The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ASHLEY MAHONE, Individually and : Civil No. 1:23-CV-01935
as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF :
CHRISTOPHER IAN RAUL, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction filed by Defendant Johnson Controls International PLC (“JCI PLC”).
(Doc. 37.) Because the court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over
JCI PLC, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Plaintiff Ashley Mahone (“Mahone”), Individually and as Administratrix of
the Estate of Christopher Ian Raul, is an adult resident of New Freedom,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 39-3, p. 5.)2 Christopher Ian Raul (“Raul”) was the son of
Mahone and an employee at the HVAC manufacturing facility located at 100 JCI
1 The court compiles the following factual background from Mahone’s complaint, Doc 39-3.
The facts relevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction are discussed in detail in the
relevant discussion section below.
2 For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page numbers contained in the CM/ECF header.
Way, York, Pennsylvania 17406 (“York Facility”). (Doc. 39-3, p. 10.) In October
2021, Raul died from fatal injuries when he was crushed to death by four industrial
fans at the York Facility (“the Accident”). (Id.) Mahone filed a complaint against
the following entities: Johnson Controls, Inc., York International Corporation,
Johnson Controls International PLC, and Columbus McKinnon Corporation
(collectively “Defendants”). (Id. at 5–6.) Mahone brought claims of negligence
and wrongful death against all Defendants as well as claims of strict liability and
breach of warranty against Columbus McKinnon Corporation. (Id. at 17–29.)
Mahone initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas for York County, Pennsylvania on October 17, 2023. (See Doc. 39-3.) On
November 22, 2023, York International Corporation removed the case to this court
based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (Doc. 1.) JCI PLC filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on November 29, 2023, and a
brief in support on December 1, 2023. (Docs. 3, 8.) On December 11, 2023,
Mahone requested leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 9.) After both
motions were briefed, the court ordered the parties to conduct jurisdictional
discovery. (Docs. 29, 30.)
Thereafter, JCI PLC filed a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and brief in support on December 2, 2024. (Docs. 37, 38.) Mahone
and Defendant Columbus McKinnon Corporation (“McKinnon”) each filed a brief
in opposition to this renewed motion to dismiss on December 16, 2024. (Docs. 39,
40.) The motion is ripe for review.
JURISDICTION
This action was properly removed to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the
parties have complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over the
defendant. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)). In cases where
jurisdictional discovery has been conducted, “[Plaintiff] need only assert a prima
facie case for personal jurisdiction over [Defendant] and all disputed facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. However, the prima facie case must
be based on evidence of specific facts in the record.” Hooper v. Safety-Kleen Sys.,
Inc., No. 2:16-CV-123, 2016 WL 7212586, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2016).
A federal court sitting in Pennsylvania in a diversity suit exercises personal
jurisdiction according to the law of Pennsylvania. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A);
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). The
Pennsylvania long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction “based on the most
minimum contact with th[e] Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the
United States.” 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 5322(b).
The Due Process Clause protects individuals from “being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful
‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–
72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Thus,
a forum state’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends
on that defendant “hav[ing] certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). From these principles, two theories of personal
jurisdiction have emerged: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Ford
Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021).
General personal jurisdiction is established when a defendant has
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state. Id. (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16, (1984)). Specific
personal jurisdiction may be established if the defendant has “purposefully directed
his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged
injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
DISCUSSION
JCI PLC asserts that this court does not have general or specific personal
jurisdiction over it.
A. General Personal Jurisdiction
General personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is established when
that corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “With respect to a
corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are
paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
137 (2014). Here, JCI PLC argues that this court does not have general
jurisdiction over it because “JCI PLC is an Irish company with its principal place
of business in Cork, Ireland” and “JCI PLC did not register to do business in
Pennsylvania [nor] consent[ed] to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.” (Doc. 38, p. 12.)
Mahone does not dispute this. Accordingly, the court finds that it does not have
general jurisdiction over JCI PLC.
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
The Due Process Clause protects defendants from being subject to
judgments in fora in which they lack meaningful contacts. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
319. Specific personal jurisdiction allows for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant that is “less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower
class of claims.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mount. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S.
