Winkley v. Blackwell

Case: 24-60244 Document: 50-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/08/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 24-60244

FILED

May 8, 2025

Summary Calendar

____________ Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Dwight Winkley, Father and Wrongful Death

Beneficiary of Isaiah Winkley, deceased, and as Representative of

all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Isaiah Winkley;

Cathy Winkley, as Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Isaiah Winkley,

deceased; Shanna Winkley Edel, as Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of

Isaiah Winkley, deceased; Jeremiah Winkley, as Wrongful Death

Beneficiaries of Isaiah Winkley, deceased; Danielle Winkley

Hutchinson, as Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Isaiah Winkley, deceased,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Michael Chase Blackwell, Individually,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:23-CV-213

______________________________

Before Richman, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

Case: 24-60244 Document: 50-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/08/2025

No. 24-60244

In this interlocutory appeal, former deputy Michael Blackwell

challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity after he fatally shot Isaiah Winkley. Because we

agree with the district court that genuine disputes of material fact exist

regarding whether Isaiah posed an immediate threat when Blackwell shot

him, we affirm. 1

I

Just after 7:00 a.m. on December 10, 2022, Brandon Wascom called

911 in Hancock County, Mississippi, to report that he had seen a man

breaking into the home of his cousin, who was away for work. The 911

operator reported Wascom’s description of the man, later identified as Isaiah

Winkley, to the deputies en route to the scene, sharing that he was a “white

male, black pants, no shirt” and that Wascom said he did not “look in his

right state of mind.” The dispatcher also advised the deputies that Isaiah had

a “[w]ire and a chain ball” in his hand, that there were “a lot of guns located

in the house,” and that the homeowner was not at home. The operator

further stated that Isaiah “mentioned hunting dogs” when Wascom

confronted him earlier, but the operator described nothing else about the

earlier verbal confrontation between Wascom and Isaiah. After Wascom

updated the operator regarding a weapon that Isaiah may have been holding,

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1

See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 424-25 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming the denial

of summary judgment and remanding for trial after agreeing with the district court that

there exist genuine disputes of material fact in the case). But see Ambler v. Nissen, 116 F.4th

351, 356, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2024) (dismissing for failure to invoke the court’s interlocutory

jurisdiction because the court can only consider issues of qualified immunity if they are

purely legal), cert. denied, ___S. Ct.___, 2025 WL 1287084 (May 5, 2025); Newman v.

Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Under the applicable law, we have no

jurisdiction to review a district court’s determination that there are genuine disputes of fact

where we have decided, as a matter of law, that those factual issues are material.”).

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the operator in turn updated the deputies that “[c]omplainant believes he

may see a weapon in his hand” but he was “[u]nsure if it’s a gun.”

Three deputies responded: Chris Sholar, Michael Blackwell, and

Laura Yeager. Police dash cameras and body cameras captured the encounter

between Isaiah and the police. Sholar’s dash camera shows the officers’

arrival at the scene, but he was not wearing a body camera. There is no dash

camera footage from Blackwell’s car, but he was wearing a body camera

during the encounter. However, his body camera shows only the first few

seconds of his interactions with Isaiah, then the camera turns to the side and

does not capture the shooting or the moments leading up to it. Yeager’s body

camera footage provides the most complete recording of the encounter,

though her position during the encounter makes some of her footage

ambiguous.

As the deputies approached, Wascom sat waiting on his four-wheeler

at the intersection of the paved road and a dirt road, about eighty yards away

from the house, according to Blackwell’s later estimation. Blackwell drove

past Wascom without stopping. When Blackwell, Sholar, and Yeager arrived

at the house, they found Isaiah in the back yard. Blackwell had K-9 Officer

Dark on a leash in his left hand while he carried his sidearm in his right hand.

As he initially moved toward Isaiah, who was standing inside the fenced

backyard, Blackwell ordered, “Hey, show me your hands, right now.” He

and Sholar then repeatedly yelled at Isaiah to “drop it!” and “drop it now!”

