The opinion
Filed 5/12/25 Holman v. County of Butte CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
RYAN HOLMAN, C101517
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 20CV00578)
v.
COUNTY OF BUTTE,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Ryan Holman appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor
of defendant County of Butte (the County).
Holman sued the County under Government Code section 815.6, claiming that it
breached mandatory duties related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of
a referral alleging child abuse perpetrated against Holman. (See Holman v. County of
Butte (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 189, 192-193 (Holman).) The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the undisputed facts showed that its
employee was exercising his discretion when he decided to “evaluate out” the referral,
1
meaning to close it without conducting an in-person investigation or cross-reporting it to
other government agencies. Thus, even if the employee erred in his evaluation of the
referral, his decision is protected by discretionary immunity.
Holman appeals, contending that the trial court erred because the County’s duties
were mandatory, not discretionary, and there are triable issues of fact about whether the
County fully performed its mandatory duties. We agree and therefore reverse the
judgment.
BACKGROUND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA; Pen. Code,1 § 11164 et
seq.) was enacted to protect children from abuse and neglect through a comprehensive
reporting scheme aimed at identifying and protecting children who are being abused or
neglected. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 174 (San
Bernardino); Ferraro v. Chadwick (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 86, 90; §§ 11166.3, subd. (a),
11164, subd. (b).) To achieve its purpose, CANRA imposes a mandatory reporting
requirement on certain individuals, known as “ ‘mandated reporters’ ” whose duties bring
them into contact with children on a regular basis. (San Bernardino, at pp. 178, 185;
§ 11165.7, subd. (a).) Under section 11166, subdivision (a), a mandated reporter must
make a report to a law enforcement agency or a county welfare department “whenever
the mandated reporter, in [a] mandated professional capacity or within the scope of
. . . employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter
knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.” (§ 11166,
subd. (a).)
As defined in CANRA, the term “ ‘child abuse or neglect’ ” includes “physical
injury . . . inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by another person,” “the
willful harming or injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
child, as defined in Section 11165.3,” and “unlawful corporal punishment or injury as
defined in Section 11165.4.” (§ 11165.6.)
Section 11166 requires only that mandated reporters report suspected child abuse
or neglect. (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 188.) Once a report is made, it is the
responsibility of various child protective agencies to investigate the report and determine
whether abuse occurred. (Id. at pp. 188, 190-191, 193, 196; Planned Parenthood
Affiliates v. Van De Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 259 (Planned Parenthood).)
Section 11165.9 identifies the agencies designated to receive and investigate such reports.
They include the local law enforcement agency and “ ‘county welfare department.’ ”
(San Bernardino, at p. 191; §§ 11165.9, 11166, subd. (d)(3)(C), 11166.3; Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 11, § 900.)
In addition, the agency receiving the initial report of suspected abuse or neglect
must share the report with its counterpart child protective agencies by means of a system
of cross-reporting. (Planned Parenthood, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 259; San
Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 178, 190, 194.) For example, an initial report to a
county welfare department must be shared with the local police or sheriff’s department,
and vice versa. (Planned Parenthood, at p. 259; § 11166, subds. (j) & (k).)
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE2
A. Holman’s Complaint
Holman commenced this action by filing a complaint for damages against the
County in February 2020. (Holman, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 193.) After a successful
2 In the proceedings below, the trial court sealed certain records discussed in this
case, which were also filed under seal in this court. As a result, the parties filed both
redacted and unredacted versions of their appellate briefs, with the unredacted versions
filed under seal. We have avoided reciting any facts from the sealed portions of the
record in this opinion, hence, we are filing the opinion without redactions. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.46(g)(1) & (2).) All further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
3
demurrer and several amendments, Holman filed the operative fourth amended complaint
(the complaint), which alleges the following facts:
Holman was born in January 1992. During his adolescence, Holman lived in
Butte County, California, under the care and supervision of his “abusive parents.” In
2004, when Holman was 12 years old, Holman’s father “began a pattern of physically
and emotionally abusing [Holman’s] mother . . . in the presence of [Holman]. This
included striking [her] with fists, shouting at her, using insults and vulgar and abusive
language, and other forms of physical and emotional abuse.”