351, 359 (2021). The requirements for specific jurisdiction aim to afford some
predictability for defendants to know when they may be held liable to suit in a
certain jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980).
The traditional test for specific personal jurisdiction consists of a three-part
analysis: (1) whether defendants purposely directed their activities at the forum; (2)
whether the claims arise out of or relate to the activities directed at the forum; and
(3) whether assertion of jurisdiction “comports with ‘fair play and substantial
justice.’” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (3rd Cir. 2007) (quoting Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 476). The third prong of fair play and substantial justice need only be
considered if the first two prongs are met. Id. This analysis is generally claim-
specific, because specific personal jurisdiction arises from a relationship between a
defendant’s forum-state contacts and the claims. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238
F.3d 248, 255 (3rd Cir. 2001).
JCI PLC argues that this court does not have specific personal jurisdiction
over it because it does not maintain a principal place of business in Pennsylvania,
does not conduct business in Pennsylvania, and is not registered to do business in
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 38, pp. 13–14.) Additionally, JCI PLC asserts it “does not
manage or operate the York Facility” and “the only contact between JCI PLC and
the York Facility occurred more than three years prior to the Accident,” claiming
that contact had nothing to do with the Accident. (Doc. 38, p. 15.) Mahone
responds that JCI PLC had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania for six reasons:
(1) JCI PLC implemented and controlled safety functions at the York Facility; (2)
JCI PLC participated in the OSHA investigation of the Accident; (3) JCI PLC
provided workers’ compensation insurance for employees at the York Facility; (4)
JCI PLC posts available jobs on their website citing JCI PLC as the employer; (5)
JCI PLC directed corporate statements to the York facility; and (6) JCI PLC’s visit
three years prior was related to the Accident. (Doc. 39, pp. 2–3.)
1. Purposeful Availment and Sufficient Minimum Contacts
The minimum contacts analysis asks whether the defendant purposefully
directed sufficient activities at the forum state. In reviewing this issue, the court
should consider whether the defendant purposefully established “minimum
contacts” in the forum state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (citing Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316). The minimum contacts must be purposefully directed at the
forum state in such a way that the defendant deliberately interacted with the forum
state or created “continuing obligations” between itself and residents of the forum
state. Id. at 475–76. This is often referred to as the “purposeful availment”
requirement. Id. at 475.
The Third Circuit has held that the defendant must have “purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum.”
O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
While physical entrance is not required, a deliberate targeting of the forum is
necessary. Id. at 317. Here, Mahone alleges several instances where JCI PLC has
not only targeted the forum, but also physical entered Pennsylvania.
i. Implementing and Controlling Safety Functions
First, Mahone contends that JCI PLC was responsible for “implementing and
controlling safety functions at the subject facility.” They reference two examples:
the Process for Violation of Safety Rules Policy and the Zero Harm Vision. (Doc.
39, pp. 11, 14, 23.)
a. First Document– Process for Violation of Safety Rules
Policy
JCI PLC first addresses the Process for Violation of Safety Rules Policy,
stating that it contained “a clerical error” that had not appeared on any other safety
policies applicable to the York Facility, including policies related to the Accident.
(Doc. 43, p. 11.) JCI PLC also refutes Mahone’s claim by noting that those
involved in preparing and approving the policy were not directors or officers of JCI
PLC. (Id.) Mahone responds that this policy is indicative of JCI PLC’s
involvement because it “contains trade secrets and proprietary information” of JCI
PLC, was issued by the company’s “‘Global HR and Labor’ vice president,”
relates to safety of the York Facility, and was provided to Raul in York,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 39, pp. 14–15.)
JCI PLC does not contest that the document states that it “contains trade
secrets and proprietary information of Johnson Controls, Intl. Plc.” (Doc. 39-8, p.
2.) However, JCI PLC maintains that this was a clerical error. (Doc. 43, p. 11.)
