Opinion

Hunt v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed: May 6, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 35.1%

stating that an ALJ, in a unified statement, should explain his or her credibility findings in terms of the factors set forth in the regulations, thereby permitting the court to “trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.”

How later courts described this case

stating that an ALJ, in a unified statement, should explain his or her credibility findings in terms of the factors set forth in the regulations, thereby permitting the court to “trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.”
“No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result.”
when “remand would be an idle and useless formality,” courts are not required to “convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.”
“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN CARL HUNT, ) CASE NO. 1:24-CV-01619-BMB

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

vs. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SECURITY, ) JONATHAN D. GREENBERG

)

Defendant. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Plaintiff, Brian Hunt (“Plaintiff” or “Hunt”), challenges the final decision of Defendant, Leland

Dudek,1 Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i),

423, 1381 et seq. (“Act”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case is before

the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to an automatic referral under Local Rule 72.2(b)

for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the Commissioner’s final decision be AFFIRMED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2021, Hunt filed an application for SSI, alleging a disability onset date of January 31,

2017, and claiming he was disabled due to a tear on the back side of heart, several heart attacks, and eight

broken bones in his right foot. (Transcript (“Tr.”) 15, 61.) The application was denied initially and upon

reconsideration, and Hunt requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 15.)

1 On February 19, 2025, Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.

On August 25, 2023, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Hunt, represented by counsel, and an

impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (Id.) On October 27, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision

finding Hunt was not disabled. (Id. at 15-27.) The ALJ’s decision became final on July 24, 2024, when

the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at 1-6.)

On September 22, 2024, Hunt filed his Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision.

(Doc. No. 1.) The parties have completed briefing in this case. (Doc. Nos. 8, 10, 12.) Hunt asserts the

following assignments of error:

(1) The ALJ erred when relying upon vocational expert testimony that conflicted with

the RFC finding.

(2) The ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical opinions and prior administrative

medical findings and in her evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. The

ALJ failed to identify substantial evidence supporting the residual functional

capacity finding.

(Doc. No. 8.)

II. EVIDENCE

A. Personal and Vocational Evidence

Hunt was born in December 1976 and was 46 years-old at the time of his administrative hearing

(Tr. 15, 26), making him a “younger” person under Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.963(c). He has at least a high school education. (Tr. 26.) He has past relevant work as a general

laborer. (Id. at 41.)

B. Relevant Medical Evidence2

On November 10, 2019, Hunt went to the emergency room after falling down some stairs. (Id. at

249.) He reported hitting his head and that he thought he broke his right ankle. (Id.) On examination,

treatment providers found the right ankle swollen and tender with fracture blisters. (Id. at 252.) X-rays

2 The Court’s recitation of the medical evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is limited to the

evidence cited in the parties’ Briefs.

taken that day revealed “[m]inimally displaced comminuted fracture of the calcaneus with prominent

bimalleolar soft tissue swelling.” (Id. at 262.)

On November 15, 2019, Hunt saw Emily Exten, M.D., for his broken ankle. (Id. at 370.) Dr.

Exten noted “significant fracture blisters” and commented that wound healing would be one of Hunt’s

greatest challenges. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Exten found “[s]ignificant swelling,” ecchymosis, a large

amount of blistering of the foot and ankle, tenderness to palpation throughout the foot and ankle,

decreased range of motion of the foot and ankle, and decreased sensation. (Id. at 372.) Dr. Exten hoped

to proceed non-operatively. (Id. at 370.) Dr. Exten ordered a CT scan, cleaned the wounds, and put Hunt

in a splint. (Id.)

On November 22, 2019, Hunt saw Dr. Exten for follow up. (Id. at 373.) Dr. Exten noted Hunt

would remain non-weightbearing and placed him in a boot. (Id.) Hunt had not yet undergone a CT scan.

(Id.) On examination, Dr. Exten found decompressed skin blisters, tenderness to palpation of the

calcaneus and over the blisters on the skin, and decreased range of motion. (Id. at 374.)

On November 27, 2019, Hunt saw Dr. Exten for follow up. (Id. at 375.) Dr. Exten noted they

were still waiting on Hunt’s CT scan. (Id. at 376.) Hunt presented with a new wound on his medial

hindfoot, although he denied any increased pain. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Exten found mostly

decompressed skin blisters, tenderness to palpation of the calcaneus and over the blisters on the skin, and

decreased range of motion. (Id.) Dr. Exten debrided the wound where the skin had broken down over the

medial hindfoot. (Id.)

