State of Florida v. Michelle Lynn Howard

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

__________________________________

Case No. 5D2024-0176

LT Case No. 2021-MM-003066-A

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STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE LYNN HOWARD,

Appellee.

_______________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Seminole County.

John L. Woodard, III, Judge.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A.

Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for

Appellant.

Stuart I. Hyman, of Stuart I. Hyman, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

May 9, 2025

BOATWRIGHT, J.

This is an appeal by the State of Florida of the lower court’s

order granting a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop

and a subsequent driving under the influence (“DUI”)

investigation filed by the Appellee, Michelle Lynn Howard

(“Howard”). We reverse because the lower court erred in granting

the motion in several respects as more particularly described

herein.

I.

On September 21, 2021, an officer with the Casselberry Police

Department was on patrol on State Road 436 (“SR 436”) within the

city limits of Casselberry observing traffic for speed violations. The

officer was positioned in a parking lot off of SR 436 so that he could

observe traffic from all directions and visually estimate speeds

while sitting stationary in his patrol vehicle. He noticed a vehicle

moving eastbound down SR 436 at a quick speed and visually

estimated that the vehicle was traveling at 69 mph in a 45 mph

zone. According to the officer, he was not using a radar device, nor

did he pace the vehicle to determine the speed. He merely visually

estimated the speed for a matter of a second while still in the

parking lot. The officer then pulled out of the parking lot to initiate

a traffic stop. He caught up with the vehicle as it was approaching

an intersection, at which point he observed that the vehicle was

being driven between the right and middle lane (essentially

straddling the two lanes) for a period of at least 15 seconds. The

vehicle continued on the same path into the intersection and the

officer initiated a traffic stop by activating his emergency lights.

At that point, the vehicle turned right from the intersection into a

convenience store parking lot and then turned left into the parking

lot hitting a curb before parking in a parking space. According to

the officer at the suppression hearing, the driver of the vehicle was

not merging from the center lane to the right turn lane to make a

turn, as the vehicle did not make the turn until it was out into the

intersection still between the center and right lane. According to

the officer, his initial reason for initiating the traffic stop was that

the driver was speeding and failed to maintain a single lane in

violation of Florida traffic laws.

The officer approached the vehicle and identified the driver as

Howard. Upon speaking with Howard, the officer noticed that she

had slurred speech and spoke with a thick tongue. In addition, she

had a flushed face; glossy, watery, bloodshot eyes; and an odor of

alcohol emanating from her person. Howard denied having had

any alcohol that evening, but then appeared confused while

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perusing her purse for her driver’s license. Howard again appeared

confused when the officer asked her for her registration.

Based on the totality of the aforementioned observations

regarding the odor of alcohol coupled with Howard’s behavior and

driving pattern, the officer suspected that she was under the

influence and decided to initiate a DUI investigation. The officer’s

body worn camera video footage of this interaction, which was

entered into evidence, depicts Howard appearing to be visibly

intoxicated. Howard declined to participate in field sobriety

exercises. As a result, the officer informed Howard she was under

arrest for driving under the influence. Howard then refused to step

out of the vehicle as the officer requested and resisted his arrest

when he physically removed her from the vehicle. He then

transported Howard to the Seminole County Jail which was

outside the city limits of Casselberry. According to the officer, he

transported Howard in furtherance of an investigation that

originated in his jurisdiction of Casselberry, Florida. While at the

Seminole County Jail, Howard provided two valid breath samples

which were taken by an employee of the Seminole County Sheriff’s

office.

Subsequently, Howard’s legal counsel filed a motion to

suppress. The trial court granted the motion. In granting the

motion, the trial found that: 1) there was no probable cause for the

officer to initiate a traffic stop on Howard’s vehicle; 2) the officer

lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Howard for a DUI

investigation, and the resulting investigation yielded insufficient

probable cause for the arrest; and, 3) it was impermissible for the

officer to ask Howard to perform breath testing after he

transported her to the county jail, which was outside of his

geographic territory. The State challenges each of these rulings on

appeal.