JCI PLC likewise does not contest Mahone’s other claims regarding this policy,
but takes the position that JCI PLC was not the one to create, approve, or
implement it. (Id.) In order for Mahone to sustain a prima facie case, the
assertions must be “based on evidence of specific facts in the record.” Hooper,
2016 WL 7212586, at *3.
Beyond Mahone’s citations to the Process for Violation of Safety Rules
Policy, Mahone fails to provide any additional evidence as to the specific claim
that the policy “was provided to [Raul] in York, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 39, p. 15.)
This evidence is required to prove that JCI PLC “purposefully avail[ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at
317. In O’Connor, the defendant company mailed brochures and traded phone
calls directly with the plaintiffs at their Pennsylvania home to form an agreement
for rendering spa services. Id. at 318. Here, Mahone provides no evidence that the
policy was provided to Raul from JCI PLC.
But even if the policy was provided to Raul, JCI PLC has provided sufficient
evidence that it was not responsible for this policy. (Doc. 43, p. 11.) JCI PLC uses
deposition testimony of Richard Dancy (“Dancy”), Vice President, Associate
General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of JCI PLC in support of its claim. (Id.)
Dancy states that the reference to JCI PLC in the footnote was likely a “clerical
error” that was not consistent with other similar policies. (Doc. 39-9, p. 39.)
Similarly, Mahone uses the Process for Violation of Safety Rules Policy, as
evidence that the policy was issued by the company’s “‘Global HR and Labor’ vice
president.” (Doc. 39, pp. 14–15.) This fact is not contested by JCI PLC. JCI PLC
instead contends that the people in these positions were not employed by JCI PLC.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has previously held that in cases where a
subsidiary is the agent of a parent corporation or the parent exercises control over
the subsidiary, “personal jurisdiction exists over the parent whenever personal
jurisdiction (whether general or specific) exists over the subsidiary,” otherwise
called an alter-ego analysis. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 781
(3d Cir. 2018). Thus, to satisfy personal jurisdiction, Mahone needs to show that,
because the policy was issued by the company’s Global HR and Labor vice
president, this is indicative of either the subsidiary as an agent of the parent or that
the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. Another Third Circuit case
utilizes a ten-factor test to evaluate the relationship between a parent and
subsidiary for the purpose of the alter-ego analysis. Gasbarre Prods., Inc. v.
Diamond Auto. Grp. Fla., Inc., No. CV 3:16-53, 2017 WL 1102652, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 23, 2017). The tenth factor is whether “the parent exercises control or
provides instruction to the subsidiary’s officers and directors.” Id.
If the Global HR and Labor vice president were employed by JCI PLC, this
would likely be an example of the parent providing instructions–here, the safety
policy–to the subsidiary for enforcement. However, Mahone failed to provide any
evidence establishing this fact. On the other hand, JCI PLC provided evidence
from Dancy’s testimony stating that all positions with the ability to create,
approve, or implement this policy were employed at the subsidiary level, not by
JCI PLC. (Doc. 39-9, p. 17.) Accordingly, Mahone fails to satisfy the first prong
for specific personal jurisdiction in regards to the Process for Violation of Safety
Rules.
b. Second Document–Zero Harm Vision
Mahone also asserts that the Zero Harm Vision was an example of how JCI
PLC “implement[ed] and control[ed] safety functions at the subject facility.”
(Doc. 39, p. 23.) JCI PLC refutes this assertion, stating that the Zero Harm Vision
is more of a value statement applicable to over 700 subsidiaries. (Doc. 43, p. 12.)
However, Mahone claims that the wording of the policy is indicative of JCI PLC’s
upfront involvement at local manufacturing facilities: “We require each of our
locations to perform regular safety audits to ensure proper safety policies . . . .” and
these standards address “the specific hazard and unique working environments of
our manufacturing . . . .” (Doc. 39, p. 15.)
JCI PLC does not contest the wording of this policy, but maintains that the
Zero Harm Vision is a value statement applicable to all subsidiaries. (Doc. 43 p.
12.) Mahone offers no additional argument in support of the claim that JCI PLC
implements and controls safety functions at the York Facility, other than the
wording of the Zero Harm Vision. (Doc. 39-10, p. 5.) This is simply not sufficient
to sustain a “prima facie case… based on evidence of specific facts in the record.”
