Williams v. Scott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT For Online Publication Only

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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TIMOTHY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 24-CV-4719 (JMA)(JMW)

CHIFFON SCOTT, CHRISTA HIGGINS, DENISE FILED

LIVRIERI, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN CLERK

SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 5/12/202   5 10:59 am

BUREAU, NYS CHILD SUPPORT PROCESSING

CENTER, WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IMPERIUM INSURANCE COMPANY, NATION EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC, NAVY FEDERAL LONG ISLAND OFFICE

CREDIT UNION, BANK OF AMERICA, TD BANK

N.A., BETHPAGE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

DECISION HR II, INC., ALFRED GRAF, Suffolk

County District Court Judge; JERRY HILLS, Child

Support Compliance Officer or Designee; SHAWNA

NEBLETT, Child Support Compliance Officer or

Designee; THE SUPERVISOR OF THE CHILD

SUPPORT PROCESSING CENTER, EXPERIAN,

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC,

TRANSUNION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, PABCO,

CORD CONTRACTING, ISLAND ACOUSTICS,

COMPONENT ASSEMBLY SYSTEMS, CURTIS

PARTITION, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY

COMPTROLLER, MERIDITH LAFLER, MICHAEL J.

WILLIAMS, Chief Court Clerk (Administration Family

Court);

Defendants.

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JOAN M. AZRACK, District Judge:

On July 19, 2024, Timothy Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se civil rights Complaint in

this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) together with an application to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Compl., ECF No. 1; IFP App., ECF No. 2.) Upon review of the

declaration accompanying Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

financial status qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is

granted. However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Given the

Court’s dismissal of the Complaint, the Court declines to sign Plaintiff’s proposed order to show

cause concerning a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

I. Background1

Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint is submitted on the Court’s civil rights complaint form for

actions brought pursuant to Section 1983 and names thirty defendants,2 each of whom is alleged

to have had some involvement over the past ten years with the garnishment of Plaintiff’s wages or

levies on his bank accounts in connection with his child support obligations. (See Compl., ECF

No. 1, in toto.)3 In its entirety, Plaintiff “Statement of Claim” alleges that, at the Suffolk County

1 All material allegations in the Complaint are assumed to be true for the purposes of this Order, see, e.g., Rogers v.

City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a

court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).

2 The Defendants are: Chiffon Scott (“Scott”), Christa Higgins (“Higgins”), Denise Livrieri (“Magistrate Livrieri”),

Administration for Children Services (“ACS”), Child Support Enforcement Bureau (“CSEB”), NYS Child Support

Processing Center (“NYSCSPC”), Workers Compensation Board (“WCB”), Imperium Insurance Company

(“Imperium”), Nation Financial Services LLC (“NFS”), Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU”), Bank of America

(“BOA”), TD Bank N.A. (“TD Bank”), Bethpage Federal Credit Union (“BFCU”), Decision HR II, Inc. (“Decision

HR II”), Alfred Graf, Suffolk County District Court Judge (“Judge Graf”); Jerry Hills (“Hills”), Shawna Neblett

(“Neblett”), Supervisor of the Child Support Processing Center (“Supervisor of CSPC”), Experian, Equifax

Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”), Transunion, Department of Labor (“DOL”), Pabco, Cord Contracting

(“Cord”), Island Acoustics, Component Assembly Systems, Curtis Partition (“Partition”), Office of the New York

City Comptroller “NYC Comptroller”), Meridith Lafler (“Magistrate Lafler”), Michael J. Williams, Chief Court Clerk

(Administration Family Court) (“Williams” and collectively, “Defendants”).