On December 4, 2019, Hunt saw Dr. Exten for follow up. (Id. at 378.) On examination, Dr. Exten

found tenderness to palpation, decreased range of motion, “several areas of decompressed blisters,” and a

“[v]ery small medial wound” that had “decreased in size significantly.” (Id. at 379.) Dr. Exten debrided

the wound again. (Id.) Dr. Exten noted Hunt’s CT scan had been approved. (Id. at 378.)

A CT scan of the right foot taken on December 6, 2019 revealed comminuted fractures throughout

the entire length of the calcaneus leading to a flattening of Boehler’s angle to 0; intraarticular extension

into the posterior subtalar joint as well as anteriorly into the articulation of the calcaneus with the cuboid;

moderate disuse osteopenia; and nonspecific moderate edema of subcutaneous fat diffusely surrounding

the lower extremity. (Id. at 382.)

On December 18, 2019, Hunt saw Dr. Exten for follow up. (Id. at 384.) Dr. Exten noted Hunt

would continue to be treated nonoperatively for two reasons:

[Hunt] had significant fracture blisters and several wounds which greatly

compromised the soft tissue envelope and led to him not being amenable to

surgery early on. However as that was healed his insurance company

continued to delay his CT scan by not approving it. This negatively impacted

this patient’s care. I discussed with him that we will allow things to heal. In

the future he may need reconstructive osteotomies and fusions of the hindfoot

related to this injury. He understands.

(Id.) On examination, Dr. Exten found tenderness to palpation throughout the heel, decreased range of

motion, and healed blisters and wounds. (Id. at 385.)

On February 13, 2020, Hunt went to the emergency room with complaints of chest pain. (Id. at

284.) Hunt complained of burning in his chest for the past week and that his left shoulder also hurt. (Id.)

He denied shortness of breath, diaphoresis, and nausea. (Id.) He admitted to using cocaine and heroin

that week. (Id.) On examination, treatment providers found elevated troponins, non-specific EKG

changes, and ST depression. (Id. at 292.) Hunt reported being noncompliant with his hyperlipidemia

medication. (Id. at 297.) Treatment providers diagnosed Hunt with a non-ST elevated myocardial

infarction. (Id. at 292.) Hunt underwent left heart catheterization and stent placement. (Id. at 318.) His

ejection fraction was 35-40%. (Id. at 302.) On February 15, 2020, treatment providers found Hunt

lethargic and minimally responsive, and his girlfriend was cyanotic and unresponsive. (Id. at 316.)

Treatment providers administered Narcan to Hunt and his girlfriend. (Id.) Later that day, Hunt left

against medical advice. (Id. at 318.)

On May 12, 2020, Hunt saw Dr. Exten for follow up after missing several follow up appointments

since his December 18, 2019 appointment. (Id. at 386-87.) Hunt complained of right heel pain. (Id. at

387.) Dr. Exten noted Hunt was weightbearing as tolerated. (Id. at 386.) On examination, Dr. Exten

found a mildly antalgic gait in regular footwear, mild tenderness to palpation at the plantar aspect of the

heel, mild tenderness of the lateral aspect of the ankle and the peroneal tendons, decreased ankle

dorsiflexion, and intact sensation. (Id. at 387.) Hunt was not in significant varus. (Id.) X-rays taken that

day revealed interval healing of the right calcaneus fracture, deformity of the calcaneus status post

fracture, and depression of the posterior facet. (Id.) Dr. Exten recommended Hunt wear a Tuli’s heel cup

and start physical therapy for subfibular impingement. (Id. at 386.)

On May 19, 2020, Hunt saw podiatrist Jeffrey Lynn for complaints of a painful and swollen right

leg. (Id. at 390, 394.) On examination, Dr. Lynn found subungual debris of the nails bilaterally, pain to

palpation of the right lower leg/ankle, pain in nails 1-5 bilaterally, and mild decrease in dorsiflexion of the

first MPJ bilaterally, no limp, and normal heel off. (Id. at 391-92.) Hunt’s diagnoses included localized

edema, tinea unguium, and pain in the feet bilaterally. (Id. at 392.) Dr. Lynn debrided the toenails. (Id.)

On June 3, 2020, Hunt saw Dr. Lynn for follow up. (Id. at 395.) Hunt complained of continued

pain and swelling in his right ankle/leg and continued instability issues. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Lynn

found pain to palpation of the right ankle, STJ, and right peroneal tendon, as well as degenerative joint

disease of the right ankle. (Id. at 396.) Dr. Lynn administered electrical stimulation, stretching, and

therapeutic ultrasound. (Id. at 397.) Dr. Lynn wrapped the foot and ankle in a medicated, multi-layered

compression dressing and placed Hunt in a hinged boot. (Id.) Dr. Lynn explained that the device was

medically necessary because while Hunt could walk, he had weakness and deformity which required

medical stability. (Id.)