II.

A.

The trial court first erred in finding that there was not a legal

basis for the traffic stop involving Howard. In making this

determination, we note that initially, the trial court applied the

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wrong legal standard in making its decision. The trial court,

relying on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), ruled that

at a minimum, “probable cause of a violation of a law” is needed to

justify a traffic stop, and thus rejected the State’s argument that

reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a stop for traffic

infractions.

Florida’s courts have routinely discussed Whren when holding

that probable cause justifies a traffic stop based on a traffic

infraction. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.

1997) (“The Whren Court rejected the reasonable officer test in

favor of a strict objective test which asks only whether any

probable cause for the stop existed.”); State v. Nelson, 183 So. 3d

1074, 1076 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“[A] seizure is permissible if the

deputy has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has

occurred.”); State v. Parker, 311 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA

2021) (“[A] traffic stop is considered reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution ‘where the police

have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has

occurred.’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 810)).

However, the lower court misinterpreted Whren as

constricting traffic stops to the standard of probable cause when it

ruled that Whren was controlling in the State of Florida on the

standard applicable to justify a traffic stop. The premise in Whren,

however, on which Florida courts have primarily relied is based on

its holding that an objective, rather than a subjective, standard

applies when determining whether a stop is constitutionally

reasonable. See Holland, 696 So. 2d at 759. Specifically, this Court

in Parker cited Whren for the purpose of rejecting an argument

that a traffic stop was invalid because it was pretextual, stating:

“While the trial court found the instant traffic stop invalid for

being pretextual, the United States Supreme Court has made clear

that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop is not

dependent on the subjective motivations of the individual officers

involved.” 311 So. 3d at 1032 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13).

Our courts have not interpreted Whren as imposing an

exclusive probable cause standard for an investigatory stop. To the

contrary, the Florida Supreme Court, post-Whren, opined that

“[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a

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vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only where

there is a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an

occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law.” Hilton v. State,

961 So. 2d 284, 290 (Fla. 2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 663 (1979)). As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, “a stop

for the violation of motor vehicle laws is similar to the investigative

detention in [a Terry stop] and may be made when there is founded

suspicion.” See State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 2006)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). In line with the Florida

Supreme Court’s opinions, this Court has held that the standard

of law to justify a stop of a motor vehicle is reasonable suspicion.

State, Dep’t of High. Safety & Motor Vehs. v. Dean, 175 So. 3d 939,

940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“[T]he lower court applied the wrong

standard of law to justify a stop of a motor vehicle—probable cause,

rather than reasonable suspicion[.]”).

“In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion

in any given case, ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole

picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that whole

picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and

objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of

criminal activity.’” Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla

1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18

(1981)). “[W]hile reasonable suspicion ‘is a less demanding

standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably

less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment

requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for

making the stop.’’” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 294 (Fla. 2007) (citing

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). In considering

whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion, one looks to the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether “the detaining

officer [had] ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting

legal wrongdoing.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

Upon applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we find

that the trial court erred in determining that the stop was invalid.

While we agree with the trial court that the officer’s reason for

stopping Howard for speeding is not well-founded based on the

lack of specific and articulable facts provided to support a basis for

the infraction, see Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v.

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Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the officer did have

reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard failed to maintain a

single lane in violation of section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes

(2023). As this determination requires us to interpret section

316.089(1), we first look to the text of the statute.

The analysis of a statute turns on the plain language of the

text. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 278 So. 3d 545, 548 n.3 (Fla.

2019) (“The interpretation of a statute begins ‘with the plain

meaning of the actual language’ the statute employs.” (quoting

Nat. Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498, 504

(Fla. 2d DCA 2016))). In interpreting statutes, “every word . . . is

to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,” absent

some contrary indication in the statute. Ham v. Portfolio Recovery

Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Advis.

Op. to Gov. re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Rest.

Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020)). When interpreting the

statute at issue, “[o]ur objective is to arrive at a ‘fair reading’ of the

text by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts on

the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the

language, would have understood the text at the time it was

issued.’” Baldwin v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 396 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla.

