Opinion

Hidalgo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Court: District Court, S.D. California
Filed: May 12, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 35.3%

“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 21 contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”

How later courts described this case

“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 21 contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

13 JONATHAN HIDALGO, ) Case No.: 3:24-cv-02386-BEN-JLB

14 Plaintiff, )

) ORDER DENYING MRV BANK’S

15 v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

16 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ) LACK OF PERSONAL

) JURISDICTION

17 LNV FUNDING LLC, and MRV ) [ECF No. 9]

BANK

18 )

Defendant. )

Taking as true the facts in the Complaint, in a nutshell this motion is about a

Missouri-based bank that issues credit cards to residents of California. The bank

issued credit to someone, using the plaintiff’s personal information without the

plaintiff’s consent, claiming to be a Michigan resident. Plaintiff informed the bank

that his information had been misappropriated. The bank nevertheless reported the

account to agencies that report creditworthiness nationally, including in

1 California.1 The bank now asks this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint and,

2 in essence, compel this California resident to litigate his claim at some distant

3 address or forum. That, this Court will not do. For the reasons that follow, the

4 motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

INTRODUCTION

The Court addresses Defendant MRV Bank’s (“MRV”) Motion to Dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Jonathan Hidalgo, a California resident, alleges that an unknown

individual opened a fraudulent credit card account in his name with MRV, a

Missouri-based bank, and that MRV’s subsequent actions harmed his

creditworthiness in California. (ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 26, 31-32). He asserts a claim

under the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), Cal.

Civ. Code §§ 1785.1 et seq., which prohibits furnishers of credit information from

reporting inaccurate data. MRV contends it lacks sufficient contacts with

1 On a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual

17 allegations and construes all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the

18 plaintiff. See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031

(9th Cir. 2008). However, the court has no obligation to draw unreasonable

inferences when determining whether the pleading under attack states a plausible

20 claim. See, e.g., Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir.

1998) (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are

contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”); Cisco Systems, Inc. v.

22 Capella Photonics, Inc., No. 20-cv-01858-EMC, 2020 WL 4923697, at *3 (N.D.

23 Cal. Aug. 21, 2020), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 20-cv-01858-EMC, 2020

WL 7227153 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020) (“When a written instrument contradicts

allegations in a complaint to which it is attached, the exhibit trumps the

25 allegations.”).

1 California to support jurisdiction. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES

2 MRV’s Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges that an unidentified individual used Plaintiff’s personal

information to apply for and obtain a credit card from MRV, with the application

listing a Michigan phone number. (ECF No. 9 at Page ID.91). Upon discovering

the fraudulent account, Plaintiff notified credit reporting agencies, who notified

MRV to dispute its validity, including through written correspondence sent in

2023. (ECF No. 12-1 ¶ 11; ECF No. 13 at Page ID.165-171). Despite these

disputes, MRV continued reporting the account to credit agencies, causing harm to

Plaintiff’s creditworthiness in California, which forms the basis of his CCRAA

claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

15 A Rule 12(b)(2) motion challenges the Court’s ability to exercise personal

16 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

17 jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction requires “minimum contacts” with the forum

18 state such that exercising jurisdiction aligns with “traditional notions of fair play

19 and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)

20 (citation omitted). Jurisdiction may be general—where the defendant is

21 “essentially at home” in the forum, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.

22 Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)—or specific, where the suit arises from or relates

23 to the defendant’s forum-related conduct. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284

24 (2014). For specific jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test: (1) the

25 defendant purposefully directed its activities toward the forum or availed itself of

26 the forum’s privileges; (2) the claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and

1 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851

2 F.3d 1015, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction exists only where a defendant’s contacts with the forum

are so “constant and pervasive” as to render it “essentially at home.” Diamler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). MRV,

a Missouri-chartered bank with its principal place of business and branches in

Missouri, has no offices, employees, or continuous operations in California. (ECF

No. 9-1 ¶¶ 2-7). Plaintiff does not dispute this. Without substantial, ongoing

12 activities in California, MRV’s contacts fall short of rendering it “essentially at

13 home” in the state. Thus, general jurisdiction is absent.

14 B. Specific Jurisdiction

15 Specific jurisdiction hinges on whether MRV’s suit-related conduct

16 establishes a substantial connection with California under the Ninth Circuit’s three-

17 part test. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284; Williams, 851 F.3d at 1022-23. All three

18 prongs—purposeful direction, claim relatedness, and reasonableness—must be

19 met. The Court finds they are.

