Opinion

In Re: Adoption of: D.J.T., Appeal of: M.M.B.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 7, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Kunselman
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.1%

The opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.J.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.M.B., MOTHER :

:

:

:

: No. 1152 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Domestic Relations

at No(s): No. 19 of 2024

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.J.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: A.J.T., FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 1153 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Orphans' Court at

No(s): No. 19 of 2024

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: May 7, 2025

In these matters, A.J.T. (Father) and M.M.B. (Mother) appeal the

decrees that terminated their parental rights to their daughter, D.J.T. (the

Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (b).

Because each parent’s appeal raises similar issues and involves the same facts

and circumstances, we address the parents’ appeals together in one decision.

After review, we affirm.

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The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as

follows. The Child was born in August 2019. On August 10, 2023, Armstrong

County Youth and Family Services (the Agency) received a referral alleging

substance abuse by both parents. In May 2023, the Agency engaged the

family in a three-month diversionary plan through Justice Works to hopefully

avoid a safety plan and placement. This program, however, was unsuccessful

because, on August 16, 2023, Mother submitted to a drug test and tested

positive for crack cocaine. A safety plan was implemented. Two days later,

however, the Agency filed an application for protective custody, which was

granted, and the Child was removed from her parents’ care.

The Child was adjudicated dependent on August 31, 2023, and the Child

was placed in the pre-adoptive home of her Paternal Aunt. A permanency

plan was developed and several permanency review hearings were held.

On April 23, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to terminate the parental

rights of Mother and Father. At the time of this filing, the Child had been in

placement for approximately eight months. An evidentiary hearing was held

on August 19, 2024. Two of the Agency’s caseworkers, a family resource

specialist from Justice Works who supervised visits, and both Mother and

Father testified. The guardian ad litem (GAL) was also present and informed

the court that the Child’s best interest did not conflict with her legal interest.1

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, the GAL stated, “I don’t see that there is any conflict between

those two roles in this case. The child is four and a half years old. I think

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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She also informed the court that termination of the parental rights of both

Mother and Father was in the Child’s best interests.

On August 21, 2024, the orphans’ court issued its factual findings and

conclusions of law based on the evidence presented at the hearing, which we

reproduce as follows:

A permanency plan was prepared with the same

permanency goals for each parent; obtain suitable housing;

supervised visitations with the [Child] together with visit

coaching; and successful completion of drug and alcohol

treatment followed by clean drug tests. At permanency review

hearings in November, 2023, February, 2024, and May, 2024, the

Court found no compliance or minimal compliance with the

permanency plan by both parents.

To date, neither parent has obtained suitable housing. In

fact they have gone backward in terms of housing. Originally they

shared a trailer home with the Child. They have since split up,

with Mother staying at multiple addresses with various people,

and Father moving in with Mother’s mother, [W.B], who he has

accused in the past of illegally distributing Suboxone. [The

Agency] has ongoing investigations into that household as well,

unrelated to [the] Child. Currently neither parent has obtained

stable, suitable housing.

The parents have participated in supervised visitation with

the Child. Mother’s initial participation was inconsistent. For

example, she would often cancel a visit at the last minute or fail

to appear for a visit. She has since become more consistent,

however. Father has consistently attended his visits, scheduling

____________________________________________

that given that the communication would not be understandable for her to

give me any kind of opinion, I don’t see any conflict with that.” N.T., 8/19/24,

at 5. Because counsel indicated on the record, that Child was too young to

articulate a preference as to the outcome of the proceedings, we agree no

conflict existed. See generally In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1089-92 (Pa.

2018).

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them around his work schedule. The Child shows an attachment

to both parents, becoming upset when the visits end, particularly

visits with Father.

Neither parent has successfully completed drug and alcohol

treatment. Both parents have done intake appointments and have

begun treatment at numerous facilities, but never fully completed

treatment. More troubling, both parents continue to test positive

for illegal drugs. Mother has tested positive for cocaine,

Suboxone, fentanyl, and THC. She also refused to take a drug

test on one or more occasions. Father initially was testing positive

for cocaine, Suboxone, and THC. Father has not tested positive

for any substances other than THC since March 2024, though he

admitted using cocaine in June 2024. Father does not have a

medical marijuana card, however, so his ongoing use of the drug

is illegal. Most recently, Father chose to discontinue his treatment

at Family Acts in July 2024, even after he knew [the Agency] filed

[the termination] petition, because he wanted to spend his money

paying for his Xbox gaming system and other bills.

The Child is very happy in the pre-adoptive home of her

paternal aunt. She has no medical issues, and requires no special

counseling or therapy. There are no other children in the pre-

adoptive home. It is understood that if the [Paternal Aunt was to]

adopt the Child, the Child will still maintain contact with Father.

The attorney for the Child, who also serves as the [GAL],

reported that the Child is doing well in the pre-adoptive home and

[the GAL] recommends to the Court that the Court grant the

petition so that the Child may be adopted[.]

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 8/21/24, at 2-5 (formatting altered).

That same day the court entered its order terminating the parental

rights of Mother and Father. Father and Mother timely filed these appeals.