5th DCA 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Ham, 308 So. 3d at

947)).

Further, “[a] fundamental principle of statutory construction

(and, indeed, of language itself) [is] that the meaning of a word

cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the

context in which it is used.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022)). As a

result, “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning.” Id.

(quoting Davis, 339 So. 3d at 324). In considering the context of a

statute, we look to “the specific context in which that language is

used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Conage v.

United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Robinson v.

Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). As such, a “statute should

be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord

meaning and harmony to all of its parts[,]” and is not to be read in

isolation, but in the context of the entire section. Jones v. ETS of

New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914–15 (Fla. 2001).

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According to section 316.089:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or

more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following

rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith,

shall apply:

(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable

entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved

from such lane until the driver has first ascertained

that such movement can be made with safety.

§ 316.089, Fla. Stat. (2023). In order to be immune from violating

the statute at issue, one must drive their vehicle “as nearly as

practicable entirely within a single lane[,]” and in addition, the

vehicle “shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first

ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”

The trial court based its decision on the finding that Howard’s

driving pattern did not affect any other traffic and thus, there was

not a valid basis for the traffic stop. 1 However, the trial court only

considered the latter part of the statute (i.e., that “the driver has

first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety”),

and did not consider whether Howard was driving “as nearly as

practicable entirely within a single lane.” In accordance with this

statutory language, this Court has held that, “irrespective of

whether anyone is endangered[,]” a stop is valid for a violation of

section 316.089(1), when the driver deviates “from his lane by more

than what was practicable.” Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26–27

(Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding when motor vehicle crossed over fog

line three times within span of one mile, even though no traffic was

1 The trial court relies on State v. Riley, 638 So. 2d 507 (Fla.

1994), to support its position. However, Riley dealt with a violation

of section 316.155, Florida Statutes, and its interpretation of that

statute. The present case deals with a violation of section

316.089(1), which governs a wholly different traffic violation and

contains different statutory language than that of section 316.155.

In particular, section 316.155 requires that other traffic be affected

by the driver’s conduct, a requirement which is not present in the

language of section 316.089(1).

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affected, there still was reasonable suspicion to believe driver had

failed to maintain his lane justifying the stop).

The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he

observed Howard driving for at least 15 seconds between both the

center and the right lane. Regardless of whether Howard affected

any traffic or endangered anyone, his testimony established that

the vehicle was not driven as nearly as practicable within a single

lane. Moreover, this was not a momentary lapse wherein Howard

subsequently corrected her vehicle. Rather, Howard continued on

this pattern into the intersection without correcting her vehicle

until the officer activated his emergency lights. In addition, we find

the trial court’s assertion that Howard was merging from the

center lane to the right lane to make a turn into the parking lot is

not supported by competent substantial evidence. In light of the

officer’s uncontroverted testimony regarding Howard’s violation of

section 316.089, we determine that there was reasonable suspicion

to stop Howard’s vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane.

B.

After the trial court found that there was not a legal basis for

the traffic stop, the court found there was insufficient evidence to

establish reasonable suspicion to detain Howard longer than

necessary to issue a traffic citation. Further, the court found that

there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to require

Howard to perform field sobriety exercises or probable cause to

place her under arrest as there was no competent substantial

evidence to believe that Howard’s normal faculties were impaired.

We agree with the State that the officer had a reasonable suspicion

that Howard was driving under the influence which justified the

detention and the resulting investigation yielded probable cause

for the arrest.

Florida courts have held that a traffic stop must last no longer

than the time it takes to write a traffic citation, but the detention

may be prolonged if the law enforcement officer has a reasonable

suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity was

committed or was about to be committed. State v. Kindle, 782 So.

2d 971, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In the context of a DUI

investigation, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a law

8

enforcement officer may temporarily detain a driver for a DUI

investigation based upon a reasonable suspicion. State v.

Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703–04 (Fla. 1995). The purpose of such

investigation is to determine whether probable cause exists for a

DUI arrest. Id.