3 Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court. On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Removal seeking to remove to

actions filed in 2013 and 2014 from the Family Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County, proceeding under

Index Nos. P-1445-14 and F15258-13, to this Court. See Scott v. Williams, 23-CV-4008(JMA)(ST). In summarily

remanding that case, the Court noted that “Williams reports that child support payments have been garnished from his

wages, suggesting that the matter has concluded. (Id., ECF No. 4 at 2.) Of note, Chiffon Scott was the petitioner in

the Paternity Petition under Index No. P-1445-14 filed on January 17, 2014. (Id., ECF No. 1 at 3-6.) In addition,

the Notice of Removal included two summonses directing Williams to appear before Support Magistrate Denise

Livrieri on September 5, 2013 and on February 25, 2014. (Id. at 8-9, 11-12.)

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Family Court:

August 8, 2013 Chiffon Scott filed for child support, as required by Federal Rule 4

I was supposed to be served in accordance with Law. I was not. Subsequently

the case was dismissed September 19, 2013 being paternity was never established.

January 17, 2014 Chiffon Scott filed for paternity, the appearance date was

February 25, 2014. The summons indicated in bold letters (service within NYS),

once again I was not served. Chiffon Scott, Magistrate Denise Livrieri and Chief

Court Clerk Michael J. Williams all proceeded to enforce a judgement violating my

Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and Seventh Amendment rights which

is constitutionally protected. Each one of the three individuals also violated 42

USC 1983. Chiffon Scott who is an officer for the Administration for Children

Services also takes an oath or affirmation to uphold Local government policy and

procedure as well as Administrative policy and procedure and support the United

States and NYS Constitution which makes her and the Administration for Children

Services as well as Michael J. Williams and Denise Livrieri guilty of a 28 USC 453

violation. Additionally being all three individuals are employees of a state or local

government in an Administrative hearing they were all acting under the color of

law which is a violation of 18 USC 242. November 3, 2017 Chiffon Scott filed an

upward modification to the support order, once again I was not served in

accordance with FRCP (4). January 19, 2018 my Support ORDER was increased

absent personal jurisdiction. The Magistrate who presided over the modification

was Meridith Lafler, the violation was equivalent to the prior magistrates violation

which is 42 USC 1983, the Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, 28 USC

453, 28 USC 636, and 18 USC 242. On March 31, 2023 I filed a motion by Order

to Show Cause which was denied by Meridith Lafler being I cited Criminal Law

instead of Civil. I objected within the 35 days as required by law. April 24, 2023

Hon. Alfred Graf denied my objection with prejudice and states that the order was

issued on consent. I disagree the order was issued under duress, coercion and

lacked statutory requirements in relation to proper service. He also violates 42

USC 1983, 28 USC 636, the Fifth & Fourteenth Amendment, 28 USC 453, FRCP

4, 18 USC 242 and the Seventh Amendment.

Throughout the last 10 years I have worked as a union carpenter and I’ve been

employed by a number of companies, each company at the compliance of the Child

Support Enforcement Bureau and NYS Child Support Processing Center proceeded

to garnish my wages weekly which is a violation of 42 USC 1983, the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment (See Companies attached). Additionally, I was also

garnished by the department of labor, the Workers Compensation and Imperium

Insurance Company after receiving withholding orders. Finally each one of my

bank accounts received levies which were enforced after receiving withholding

orders. (See banks attached).

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All withholding order were signed off by Child Support Compliance Officers, the

Supervisor and the head. (See Designee attached). All three credit bureaus are in

violation of 5 USC 552a and 15 USC 1681s-2.

(Id. ¶ II.) In addition, Plaintiff has written the laws upon which he seeks relief next to the names

of each Defendant listed in the “Parties” section of the Complaint. (Id. at 2-7.) These laws include

5 U.S.C. § 552a; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 28 U.S.C. §§ 453, 636, 1361; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Id.) For relief, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll injuries are

financial. I have been getting my wages garnished for the past 10 years and had levies placed on

my bank accounts” and seeks to recover “monetary relief in the form of $1,000,000 per defendant”

in addition to the “full dismissal of this support order.” (Id. ¶¶ II.A-III.)

On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed order to show cause for a preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s papers reiterate the claims

made in his complaint and assert that he should not be required to pay child support because he

recently lost his job and the state court child support proceeding “lack[ed] personal jurisdiction.”

(ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) Attached to Plaintiff’s proposed order to show cause are various filings from

Plaintiff’s state court proceedings. (ECF No. 5-1.) In January 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to

vacate a July 10, 2014 Order of Support for alleged improper service. (Id. at 9–14.) In a decision

dated February 15, 2024, Magistrate Lafler denied Plaintiff’s motion and explained that Plaintiff—

who personally appeared in court on numerous occasions in 2014 and repeatedly waived his right

to counsel—was now precluded from “asserting lack of service.” (Id. at 24–25.) Plaintiff filed

objections to Magistrate Lafler’s February 15, 2024 decision. (Id. at 26–27.) Plaintiff’s order to

show cause also indicates that Plaintiff also filed objections to a January 19, 2018 order by

Magistrate Lafler. (Id. at 41–42.) Judge Graf denied those objections, finding that Plaintiff

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waived any objections to service by personally appearing on multiple occasions in 2017 and that

Plaintiff’s objections were also untimely. (Id.) The documents attached to Plaintiff’s order to

show cause do not indicate that he filed any documents in state court concerning the loss of his job

on April 7, 2025.

II. Discussion

A. IFP Application

Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his application to proceed IFP, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s financial status qualifies him to commence this action without

prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s application to

proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is granted.

B. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), requires a district court to dismiss a complaint

if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. District courts are required to

read pro se complaints liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013), and to

construe them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse

Securities (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted).

At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all well-

pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint.” Harrington v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 607

F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Nevertheless,

a complaint must plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not

required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quotations and citation omitted). “A

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170,

180 (2d Cir. 2013).

C. Domestic Relations Abstention

The domestic relations exception—which applies to state law claims—derives from an

appreciation that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and

child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136

U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). One decision recently summarized the related domestic relations

abstention doctrine, which applies to federal claims :

In 1990, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit instructed federal district courts to abstain from exercising

federal question jurisdiction of claims involving domestic relations issues, so long

as those claims could be fully and fairly determined in the state courts. See 905 F.2d

12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990). For example, a federal district court should abstain from

exercising its federal question jurisdiction of claims in which it is ‘asked to grant a

divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award custody of a child.’

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) [(emphasis added)]. Thus, this

abstention doctrine applies when a federal district court is asked, under its federal

question jurisdiction, to determine child support or modify a previously determined

child support amount set by a state court. See id.; Legister, 2020 WL 7405672, at

*4 [emphasis added] (“Plaintiff asserts claims under the Court’s federal-question

jurisdiction and asks this Court to overturn or ‘dismiss and void’ final

determinations of the New York Family Court. . . . He challenges the fact that he

must pay child support, the amount owed, and that his income is being garnished

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to pay his child-support arrears. His claims therefore involve domestic-relations

issues. Thus, unless he shows that there is an obstacle that prevents him from

receiving a full and fair determination of those issues in the state courts, this Court

must abstain from exercising its federal-question jurisdiction over his claims arising

from the Family Court’s orders and judgments and their enforcement.”); Mayers v.

Sara Lee Corp., No. 08-CV-1421, 2009 WL 10706711, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,

2009) (“As in American Airlines, the income execution for which enforcement is

sought consists of an ongoing support obligation that is subject to modification by

the Family Court. Enforcement by this court would thus require interference with

the ability of the Family Court to modify ongoing child support obligations, and

abstention would be mandated here for the same reasons it was required as to the

non-final judgment amounts in American Airlines.”). More recently, the Second

Circuit, in Deem v. DiMella-Deem, held that its own previous holding in American

Airlines remains good law. 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019).

