Elijah Garrison v. State of Tennessee

05/12/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 1, 2025

ELIJAH GARRISON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-23-100 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

No. W2024-01005-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Elijah Garrison, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction

relief. He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue to the jury

that an eyewitness’s testimony was unreliable because the eyewitness’s initial statements

to police were “essentially coerced” and (2) failing to present and argue to the jury

additional evidence that, in his view, contradicted the State’s proof. After review, we

affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,

JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Samuel W. Hinson (on appeal), Lexington, Tennessee, for the appellant; and Elijah

Garrison, Pro Se (at post-conviction hearing), Mountain City, Tennessee.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ryan W. Davis, Assistant Attorney

General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Al Earls and Shaun A. Brown,

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Trial and Direct Appeal

The Petitioner was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree murder and

unlawful possession of a firearm. State v. Garrison, No. W2021-01064-CCA-R3-CD,

2022 WL 17498889, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2022), no perm. app. filed. These

convictions stemmed from the Petitioner’s shooting the unarmed victim from a vehicle,

exiting the vehicle to approach the victim, and standing over the victim as he lay dying to

shoot him several more times. Id. at *1-2. The proof introduced at the Petitioner’s trial

featured the testimony of Tierra Wilson, who was the driver of the vehicle involved in the

shooting, and A.A.,1 who was seated in the back seat behind Ms. Wilson when the shooting

occurred. Id. at *2-3. After the shooting, the Petitioner got back in the vehicle, instructed

Ms. Wilson to drive away, and threw the gun out of the moving vehicle into a ditch. Id.

At the Petitioner’s direction, the three individuals immediately left Madison County and

eventually drove to Knoxville, Tennessee, where the Petitioner instructed A.A. to leave

with the vehicle because it was stolen. Id. at *2.

A.A. drove the vehicle to Cookeville, Tennessee, where he contacted his mother for

help and told her what had occurred. Id. at *2, *4. After his mother informed local law

enforcement that her son had witnessed a homicide, she traveled to Cookeville with two

members of the Jackson Police Department.2 Id. A.A. told these investigators what he had

witnessed, identified the Petitioner as the shooter and Ms. Wilson as the driver, and

provided a detailed description of the distinctive-looking gun used in the shooting, as well

as where he had seen the Petitioner throw it from the vehicle. Id. Based on the information

provided by A.A., law enforcement was able to recover the gun used in the shooting, match

it to the casings and bullets recovered at the scene of the victim’s death, and later connect

it to the Petitioner based on photographs of him holding it that were obtained from his cell

phone. Id. at *2, *4. Law enforcement also used information provided by A.A. to later

locate and interview Ms. Wilson, whose independent account of the shooting matched the

information provided by A.A., and the Petitioner was thereafter arrested for the victim’s

murder. Id. at *4. Both individuals testified consistently with one another at the

Petitioner’s trial. Id. at *1-3.

In addition to the testimony of Ms. Wilson and A.A., a resident of the area where

the victim was killed also witnessed the shooting, and he described the shooter as a tall

young man with “some form of dread[s.]” Id. at *1. At the time of the murder, this

description matched the Petitioner; by contrast, A.A. was approximately five feet, five

inches tall and had an “afro.” Id. at *1, *5. An area surveillance video recording was also

received as evidence, which depicted the vehicle entering and leaving the scene, as well as

the shooting itself. Id. at *1.

1

Because the witness was a minor at the time of the shooting, we will refer to him by his initials.

2

The record indicates that the vehicle A.A. was driving had run out of gas, leaving him stranded

there.

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On direct appeal, the Petitioner challenged only the murder conviction on the basis

of insufficient evidence due to a lack of corroboration of accomplice testimony. Id. This

court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction in an opinion issued on December 8, 2022,

holding that the evidence was sufficient to support it and concluding that neither Ms.

Wilson nor A.A. were acting as the Petitioner’s accomplices. Id. at *6-7.

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

Prior to filing his petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner filed a pro se

pleading entitled “Motion For New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence” on April

11, 2023. The disposition of this motion is not entirely clear from the record, but its filing

provides context for the subsequent post-conviction proceedings. In this pleading, the

Petitioner contended that following his trial, he received a police video recording of A.A.’s

mother speaking on the phone with A.A. during the mother’s initial contact with law

enforcement and that the recording had been withheld from the defense at trial. The

Petitioner asserted that A.A. indicated to his mother in this recording that he was not

actually present at the scene of the homicide.

On December 27, 2023, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief. The Petitioner’s notarized certificate of service lists the date of mailing as December

7, 2023. In this petition, the Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel, both pretrial and at trial,3 and further asserted that the prosecutor committed a

Brady4 violation by withholding the video recording referenced above from the defense.