“In order to detain someone for a DUI investigation, the officer

must have reasonable suspicion that the detainee committed the

offense.” State v. Castenada, 79 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla 4th DCA 2011).

Reasonable suspicion in this context is premised on the totality of

the circumstances approach as “observed by the officer, when those

circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer's

knowledge and experience.” Id. Our district courts have found that

reasonable suspicion for a DUI may be based on the commission of

traffic infractions, an odor of alcohol, and glassy, bloodshot eyes.

Id. (“[T]he officer observed Defendant speeding, smelled an

alcoholic beverage on Defendant’s breath, and observed that

Defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.”); see also State v.

Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d 339, 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding

reasonable suspicion for DUI investigation when suspect sped,

smelled of alcohol, and exhibited glassy, bloodshot eyes).

Based on a DUI investigation, whether a person has

consumed sufficient alcohol to be deemed “under the influence” or

impaired to an appreciable degree to be considered driving under

the influence is a judgment call made by a police officer based on

objective facts and circumstances observed by the officer. State v.

Brown, 725 So. 2d 441, 443–44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The offense of

driving under the influence occurs when a “person is driving or in

actual physical control of a vehicle” and “is under the influence of

alcoholic beverages . . . when affected to the extent that the

person’s normal faculties are impaired.” See § 316.193(1)(a), Fla.

Stat. (2021); see also Hoffman v. State, 743 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla.

4th DCA 1999) (“The three elements of DUI are driving, being

under the influence, and being impaired.” (citing State v. Weitz,

500 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986))). Although the smell of alcohol

is a critical factor, probable cause for a DUI arrest must be based

upon more than a belief that a driver has consumed alcohol; it

must arise from facts and circumstances that show a probability

that a driver is impaired by alcohol or has an unlawful amount of

alcohol in his system. State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla.

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4th DCA 2000); see Brown, 725 So. 2d at 444 (noting “under the

influence” as used by statute means the driver’s normal faculties

were “impaired,” not simply that the driver had consumed alcohol

but the odor of alcohol on a driver’s breath is a critical factor in

determining whether probable cause existed).

The officer in this case testified that he stopped Howard

because he witnessed a driving pattern of failing to maintain a

single lane; he then saw the defendant’s vehicle making contact

with a curb going into the parking lot of the convenience store

while she was pulling over. Upon making contact with Howard, the

officer noticed slurred speech, thick tongue, and a flushed face.

Howard had glossy, bloodshot eyes, as well as the odor of alcohol

emanating from her person. He further observed that she

appeared to have significant issues locating her driver’s license

and registration. This was sufficient to detain Howard for a DUI

investigation and to request her to perform field sobriety exercises.

Once she refused to perform the field sobriety exercises, these

same observations provided probable cause for Howard’s arrest for

driving under the influence. See Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 704 (refusal

to perform field sobriety exercises admissible as a suspect’s

consciousness of guilt and can factor into a finding of probable

cause).

The trial court in this case stated that it had reviewed body

cam footage from the officer on the evening in question and found

it to contradict the officer’s testimony. However, upon review of the

video evidence, 2 the body cam footage does not contradict the

2 The Casselberry police officer was the only witness who

testified at the suppression hearing regarding the traffic stop and

subsequent DUI investigation. He was wearing a body camera

during his investigation. The video was admitted into evidence

and is provided in the record on appeal. We are therefore “in the

same position to review it as the trial court.” See Baxter v. State,

389 So. 3d 803, 803 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024); see also State v.

Vazquez, 295 So. 3d 373, 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“Our record

contains the recording of Vazquez’s interview, and we ‘may

independently review the audio recording of an interview to assess

whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

10

officer’s testimony as the trial court suggests. For example, the

court stated that Howard was able to articulate where she was

coming from and that she was able to readily locate her driver’s

license and registration. However, it is evident in viewing the video

that Howard took several seconds (and appeared confused) to

respond to the officer’s question regarding where she came from;

she took a significant amount of time to find her driver’s license in

her wallet (including, as the officer testified to, combing the wallet

several times and throwing her hands up in frustration before

finally finding it, fumbling and dropping it, and then retrieving it

to provide to the officer); her speech seemed slow and slurred; and

she exhibited an abnormal degree of confusion when asked to

provide her insurance and registration. The video also does not

refute the officer’s testimony that Howard had a strong odor of

alcohol and that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Thus, our

review of the video footage leads us to the conclusion that the

court’s findings based on the video were unsupported.