Hooper, 2016 WL 7212586, at *3.
Finally, JCI PLC provides further argument regarding the alter-ego analysis
in its renewed motion to dismiss. (Doc. 38, pp. 17–21.) However, Mahone only
addresses this argument in a footnote. The Third Circuit has previously held that,
“arguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are
considered waived.” John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d
1070, 1076 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Mahone’s brief argument as to an alter-
ego analysis is considered waived and the court will not address this issue further.
Thus, Mahone fails to satisfy the first prong for specific personal jurisdiction in
regards to the Zero Harm Vision.
ii. Participation in OSHA Investigation
Second, Mahone alleges that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) cited JCI PLC for safety violations and that JCI PLC
actively participated in OSHA’s six-month investigation. (Doc. 39, p. 10.) JCI
PLC first addresses OSHA’s citation for safety violations, claiming that the
citation was incorrect. (Doc. 43, p. 20.) Mahone responds that JCI PLC, “at no
point… object[ed] to or contest[ed] the designation of JCI PLC as the
‘Establishment Name,’ ‘Company Name,’ or ‘Employer’ all of which it was
referred to as by OSHA.” (Doc. 39, p. 13). Likewise, Defendant Columbus
McKinnon Corporation argues “there is no indication of a filing or attempt by JCI
PLC or one of its subsidiaries to correct the OSHA record . . . .” (Doc. 40, pp. 2–
3.)
Here, there is a material fact in dispute regarding OSHA’s citation of JCI
PLC for safety violations and whether the citation was a mistake. In order for
Mahone to sustain a prima facie case, assertions must be “based on evidence of
specific facts in the record.” Hooper, 2016 WL 7212586, at *3. Here, Mahone
provided specific evidence in the record acknowledging that JCI PLC never
objected to or contested OSHA’s citation, nor, as McKinnon pointed out, made an
effort to correct the record. (Doc. 39, p. 13; Doc. 40, pp. 2–3.) Thus, “all disputed
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.” Hooper, 2016 WL
7212586, at *3.
But even assuming OSHA correctly identified JCI PLC on this
documentation, this evidence alone still fails to satisfy the first prong regarding
purposeful availment for two reasons. First, OSHA’s identification of JCI PLC as
the employer has no legal significance in this case in considering whether an
employer-employee relationship actually exists. See Grimsley v. Manitowoc Co.,
675 Fed. App’x 188, 121 (3d Cir. 2017). Mahone also fails to provide any other
support that there was an employer-employee relationship between JCI PLC and
the York Facility. As previously stated, because Mahone failed to properly address
JCI PLC’s alter-ego analysis, the argument was waived. Additionally, Mahone’s
own brief in opposition acknowledges that Raul’s actual employer was York
International Corporation because this was the company listed as his employer on
Raul’s W-2 forms. (Doc. 39, p. 14.)
Secondly, OSHA’s “unilateral activity… is not enough” to establish JCI
PLC’s “deliberate targeting in the forum.” Baker v. LivaNova PLC, 210 F. Supp.
3d 642, 648 (M.D. Pa. 2016); O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. Rather, specific
personal jurisdiction “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’
creates with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). Here,
simply because OSHA cited JCI PLC, potentially characterizing them as
responsible for the Accident, this is not sufficient for the court to conclude that JCI
PLC purposefully availed itself of business in York, Pennsylvania. Rather, a
finding of specific personal jurisdiction can only be found using evidence of
contacts that JCI PLC itself created with Pennsylvania.
Mahone further asserts that JCI PLC actively participated in OSHA’s six-
month investigation because JCI PLC was represented by counsel and responded to
the OSHA subpoena. JCI PLC refutes this, stating that they were not represented
by counsel but rather routed the matter to its subsidiary for resolution. (Doc. 43, p.
22.) Mahone cites a letter from Foley & Lardner LLP to OSHA as evidence that
JCI PLC was represented by Foley & Lardner LLP, and therefore responded to
OSHA’s subpoena. (Doc. 39, p. 2.)