In 2006, when Holman was 14 years old, “his parents began . . . a pattern of
physical abuse against [him],” which included “striking him with fists, attempting to kick
him, other physical abuse, and threatening him with violence and retaliation.” Holman
was subjected to such abuse “continuously for approximately two years until . . . April
2008.” During the course of this abuse, Holman’s parents “intentionally and maliciously
threatened [Holman] with great bodily harm, causing [him] to be in constant fear for his
life, and inflicted injury on [him] through intentional, violent, unjustified, harmful, and
offensive physical contact without [his] consent.”
On May 8, 2006, the County’s Health and Human Services Agency (the County
welfare department) received a report of suspected child abuse from Holman’s teacher
(the May 2006 referral or report), a mandated reporter under section 11165.7, subdivision
(a)(1). Holman alleges that, based on the allegations in the report, the County welfare
department should have conducted some form of an in-person investigation. Instead, the
County “evaluated out” the May 2006 referral, without any investigation.
The complaint alleges two causes of action under Government Code section 815.6,
which renders a public entity liable for injury caused by its failure to discharge a
mandatory duty. The first cause of action claims that the County negligently failed to
perform a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 328 and 16504 to
evaluate and investigate the “substantiated” report of child abuse. The second cause of
4
action alleges that the County breached a mandatory duty under section 11166,
subdivision (j), by failing to cross-report the allegations of abuse to local law
enforcement and the district attorney’s office. As a proximate result of these violations,
the complaint alleges that Holman suffered “years of physical and emotional abuse” that
otherwise could have been prevented, leading to “post-traumatic stress disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety disorder(s), [and] depression,” requiring
professional treatment and counseling for the rest of Holman’s life. The complaint seeks
compensatory damages in an amount according to proof.
B. The County’s Summary Judgment Motion
The County filed a motion for summary judgment on the complaint. In support of
the motion, the County relied on a collection of exhibits, which included portions of the
State Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures for Child Welfare
Services, Division 31 Regulations, Manual Letter No. CWS-93-01, (July 1, 1993), pages
52-79.7 (the DSS Manual); the May 2006 referral; the County’s “Structured Decision
Making Hotline Tools,” application guide of procedures and forms; and a County welfare
department’s Emergency Response Referral Information form dated May 9, 2006. The
County’s exhibits also included a declaration and an excerpt of the deposition testimony
from the intake social worker, Bee Lee; a declaration and an excerpt of the deposition
testimony from the County’s “person most knowledgeable” about training social workers,
Erin Sweet; and an excerpt of the transcript of the videotape deposition from the
mandated reporter.
The County argued that its evidence established the following undisputed facts:
In responding to reports (referrals) involving suspected child abuse, social workers
follow the DSS Manual. According to section 31-101.1 of the DSS Manual in effect in
2006, the County was required to respond to “all referrals for service which allege that a
child is endangered by abuse, neglect or exploitation.” Under section 31-101.3 of the
DSS Manual, a county social worker “shall respond” to a referral by one of the following
5
methods: “[c]ompleting an Emergency Response Protocol, as described in Section 31-
105[,]” “[c]onducting an in-person immediate investigation, as described in Section 31-
115[;]” or “[c]onducting an in-person investigation initiated within 10 calendar days from
the date the referral was received, as described in Section 31-120.”
Section 31-105 of the DSS Manual governs the “Emergency Response Protocol”
process. (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) It provides: “The social worker shall
immediately initiate and complete the Emergency Response Protocol process when it is
necessary to determine whether an in-person investigation is required. The social worker
shall record all available and appropriate information on the Emergency Response
Protocol form, SOC 423 (10/92), or an approved substitute.” (DSS Manual, § 31-105.1.)
Among other things, the form must include “[d]ecision criteria” related to the
determination of whether an in-person investigation is necessary. (DSS Manual, § 31-
105.115.)
In accordance with the Emergency Response Protocol process, “an intake social
worker conducts an initial evaluation of risk to determine whether an in-person response
is appropriate.” During this initial evaluation, “the intake social worker engages in a
decision-making process and determines if the allegations rise to the level of abuse and
neglect to warrant an in-person investigation.” “Intake social workers utilize the [DSS
Manual] section 31 regulations and the Structured Decision Making tools to guide their
assessment,” and “document their conclusions in the Emergency Response Protocol
form.” “Based on their conclusions during the initial evaluation of risk, the intake social
worker will either ‘evaluate out’ the referral or assign it for an in-person investigation.”