On July 1, 2020, Hunt saw Dr. Lynn for follow up and reported the brace had reduced his pain and

helped “significantly” with his instability. (Id. at 400.) On examination, Dr. Lynn found pain to palpation

of the right ankle, STJ, and peroneal tendon, as well as degenerative joint disease of the right ankle. (Id. at

401.) Dr. Lynn administered electrical stimulation, stretching, and therapeutic ultrasound. (Id. at 402.)

Dr. Lynn wrapped the foot and ankle in a medicated, multi-layered compression dressing. (Id.)

On December 19, 2021, Hunt underwent a consultative physical examination conducted by Casey

Norris, D.O. (Id. at 437-44.) Hunt told Dr. Norris his disability stemmed from his right foot pain, back

pain, chest pain, and shortness of breath. (Id. at 442.) Hunt reported wearing an ankle brace “24/7 for

stability” and that he usually used a cane. (Id.) Hunt did not bring his cane to the examination because

“he did not want to seem as if he were trying to fake it for disability.” (Id.) He endorsed weakness and

numbness in the right foot and ankle. (Id. at 443.) On examination, Dr. Norris found the ability to get on

and off the examination table unassisted with difficulty, antalgic gait favoring the right foot, inability to

walk heel to toe, on heels, or on toes, inability to hop or squat, positive straight leg raise test on the right,

tenderness to palpation over the low back, right foot, and right ankle, and decreased range of motion in the

right ankle. (Id.) Dr. Norris opined:

This claimant should be able to walk for two to three hours out of an eight-

hour day. The claimant could probably be on their feet for a combined total of

three hours out of an eight-hour day. The claimant probably could carry less

than 30 pounds frequently and more than 40 pounds on occasion. Other

limitations in function include lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, crawling,

kneeling, crouching, climbing, stooping, and bending.

(Id. at 444.)

On January 12, 2022, Hunt underwent a myocardial perfusion multi spect study, which revealed

the following abnormalities: a large fixed defect involving the entire inferior, interior, basal-mid

inferospetal, and basal-mid inferoseptal walls with associated hypokinesis consistent with previous

myocardial infarction; a small, moderate intensity, partially reversible defect consistent with reversible

myocardial ischemia; and a dilated left ventricle with segmental hypokinesis and severe left ventricular

systolic dysfunction, post-stress LVEF 24%, and rest LVEF 38%. (Id. at 453-54.) Hunt had an overall

high-risk study. (Id. at 454.)

A March 2, 2022, echocardiogram revealed moderate reduction of heart function, an ejection

fraction of 38%, and a mild enlargement of the aortic root. (Id. at 500.) Viremkumar Patel, M.D., noted

that Hunt “has been a no-show to 3 of his last scheduled dates for the heart cath. I would really

recommend that he consider the heart cath as we were concerned with LAD/anterior ischemia/CAD given

his nuc results.” (Id.)

On March 23, 2022, Dr. Lynn certified that Hunt was to be non-weightbearing with crutches at all

times. (Id. at 511.)

On March 24, 2022, Dr. Lynn prescribed a knee scooter for Hunt due to right ankle fracture. (Id.)

On June 22, 2022, Hunt saw Matthew Schirner, PA-C, for follow up of his closed displaced pilon

fracture of right tibia with nonunion, post-operative pain, and status post ankle fusion. (Id. at 512.) Hunt

was to be strictly non-weightbearing for 2-8 weeks and elevate his foot/ankle to heart level while at rest.

(Id. at 515.)

On October 20, 2022, EMS brought Hunt to the emergency room for a drug overdose after Hunt

snorted a Xanax. (Id. at 543.) Hunt’s mother called 911 after becoming concerned and EMS administered

Narcan. (Id.) Hunt denied chest pain, shortness of breath, and abdominal pain. (Id.) On examination,

treatment providers found altered mental status, polysubstance abuse, cardiac arrythmia, and hypoxia, and

admitted Hunt for treatment. (Id. at 551.) On October 21, 2022, treatment providers noted Hunt

ambulated in the hallway with a steady gait and denied shortness of breath. (Id. at 555.) An ECG taken

that same day revealed sinus rhythm with frequent PACs and PVCs, as well as an ejection fraction of

24%. (Id. at 574.) Dr. Patel thought the low ejection fraction may be related to Hunt’s drug overdose.

(Id.) Dr. Patel restarted Hunt’s heart medications and stressed the importance of medication compliance.

(Id.)