1. Purposeful Direction

The Ninth Circuit employs another three-part test, the Calder effects test

from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), for assessing purposeful direction,

requiring: (a) an intentional act, (b) expressly aimed at the forum, and (c) causing

harm the defendant knows is likely to be suffered there. Brayton v. Purcell LLP v.

Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Yahoo! Inc v.

La Ligue Contre La Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir,

1 2006) (en banc)).

a. Intentional Act

The first prong of the Calder effects test requires an intentional act, defined

as “an intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an

intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Brayton, 606 F.3d at

1128 (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 806 (9th

Cir. 2004)). In Schwarzenegger, the Ninth Circuit clarified that intent under

Calder focuses on the act itself (e.g., publishing an advertisement), not the intent to

cause harm, ensuring the defendant’s conduct is deliberate. 374 F.3d at 806. This

standard focuses on the defendant’s deliberate conduct, not the intent to cause

harm, ensuring the act is purposeful and not incidental.

Here, MRV continued to report the fraudulent account in Plaintiff’s name to

credit agencies after being notified of its falsity and Plaintiff’s California

residency. This constitutes an intentional act. (ECF No. 1-2; ECF No. 12-1 ¶11).

MRV’s decision to persist in reporting, despite Plaintiff’s disputes, was a

deliberate, real-world action—submitting credit information to national agencies—

that directly affected Plaintiff’s financial standing. This satisfies Brayton’s

requirement of a purposeful physical act, as MRV actively chose to transmit the

disputed data rather than correct or cease reporting.

21 In Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision supports the

22 finding that MRV’s reporting was an intentional act under the Calder test. No. 22-

23 15815, 2025 WL 1154075, at *11-12, 37-38 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025). The court

24 found that Shopify “[intentionally] reached out beyond its home state by

25 knowingly installing tracking software onto unsuspecting Californians’ phones so

26 that it could later sell the data it obtained.” Shopify’s deliberate act of embedding

27 cookies on a California resident’s device was intentional because it was a

1 calculated step in its business model. Similarly, MRV’s continued reporting of the

2 fraudulent account, despite disputes notifying it of Plaintiff’s California residency

3 and the account’s falsity, was a purposeful act within its credit services framework.

4 (ECF No. 1-2; ECF No. 12-1 ¶ 11). MRV’s choice to persist in reporting, knowing

5 it would impact Plaintiff’s creditworthiness in California, parallels Shopify’s

6 intentional outreach, as both defendants executed deliberate acts targeting known

7 California residents for commercial purposes. Both MRV’s reporting and

8 Shopify’s cookie installation involved affirmative steps—submitting data to credit

9 agencies and embedding software, respectively—designed to advance their

10 business interests, regardless of the harm caused.

MRV might argue that its reporting was automated or part of standard

procedures, not a deliberate act targeting the Plaintiff. However, Brayton clarifies

that the intentional act need not be malicious or specifically aimed at harm; it only

requires purposeful conduct. 606 F.3d at 1128. MRV’s choice to continue

reporting after receiving Plaintiff’s disputes—rather than correcting the error—

demonstrates intentionality, as it actively maintained the inaccurate credit

information. Moreover, Briskin underscores that even automated processes, like

Shopify’s cookie installation, qualify as intentional when part of a defendant’s

deliberate business strategy. 2025 WL 1154075, at 37. MRV’s reporting,

conducted with knowledge of some impact on a California resident, meets this

threshold. Having established that MRV committed an intentional act, the Court

now examines whether the act was expressly aimed at California.

b. Express Aiming

MRV’s conduct was expressly aimed at California, satisfying the second

prong of the Calder effects test. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a

defendant’s intentional actions targeting a known California resident or profiting

1 from California’s market constitute “express aiming.” Here, as described in the

2 “Intentional Act” section, supra., despite knowing Plaintiff's California residency,

3 MRV’s continued reporting of the fraudulent account to credit agencies directly

4 targeted him in the forum state, causing harm to his creditworthiness.

Ninth Circuit precedent supports this conclusion. In Mavrix Photo, Inc. v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011), the court held that

“where, as here, a website with national viewership and scope appeals to, and

profits from, an audience in a particular state, the site’s operators can be said to

have ‘expressly aimed’ at that state.” In Marvix, the defendant’s use of

copyrighted photos to exploit California’s celebrity market established jurisdiction,

even without physical presence in the state, because the defendant intentionally

targeted California’s audience for commercial gain. Similarly, MRV’s reporting,

which affected Plaintiff’s creditworthiness in California’s financial system, was

not random but part of its nationwide credit services that foreseeably impacted

California residents.