On March 22, 2024, the Petitioner’s appointed post-conviction counsel filed a

supplemental brief in support of the petition for post-conviction relief that contained six

grounds for relief; some of these grounds were new, and others restated grounds previously

asserted in the pro se petition. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, the Petitioner alleged

(1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress A.A.’s statements to police on

grounds they were coerced and (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach

A.A. with the video recording. Ultimately, the post-conviction court granted the

3

Pretrial counsel was relieved after the Petitioner’s suppression hearing, and new counsel was

appointed to represent the Petitioner at trial.

4

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to

guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).

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Petitioner’s request to represent himself at the post-conviction hearing held on June 20,

2024.

The Petitioner presented testimony at the hearing from pretrial counsel, trial

counsel, and the prosecutor at trial. The Petitioner’s main focus throughout the hearing

was his contention that A.A. was not in “that car” and was “nowhere around when the

crimes happened.” On this point, the Petitioner relied heavily on the video recording that

captured the conversations between A.A. and his mother. Notably, based on the other

evidence introduced, it appears that at the time the police recorded these conversations

between A.A. and his mother, A.A. was in possession of the vehicle in question in

Cookeville and his mother had gone to the police and initiated this contact based on A.A.’s

telling her that he had witnessed a homicide.

Pretrial counsel testified that he represented the Petitioner for approximately two to

three weeks, most notably at the hearing to suppress A.A.’s identification of the Petitioner

as the shooter. Pretrial counsel could not recall whether he himself filed for discovery,

whether or when he received the video recording in question, or whether he himself had

watched the video. The Petitioner repeatedly used portions of the transcript of the

suppression hearing, the order denying the suppression motion, and portions of the video

in question to refresh pretrial counsel’s memory, though his recollection remained largely

unchanged. After a segment of the video was played multiple times, pretrial counsel

acknowledged that he heard A.A. say to his mother, “I know I haven’t been in that car.”

When asked whether he would have used this recording to impeach A.A. at the suppression

hearing, pretrial counsel responded that he believed A.A. had encountered law enforcement

while in the very same car shortly after making this statement. Pretrial counsel

acknowledged that he did not play the video at the suppression hearing, but he did not know

whether he would have used it to impeach A.A. and maintained that he did not recall

whether or when he received or reviewed the video itself.

Trial counsel testified that he represented the Petitioner at trial and conducted a

rigorous cross-examination of both A.A. and Ms. Wilson. Trial counsel was adamant that

each of the now complained of decisions he made in his representation of the Petitioner

were strategic. He stated that the evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt was “overwhelming”

because the eyewitnesses testified consistently with one another, their prior statements led

investigators to locate the firearm used in the shooting, and investigators had established

the firearm’s connection to both the Petitioner and the casings and bullets recovered from

the scene of the murder. Trial counsel emphasized that his strategy had been to cast doubt

on the efficacy of the investigation by bringing up law enforcement’s inability to charge

the Petitioner when he was a suspect in a separate homicide. Trial counsel additionally

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noted that he would not have called A.A.’s mother to testify as a witness because her only

knowledge of the case came from A.A., making any testimony from her inadmissible

hearsay. Trial counsel also clarified that, regardless of whether he had received the police

video recording of A.A.’s mother prior to trial, he would not have used it at trial. He

believed it would not have made any difference in the outcome of the case. This decision

was based in part on his considering all of the evidence together, rather than each piece in

isolation.

The prosecutor testified that his office had an “open-file” discovery policy in the

Petitioner’s case, and defense counsel was provided an opportunity to view and make

copies of everything discoverable that was in the State’s file, which included the video

recording in question. In response to questioning about the State’s duty to provide

exculpatory evidence to the defense, the prosecutor stated that he did not believe the video

recording contained exculpatory evidence. After a portion of the recording was played, the

prosecutor stated that, based on the context of the surrounding conversation in the

recording, he believed that A.A.’s statement about not being “in that car when the crime

happened” was an attempt to make it clear that he did not steal the car or participate in it

being stolen. The prosecutor supported this interpretation by emphasizing the surrounding

sentences, wherein A.A.’s mother informed her son that the investigators wanted to come

get the car and they knew he did not steal it. When pressed by the Petitioner to answer

whether A.A. was in the car at the time of the homicide, the prosecutor stated that the video

could “speak for itself” as to what A.A. did or did not say. The prosecutor further testified

that it would have been very difficult for him to have withheld this video from the defense

because it was contained on the same “jump drive” as all of the other media files provided

to the defense in this case.