Goodwin v. Bronx Family Court, et al., No. 24-CV-4103, 2024 WL 4168348, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 9, 2024); see also Sekou Camera v. New York City Dept of Soc. Servs., No. 24-CV-5886,

2024 WL 4107256, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2024) (“Federal courts must abstain from exercising

federal question jurisdiction over claims involving domestic relations issues such as child

support.”) (citing Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 625 (2d Cir. 2019)); Donahue v. Pataki,

28 F. App’x 59, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order) (federal courts lack jurisdiction over child

support payments); Oliver v. Punter, No. 22-CV-3580, 2022 WL 3228272, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

10, 2022) (“The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction divests the federal courts of

power to issue divorce alimony and child custody decrees . . . . This exception also extends to child

support determinations and the enforcement thereof.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Given that the Complaint seeks, inter alia, “a full dismissal of the support order” and does

not plausibly allege “there is an obstacle that prevents him from receiving a full and fair

determination” of his claims concerning the enforcement of his child support obligations, this

Court abstains from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in the

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Complaint and, thus, dismisses (with one exception) all of Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).4 See Phillips v. Wagner, No. 22-CV-0833,

2022 WL 17406092, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022

WL 17403441 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2022).

D. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Even if the domestic relations exemption did not apply, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

divests this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413,

414–15 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983),

“established the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in

substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422

F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

Sung Cho v. City of N.Y., 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). In other words, Rooker-Feldman applies only

after state-court proceedings have “ended.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291.

“[W]hile keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s warning that courts must avoid extending

Rooker-Feldman beyond the narrow circumstances in which it properly applies,” the Second

Circuit has “articulated a four-part test” for determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

controls in each case. Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2023). Under that test,

4 As explained below, Plaintiff’s claims against three credit reporting agencies are dismissed with prejudice.

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a district court cannot exercise jurisdiction if: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2)

the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites review

and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment was rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, each prong is met. Plaintiff lost in state court and complains of injuries caused by

the state court judgments. (Compl., ECF No. at 10-11.) To be sure, Plaintiff alleges that Scott

filed, in January 2014, a petition seeking to establish paternity as well as for child support. (Id.

at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not properly served with notice of those proceedings (and

inexplicably claims that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 governed state court service) yet a

paternity determination was made and child support was ordered. (Id.) Further, Scott sought

and received upward modifications to the child support payment amounts in November 2017 and

January 2018. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he unsuccessfully challenged those

determinations and, the matter was concluded on April 24, 2023 when Judge Graf, New York State

Family Court Judge, Suffolk County, denied Plaintiff’s “objection.” (Id.) Plaintiff commenced

this action on July 19, 2024, well over a year after those proceedings are alleged to have concluded.

And, Plaintiff seeks a “full dismissal of this support order” in this Court which clearly invites the

review and rejection of the state court judgment. (Id. ¶ III.) As a result of the state court orders

challenged here, Plaintiff complains to have suffered financial injuries due to the garnishment of

wages and levies on his bank accounts made pursuant to the state court’s orders. (Id. ¶ II.A., and

at 11.)

Thus, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims challenging the state court judgments concerning paternity, child

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support, and the enforcement thereof. A challenge to “the validity or enforcement of [a] child

support order itself” constitutes an injury “caused by a state court judgment.” Sykes v. Bank of

Am., 723 F.3d 399, 404 (2d Cir. 2013); Davis v. Westchester Cnty. Family Court, No. 16-CV-

9487, 2017 WL 4311039, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“Courts have repeatedly invoked

Rooker-Feldman in cases in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support

arrears.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman divests

this Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims and they are thus dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). See, e.g, Hart v. Shmayenik, No.

23-CV-4779 (LTS), 2023 WL 7164975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2023) (“[T]he Court lacks

authority to reconsider the Family Court’s determination that Plaintiff owes child support, or the

amount owed, [thus] Plaintiff’s claims against DSS and Defendant Shmayenik, seeking to overturn

the I[ncome] W[ithholding] O[rder] as invalid and enjoin its enforcement, must be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Fernandez v. Turetsky, 645 F. App’x 103, 105 (2d Cir.