Likewise, in CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1077

(9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) the court found jurisdiction where a company

had “engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant

kn[ew] to be a resident of the forum state.” There, the defendant’s

misappropriation of a California company’s materials was aimed at the plaintiff’s

home state because the defendant knew the plaintiff was based in California and

directed its tortious conduct there. MRV’s actions parallel this, as it knowingly

targeted Plaintiff—a California resident—by persisting in reporting after receiving

his disputes, which explicitly notified MRV of his location.

In Will Co., Ltd v. Lee, 47 F. 4th 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2022), the court found

express aiming based on the defendant’s “intent to cultivate an audience in the

1 United States,” evidenced by website optimizations for U.S. users. Although

2 MRV’s credit reporting is not website-based, its deliberate engagement with the

3 Plaintiff in California through correspondence and reporting affecting his credit

4 shows intent to interact with California’s financial ecosystem, akin to cultivating

5 an audience.

The Ninth Circuit further clarified express aiming in Herbal Brands, Inc. v.

Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F. 4th 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023), where selling a physical

product through an interactive website constituted conduct “purposefully directed

at the forum state” when done as part of regular business. In Herbal Brands, the

defendant’s sales to Arizona residents via Amazon were deemed forum-directed

because they were systematic and targeted. MRV’s reporting, conducted as part of

its ongoing credit service, similarly targeted California by affecting Plaintiff’s

creditworthiness in the state, distinguishing it from isolated or fortuitous contacts.

Briskin further clarifies that MRV’s actions were “expressly aimed” at

California, satisfying the Calder test’s second prong. No. 22-15815, 2025 WL

1154075, at *11-12, 15. The Ninth Circuit held that Shopify, a Canadian e-

commerce company, was subject to specific jurisdiction in California because it

knowingly installed tracking cookies on a California resident’s device and used the

collected data for profit. The court emphasized that Shopify’s deliberate extraction

and commercial use of the plaintiff’s data constituted express aiming, likening it to

“installing code on someone’s phone and secretly collecting data is like entering

someone’s house to steal personal files.” Id. at *16. Likewise, MRV’s continued

reporting, undertaken after Plaintiff’s disputes confirmed his California residency,

foreseeably harmed his creditworthiness in violation of California law. Like

Shopify’s digital intrusion, MRV’s actions reached into California, targeting the

Plaintiff in the forum state.

1 This case is also analogous to Mavrix Photo, where jurisdiction was upheld

2 because the defendant continued reporting after notice of the plaintiff’s California

3 residency. 647 F.3d at 1229. Unlike Smith v. Bellco Credit Union, No. 2:20-cv-

4 09772-MCS-JPR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250471, at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2020),

5 where the court declined jurisdiction because the harm occurred before the plaintiff

6 moved to California, here the gravamen of the argument is that the alleged harm

7 transpired during the entire time period Plaintiff was a California resident. MRV’s

8 knowledge of Plaintiff’s residency, gained through his credit disputes, and its

9 decision to persist in reporting, distinguish this case from situations where harm

10 was unknown or preceded the plaintiff’s move to the forum.

MRV might argue that its reporting was not California-specific, as it

occurred through national credit agencies and was intended to affect Plaintiff’s

credit through national credit generally, not specifically in California. However,

Briskin and Mavrix clarify that express aiming does not require differential

targeting of the forum over others. Briskin, 2025 WL 1154075, at *17 (overruling

AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020), which required

“differential targeting”). Instead, intentional conduct affecting a known California

resident suffices. MRV’s actions, undertaken with awareness of Plaintiff’s

location, were neither random nor fortuitous, and establish express aiming under

Ninth Circuit precedent. Having confirmed MRV’s actions were expressly aimed

at California, the Court now considers whether the harm caused was foreseeably

suffered in the forum.

c. Causing Harm That Defendant Knows Will Be Suffered In Forum

The third prong of the Calder effects test requires the defendant to cause

harm it knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-

90; Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1228. This element focuses on the defendant’s

1 awareness that its conduct will foreseeably injure the plaintiff in the forum,

2 ensuring the harm is not random or attenuated. Here, MRV’s continued reporting

3 of the fraudulent account foreseeably harmed Plaintiff in California, satisfying this

4 prong.