Here, Mahone’s evidence confirms that Foley & Lardner LLP responded to
OSHA’s subpoena, “Pursuant to your request, we are forwarding the enclosed flash
drive related to OSHA’s subpoena dues tecum dated October 28, 2021.” (Doc. 39-
6, p. 2.) JCI PLC does not dispute this; however, there is a material dispute as to
whether Foley & Lardner LLP represented JCI PLC in the OSHA investigation.
Mahone provides no other evidence to show that Foley & Lardner LLP represented
JCI PLC. JCI PLC rather asserts that Foley & Lardner LLP represented JCI not JCI
PLC, citing Foley & Lardner LLP’s email to Shawn Renaldi on October 26, 2021
as evidence. (Doc. 43, p. 22.) Upon review of this evidence, the court agrees with
JCI PLC. In the email, Foley & Lardner LLP confirms they “ha[ve] been retained
to represent Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) with respect to the above-referenced
OSHA investigation.” (Doc. 43-4, p. 2.) Additionally, the subject of the email is
listed as “Johnson Controls, Inc. – OSHA Fatality Investigation.” (Id.)
Given that the evidence confirms Foley & Lardner LLP represented JCI, not
JCI PLC and Mahone cites no other evidence to suggest the opposite, it is clear to
the court that JCI PLC was not represented by Folely & Lardner LLP. As such,
any correspondence from Foley & Lardner LLP, including their response to
OSHA’s subpoena, was on behalf of JCI and not JCI PLC. Thus, Mahone fails to
satisfy the first prong for specific personal jurisdiction based on the OSHA
investigation.
iii. Workers’ Compensation Insurance
Third, Mahone claims that JCI PLC provided workers’ compensation
insurance for the York Facility. (Doc. 39, p. 14.) JCI PLC responds that they have
no role in providing workers’ compensation insurance. (Doc. 43, p. 17.) Mahone
cites a letter from a Claims Examiner for Sedgwick confirming that Sedgwick
administers workers’ compensation claims “on behalf of Johnson Controls
International, PLC.” (Doc. 39-7, p. 2.)
Here, there is a material fact in dispute as to whether the claims examiner for
Sedgwick mistakenly mentioned that Sedgwick administers workers’
compensation claims “on behalf of Johnson Controls International, PLC.” (Doc.
39-7, p. 2.) Mahone provided specific evidence in the record pointing to the letter
from Sedgwick that Sedgwick administers workers’ compensation claims “on
behalf of Johnson Controls International, PLC.” (Doc. 39-7, p. 2.) This fact is
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Hooper, 2016 WL 7212586 at
*3.
However, even assuming that the claims examiner correctly identified JCI
PLC in its letter, a letter simply mentioning JCI PLC does not establish “deliberate
targeting in the forum” since specific personal jurisdiction “must arise out of
contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State” and “unilateral
activity… is not enough.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317; Walden, 571 U.S. at 284;
Baker, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 642. Here, the claims examiner’s characterization of JCI
PLC is not sufficient for this court to conclude that JCI PLC purposefully availed
itself of business in York, Pennsylvania. Rather, a finding of specific personal
jurisdiction can only be found using evidence of contacts that JCI PLC itself
created with Pennsylvania.
Further, a parent company providing a subsidiary company’s workers
compensation insurance would only give rise to specific personal jurisdiction by
satisfying an alter-ego analysis, where a subsidiary is the agent of a parent
corporation or where the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. Shuker, 885
F.3d at 781. For this argument to succeed in the present case, Mahone needed to
demonstrate how the Sedgwick letter establishes the subsidiary as an agent of the
parent or how the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. Because Mahone
failed to even raise this argument, this argument is waived and Mahone fails to
satisfy the first prong for specific personal jurisdiction based on the workers’
compensation insurance.
iv. Online Job Postings
Mahone’s next assertion is that JCI PLC maintains a presence in
Pennsylvania based on “its websites for available jobs at the facility in York,
Pennsylvania that identify JCI PLC as the employer.” (Doc. 39, p. 3.) JCI PLC
claims that they have no control over the website containing the job postings and
that the website does not target Pennsylvania, but lists jobs across 2,000 locations
throughout 150 countries. (Doc. 43, pp. 24–25.) Mahone cites the Equal
Opportunity & Non-Discrimination disclaimer at the bottom of the webpage as
evidence of JCI PLC’s control over the website, “Johnson Controls International
plc is an equal employment opportunity and affirmative action employer . . . .”