The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof

with regard to any of his claims and denied the petition by written order. In so doing, the

post-conviction court accredited the testimony of both trial counsel and the prosecutor. As

for the issues relevant to this appeal, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel was

not ineffective for failing to impeach A.A. with the statement he made to his mother on the

phone that was captured by the video recording. The post-conviction court reasoned that

A.A. was thoroughly cross-examined at trial and that, even if trial counsel never received

the video recording, it would not have made “any difference in the outcome of the trial

based upon the overwhelming evidence in this matter including testimony of the two

eyewitnesses.” The post-conviction court also found that the State did not violate Brady

by failing to provide the defense with the video recording, citing the prosecutor’s testimony

that the State had an open-file discovery policy and that the recording “would have been

on the same thumb drive used during the trial,” as well as trial counsel’s testimony that he

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would not have used the recording to impeach A.A. Again, the post-conviction court noted

that the statement would not have made “any difference in the outcome of the trial based

upon the overwhelming evidence in this matter including testimony of the two

eyewitnesses.” Finally, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner had “failed to

present any evidence regarding any other allegations that may [have been] in the

Petitioner’s pleadings[.]” This timely appeal followed, and appellate counsel was

appointed to represent the Petitioner.5

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his

petition upon its finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. The

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the jury that A.A.’s

statement to the police was “essentially coerced” and that his subsequent testimony was

therefore unreliable. The Petitioner also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to present the video recording of A.A.’s conversation with his mother and to argue

to the jury that it proved A.A. was not present at the scene of the shooting. The State

responds that the appeal should be dismissed as the petition was untimely filed. In the

alternative, the State asserts that the Petitioner’s claims regarding trial counsel’s lack of

argument are waived due to his failure to raise them in the post-conviction court, and any

assertion that the introduction of the disputed evidence would have changed the outcome

of the case is without merit.

A. Timeliness of the Petition

The State contends that the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to

consider this petition, as it was untimely filed. 6 Under Tennessee Code Annotated section

40-30-102(a), a post-conviction petition must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of

the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no

appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the judgment became final, or

consideration of the petition shall be barred.” The statute provides that the limitations

5

Following the appointment of counsel, and most recently on May 5, 2025, the Petitioner lodged

several pro se motions in connection with this appeal. To the extent these pleadings have not already been

addressed by written order of this court, the Petitioner’s outstanding requests are hereby denied based on

his being represented by counsel. See Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275, 284 (Tenn. 2009) (noting that persons

represented by counsel may not simultaneously engage in self-representation).

6

We note that, at the time the State filed its brief, the technical record provided on appeal was

missing several pages, including the signature page and certificate of service from the Petitioner’s original

petition. Following supplementation of the appellate record, this court was able to review it for timeliness.

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period “shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision

otherwise available at law or equity.” Id. Failure to file within the limitations period

removes the case from the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at § -102(b).

However, timely filing of certain documents prepared by, or on behalf of, pro se

inmates is governed by the “prison mailbox rule”:

If a paper required or permitted to be filed pursuant to the rules of criminal

procedure is prepared by or on behalf of a pro se litigant incarcerated in a

correctional facility and is not received by the court clerk until after the

deadline for filing, the filing is timely if the paper was delivered to the

appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time set for

filing.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(1). Additionally, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 § 2(G) states

that a pro se “filing shall be timely if the papers were delivered to the appropriate individual

at the correctional facility within the time fixed for filing.” When timeliness of the filing

is an issue, the burden is on the pro se litigant to prove compliance by a preponderance of

the evidence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(3); see also Adkins v. State, No. E2020-01213-CCA-

R3-PC, 2022 WL 122673, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2022) (stating that the petitioner

has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence compliance with Rule 28 §

2(G)).

In this case, the incarcerated Petitioner’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief

was filed in the post-conviction court on December 27, 2023, nineteen days after the

one-year limitations period initiated by the December 8, 2022 disposition date of his direct

appeal by this court. However, the notarized certification on the final page indicates that

it was provided for mailing on December 7, 2023, one day within this period. Accordingly,

by operation of the prison mailbox rule, we conclude that the petition was timely filed.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or voidable

because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the

Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The burden in a

post-conviction proceeding is on the petitioner to prove allegations of fact by clear and

convincing evidence. Id. § -110(f); see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293-94 (Tenn.

2009). “[Q]uestions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be

given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved” by

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the post-conviction court. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). However,

“[i]ssues not addressed in the post-conviction court will generally not be addressed on

appeal.” Walsh v. State, 166 S.W.3d 641, 645-46 (Tenn. 2005) (first citing Rickman v.

State, 972 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); then citing State v. White, 635

S.W.2d 396, 397-98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)). Moreover, “an issue raised for the first

time on appeal is waived.” Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2004) (citing State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). On

appeal, we are bound by the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless we conclude

that the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Fields, 40 S.W.3d at

456. Because they relate to mixed questions of law and fact, the post-conviction court’s

conclusions as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether that deficiency

was prejudicial are reviewed under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness.