As previously detailed, MRV’s reporting of the fraudulent account to credit

agencies directly impacted Plaintiff in California by damaging his

creditworthiness. Like Shopify’s cookies in Briskin, MRV’s reporting harmed

Plaintiff’s financial standing. In Briskin, the Ninth Circuit found that Shopify’s

installation of tracking cookies, with knowledge of the plaintiff’s California

location, caused foreseeable privacy harms in the forum, in the same way that

Shopify knew its data collection would affect the plaintiff where he resided. 2025

WL 1154075 at *37-38. Similarly, MRV’s awareness of Plaintiff’s location—

gained through his disputes—and its decision to persist in reporting mirror

Shopify’s intentional targeting in Briskin. MRV knew or should have known that

its inaccurate reporting would damage Plaintiff’s credit in California, where he

lived and conducted financial transactions, limiting his access to loans and other

credit-dependent activities. This knowledge and subsequent action distinguish

MRV’s conduct from random or fortuitous contact, establishing that it expressly

aimed its actions at California under Briskin’s reasoning.

MRV cites Deveroux v. TT Mktg., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-00487-AWI-SAB, 2018

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139244, at 13–14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2018), where jurisdiction

was absent. In Deveroux, the plaintiff incurred debt in Texas and later moved to

California, and the defendant’s actions preceded notice of the move, rendering the

harm in California unforeseeable. Here, Plaintiff has resided in California

throughout the relevant time period. Yet, MRV continued reporting after receiving

notice of his residency, making its conduct deliberately forum-directed, and

1 suggesting MRV could foresee that Plaintiff would suffer harm in California.

2 Unlike Deveroux, where the defendant lacked knowledge of the plaintiff’s new

3 location, MRV’s persistence after Plaintiff’s disputes demonstrates awareness that

4 its reporting would foreseeably harm Plaintiff’s creditworthiness in California,

5 satisfying the Calder test’s third prong.

MRV might argue that it did not specifically intend to harm Plaintiff in

California or that the harm was not unique to the forum, given its reporting to

national credit agencies. However, the Calder test does not require intent to harm,

only knowledge that harm is likely to occur in the forum. Brayton, 606 F.3d at

1128. In Marvix, the Ninth Circuit upheld jurisdiction where the defendant’s

actions foreseeably harmed a California resident’s business interest, even though

the conduct (posting copyrighted photos) was nationally accessible. 674 F.3d at

123. Similarly, MRV’s reporting, while part of a national system, was directed at

Plaintiff, a known California resident, and caused financial harm in California,

where he relied on his credit for economic activities. The foreseeable harm to

Plaintiff’s credit in California satisfies the third prong. Thus, the Calder effects

test is satisfied.

2. Arising Out of or Relating to Forum Contacts

The claim must also arise out of or relate to MRV’s California contacts.

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284; Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District

Court, 592 U.S 351, 358 (2021). Plaintiff’s CCRAA claim arises directly from

MRV’s California-directed reporting after notice of his residency, which caused

his alleged harm—damaged creditworthiness in California. Though MRV

contends its actions occurred in Missouri or Michigan, the Ninth Circuit does not

require a strict causal link; relatedness suffices. Williams, 851 F. 3d at 1023.

Because MRV’s intentional, California-directed conduct caused the alleged injury,

1 Plaintiff’s CCRAA claim, which seeks to remedy inaccurate credit reporting,

2 directly relates to MRV’s forum activities. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 358.

3. Reasonableness

Finally, MRV must show that exercising jurisdiction is unreasonable. Burger

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). It has not. MRV offers

nationwide credit services and corresponded with Plaintiff in California.

California has a strong interest in protecting its residents from inaccurate credit

reporting, and litigating here is convenient for Plaintiff, who suffered harm in the

state. The burden on MRV, a national bank, to defend in California is minimal

compared to the Plaintiff’s interest in a convenient forum and California’s interest

in enforcing its consumer protection laws. Thus, jurisdiction is reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

14 Plaintiff has demonstrated that MRV purposefully directed its conduct at

15 California by continuing to report a fraudulent account after notice of his

16 residency. Plaintiff’s claim arises from this conduct, and jurisdiction is reasonable.

17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

18 MRV Bank’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 12, 2025

HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ

23 United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.