Based on their later instruction to “drop the pole,” it seems they were

referring to the “T-post,” approximately six feet long with “a sharp shovel

metal piece on the bottom,” that Isaiah was holding in his right hand. Isaiah

also appeared to be gripping an unidentifiable object in his left hand. As they

yelled at Isaiah, Blackwell moved past the gate into the backyard so that he

was on the same side of the fence as Isaiah, while Sholar remained outside of

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the fence. Yeager also remained outside of the fence, positioning herself

several yards behind Sholar.

Sholar then shot Isaiah with his taser from outside of the metal fence,

causing him to fall down, but he stood back upright, T-post still in hand, only

three seconds later. While Isaiah was on the ground, Blackwell approached

him but then backed away once Isaiah was back on his feet. Immediately after

Isaiah stood up, he took two small steps toward Blackwell but otherwise made

no forward movement for the rest of the encounter. Sholar tased Isaiah over

the fence again, causing Isaiah to bend over and shift back and forth several

times, but he remained on his feet. Following the second taser deployment

that failed to bring Isaiah down, Sholar said to the other deputies, “It’s not

working, man,” seemingly referring to the taser. In response, Blackwell, who

had his sidearm drawn, told Sholar and Yeager, “I’m going to shoot him.”

Isaiah then backed up a few steps so that he was farther from Blackwell and

partially obscured by a large wooden fence post. When he stopped, his arms

were crossed in front of his chest so that the T-post was on his left side,

vertical and stationary.

All three deputies continued to yell, “Drop it!,” to which Isaiah

responded, “Shoot me!” Isaiah then uncrossed his arms and lowered his left

hand so that it was dangling by his side; his right side and the T-Post

remained obscured by the large wooden fence post. The second after Isaiah

lowered his left hand, Blackwell fired four shots at Isaiah, approximately

fourteen seconds after he had taken two small steps toward Blackwell or any

of the officers, nine seconds after he had backed away from Blackwell, and

ten seconds after Blackwell told Yeager and Sholar that he was going to shoot

Isaiah. When he pulled the trigger, Blackwell was standing approximately

eight feet from Isaiah.

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Isaiah immediately collapsed to the ground, and the deputies

continued to shout at him to drop the T-post. Yeager eventually handcuffed

him, removing an item from Isaiah’s left hand in the process—revealed then

to be a blue container of Mentos candies—as Isaiah continued to lie on the

ground, face down in the grass, unmoving. About nine minutes after the

shooting, Yeager responded to “central” and told them that Isaiah no longer

had a pulse. Yeager’s ongoing body camera footage and medical

documentation suggest that the officers did not attempt CPR to resuscitate

Isaiah.

Throughout the encounter, Isaiah held the post upright by his side; he

did not wave it at the deputies. Blackwell twice described Isaiah as using the

T-post as a “walking stick” in an interview about the incident with the

Mississippi Bureau of Investigation. Aside from the moments when Isaiah

had fallen and was attempting to stand back up, the bottom of the post

remained on the ground or within a couple of inches of the ground and did

not point forward or backward. Throughout the encounter, the only words

Isaiah said to the deputies were, “Shoot me!,” a phrase which he repeated

multiple times at escalating volumes. Because he was not wearing a shirt, his

waistband was visible to the deputies at all times, and there was nothing

protruding from his waistband. His hands were also visible to the deputies

throughout the encounter, as he did not reach behind his back or anywhere

else beyond their line of sight.

The autopsy report from the medical examiner stated that Isaiah was

five feet nine inches tall and weighed 165 pounds. It reported his cause of

death as “multiple gunshot wounds,” describing five separate gunshot

wounds in total, including two gunshot wounds to the chest. A toxicology

report showed that he had no drugs or alcohol in his system when he died,

only caffeine.

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In the wake of the shooting, Blackwell signed a non-prosecution

agreement with the United States, which was represented by the Criminal

Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the

United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Blackwell promised to resign from his position and never to seek employment

in law enforcement again in exchange for the United States’ promise not to

prosecute him for shooting Isaiah.