C.

Finally, the State argues the court erred when it determined

the officer lacked authority to require Howard to submit to a

breath test outside of the city of Casselberry and we agree. The

State contends the court relied on inapposite cases from other

district courts of appeal in determining that the officer lost the

authority to require Howard to take a breath test when he crossed

over the Casselberry city limits and ignored binding precedent

from this Court even though it was presented to the court during

the suppression hearing. Why the lower court overlooked this

Court’s binding precedent is unclear. See Pardo v. State, 596 So.

2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1992) (“[I]f the district court of the district in

which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court

is bound to follow it. Contrarily, as between District Courts of

Appeal, a sister district’s opinion is merely persuasive.” (quoting

State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976))); see also

State v. Washington, 114 So. 3d 182, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)

(noting while a lower court is free to disagree and to express its

disagreement with an appellate court ruling, it is duty-bound to

findings.’” (quoting State v. Thompson, 193 So. 3d 916, 919–20

(Fla. 2d DCA 2016))).

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follow it, and the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly

articulated, “[t]he decision of the district courts of appeal represent

the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this

Court.” (quoting Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980))).

In State v. Torres, 350 So. 3d 421, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022),

this Court clearly held that there is an exception to the limitation

of municipal law enforcement officers’ utilization of powers outside

of their territory where the officer continues “to act or investigate

outside of his or her geographic jurisdiction” and “the subject

matter of the officer’s investigation originates inside their city

limits.” (citing Knight v. State, 154 So. 3d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022); Nunn v. State, 121 So. 3d 566, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).

This Court has applied the “ongoing investigation exception” to

DUI investigations that originate in an officer’s municipality but

then result in the suspect being transported to a neighboring area

outside the city limits for a request for administration of a breath

test. Torres, 350 So. 3d at 426. This case falls squarely within the

ambit of Torres, and the lower court offered no explanation or

justification for wholly ignoring Torres in favor of precedent from

another district. 3 Therefore, we find Torres controlling and we hold

that the court erred in finding that the officer did not have the

authority to request the employee with the Seminole County

Sheriff’s Office to administer the breath test. 4

3 The State, in its initial brief, acknowledges there is a case

emanating from the Sixth District (which was not cited by the

lower court), State v. Repple, No. 6D23-1448, 2024 WL 2983786

(Fla. 6th DCA June 4, 2024), in which it disagreed with this Court’s

holding in Torres that there is an ongoing investigation exception

to a law enforcement officer’s jurisdiction outside his municipality

and certified conflict to the Florida Supreme Court. Review was

granted on January 16, 2025, State v. Repple, 49 Fla. L. Weekly

D1296 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2025).

4 We note that the Casselberry police officer did not read

implied consent to Howard nor administer the breath test.

Although he made this request, the reading of the implied consent

and administering of the breath test was done solely by an

employee of the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office. The trial court’s

ruling is one that could be considered a slippery slope, as local law

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III.

We reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence

obtained as a result of the stop of Howard’s vehicle and the

subsequent DUI investigation. The trial court erred when it ruled

there was no legal basis for the traffic stop; and it also erred when

it found there was neither reasonable suspicion to conduct the

DUI investigation nor probable cause to justify the arrest of

Howard. We also find that the breath test results were lawfully

obtained under our precedent in Torres, 350 So. 2d at 424.

Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

enforcement agencies routinely send requests outside of their

jurisdiction for testing of evidentiary items such as drugs, blood,

fingerprints, bullets, and firearms in furtherance of their

investigation which appears to be no different than what took

place in this case.

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