In this case, a mandated reporter called the County welfare department in May
2006 to make a child abuse referral relating to Holman. The mandated reporter spoke to
intake social worker Lee. The mandated reporter subsequently completed a written
“Suspected Child Abuse Report.”
6
Lee performed an initial evaluation of the referral using the “Structured Decision
Making Hotline Tools” as a guide. The fact that Lee did not check certain boxes on the
Structured Decision Making Hotline Tools form did not mean it was incomplete. Lee
intentionally did not check those boxes because, in his discretion, he determined the
allegations did not meet the definitions of abuse. Accordingly, Lee “evaluated out” the
referral and characterized it as a “substantial risk.”
Lee did not personally contact Holman or his parents before deciding to “evaluate
out” the May 2006 referral. Lee documented his decision to “evaluate out” the referral
using an “Emergency Response Referral Information” form. Lee’s supervisor approved
the decision. Because the referral was “evaluated out,” Lee did not cross-report the
allegation to local law enforcement.
Based on these “undisputed” facts, the County argued that Holman’s first cause of
action fails because (1) the County fulfilled its mandatory duty to perform an initial
evaluation and determine whether an in-person investigation was appropriate, and (2) the
County is entitled to discretionary immunity for its decision to “evaluate out” the May
2006 referral without conducting an in-person investigation.
The County argued that the second cause of action fails because section 11166,
subdivision (j), does not confer a private right of action, and because there is no
mandatory duty to cross-report a referral where the social worker has determined the
allegations do not meet the definitions of abuse or neglect.
C. Holman’s Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Holman relied on much of the
same evidence as the County: The May 2006 referral, portions of the DSS Manual,
county forms and training materials, and excerpts of depositions from Lee, Sweet, and the
mandated reporter. However, Holman generally disputed the County’s interpretation of
the evidence and/or its legal significance. According to Holman, the evidence shows:
7
On or about May 4, 2006, the mandated reporter called the County to report
suspected child abuse involving Holman. The mandated reporter testified about the
circumstances giving rise to her duty to report. The mandated reporter also stated that
she immediately stepped away to call child protective services while Holman and his
mother waited. The mandated reporter also testified about what she reported over the
phone.
Lee documented the information relayed to him by the mandated reporter in an
Emergency Response Referral Information form. In the form, Lee wrote down
observations gained from the interaction with the mandated reporter.
Lee made the decision to “evaluate out” the May 2006 referral based on what was
verbally communicated to him by the mandated reporter. Lee determined that the
information reported to him by the mandated reporter was not sufficient to meet the
definitions of physical abuse or neglect. Lee explained that he reached this conclusion
because there was no evidence of “injury to the child” and no specific information
regarding the alleged abuse. In short, he “didn’t have enough information,” and the
“information that [he] tried to gather, the reporting party didn’t know.” Lee, therefore,
“evaluated out” the May 2006 referral without performing an in-person investigation.
Lee completed the Emergency Response Referral Information form before he
received the mandated reporter’s written report. A date stamp on the written report
suggests it was received by the county on May 16, 2006, about five days after Lee’s
supervisor approved the decision to “evaluate out” the May 2006 referral. The
description of the incident in the written report includes details that were not included in
the mandated reporter’s verbal statement.
As the designated “person most knowledgeable” about training intake social
workers, Sweet testified about the definition of “physical abuse.” She testified that the
perpetrator must have had an “intent” to physically harm the child. She testified that she
could not say, without more information, whether a parent punching a child in the face
8
would meet the definition of physical abuse. However, she testified that it would be
abuse for a parent to punch a child out of anger because the child threw something.
Sweet additionally testified that if a social worker does not believe the allegation
in a referral meets the definitions of abuse or neglect, the worker is not required to cross-
report the referral to law enforcement.
Relying on this evidence, Holman argued that there is a triable issue of material
fact about whether the County performed its mandatory duty to evaluate and investigate
the abuse alleged in the May 2006 referral. He argued that the County failed to satisfy its
ministerial duty because the County (1) failed to complete the required forms, (2) used a
legally incorrect definition of abuse, (3) failed to consider the additional information
contained in the mandated reporter’s written report, and (4) improperly delegated its
duties to the mandated reporter.
Holman also argued that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the
County breached a duty to cross-report the allegations to local law enforcement. He
argued that cross-reporting is mandatory whenever an allegation meets the legal
definition of abuse. Holman argued that the County used an incorrect legal definition of
physical abuse and therefore failed to fulfill its mandatory duty.