Isaiah’s father, Dwight Winkley; his mother, Cathy Winkley; his

sisters, Danielle Hutchinson and Shanna Edel; and his brother, Jeremiah

Winkley, jointly sued multiple defendants, including, as relevant to this case,

Blackwell individually and in his official capacity as a deputy. Bringing suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Winkley family alleged in relevant part that the

defendants had violated Isaiah’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an

unreasonable seizure when they “shot and killed Isaiah without provocation

or justification.” The Winkleys filed their suit in the District Court for the

Southern District of Mississippi. Blackwell moved for judgment on the

pleadings, seeking dismissal of the official capacity claims against him, and

the court granted that motion. Blackwell then moved for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.

Blackwell timely filed an interlocutory appeal of that denial of qualified

immunity.

II

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability” for

alleged constitutional violations “if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

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would have known.’” 2 “Qualified immunity shields from civil liability ‘all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 3 “To

determine whether qualified immunity applies, courts generally engage in a

two-part inquiry asking: (1) whether an official’s conduct violated a statutory

or constitutional right of the plaintiff; and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the violation.” 4 Courts have “discretion ‘in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should

be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

hand.’” 5

Although “[o]rdinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a denial

of a summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” the “denial of qualified immunity on a motion

for summary judgment is immediately appealable if it is based on a conclusion

of law.” 6 Typically, “the party who moves for summary judgment bears the

initial burden to show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 7 However, a

public official’s “good-faith assertion of qualified immunity . . . alters the

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2

Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

3

Id. at 745 (quoting Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009)).

4

Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223 (2009)).

5

Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236).

6

Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Palmer v. Johnson,

193 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 1999)).

7

Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

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usual summary-judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show

that the defense is not available.” 8 Accordingly, once the official moves for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, “[t]he plaintiff must

show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury could

return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional injury” as

well as that “the plaintiff’s version of those disputed facts . . . constitute[s] a

violation of clearly established law.” 9

When “the plaintiff is the non-moving party, we construe all facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 10 However, “a

plaintiff’s version of the facts should not be accepted for purposes of qualified

immunity when it is ‘blatantly contradicted’ and ‘utterly discredited’ by

video recordings.” 11 We “review[] materiality and legal conclusions de

novo.” 12 These legal conclusions include the “scope of clearly established

law and the objective reasonableness of those acts of the defendant that the

district court found the plaintiff could prove at trial.” 13

Blackwell argues that the district court erred in denying qualified

immunity because he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

The Winkley family in turn argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over this

appeal because Blackwell’s argument is “based upon disputes of genuine

material facts.” We address the Winkleys’ jurisdictional argument first.

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8

Id. at 329-30 (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)).

9

Id. at 330.

10

Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

11

Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 664 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

12

Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (italics omitted).

13

Id. (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001)).

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III

The Winkleys argue that this court “lacks jurisdiction to hear any

portion of [an] appeal where the appellant’s argument is based upon disputes

of genuine material facts.” Under their reading, the district court’s order

was “unquestionably based on a factual dispute” and therefore is beyond this

court’s proper scope of review.

The district court concluded that “there exist material questions of

fact whether Officer Blackwell faced an immediate threat of death or bodily

injury at the time he applied deadly force.” The Winkleys are correct that,

generally, we may not second-guess the district court’s determination that

genuine disputes of fact exist when reviewing the denial of qualified

immunity in an interlocutory appeal. 14 However, we may review the

materiality of those factual disputes in determining “whether the officer is

entitled to summary judgment even assuming the accuracy of the plaintiff’s

version of the facts.” 15 Additionally, “we are permitted to review

genuineness where, as here, video evidence is available.” 16 Therefore,

“[a]lthough the district court’s factual findings are given near-complete

deference, we cannot disregard clear video footage when available: If events

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14

See Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2018) (“When reviewing the

denial of summary judgment based on [qualified immunity], ‘we have jurisdiction to

“review the materiality of any factual disputes, but not their genuineness.”’” (quoting

Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016))).

15

Melton, 875 F.3d at 261.

16

Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Poole v. City of

Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2021)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 435 (2024).