Id. at 457.

Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective assistance

of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446

U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293. When a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is made under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was

deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). “Because a

petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or

prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance

claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). The Strickland standard has

been applied to the right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee

Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

Deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness,” and reviewing courts “must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. When a court reviews a lawyer’s

performance, it “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from the

perspective of counsel at that time.” Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tenn. 2006)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We will not deem counsel to have been ineffective

merely because a different strategy or procedure might have produced a more favorable

result. Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We recognize,

however, that “deference to tactical choices only applies if the choices are informed ones

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based upon adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1992) (citing Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)).

As to the prejudice prong, the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability

that[,] but for counsel’s errors[,] the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “That is, the petitioner must establish that his

counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree that it deprived him of a fair trial and

called into question the reliability of the outcome.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869

(Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999)).

Both of the Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claims on appeal contain the allegation that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue certain topics to the jury: (1) that A.A.’s

testimony was unreliable because his initial statements to police were “essentially coerced”

and (2) that the video recording contradicted the State’s proof. However, in the court

below, the Petitioner did not include in his pro se or amended pleadings any ineffectiveness

allegations regarding trial counsel’s failure to argue these points to the jury; he likewise

did not present proof of these allegations during the hearing; and the post-conviction court

did not make any ruling regarding the same. As noted by the State, these new allegations

on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are waived for the Petitioner’s failure

to preserve them in the post-conviction court. See Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 458

(Tenn. 2020) (“Tennessee appellate courts may only consider issues that were not formally

raised in the post-conviction petition if the issue was argued at the post-conviction hearing

and decided by the post-conviction court without objection.” (citation omitted)). The

Petitioner made numerous allegations regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in his

petition, put on testimony to support his contentions, and argued in support of those specific

contentions at length during the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court

separated and addressed each of the Petitioner’s contentions in its oral ruling at the hearing

and memorialized its findings in a written order. At no stage of these proceedings was trial

counsel’s inadequate argument raised, developed in any meaningful way, or otherwise

preserved for appellate review. See id. Waiver is the result.

To the extent the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

admit the video recording of A.A.’s conversation with his mother at trial in an effort to

show that A.A. was not present at the scene of the shooting, this claim is without merit.

First, the Petitioner cannot show deficient performance. Trial counsel testified explicitly

that, regardless of whether he had possession of it, he would not have used the video

recording at trial. In so testifying, trial counsel emphasized that this was a strategic

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decision that stemmed from not looking at the evidence “in isolation.” As noted above,

speculating that a different strategy might have produced a more favorable outcome for the

Petitioner is not a basis to find that counsel’s performance was deficient. Rhoden, 816

S.W.2d at 60. Additionally, trial counsel’s testimony at the post-conviction

hearing—which took place several years after the trial itself—was detailed regarding his

interpretation of the evidence and firm on the point that he had been more than adequately

prepared to defend the case at trial. We conclude that his strategic decision on this point

was based on such preparation and is thus afforded deference on appeal. See Cooper, 847

S.W.2d at 528. Moreover, the prosecutor’s testimony established that the video was not

helpful to the Petitioner because the statements therein pertained to the theft of the vehicle,

not the murder. Not only does this further support trial counsel’s strategic decision not to

use the video in his defense, but the post-conviction court also accredited the testimony of

both of these witnesses, demonstrating its agreement with the propriety of this assessment

of the evidence. The Petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient, as required under Strickland.

Second, the Petitioner has not established a reasonable probability that introduction

of the video would have resulted in any difference in the outcome of his trial. See Vaughn,

202 S.W.3d at 116. Just as trial counsel testified regarding his review of the evidence, this

court does not look at the components of the record on appeal in isolation. Instead, we

must consider that (1) the entire conversation depicted in the video recording was prompted

by A.A. relating to his mother that he had witnessed a homicide; (2) he believed the car he

was then in possession of was stolen; and (3) absent outside intervention, he would still be

in possession of that car if and when he was encountered by law enforcement. There is

simply no reasonable interpretation of this recording that, when viewed in concert with the

overwhelming evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt, would lead a rational trier of fact to

believe that A.A. did not witness the murder. He was the first person who provided

information to law enforcement, which led investigators to physical evidence that

supported his account of the murder committed by the Petitioner, and his statement was

corroborated by another eyewitness—as was his presence in the vehicle at the time of the

murder. As such, the Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s

decision not to introduce the video recording at trial, because he has not established a

“reasonable probability” that the outcome would have differed had he done so. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

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III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing and consideration of the record as a whole, we affirm the

judgment of the post-conviction court.

s. Kyle A. Hixson .

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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