(Doc. 39-12, p. 11.)
JCI PLC does not dispute that the website contains this disclaimer; however,
there is a material dispute as to whether JCI PLC has control over the website and
makes those job postings. Here, Mahone provided specific evidence citing the
disclaimer on the bottom of the webpage and this fact is viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. (Doc. 39-12, p. 11.) However, even assuming that JCI PLC
did have control over the website, this would still be insufficient evidence for JCI
PLC to have purposefully availed itself of business in York, Pennsylvania. The
Third Circuit has held that simply because a parent and subsidiaries share a
common website, that is insufficient for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the parent. Hoffman v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. CIVA 06-2961, 2006 WL
3759709, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2006). Accordingly, even if JCI PLC exercised
control over the employment website, this would still be insufficient to establish
purposeful availment by JCI PLC in Pennsylvania.
v. Corporate Statements Directed Towards York Facility
Mahone cites two consolidated corporate disclosure reports to support the
argument that JCI PLC satisfies the first prong required for specific jurisdiction:
JCI PLC’s 2021 Sustainability Report and 2022 Non-Financial Disclosure Report.
(Doc. 39, p. 15.) JCI PLC addresses these documents in the aggregate claiming
consolidated corporate annual statements do not suffice for the purposeful
availment prong of specific personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 43, p. 13.)
Mahone lists specific reasons in regards to each corporate disclosure,
examining how each document satisfies this first prong. (Doc. 39, pp. 15–18.)
With regard to the 2021 Sustainability Report, Mahone outlines several aspects of
the report that are indicative of JCI PLC’s purposeful availment in York,
Pennsylvania: (1) global initiatives for safe working conditions, (2) efforts to
collect data regarding workplace safety, (3) the use of standard US-OSHA
recordkeeping rules, (4) company-wide policies that are supported by local,
regional, and site-specific employee health and safety, (5) training requirements,
(6) regular safety auditing process, (7) health and safety reports from each
subsidiary, (8) safety committees used to ensure safe working conditions at local
facilities, and (9) software to report and track work-related injuries. (Doc. 39, pp.
15–18.) JCI PLC does not address each of these aspects individually. Rather, JCI
PLC responds in the aggregate stating that these factors are indicative of the
“investor facing” quality of the report. (Doc. 43, p. 13.)
JCI PLC argues that these examples in the report do not establish JCI PLC’s
purposeful availment of business in York, Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit has
held that consolidated information for reporting purposes is not indicative that the
parent company exercised daily control over the subsidiary, subjecting the parent
to specific personal jurisdiction. Deardorff v. Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc., No.
CV 19-2642-KSM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18444, at *24 (E.D. Pa. 2022). The
Third Circuit has likewise held that gathering information about corporate
performance typifies standard parent-subsidiary interactions. In re Chocolate
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d. 367, 386 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Thus,
the following aspects of the 2021 Sustainability Report would be insufficient
evidence to support a finding of JCI PLC’s purposeful availment: efforts to collect
data regarding workplace safety, regular safety auditing processes, health and
safety reports from each subsidiary, and software to report and track work-related
injuries.
Moreover, regulatory filings presenting information about a parent’s
subsidiaries as one indistinguishable whole do not prove agency, and thus would
not establish a finding of personal jurisdiction. Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical
Coffee Co. SA, 263 F. Supp. 3d 498, 505 (D. Del. 2017). “For the same reasons,
[the Parent] setting the corporate policies and procedures for all subsidiaries is not
sufficient evidence of agency” and would also not support a finding of personal
jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the remaining factors would be insufficient evidence to
support a finding of JCI PLC’s purposeful availment: global initiatives for safe
working conditions, the use of standard US-OSHA recordkeeping rules, company-
wide policies that are supported by local, regional, and site-specific employee
health and safety, training requirements, and safety committees used to ensure safe
working conditions at local facilities. Thus, the 2021 Sustainability Report fails to
provide sufficient evidence to establish JCI PLC’s purposeful availment in York,
Pennsylvania.