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in dispute are recorded, as they are here, we do not accept any facts that are

‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’” 17

IV

The Winkleys claim that Blackwell’s fatal shooting of Isaiah

constituted an unreasonable seizure because Blackwell utilized excessive

force. “A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the

government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by

means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his

freedom of movement, ‘through means intentionally applied.’” 18 “A seizure

is unreasonable if it involves excessive force.” 19 “Whether the force used is

excessive depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 20

Determining if force was excessive

requires us to balance the individual’s interest against the

government’s, weighing the Graham[ 21] factors: (1) “the

severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and

(3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 22

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17

Ambler v. Nissen, 116 F.4th 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007)), cert. denied, ___S. Ct.___, 2025 WL 1287084 (May 5, 2025).

18

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (first quoting

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); and then quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489

U.S. 593, 597 (1989)).

19

Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2023).

20

Id.

21

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

22

Baker, 68 F.4th at 247 (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396).

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“Courts will consider ‘not only the need for force, but also the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used.’” 23 “[T]he use of force

should be proportional to the threat” as perceived by a reasonable officer. 24

“[A]n exercise of force that is reasonable at one moment can become

unreasonable in the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased.” 25

Regarding deadly force in particular, “[w]here the officer has probable

cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,

either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to

[seize him] by using deadly force.” 26 However, “[w]here the suspect poses

no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting

from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do

so.” 27 “Even when a suspect is armed, a warning must be given, when

feasible, before the use of deadly force.” 28 “[I]f the officer could reasonably

use less than deadly force, he must.” 29

In evaluating the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, “the

question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would

have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force.” 30

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23

Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d

379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021)).

24

Id.

25

Baker, 68 F.4th at 250 (quoting Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir.

2009)).

26

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

27

Id.

28

Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2021).

29

Allen, 65 F.4th at 745.

30

Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Elliott v. Leavitt, 99

F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996)).

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Moreover, “the reasonableness is ‘judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene,’ instead of the ‘20/20 vision of

hindsight.’” 31 In other words, “[w]e only consider the facts ‘knowable to the

defendant officer[]’ at the time the officer[] used force, and we must be

‘careful to avoid “second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the

scene, of the danger presented by a particular situation.”’” 32 Ultimately, we

conclude that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the second

Graham factor.

In addressing the second Graham factor, “whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” 33 we first identify

the factual disputes noted by the district court. The district court made

several observations in reaching its conclusion that “there exist material

questions of fact whether Officer Blackwell faced an immediate threat of

death or bodily injury at the time he applied deadly force”:

[Isaiah] was clearly having a mental or emotional health crisis.

However, he never directed verbal threats toward the officers;

instead, he begged the officers to shoot him. In addition, much

of the testimony and many of the assertions made in support of

the qualified immunity motion appear to be inconsistent with

the body camera video and audio footage. A reasonable officer

at the scene could have viewed [Isaiah]’s actions as

nonthreatening because [Isaiah] did not touch his waistband

and he could not have grabbed an additional weapon while his

hands were grasping other objects—a post in one hand and a

container of mentos candy in the other. The body camera

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31

Allen, 65 F.4th at 744 (quoting Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021)).

32

Roque, 993 F.3d at 333 (quoting Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir.

2019)).

33

Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

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video tends to support[] the assertions made by Plaintiffs that

a reasonable officer at the scene could have observed that

[Isaiah] was not lifting the T-post or attempting to use it in a

threatening manner. In fact, contrary to Blackwell’s assertions

in summary judgment pleadings, none of the videos from the

incident appear to show [Isaiah] raising the T-post over his

head or in any other threatening manner. At no time does it

appear that [Isaiah] was advancing toward Blackwell or anyone

else just before Blackwell discharged his firearm. Therefore,

the video is ambiguous as to whether [Isaiah] posed a threat in

the moments before he was shot.

According to Blackwell, right before he shot Isaiah, Isaiah “made a

quick movement to his right with that T-post, his left hand dropped down

towards the waistband of his pants and the bottom of the T-post came up,”

at which point Isaiah “made a threat with that T-post” while screaming

“Shoot me!” The Winkleys, on the other hand, contend that right before

the shooting, Isaiah “complie[d] with the officers’ demands” by “mov[ing]

his left foot slightly backward and begin[ning] to gently lean the T-post

against the fence to his right.” The Winkleys view the video as showing that

“[t]he end of the T-post never leaves the ground, Isaiah never attempts to

grasp it with two hands and [his] left foot never moves forward in a swinging

or throwing position.”