We will address Father’s appeal first. Father presents the following issue for

our review:

1. Whether the [Orphans’] Court erred when it found that

the evidence presented by the Agency clearly and

convincingly established grounds for involuntary

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termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.

§2511(a)(5)?

Father’s Brief at 5 (underline and excess capitalization omitted).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are

supported by the record. If the factual findings are

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because

the record would support a different result. We have

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving . . . the termination of parental rights, the appellate court

should review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence

supports the trial court’s conclusions; the appellate court should not search

the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court.”). The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a

highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the

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court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also

support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of his or her parental rights does the court

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of

the child . . . .

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted);

see also Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s rights under Section

2511(a)(5) and (b). Subsection 2511(a)(5) provides:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the

following grounds:

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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with

an agency for a period of at least six months, the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which

led to the removal or placement of the child within a

reasonable period of time and termination of the parental

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5).

In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(5), this Court has stated that the

moving party must satisfy the following five factors:

(1) The child has been removed from parental care for at least six

months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or

placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not

remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement with a

reasonable time; (4) the services reasonably available to the

parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to removal

or placement within a reasonable time; and (5) termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child.

In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Regarding

the final factor, we have clarified that the orphans’ court “must examine the

status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the

natural parents’ rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary

and beneficial.” In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. Super. 1990). Stated

differently, the Agency, when seeking termination under Section 2511(a)(5),

“must prove that the family ties either do not exist or no longer help but rather

hinder the children.” Id.

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Our review supports the orphans’ court factual findings and credibility

determinations. Based on its factual findings, the orphans’ court made the

following conclusions of law:

The Child has been removed from the custody of the parents

by the Court for a period in excess of six months. The illegal drug

use by the parents and lack of suitable housing by both parents

are the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from the

parents, and those conditions continue to exist. The parents

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable

time. The services or assistance reasonably available to the

parents are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to

removal of the Child within a reasonable time, as demonstrated

by the total lack of progress over a period of time in excess of 12

months.

The Child’s parental bond with her parents is not necessary

and beneficial to the Child. That is to say that maintaining that

bond does not serve the Child’s developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare.

A qualified pre-adoptive family has been identified by [the

Agency], and the Child is happy in the pre-adoptive home and has

bonded with the foster parents.

The [pre-adoptive] home meets the Child’s developmental,

physical and emotional needs, including her intangible needs of

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 8/21/24, at 5-6 (formatting altered).

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

The testimony presented by the Agency establishes that neither Father or

Mother has suitable housing in which to raise a child and has never completed

drug treatment. The failure to obtain either goal renders any bond they have

with their daughter neither necessary nor beneficial to the Child’s best

interests.

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In arguing to the contrary, Father asserts that the orphans’ court “failed

to take into account [Father’s] financial inability to continue attending drug

and alcohol treatment as well as the attachment between parent and child.”

Father’s Brief at 8.

Father first argues that his parental rights “should not be terminated

simply because he is financially unable to pay for services required by” the

Agency. Id. at 10. Father contends that “[i]f given additional time and

financial assistance, [he] likely would been able to remedy said conditions that

led to the initial placement” of the Child. Id. at 10-11.

Father next asserts that a “special bond” had developed between himself

and the Child. Id. at 11. In a one-sentence argument, unsupported by case

authority, Father states that “[t]his bond was not thoroughly explored by the

[orphans’] court in order to determine the extent of said parent-child bond.”

Id. at 11.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court concluded that the record

refutes Father’s claim of financial inability and that any bond the Child might

share with Father must yield to the Child’s best interests. The court explained:

Father’s concise statement asserts that Father was unable

to complete treatment because he was financially unable to do so.

That is not supported by the record in this case. Father

testified that in July 2024 he voluntarily quit his outpatient

treatment at Family Acts because he was having difficulty paying

all of his bills, including the finance payment on his Xbox gaming

system. Father has full-time employment and he conceded that

he could have continued to pay Family Acts, but chose not to

continue. Family Acts even offered to reduce Father’s cost to $50

per visit, but he chose not to take advantage of that offer. Of

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course, as a result Family Acts discharged Father, once again,

unsuccessfully.

The [GAL] provided her opinion at the hearing that neither

parent is able to take care of their own needs, let alone the needs

of a young child. Their drug abuse continues unabated after a full

year (plus three months, counting the diversion program) in which

to complete drug treatment. Their housing situation has

deteriorated, not improved.

[The orphans’ court] concluded that in the final analysis the

parental bond that [the Child] has with her parents is not

necessary or beneficial, because the bond does not serve her

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare. To

expand on that, it is clear that the [Child] enjoys her visits with

her parents, and she is sad when the visits end. But the fact that

the bond exists is not the end of the analysis. As the [GAL]

stated—the parents cannot take care of their own needs and

welfare. Both use illegal drugs and cannot stop. Neither has

suitable housing for a child. They cannot meet the needs of their

child. The foster family does meet those needs and welfare.

[The] Child has waited over a year for one or both parents

to pull themselves together and become a responsible parent.