In reply, the County argued that many of the issues raised by Holman were beyond
the scope of the complaint and therefore irrelevant to the summary judgment analysis. In
any event, the County argued, none of the issues raised created a material dispute of fact.
Before ruling on the motion, the trial court asked for supplemental briefing on
whether discretionary immunity applies when a child abuse report contains an
“admission” that a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally upon the child by a parent or
guardian. The County disputed the premise of the court’s question, but argued that even
if there was an admission, discretionary immunity would still apply to the County’s
decision to “evaluate out” the report. Holman argued that discretionary immunity would
9
not apply because county social workers have a mandatory duty to investigate and cross-
report any referral in which a parent admits to “committing physical abuse against their
child.”
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court granted the County’s
motion for summary judgment. The court found that the County met its burden of
demonstrating that Lee “fulfilled his ministerial duties” and was exercising his discretion
when he decided to “evaluate out” the child abuse report. Thus, even if Lee erred in his
application of the definition of abuse, his decision is protected by discretionary immunity.
Regarding the second cause of action, the trial court ruled that the statute
(§ 11166, subd. (j)) demonstrates the Legislature did not intend to require county welfare
departments to cross-report every referral “ ‘reported to it’ ” and that the statute “clearly
exempts [referrals]” that are “unfounded or ‘evaluated out.’ ”
In June 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the
County. Holman filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
Deficiencies in Holman’s Appellate Briefs
As a preliminary matter, we begin by noting the deficiencies in Holman’s appellate
briefs that have hindered our review in this case. Those defects include a failure to state
each point under a separate heading (rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)); to support each point “by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority” (ibid.); and to provide an adequate
“summary of the significant facts,” supported by citations to the record.3 (Rule
3 These rules apply with equal force to self-represented litigants like Holman.
(Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205;
accord, Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126
[“ ‘When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no
greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. . . . [T]he in propria persona
litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.’ ”].)
10
8.204(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C); In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 402; see Lewis v.
County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 112; Lopez v. C.G.M. Development,
Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 430, 435; Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.)
Holman’s opening brief also improperly attempts to raise new issues for the first
time on appeal. The rule is well-settled that the theory upon which a case is tried must be
adhered to on appeal. (Trammell v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d
538, 554-555.) A party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on theories not
alleged in the pleadings or argued to the trial court. (Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC
v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 224.)
Here, Holman’s primary arguments are the same as they were below: that there
are triable issues of material fact as to whether the County violated mandatory duties by
(1) determining the reported allegation did not meet the statutory definition of abuse, (2)
failing to perform an in-person investigation of the allegation, and (3) failing to cross-
report the allegation to law enforcement and the district attorney. However, Holman
seeks to dress his old arguments in new clothing, by adding claims centered around his
constitutional rights, the negligent undertaking doctrine, and a theory of gross negligence.
In addition, he improperly seeks to bolster his claims with new evidence (a state audit
report) that was not before the trial court when it decided the motion that is the subject of
this appeal. (Continental Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 69, 79.)
Although we have the discretion to strike Holman’s opening brief and require him
to file an amended version that corrects the errors, (rule 8.204(e)(2)), we have chosen
instead to overlook many of the procedural defects and treat the brief as if it were
properly prepared. However, in so doing, we shall disregard any points unsupported by
legal analysis or authority, factual assertions unsupported by citations to the record, and
11
arguments or theories not alleged in the pleadings and presented to the trial court in
connection with the motion for summary judgment.4
II
Standard of Review
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Under the summary judgment law (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c), any party to an action may move for summary judgment on a claim or
defense. (Aguilar, at p. 843.) Generally, the court must grant the motion if the papers
submitted show that “there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
To meet its initial burden on summary judgment, a moving defendant generally
must show, by admissible evidence, that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of
action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Serri v. Santa
Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 859.) Once the defendant makes this
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact
exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Id. at pp. 859-860.) In opposing the motion,
the plaintiff may not simply rely upon the allegations or denials of the pleadings. (Seo v.
All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201.) The plaintiff must set
4 Holman filed a request for judicial notice on October 7, 2024, asking this court to
take judicial notice of 10 documents, consisting of six documents that are already part of
the record on appeal (Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), three published court opinions
(Exhibits 2, 9, and 10), and one new document that was not presented to the trial court
(Exhibit 3). We deny the request as unnecessary to our decision. (Adams v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 673; Townsel v. Superior Court of Madera
County (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1087; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty
Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45.)