Reviewing the video for genuineness, we agree with the district

court’s assessment that “none of the videos from the incident appear to show

[Isaiah] raising the T-post over his head or in any other threatening manner,”

thereby disputing Blackwell’s version of events. Though the T-post was

largely obscured by a fence post in the moments before Blackwell shot Isaiah,

the fence post and the T-post were nearly the same height, and the top of the

T-post was never visible over the top of the fence post, suggesting that Isaiah

was not raising the post. The fact that the top and bottom of the T-post

remained obscured by the vertical fence post also suggests that Isaiah did not

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point it forward or backward at the deputies. Finally, Isaiah’s uncrossing his

arms and bringing the T-post toward the fence post to his right conceivably

support the Winkleys’ theory that he was about to lean it against the fence

and release it before he was shot. Even though the T-post remained in his

hand as he fell to the ground after being shot, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Winkleys, his continued hold on the T-post may have

been due to the fact that he did not have time to fully release his grip before

Blackwell shot him. The Winkleys’ version of events is not “utterly

discredited” by the video, 34 and we must agree with the district court that

the factual disputes regarding Isaiah’s use of the T-post in the moments

before the shooting are genuine.

Concerning the movement of Isaiah’s left hand, the Winkleys dispute

that he was reaching toward his waistband and instead describe his left hand

as “falling toward the ground below his waist with a hand full of something,

while his head and shoulders begin looking away.” Reviewing the video for

genuineness, we again agree with the district court that it is not clear that the

video blatantly contradicts the Winkleys’ construction of the events. Just

before the shooting, Isaiah uncrossed his arms and lowered his left hand so

that it was dangling by his side, and Blackwell did not start shooting until after

Isaiah’s hand had come to rest by his side. Additionally, as the district court

observed, Isaiah did not touch his waistband, and because he was not wearing

a shirt, it was evident throughout the encounter that nothing was protruding

from his waistband that he might have grabbed to use as a weapon.

Blackwell argues that “an officer’s use of deadly force has been

repeatedly deemed reasonable when the ‘suspect reached toward his waist in

such a way that the officer perceived “to be consistent with a suspect

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34

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

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retrieving a weapon”’” and that “[t]he same holds true where the suspect is

shirtless when making the sudden movement.” 35 However, the case that

Blackwell cites for the latter contention, Collie v. Barron, 36 does not support

this argument about reaching for a waistband while shirtless. Rather, in that

case, the court granted a police officer qualified immunity after a shirtless

suspect who initially had his hands in his pockets “removed his hand from

his pocket and swung it upward and over in the direction of [another

officer],” causing the defendant officer to think “he saw the glint of a gun,”

following which he fired two shots at the suspect. 37 Whereas the contents of

a shirtless suspect’s pockets are unknowable to an officer in the moment, the

vacancy of Isaiah’s waistband would have been evident to Blackwell at the

time of the shooting. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston 38 likewise does not

support Blackwell’s argument, as the suspect in that case was wearing a shirt;

it was merely untucked, obscuring his waistband. 39 We must construe the

video in the light most favorable to the Winkleys, from which a jury could

deem it objectively unreasonable for an officer to believe that Isaiah was

reaching for a weapon in his waistband when his hand passed his waistband

without touching it, his hand came to rest below his waistband, and his

waistband was clearly visible with nothing protruding from it.

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35

See Valencia v. Davis, 836 F. App’x 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(quoting Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2016)); Blanchard-

Daigle v. Geers, 802 F. App’x 113, 120 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Collie v. Barron, 747 F.

App’x 950, 951-53 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 278-79).

36

747 F. App’x 950 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

37

Id. at 951.

38

826 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016).

39

Id. at 275.