Neither one has done so, and it is not clear whether either of them

has really made a sincere effort or is just going through the

motions.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/1/24, 4-6.

We are bound by the orphan’s court’s credibility determinations because

they are supported by the record. T.S.M., supra. The court found as fact

that Father chose not to continue his drug treatment, not that he could not

afford it. Father’s argument regarding the bond he shares with the Child is

undeveloped. Thus, we need not consider it further. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119

(outlining requirements for “Argument” section of an appellate brief).

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In sum, Father’s claim that the Agency’s petition was premature lacks

merit. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s

decision to terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(5).

We turn next to Section 2511(b), the second part of the bifurcated

analysis in termination of parental rights cases. Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Here, Father has not challenged the orphans’ court’s

treatment of this subsection. Thus, any claim under this subsection is waived.

In re J.T.M., 193 A.3d 403, 408 n.5.

We now address Mother’s appeal. Mother presents the following issue:

Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion by showing a

manifest unreasonableness in not accounting for [Mother’s]

continued efforts to rid herself of her addiction to controlled

substances when the court terminated [Mother’s] parental

rights[?]

Mother’s Brief at 8.

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s rights under Section

2511(a)(5) and (b). We begin with our analysis of Section 2511(a)(5),

incorporating our standard of review and factors necessary to establish this

subsection as described above in our analysis of Father’s appeal. As noted

above, the orphans’ court first determined that the Child had been removed

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from Mother’s care for a period in excess of six months. The court next

concluded that the conditions that led to the Child’s removal continue to exist

and that Mother, like Father, could not or would not remedy the conditions

that led to the Child’s removal within a reasonable period of time, that the

services available to her were not likely to remedy the conditions and that

Mother’s bond with the Child was not necessary and beneficial to the Child.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court expanded on its

reasoning regarding substance abuse by both parents:

The [Child] was placed on August 19, 2023 when she was just shy

of her fourth birthday. The primary reason for her placement was

her parents’ ongoing drug use, although housing was a secondary

concern. It is worth noting that [the Agency] had attempted a

diversionary program through Justice Works for both parents in

May 2023, prior to actually opening a case. The Justice Works

Family Resource Specialist testified that the parents showed

limited cooperation and were sometimes impossible to reach by

phone, and they continued to test positive for suboxone, cocaine,

and marijuana. After three months, it was clear that the

diversionary program was not having any success and so the

safety plan was implemented in August and the [Child] was

removed from her parents’ care.

From August 2023 through March 2024 both parents

continued to test positive for cocaine and marijuana and [Mother]

tested positive for suboxone. Since March, Father has consistently

tested positive for marijuana, for which he does not have a card,

and has admitted using cocaine. Mother has continued to test

positive for suboxone, fentanyl, and marijuana. Mother has also

refused a number of drug tests including drug tests offered shortly

before the termination hearing.

Both parents have begun treatment on multiple occasions

during the year the [Child] was placed, but neither has ever

successfully completed treatment.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/1/24, 3-4.

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On appeal, Mother argues the orphans’ court abused its discretion in

terminating her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) because “the court

did not account for [Mother’s] repeated attempts to escape her drug habit as

well as the difficult nature of stopping the abuse of illicit substances.” Mother’s

Brief at 12.

In support of her claim, Mother acknowledges our case law which holds

“[a] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain

the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities,” and that this

Court “cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for

permanence and stability to a parent’s claim of progress and hope for the

future.” Mother’s Brief at 12 (quoting In re Adoption of S.D.S., 328 A.3d

521, at **9 (Pa. Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision)). Mother notes

that in S.D.S., four of the mother’s five children at issue had been in

placement for roughly two and a half years and the fact that the mother had

received services for nearly three years without success established that she

was unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to removal within a

reasonable period of time. Id. In contrast, in this case only one year has

elapsed, and Mother testified at the termination hearing that she would be

back in a rehabilitation program as soon as her insurance was approved.

Mother’s Brief at 13 (citing N.T., 7/15/24, at 72).

In short, Mother asserts this Court has previously permitted longer

periods of time for a parent to remedy a drug addiction and she is willing to

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reengage in rehabilitation efforts to overcome her addiction. Mother’s Brief at

15.

However, Mother’s argument fails to appreciate the standard of review

we must apply to termination cases. We must accept the orphans’ court’s

factual findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by the

record. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation omitted). This is true even if

the record could support an opposite result. See id.

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision and

refutes Mother’s arguments. As cited above, the orphans’ court expressed

doubt that Mother has put forth a sincere effort to seek drug treatment or was

just “going through the motions.” Moreover, in S.D.S., as Mother concedes,

this Court affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights pursuant

to Section 2511(a)(2), which has different requirements to be met in order to

establish a basis for termination. Thus, we affirm the orphans’ court’s decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5).

We turn next to Section 2511(b), the second part of the bifurcated

analysis required in termination cases. Like Father, Mother does not challenge

the orphans’ court treatment of this subsection. Thus, we need not consider

it further. J.T.M, supra.

In sum, we hold that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act.

Decrees affirmed.

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DATE: 05/07/2025

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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