12
forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) A genuine
issue of material fact exists only if the evidence reasonably would permit a trier of fact,
under the applicable standard of proof, to find the contested fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion. (Catholic Healthcare West v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 15, 23.)
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we independently review the
record, applying the same process as the trial court to determine if there are genuine
issues of material fact. (Rheinhart v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
1016, 1024.) In doing so, we liberally construe the opposing party’s evidence, strictly
construe the moving party’s evidence, and resolve all doubts in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493-494; accord, Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067.)
III
Analysis
In reviewing the propriety of an order granting summary judgment, we first
identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the
motion must respond. (Lennar Northeast Partners v. Buice (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1576,
1582.)
Holman’s complaint alleges two causes of action against the County for failure to
perform a mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6. The first cause of
action asserts two theories for relief. The first theory is that the County negligently failed
to perform a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 16504 to
evaluate the reported incident and complete the required forms. The second theory is that
the County negligently failed to perform a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 328 to conduct an in-person investigation of the incident. The second cause
of action alleges that the County negligently failed to perform a mandatory duty under
13
section 11166, subdivision (j), to cross-report the incident to law enforcement and the
district attorney’s office.
Because the County moved only for summary judgment, and did not move for
summary adjudication in the alternative, the County must defeat both of Holman’s causes
of action to prevail. (Slovensky v. Friedman (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1527.) If a
triable issue of material fact exists as to either cause of action, we must reverse the
judgment. (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 811; Hawkins v. Wilton (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 936, 949; Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th
1218, 1223, fn. 1.) As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the second cause of action and, therefore, reverse the judgment.
A. The Government Claims Act
To provide context for our analysis, we begin by briefly summarizing the
governing legal principles under the Government Claims Act (the Claims Act; Gov. Code,
§ 810 et seq.).
Enacted in 1963, the Claims Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing
the liabilities and immunities of public entities and employees. (Quigley v. Garden Valley
Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) “Government Code section 815 is the
‘policy cornerstone’ of the act.” (Churchman v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 246, 250.) It establishes the general rule that public entities are immune
from tort liability except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); San
Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 179.)
Relevant here, Government Code section 815.6 provides a statutory exception to
the general rule of public entity immunity. (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 179.)
It provides: “ ‘Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by
an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the
public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to
discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable
14
diligence to discharge the duty.’ ” (Gov. Code, § 815.6; see Gov. Code, § 810.6 [defining
“ ‘[e]nactment’ ”].) As our Supreme Court has explained, Government Code section
815.6 has three discrete requirements that must be met to impose public entity liability:
(1) an enactment must impose a mandatory duty; (2) the enactment must be meant to
protect against the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) breach of the
mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered. (San Bernardino, at
p. 179.)
B. Holman’s Second Cause of Action
In granting summary judgment on the second cause of action, the trial court ruled
that (1) the County social worker was exercising his discretion when he “evaluated out”
the mandated report because the allegations did not meet the definitions of abuse, (2) the
social worker’s decision to “evaluate out” the mandated report is entitled to discretionary
immunity, even if erroneous, and (3) because the report was evaluated out, the County
had no duty to cross-report it to law enforcement and the district attorney’s office.
On appeal, Holman contends that the trial court erred in concluding that County
social workers have discretion to decide whether a mandated report meets the statutory
definitions of abuse. Citing San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th 168, Holman argues that
when social workers receive a mandated report of suspected child abuse, section 11166,
subdivision (j), imposes a mandatory duty to cross-report the alleged abuse to law
enforcement and other agencies. We agree.
Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty within the meaning of
Government Code section 815.6 is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.
(Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 631.) In divining
legislative intent, we begin with the words of the statute because they usually provide the
most reliable indicator of its purpose. (Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616,
624; Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 567.)
15
As relevant here, section 11166, subdivision (j), provides: “A county probation or
welfare department shall immediately, or as soon as practicably possible, report . . . to the
law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the case, to the agency given the
responsibility for investigation of cases under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, and to the district attorney’s office every known or reasonably suspected instance
of child abuse or neglect . . . .”