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Moreover, Blackwell was aware during the encounter that Isaiah was

holding another item in his left hand, which Isaiah never dropped. A jury

might therefore doubt whether it was reasonable for Blackwell to worry that

Isaiah was about to grab a weapon because Blackwell knew that Isaiah’s hand

was already occupied. Therefore, as with the T-post, the record does not

“blatantly contradict” the Winkleys’ version of events regarding Isaiah’s

left-hand movement, 40 and we must agree with the district court that the

factual disputes on that point are also genuine.

The question then becomes whether these genuine factual disputes

are material. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Winkleys,

as we must at this stage, a reasonable jury could determine that Isaiah was

attempting to comply with the officers’ commands by releasing the T-post

and was merely dangling his left hand by his side in the moments leading up

to Blackwell’s fatal shots. Under that viewing, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Isaiah “posed little or no threat to [Blackwell] or others” at

that point in the encounter. 41 Given that the Supreme Court has held that

“[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat

to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify

the use of deadly force to do so,” 42 the possibility that Isaiah may have posed

little or no threat to the officers or anyone else in the moments leading up to

the shooting is highly relevant. Therefore, we conclude that “[t]he fact

issues identified by the district court in this context were [] material to [the

_____________________

40

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

41

See Ambler v. Nissen, 116 F.4th 351, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2024) (determining that the

district court’s identified genuine disputes of fact were not blatantly contradicted by video

evidence, so a reasonable jury could conclude the suspect posed little or no threat during

his arrest and thus the fact issues were material to the Fourth Amendment claim), cert.

denied, ___S. Ct. ___, 2025 WL 1287084 (May 5, 2025).

42

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

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Winkleys’] Fourth Amendment claim,” and “we lack jurisdiction to

consider anything more.” 43

V

Lastly, we consider whether the constitutional right that Blackwell is

alleged to have violated was clearly established. 44 “[A] clearly established

right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 45 “The critical

question when ascertaining the clearly established law is ‘whether the state

of the law at the time of an incident provided fair warning to the defendants

that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.’” 46 To prove that a right

was clearly established, a plaintiff “must ‘identify a case—usually, a body of

relevant case law—in which an officer acting under similar circumstances

was held to have violated the Constitution.’” 47 Though “there need not be

‘a case directly on point,’ the unlawfulness of the challenged conduct must

be ‘beyond debate.’” 48 The Supreme Court has further directed that clearly

established law “should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’”; rather

_____________________

43

Ambler, 116 F.4th at 358-59.

44

See Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2023).

45

Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)).

46

Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572

U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam)).

47

Id. (quoting Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir.

2020)).

48

Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64

(2018)).

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it “must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” 49 However, “‘in an

obvious case,’ general standards ‘can “clearly establish” the answer, even

without a body of relevant case law.’” 50

We agree with the district court that Isaiah’s constitutional right was

clearly established by a precedential decision published by this court

seventeen years before the events underlying this case, Meadours v. Ermel. 51

In Meadours, this court upheld a denial of qualified immunity on summary

judgment because material factual disputes existed regarding whether a man

suffering mental health problems posed an imminent threat to officers when

he refused to drop a potential weapon despite their repeated commands to do

so. 52 The sister of the eventual shooting victim in that case called 911 to

request mental health assistance for her brother because he had been having

an ongoing “mental episode” for about one week. 53 “In her call [the sister]

made it clear she was seeking mental health assistance for her brother and not

reporting a crime,” but she “inform[ed] the dispatcher that [her brother] had

‘flipped out’ and she did not know what he was going to do.” 54

When officers arrived on the scene, they found the brother “holding

a large screwdriver, later identified as being 10 3/4 inches long.” 55 “The

_____________________

49

White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (first quoting Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011); and then quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)).

50

Roque, 993 F.3d at 336 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)

(per curiam)).

51

483 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2007).

52

Id. at 419-21, 423.

53

Id. at 419.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 420.