Unlike the 2021 Sustainability Report, Mahone does not point to any
specific aspects of the 2022 Non-Financial Disclosure Report that could constitute
purposeful availment by JCI PLC. Mahone merely mentions the 2022 Non-
Financial Disclosure Report once by name while describing the “Zero Harm”
safety policy. (Doc. 39, p. 3.) As was previously established, the Zero Harm
policy is insufficient evidence to establish JCI PLC’s purposeful availment in
York, Pennsylvania.
Additionally, the court notes that the Accident occurred in October 2021.
The Third Circuit has previously held that the purposeful availment requirement
“necessary implies that only conduct prior to the accrual of the cause of action or,
at the very latest, the filing of the lawsuit is relevant.” In re Enter. Rent-A-Car
Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 312 (W.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd,
683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012). Thus, a 2022 report is insufficient to establish
purposeful availment for specific personal jurisdiction for this reason as well.
vi. JCI PLC Visit to York Facility
Finally, Mahone alleges that JCI PLC physically entered Pennsylvania in
2018 when officers of JCI PLC visited the York Facility where the Accident
occurred. (Doc. 39, p. 11; Doc. 39-9, p. 36.) Given that physical entrance is
satisfied with this fact, it is likely this instance satisfies “deliberate targeting of the
forum.” O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. However, the court must assess whether this
singular visit three years prior to the Accident satisfies the second prong regarding
whether the claim arose out of or related to this visit, which will be further
explored next.
2. Claim Arises Out of or Relates to Defendant’s Contacts
The second part of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis examines
whether the litigation arises out of or directly relates to one of the activities the
defendant purposely directed at the forum. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. Mahone
cites six instances of alleged purposeful availment, all of which were analyzed in
the previous section. Of the six alleged, the first three reasons do not satisfy step
one and therefore will not be analyzed in step two.
And, even if we assume the next two claims–online job postings and
corporate statements directed towards the York Facility–satisfy the first step, they
still fail the second requirement for establishing specific personal jurisdiction.
Online job postings relate more to the human relations function of an organization
rather than safety policies that would have directly related to the Accident.
Reynolds v. Turning Point Holding Co., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-01935-JDW, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33163, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Even if the online job postings
related to the Accident in some way, they still would not give rise to specific
personal jurisdiction because there is no evidence that Raul was hired via these
online job postings. Thus, the alleged harm did not flow from these hiring
procedures and could not therefore be used as evidence that the Accident arose out
of or related to these job postings. Id.
Likewise, the consolidated corporate statements were simply a way for the
parent company to monitor its subsidiaries’ performance through key performance
indicators and various reports. (Doc. 39-9, p. 16.) While these statements may
have contained a report on the Accident at the York Facility, they were merely a
part of the environmental health and safety oversight that was routinely included in
these consolidated statements. (Doc. 39-9, p. 21.) Simply mentioning the
Accident in a routine, global report issued to all subsidiaries is not sufficient to
establish the second prong required in the analysis for specific personal
jurisdiction.
JCI PLC’s visit to the York Facility is the only instance that clearly satisfies
the first prong; however, it is not sufficient to meet the relatedness prong. The visit
in question occurred approximately three years before the Accident and was the
only time JCI PLC maintained physical presence at the York Facility. (Doc. 39, p.
2.) Mahone claims that the visit was to create an operational review of the York
Facility. Id. However, jurisdictional discovery revealed that this visit instead
consisted of a Chiller/Airside presentation and tour of the York Facility, neither of
which related to the Accident. (Doc. 38-6, p. 3.) Accordingly, Mahone has failed
to establish how the claim arises out of or relates to JCI PLC’s visit in 2018 such
that this court may exercise jurisdiction over JCI PLC.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted on the ground that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant JCI PLC, and the claims
against JCI PLC are dismissed with prejudice.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: May 12, 2025