In our view, this language raises several questions relevant to this case. First, to
trigger the cross-reporting duty under section 11166, subdivision (j), by whom must the
abuse or neglect be “known or reasonably suspected,” the person who made the referral
or the county welfare agency that received it? Second, if the answer is the county welfare
agency, to what extent does the duty to cross-report depend not just on receipt of the
report, but its assessment or investigation of the allegations? Third, assuming the county
welfare agency may “evaluate out” a report because it determines the allegations do not
meet the definitions of abuse or neglect, is that determination a mandatory or
discretionary activity?
In answering these questions, we are guided by our Supreme Court’s opinion in
San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th 168. Although that case did not analyze whether
county welfare agencies have a mandatory duty to cross-report under section 11166,
subdivision (j), it addressed a closely related question of whether law enforcement
agencies have a mandatory duty to cross-report under section 11166, subdivision (k).
(San Bernardino, at pp. 174, 180-186.)
In San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th 168, a private citizen called 911 to report an
incident of suspected child abuse involving the child’s father. (Id. at p. 174.) A deputy
sheriff investigated the report and determined there was an ongoing custody dispute
between the parents, the child was not a victim of abuse, and there was no need for
further investigation. (Ibid.) Neither the sheriff’s department nor the officer cross-
reported the 911 report to the county child welfare agency. (Ibid.) Several weeks later,
16
the child suffered extensive head injuries during a visit with his father. (Ibid.) The child,
through a guardian ad litem, sued the deputy sheriff and the county for failing to cross-
report the initial child abuse allegations to the child welfare agency, in violation of
sections 11166, subdivisions (a) and (k), respectively. (San Bernardino, at p. 174.) The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeal
affirmed. (Id. at pp. 175, 177.)
The California Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. (San
Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 198.) The court held that the deputy sheriff
dispatched to investigate the 911 report did not have a mandatory duty under section
11166, subdivision (a), to cross-report the incident to a county child welfare agency. (San
Bernardino, at pp. 186, 197-198.) Even though the officer was a mandated reporter, the
court held that the statutory scheme differentiates between those who make the initial
report of suspected abuse and those who “ ‘come later’ in performing . . . investigatory or
prosecutorial functions.” (Id. at pp. 188-189, 196.) As the individual designated to
investigate the previously reported incident of suspected child abuse, the officer’s
findings, observations, and duties were not governed by section 11166, subdivision (a),
but by the statutory provisions related to investigations. (San Bernardino, at p. 189.)
In contrast, our Supreme Court concluded that the sheriff’s department had a
mandatory duty under section 11166, subdivision (k), to cross-report the 911 report to
other county child welfare agencies. (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 181-186.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that section 11166, subdivision (k), uses
mandatory language, providing that the law enforcement agency “shall” report “every
known or reasonably suspected instance of child abuse or neglect reported to it . . . .”
(San Bernardino, at p. 182; see Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d
432, 443.)
The Supreme Court additionally held that the determination of whether a reported
incident involves child abuse or neglect is a mandatory, not a discretionary, function. It
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explained: “The term ‘child abuse or neglect’ is clearly defined. [Citations.] Although in
some instances it may require the exercise of judgment to identify whether a report
involves child abuse or neglect, such a determination does not involve the exercise of
discretion. Deciding if conduct falls into a defined category does not require the
consideration of a host of potentially competing factors that is the hallmark of
discretion.” (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 181, italics added; see Barner v.
Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 684-685 [not all acts requiring a public employee to choose
among alternatives entail the use of discretion].)
The California Supreme Court found further support for its conclusion in the
legislative history of CANRA, noting that it reflects a legislative intent “to rectify the
problem of inadequate child abuse reporting by mandating [reciprocal] cross-reporting
between law enforcement and child welfare agencies.” (San Bernardino, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 183.) The court quoted committee hearing testimony that the legislation
was intended to require “ ‘alternative reporting in the sense that . . . if the police gets the
report first, . . . they immediately advise [child welfare services], and vice [v]ersa. If
[child welfare services] gets it, they immediately advise the police.’ ” (Ibid.) The court
also quoted with approval the following passage from Planned Parenthood, supra,
181 Cal.App.3d at pages 259-260: “ ‘The child protective agency receiving the initial
report must share the report with all its counterpart child protective agencies by means of
a system of cross-reporting. An initial report to a probation or welfare department is
shared with the local police or sheriff’s department, and vice versa.’ ” (Id. at p. 183.)