2016) (finding the seizure of appellant’s car was “an injury ‘produced by’ or caused by the state-

court judgment setting arrears)); see also Sorenson v. Suffolk Cnty. Child Support Enforcement

Bureau, 07–CV–03755(JFB)(AKT), 2009 WL 580426, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.5, 2009) (finding

plaintiff, who previously unsuccessfully sought to have child support “arrears vacated . . . in state

court” cannot “utilize the federal courts to, in essence, challenge the existing judgment regarding

child support arrears, or the County’s enforcement of that judgment”).

For the reasons set out above, pursuant to both the domestic relations abstention doctrine

and Rooker-Feldman, the Court dismisses (with one exception) all of Plaintiff’s claims without

prejudice (except for his claims against three credit reporting agencies, which are discussed in the

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next section).5

E. Claims Against the Credit Reporting Agencies Pursuant to the Fair Credit

Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a

The Complaint’s only allegations concerning Experian, Equifax, and Transunion

(collectively, the “Credit Reporting Agencies”) are that “all three credit bureaus are in violation of

5 USC 552a [(the Privacy Act”)], and 15 USC 1681s-2 [of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

“FCRA”)].” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11.) It seems likely that Plaintiff’s purported claims

concerning the Credit Reporting Agencies are so intertwined with his claims concerning child

support and garnishment that the domestic relations abstention doctrine would also warrant

abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against these three defendants under

the Privacy Act and the FCRA. However, given the utter conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s claims

against these three defendants, it is impossible to discern anything about the substance of these

claims. Accordingly, the Court determines that it is more appropriate to address these claims, on

the merits, and to dismiss these claims with prejudice. Plaintiff’s conclusory Complaint does not

plausibly allege any claims against the Credit Reporting Agencies under the FCRA or the Privacy

Act.

5 The Court notes that, if the domestic relations abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines were not applicable,

Plaintiffs’ claims would also subject to dismissal on the following additional grounds: (1) the Complaint fails to

allege plausible claims against any defendants under Section 1983 or any of the other statutes cited in the Complaint;

(2) the damages claims against Judge Graf, Magistrate Livrieri, and Magistrate Lafler are precluded by judicial

immunity and the claims for injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983 against those judicial defendants are barred by

the provision in Section 1983 that severely restricts the availability of injunctive relief against judicial officers;

(3) sovereign immunity precludes all claims against NYSCSPC and WCB and all Section 1983 claims against Hills,

Neblett, Magistrate Livrieri, Magistrate Lafler, and Williams in their official capacities; and (4) the Complaint does

not plausibly allege state action for his Section 1983 claims against the private defendants, Scott, Imperium, NFS,

NFCU, BOA, TD Bank, BFCU, Decision HR, Experian, Equifax, Transunion, Pabco, Cord, Island Acoustics,

Component Assembly Systems, and Partition.

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III. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a party shall be given leave to

amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[W]hen addressing a pro se

complaint, a district court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted); see also

Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d

133, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2013) (accord).

With respect to the Credit Reporting Agencies, there is nothing in the Complaint (or

Plaintiff’s most recent filings) which gives any indication that Plaintiff may be able to state

plausible claims against the Credit Reporting Agencies under the Privacy Act or the FCRA.

Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend as to those claims.

As to all of Plaintiff’s other claims, the Court: (1) abstains from exercising its subject

matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations exemption and; (2) also finds that subject-matter

jurisdiction is lacking under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See supra at 5-9.) For the reasons set

forth above, the defects in Plaintiff’s claims are substantive and could not be cured with better

pleading. The Complaint does not give any indication that an amended complaint could cure

these defects. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend as to any claims

or defendants.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons

set forth above, the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed with prejudice as to the Credit Reporting

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Agencies and dismissed without prejudice as to the claims against all other defendants. The Clerk

of the Court shall: (1) enter judgment accordingly; (2) mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order

to the Plaintiff at his address of record and note such mailing on the docket; (3) mark this case

closed. Because the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court declines to sign

Plaintiff’s proposed order to show cause as his requests for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction are now moot.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 12, 2025

Central Islip, New York /s/ (JMA)

Joan M. Azrack

United States District Judge

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