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officers claim[ed] they repeatedly commanded [the brother] to drop the

screwdriver” but he “refused.” 56 After a fourth officer arrived on the scene,

the brother “became increasingly aggressive,” and the officers claimed that

“based on [his] behavior, they felt that [he] was a threat to himself and

others, and that the officers could not simply leave or allow [him] to leave.” 57

He again “refused to drop his weapon,” so the fourth officer “fired

one beanbag round that struck [the brother] in the upper thigh area.” 58 “In

response, [the brother] ran and jumped over a fence into a dog pen and

climbed atop a doghouse, retaining possession of the screwdriver.” 59 Three

of the officers followed him into the pen and “again ordered [him] to drop

his weapon, and he again refused.” 60 The fourth officer then “shot [the

brother] with a second beanbag round, but [he] remained atop the doghouse

with the screwdriver.” 61 At this point, the fourth officer claimed that he

“fired a third beanbag round that . . . knocked [the brother] off the

doghouse,” though the plaintiffs “claim[ed] that it was [a] bullet, not a

beanbag round, that knocked [him] from the doghouse.” 62

“After falling/jumping from the doghouse, [the brother] began to run

toward a door leading to the garage with the screwdriver held in what the

officers describe as a ‘stabbing grip.’” 63 The officers claimed that one officer

_____________________

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 420-21.

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“was standing near that door and they felt that [the brother] was charging at

[that officer] with the screwdriver,” so “[r]esponding to the perceived

threat, [three officers] stated they repeatedly fired their service weapons,

each a different caliber, killing [the brother].” 64

The brother’s estate, his parents, and his sister then sued the officers,

alleging that their excessive force violated the brother’s constitutional

rights. 65 The officers asserted a qualified immunity defense at summary

judgment, and this court reasoned on appeal that “[i]n order to determine

reasonableness in the case at bar, several key factual disputes must be

resolved—for example, whether [the brother] was first shot while charging

at [an officer] or while he was still atop the doghouse, posing no imminent

threat.” 66 Due to “the necessity to determine these types of facts,” we held

that “this dispute is material to the outcome of the case and the officers are

not entitled to summary judgment.” 67

To be sure, as Blackwell notes, differences exist between Meadours

and Blackwell’s shooting of Isaiah. For one, the police in Meadours were

responding to a call for mental health assistance rather than a report of a

crime, whereas Wascom had reported Isaiah as a burglary suspect. However,

the circumstances of Isaiah’s alleged burglary, particularly the unoccupied

status of the home and the lack of threats or physical violence, weigh against

using deadly force, so this difference is not significant enough to outweigh

the many similarities between the two cases.

_____________________

64

Id. at 421.

65

Id. at 419.

66

Id. at 421, 423.

67

Id. at 423.

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Additionally, Isaiah was holding a six foot T-post, while the brother’s

potential weapon in Meadours was a screwdriver of only ten and three

quarters inches in length. However, in both cases, the officers described the

objects as weapons, repeatedly ordered the eventual shooting victims to drop

them, and viewed escalating force as necessary when they refused to do so.

These similarities suggest that the officers in Meadours viewed the

screwdriver as no less threatening than Blackwell viewed the T-post.

Moreover, because Blackwell stood approximately eight feet from Isaiah

when he shot him, a reasonable jury could determine that he was beyond the

range of endangerment from the T-post at that moment, just as the officers

in Meadours were potentially out of range of the screwdriver, so this

difference again does not outweigh the similarities in the cases.

Lastly, Blackwell argues that Meadours “did not involve” any

“sudden movements with his hand toward his waistband and movement of

his feet,” unlike Blackwell’s version of the facts in this case. However, as

discussed above, the video evidence does not blatantly contradict the

Winkleys’ claim that Isaiah was not advancing toward Blackwell in the

moments leading up to the shooting and that he was merely lowering his hand

rather than reaching for his waistband. Therefore, these alleged differences

also do not sufficiently distinguish these cases, at least at the summary

judgment stage.