Finally, the California Supreme Court criticized the Court of Appeal for having
“incorrectly determined that a law enforcement agency’s duty to cross-report under
section 11166, subdivision (k) is contingent on its employee’s duty, arising as a mandated
reporter, to report and investigate under subdivision (a).” (San Bernardino, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 184.) The court held that the duties specified in each provision are “not
dependent on each other.” (Ibid.) A law enforcement agency’s duty to cross-report an
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initial report is separate from its investigative duties, and is “contingent only on receipt of
a child abuse report.” (Id. at p. 185.)
Because the sheriff’s department had a mandatory duty to cross-report the initial
911 report, and it indisputably failed to perform that duty, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming summary judgment against the
county. (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 175, 198.)
We find that the construction placed upon section 11166 by our Supreme Court in
San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th 168, applies to this case and controls the outcome.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion makes clear that, in general, the duty to cross-
report is triggered by receipt of a mandated child abuse report, since such reports are
made only when the mandated reporter “knows or reasonably suspects” a child has been
the victim of child abuse or neglect. (Id. at p. 185.) Although “in some instances” the
agency may need to exercise “judgment” to identify whether a particular report involves
child abuse or neglect, “such a determination does not involve the exercise of discretion.”
(Id. at p. 181.)
The County argues that San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th 168, is distinguishable
because section 11166, subdivision (k), requires a law enforcement agency to cross-report
every known or reasonably suspected instance of child abuse or neglect “reported to it,”
while section 11166, subdivision (j), requires county welfare departments only to report
referrals that are determined to meet the statutory definitions of abuse or neglect. We are
not persuaded. As our Supreme Court explained in San Bernardino, the purpose of
CANRA is to protect children from abuse and neglect by mandating reciprocal cross-
reporting duties. (San Bernardino, at p. 183; James W. v. Superior Court of San Diego
County (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 246, 254.) To that end, “the Legislature intended that the
various law enforcement and child welfare agencies immediately communicate to each
other information received on alleged child abuse or neglect so that they may in turn
coordinate their investigative procedures.” (San Bernardino, at p. 185, italics added; see
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Planned Parenthood, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 259 [agency receiving the initial report
must share the report with all its counterpart child protective agencies].) Thus, even
though section 11166, subdivision (k), includes the term “reported to it,” and section
11166, subdivision (j), does not, we conclude the intent of the provisions is the same: To
require “[t]he agency that receives the initial report [to] share the information with [the]
various other agencies.” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 779; accord, Doe v.
Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 141; San Bernardino, at
p. 194.)
Moreover, the California Supreme Court unequivocally held that determining
whether a reported incident meets the definitions of abuse or neglect is a ministerial or
operational function, not a discretionary activity. (San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 181.) Accordingly, even if social workers are required to cross-report only those
allegations determined to meet the definitions of abuse or neglect, there is still a triable
issue of fact in this case as to whether the County violated a mandatory duty by failing to
cross-report the referral. (Id. at pp. 180-186 [failure to cross-report can be the basis for
imposing civil liability].)
We likewise reject the County’s argument that the second cause of action fails
because section 11166, subdivision (j), does not authorize a private right of action. As
our Supreme Court explained in Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490: “If
the predicate enactment is of a type that supplies the elements of liability under section
815.6–[that is,] if it places the public entity under an obligatory duty to act or refrain from
acting, with the purpose of preventing the specific type of injury that occurred–then
liability lies against the agency under section 815.6, regardless of whether private
recovery liability would have been permitted . . . under the predicate enactment alone.”
(Id. at p. 500.) In such a scenario, “[i]t is section 815.6, not the predicate enactment, that
creates the private right of action.” (Id. at pp. 499-500.)
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C. Conclusion
Because we conclude there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the County
breached a mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the May 2006 referral, we must
reverse the judgment. (Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1223, fn. 1; Samara v. Matar, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 811.) Accordingly, we need
not decide whether the trial court properly ruled on the first cause of action. (Samara, at
p. 811.) We note, however, that to the extent the trial court’s ruling was predicated on the
County having discretion to decide whether a reported incident meets the definitions of
abuse, the ruling is inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in County
of San Bernardino, supra, 62 Cal.4th at page 181, as discussed above. Whether county
social workers have the discretion to “evaluate out” a referral for other reasons, such as
collateral information invalidating the reported allegation, remains an open question.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Holman shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Earl, P. J.
\s\ ,
Hull, J.
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