DeJesus v. Shoemaker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX CHRISTOPHER DEJESUS, : No. 3:25-CV-0483

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

WARDEN SHOEMAKER, ef a/., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Alex Christopher DeJesus initiated the above-captioned pro se

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,’ alleging unconstitutional conditions of

confinement at Lycoming County Prison. The court will dismiss DeJesus’s

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted but will provide leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

In his complaint, DeJesus asserts that he is a pretrial detainee at Lycoming

County Prison who is housed in the “SMU/DLU” on the G-Block unit. (Doc. 1 at

2, 4). His allegations are succinct: he maintains that unspecified prison officials

keep the lights illuminated in his housing unit 22 out of 24 hours a day, causing

inmates significant sleep deprivation. (Id. at 4). DeJesus further alleges that, as

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed b

state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism fc

vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 US. □□□

284-85 (2002}.

none of the inmates in the unit are on suicide supervision, there is no legitimate

penological justification for the constant lighting. (Id.) He contends that the near

continuous illumination has caused him “sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety,

delusion, mood swings, [and] sight distortion.” (Id. at 5).

DeJesus lodged the instant complaint in this court on March 17, 2025.

(See generally Doc. 1). He sues four defendants: Warden Brad Shoemaker,

Deputy Warden Ryan Barnes, Deputy Warden Chris Ebner, and the Lycoming

County Prison Medical Administration. (Id. at 2-3). He seeks “monetary

compensation’ as his only requested relief. (Id. at 5).

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”

unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening

stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted[.]” Id. § 1915A(b}(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they

utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b}(6). See Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 &n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O'Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov't, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(nonprecedential); cf. Allah _v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974): see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents” attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct 2

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). At

step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to

state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)

(alterations in original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded

factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions,

| which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-

| truthful allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

| entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is

a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because DeJesus proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

| stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when

the pro se litigant, like DeJesus, is incarcerated. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3c

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

lll. DISCUSSION

DeJesus asserts a single Fourteenth Amendment? claim of unconstitutiona

conditions of confinement. His complaint, however, fails to state a claim upon

? Although DeJesus invokes the Eighth Amendment, he avers that he was a pretrial detaine

(not a convicted and sentenced prisoner) at the time of the alleged events, so his conditions-o

confinement claim implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not th

Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Jacobs v. Cumberlan

County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 22

n.4 (3d Cir. 2014); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard |); see als

which relief may be granted. The court will discuss DeJesus’s pleading

deficiencies in turn.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. lgbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens

context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that

demonstrate the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”

Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Personal involvement can

include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated

through evidence of “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and

acquiescence’; however, such averments must be made with particularity. Id.

(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Furthermore, it is equally settled that

involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does not give rise to

section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison

officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement’ was

“their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp.

Paulino v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, 438 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explainin

that “sentenced prisoners are protected from punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual,’ whil

pretrial detainees are protected from any punishment” (citing Hubbard |, 399 F.3d at □□□□□□□□□

3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’

923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x

924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner's claims

against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations

| against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance

process’ ).

DeJesus’s first and primary deficiency is that he fails to allege personal

involvement by Defendants in the purported constitutional violation. His

complaint is silent as to the alleged unlawful action (or inaction) of any of the

Defendants he identifies in his complaint. In fact, besides being listed in the

caption and the defendant-identification section, the prison entity and officials

DeJesus sues do not appear anywhere else in the pleading. Accordingly, the

court must dismiss the Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against all

Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal

involvement.

B. “Person” for Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, anc

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). Only “persons”

are subject to suit under Section 1983, and entities such as prisons, agencies,

and private businesses do not qualify as “persons.” See Will v. Mich. Dep't of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989): Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435

F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that

district court properly “dismissed Clarion County Jail as a defendant in this case,

quoting district court’s reasoning that “it is well established in the Third Circuit

that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under federal civil rights laws’”);

Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp. 2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that

PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of Section 1983” and thus not

subject to liability under that statute); see also Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991,

992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a

state agency and not a “person” under Section 1983); Ali v. Ann Klein Forensic

Center, No. 21-CV-316, 2022 WL 138084, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding

that state hospital “is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”).

DeJesus attempts to sue the Lycoming County Prison Medical

Administration. (See Doc. 1 at 3). This entity is not a “person,” and therefore

DeJesus has failed to assert a viable Section 1983 claim against it. Moreover,

DeJesus does not allege an unconstitutional policy or custom by the prison

medical administration such that a Section 1983 lawsuit could be maintained

against Lycoming County. See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318

F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the prison medical administration

must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relie

C. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

When a pretrial detainee asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim, the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to consider

“first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by the[] conditions, and

second, whether the[] conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” See

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hubbard Il} (quoting Union

Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)). If pretrial

detainees are subjected to conditions that are not reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective, an inference may be made that the purpose o

the prison official's action is punishment. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 97:

F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, “a particular measure amounts to

punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of

detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally relatec

to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is

excessive in light of that purpose.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir

2007) (quoting Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).

As the Third Circuit instructs, courts confronted with a Fourteenth

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must “consider the totality of the

circumstances of confinement.” Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (citing Hubbard |, 399

F.3d at 159-60). And, like an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement

claim by a convicted prisoner, a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim by a pretrial detainee requires a showing of deliberate

indifference on the part of prison officials. Edwards v. Northampton County, 663

F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Colburn v. Upper

Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991)).

DeJesus’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim fails

because he has not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by any Defendant.

He has not alleged who was potentially responsible for the near-constant

illumination in his housing unit, who had knowledge of these conditions and was

deliberately indifferent toward them, or whom he informed about the conditions

and subsequently acted with deliberate indifference toward them. Without such

fundamental allegations of deliberate indifference by any Defendant, dismissal ot

this claim is required under Section 1915A(b)(1). See Edwards, 663 F. App’x at

135-36.

D. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. The cour

will grant DeJesus leave to amend in the event that he could plausibly allege a

Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against a state actor or

actors.

lf DeJesus chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and

without reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should sel

forth his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in short,

concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs.

DeJesus must address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Memorandum.

Most notably, he must clearly set forth the personal involvement of any named

defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. That is, he must plausibly plead

the unconstitutional action (or inaction) of each defendant he is attempting to

sue.

DeJesus must also sign the amended complaint and indicate the nature of

the relief sought. He may not include unrelated claims against different

defendants in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). If he does nc

10

timely file an appropriate amended pleading, dismissal of his complaint will

automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the court will close this

case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss DeJesus’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Leave to amend will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

Date:. = be 3% THE\COURT:

“JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY

United States District Court

44