jacob Servais. Servais’ mother,

in her individual capacity and as administrator of Servais’ estate (together, the Estate),

brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state laws,1 claiming that Caccia’s

use of lethal force against Servais was excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment, and we will affirm.

I.2

On October 18, 2018, Officers John Caccia and Dallas Bohn planned to apprehend

armed-robbery suspect Deshyamma Dalton as she returned a rental car. Servais drove to

pick up Dalton at the rental agency. When Servais arrived and backed into a parking spot

on the side of the agency’s building, Caccia, Bohn, and Officer Sarah Best surrounded

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.

1

The Estate does not challenge the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on its

claims against Paul Skill.

2

Writing solely for the parties, we recount only the facts necessary for our disposition.

Where the facts are disputed, we recite them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, the Estate.

2

him while a separate cohort arrested Dalton.3 Caccia parked his unmarked SUV “nose-

to-nose” with Servais’ sedan, with two-to-four feet between their front bumpers.4 Best

parked perpendicular to Servais, on the driver’s side of Caccia’s SUV.

As the vehicles came to a stop, Bohn exited the SUV on the passenger’s side and

began yelling commands for Servais to surrender. Caccia exited on the driver’s side—

facing the passenger’s side of Servais’ sedan—and also gave commands while drawing

his weapon. In response to the officers’ commands, Servais did not turn off the engine,

exit his vehicle, or put his hands up. He shook his head in response to one of Bohn’s

commands. He then attempted to drive out of the parking spot, first driving forward

towards Bohn and bumping the passenger’s side of the SUV. Bohn moved to the right

and out of the way. Servais reversed, became stuck on the parking block behind his

vehicle, and accelerated forward towards Caccia, who was standing near the front

driver’s side of the SUV. Caccia, fearing that he was going to be run over by Servais’

vehicle, shot Servais three times through the windshield. Servais reversed again, before

succumbing to his injuries.

3

Prior to the arrest, Caccia knew that Servais “may be someone to look into” in

connection with Dalton’s home invasions. Appx. 775. While the District Court

characterized Servais as “a suspected accomplice” in Dalton’s robberies, Servais v.

Caccia, No. 1:20-cv-14601, 2023 WL 4897587, at *7 (D.N.J. July 31, 2023), the record

does not support any inference that Caccia had probable cause to arrest Servais for

involvement in the armed robberies. However, Caccia was aware that Servais had two

active warrants unrelated to Dalton’s activities, most recently for failure to appear in

connection with a charge of vehicular homicide/reckless death by auto, and that Servais’

criminal history included aggravated assault on law enforcement and vehicular homicide.

4

Appx. 145.

3

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo.5 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and

drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6

III.

As the Estate brings a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, it

“must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the

circumstances.”7 We assess the reasonableness of a seizure under the totality of the

circumstances, “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” and consider “the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”8 The

“assessment of the threat of injury. . . is crucial to identifying the magnitude of the

governmental interests at stake.”9

5

Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2019).

6

Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 n.14 (3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

7

El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Lamont v. New

Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2011)). Neither party disputes that Caccia’s use of

deadly force “seized” Servais. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding

that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure.”).

8

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

9

Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 2016).

4

It is beyond dispute that Caccia’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the

totality of the circumstances. We have long held that “an otherwise non-threatening

individual [] engaged in vehicular flight is entitled to be free from being subjected to

deadly force if it is unreasonable for an officer to believe his or others’ lives are in

immediate jeopardy from their actions.”10 But when the driver’s actions threaten

imminent death or critical injuries, deadly force is permissible.11 Here, Servais posed a

serious threat to Caccia’s life and limb. Caccia stood directly in front of an accelerating

vehicle when he discharged his weapon, only a few feet and moments away from a

potentially life-threatening collision. The Estate’s analogy to our holding in Abraham v.

Raso fails for this reason.12 As the Estate acknowledges, our decision in Abraham turned

on material disputes of fact regarding the officer’s position vis-à-vis the threatening

10

See Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 85–86 (3d Cir. 2021); accord Rush v. City of

Philadelphia, 78 F.4th 610, 620 (3d Cir. 2023).

11

See Johnson, 837 F.3d at 350 (“At that point there was a serious risk that [the suspect]

would kill [the officer], and no reasonable juror could conclude that it was unreasonable

for [the officer] to deploy lethal force in response.”); Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d

77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where the decedent’s

“behavior threatened the safety of the officers . . . . including by trying to drive with

officers standing in close proximity to the [decedent’s vehicle].”); cf. Jefferson, 21 F.4th

at 85 (distinguishing Bland because “neither [the officer] nor anyone else was in danger

of being struck by Jefferson as he was passing him”).

12

183 F.3d 279, (3rd Cir. 1999).

5

vehicle, which we properly left to the jury.13 There is no such dispute here.14 Moreover,

Servais had failed to comply with the officers’ commands and, seconds earlier, had

nearly struck Bohn with his vehicle. When Servais turned and drove at Caccia, it was

reasonable for Caccia to believe that he was about to be struck as well. In light of

Servais’ noncompliance, continuously threatening behavior, violent criminal record, and

the immediate threat of a deadly collision, Caccia’s use of force falls within the “narrow

set of circumstances” where use of deadly force is permissible against a moving

vehicle.15

The Estate’s remaining arguments rest on its assertion that Caccia had alternatives

to deadly force (i.e., he should not have placed himself in front of a moving vehicle, and

should have moved out of the way instead of discharging his weapon). But even viewed

in the light most favorable to the Estate, the record shows that Servais turned to drive

towards Caccia, and the Estate’s contention that Caccia should have stood elsewhere is

13

Id. at 293–94.

14

The Estate makes much out of the fact that Caccia’s deposition testimony and post-

incident statement—the only evidence that we have in the record of his position—are

contradictory, as he states that he was in front of his vehicle, but also walking along its

side. This is a dispute of fact, but it is not material. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–248 (1986) (alteration in original)). Caccia was

in the path of Servais’ vehicle in either position. The Estate is correct that we “may not

simply accept what may be a selfserving account by the officer” and “must also look at

the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s

story,” see Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th

Cir. 1994)). But it does not point to anything in the record that contradicts Caccia’s

statements.

15

Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 85.

6

pure speculation, as it does not identify where Caccia could have moved while

sandwiched between multiple vehicles and a wall.16

Accordingly, as the Estate has not shown that Caccia’s use of force was

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we will affirm the District Court’s

judgment.17

16

The Estate also argues that the District Court ignored the testimony of the Estate’s

expert, Mickie McComb, which established that Caccia’s choice of location and failure to

move violated generally acceptable police policy, training, and procedures, as well as the

New Jersey Attorney General’s use-of-force policy. As relevant here, the state attorney

general’s policy prohibits firing at a moving vehicle absent imminent serious or deadly

injury and no viable alternatives. We have underscored the general consensus that using

deadly force against a moving vehicle is a prohibited, dangerous, and ineffective method

of stopping it. See Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 89–91 (McKee, J., concurring) (“[P]olice

departments across this country have essentially come to a consensus that shooting at

fleeing suspects in vehicles is never reasonable and will always be very reckless, except

for the rarest of circumstances specifically noted in those policies.”). However, where, as

here, there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury and no viable alternative

actions, Caccia’s actions are permissible under these policies.

17

As we find no constitutional violation, we do not reach whether Caccia was entitled to

qualified immunity.

7