Many significant similarities exist between the cases. In Meadours, the

sister called 911 because her brother had been experiencing an ongoing

“mental episode” and had “flipped out.” The brother also “became

increasingly aggressive” in the encounter with the officers, leading them to

believe that his mental health status rendered him a threat to himself and

others. Similarly, the district court here determined that Isaiah was “clearly

having a mental or emotional health crisis” based on his pleas to the officers

to shoot him. The 911 dispatcher also warned the officers in advance that

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Isaiah did not “look in his right state of mind,” another sign of mental

instability. Throughout the encounter in Meadours, the brother was holding

a large screwdriver that the police described as a “weapon.” Here, Isaiah

was holding a T-post during the encounter that the officers also viewed as a

potential weapon. In Meadours, the officers repeatedly ordered the brother

to drop the screwdriver, but he did not do so. Here, the narrative differs

slightly, but in a way that favors Isaiah: the officers also repeatedly ordered

Isaiah to drop the T-post, and though he did not comply initially, he

disputedly attempted to comply in the moments before Blackwell shot him,

as described above. In Meadours, the officers attempted to use non-deadly

force—a beanbag shotgun—at least twice before resorting to deadly force in

order to force the brother to comply with their orders. Here, Sholar deployed

nondeadly force—his taser—twice unsuccessfully to bring down Isaiah

before Blackwell resorted to deadly force, gunshots to Isaiah’s chest.

Finally, in Meadours, this court upheld the denial of qualified

immunity because the facts disputedly suggested that the officers shot the

brother with a bullet while he stood atop the doghouse “posing no imminent

threat” even though he was still gripping his potential weapon, the

screwdriver. Similarly, a reasonable jury could view the videos here as

showing that Blackwell shot Isaiah when he posed no imminent threat

because he was arguably dangling his left hand by his side, making no

threatening gestures with the T-post, and potentially attempting to release

the T-post. Based on these similarities, Meadours placed Blackwell on notice

that he would not be entitled to qualified immunity when he used deadly force

on someone showing signs of mental instability who posed no imminent

threat to Blackwell or others, even if the shooting victim was holding a

potential weapon and multiple attempts to use nondeadly force were

unsuccessful.

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Blackwell argues that this case is factually analogous to Kisela v.

Hughes, 68 in which the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of

qualified immunity. 69 Blackwell asserts that the similarities between the

cases clearly establish the reasonableness of his conduct. While it is true that

the two cases share some factual similarities, Blackwell misconstrues Kisela’s

holding. In Kisela, police officers responded to reports that a woman who

had been “acting erratically” was “hacking a tree with a kitchen knife.” 70

When the officers arrived, they watched through a chain-link fence as a

woman “match[ing] the description of the woman who had been seen

hacking a tree” proceeded to “walk[] toward [a second woman] and stop[]

no more than six feet from her” while holding a large knife. 71 The officers

told the woman with the knife to drop it at least twice, and though the woman

“appeared calm,” she “did not acknowledge the officers’ presence or drop

the knife.” 72 One officer then “shot [the woman with the knife] four times

through the fence.” 73

The Court framed the question in the case as “whether at the time of

the shooting [the officer’s] actions violated clearly established law.” 74 In

reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s award of

qualified immunity, the Supreme Court stated that it “need not, and does

not, decide whether [the officer] violated the Fourth Amendment when he

_____________________

68

584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam).

69

Id. at 102, 108.

70

Kisela, 584 U.S. at 101.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 101-02.

73

Id. at 102.

74

Id. at 101.

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used deadly force” because “even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation

occurred—a proposition that is not at all evident—on these facts [the officer]

was at least entitled to qualified immunity.” 75 The Court went onto explain

that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the case was “far

from an obvious case in which any competent officer would have known that

shooting [the woman with the knife] to protect [the second woman] would

violate the Fourth Amendment,” and “the most analogous Circuit precedent

favor[ed] [the officer].” 76 Therefore, the Court concluded that the

constitutional right was not clearly established and reversed the Ninth

Circuit’s decision denying qualified immunity. 77 The inquiry in Kisela differs

from that before us.

* * *

Because we agree with the district court that genuine disputes of

material fact raise questions as to whether Isaiah posed an immediate threat

when Blackwell fatally shot him, we AFFIRM and REMAND the case for

further proceedings.

_____________________

75

Id. at 103-04.

76

Id. at 105-06.

77

Id. at 108.

24