On February 7, 2023, Hunt saw Dr. Patel for follow up. (Id. at 725.) Dr. Patel noted the etiology

of Hunt’s drop in ejection fraction was unclear, although it was possible it was related to his drug

overdose. (Id.) At Hunt’s last visit, Dr. Patel had started Hunt on Entresto and scheduled him for the

heart failure clinic. (Id. at 726.) Dr. Patel noted Hunt had missed two appointments with the heart failure

clinic. (Id.) Hunt told Dr. Hunt he was doing well and denied chest pain, shortness of breath, lower

extremity swelling, orthopnea, and palpitations. (Id.) Hunt endorsed lightheadedness at times, especially

with quick movements. (Id.) Dr. Patel recommended continued medications, lifestyle modifications, and

cardiac rehabilitation. (Id. at 729.)

A March 30, 2023, echocardiogram revealed an ejection fraction of 41%. (Id. at 738.)

C. State Agency Reports

On January 12, 2022, Laverne Barnes, D.O., reviewed the file and opined that Hunt could

occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, and his ability to push

and/or pull with the upper extremities and his left lower extremity was unlimited other than shown for lift

and/or carry. (Id. at 65-67.) He could stand and/or walk for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday

because of his heart attacks and right foot fracture. (Id. at 66.) He could sit for about six hours in an

eight-hour workday. (Id.) Hunt could occasionally push and/or pull with his right lower extremity. (Id.)

Hunt could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.) He

could occasionally balance and stoop. (Id.) He could frequently kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id.) He must

avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes, humidity, vibration, and fumes, odors, dusts, gases,

poor ventilation, etc. (Id.) He must avoid even moderate exposure to hazards. (Id.)

On September 1, 2022, on reconsideration, Gerald Kylop, M.D., affirmed Dr. Barnes’ findings.

(Id. at 74-76.)

D. Hearing Testimony

During the August 25, 2023 hearing, Hunt testified to the following:

• He holds a driver’s license, and he drives. (Id. at 42.)

• He has very slow breathing and he cannot do much. (Id.) He can’t breathe after

climbing stairs. (Id.) He mainly experiences shortness of breath. (Id.) He gets some

chest pain, but it’s not constant. (Id.) When he gets chest pains, he needs to sit down

and take a break. (Id.) He gets fatigued easily. (Id.) He has had three heart attacks.

(Id. at 43.) He takes five heart medications. (Id.) If he lays flat on his back, his heart

starts to race, and he gets short of breath. (Id. at 44.) The only time his heart starts to

“get out of whack” is when he is doing some kind of activity, especially in the heat.

(Id.) His heart starts to race, and he gets short of breath. (Id.) He cannot do cardiac

rehab because he cannot run on a treadmill or be on an elliptical because of his ankle.

(Id. at 45.)

• His ankle is a “complete mess.” (Id. at 44.) He uses a cane. (Id.) He cannot stand

for more than 15 minutes. (Id.) He cannot sit for more than 20-25 minutes because

the pain moves up. (Id.) He must stand and sway from foot to foot so he can keep his

weight off the right ankle. (Id.) It’s swollen all the time. (Id.) He underwent surgery

to reconstruct the bottom of his foot with a bone graft and a titanium rod. (Id. at 44-

45.) He wears a brace when he is going to be out walking. (Id. at 45.) He uses a cane

to help when he is walking. (Id. at 46.) He uses an electric scooter at the grocery

store because if he walks around for an hour when grocery shopping, he is “down for

two days.” (Id.) He also uses his cane to help him balance when he sways back and

forth to keep the weight on his left side. (Id. at 47.)

• He could lift 50 pounds at any one time. (Id. at 48.) He could lift 50 pounds about

three to four times before he would be winded and need to take a break. (Id.) He tries

to help with the yard work. (Id.) One time, he lifted five or six mulch bags out of the

trunk and then needed to sit down. (Id.)

• He stays with his grandmother, and she has the beginnings of dementia. (Id.) He tries

to help her as much as he can. (Id.) She has people who come in to help her, but not

24 hours a day. (Id.) He does things around the house, like cooking, dishes, and

laundry. (Id. at 48-49.) When he folds laundry, he can change positions, so he

doesn’t have to be winded. (Id. at 49.) He can do it at his own time and pace. (Id.)

There are not many dishes, so he can stand there and do them. (Id.) His biggest

challenge is climbing stairs. (Id.) He can do it, but he tries to avoid it as much as he

can. (Id.)

The ALJ told the VE he was going to skip the assessment of past work. (Id. at 41.) The ALJ

posed the following hypothetical question:

[F]or the first hypothetical, please assume an individual the same age and

education and [sic] the claimant. This individual could perform light work as

defined by the regulations. However, the individual would be limited to

standing and/or walking for two hours in an eight hour workday. The

individual can occasional [sic] push or pull with the right lower extremity.

The individual could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasionally

climb ramps and stairs, occasionally balance as that term is defined in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, as well as occasionally stoop. The

individual could frequently kneel, crouch and crawl. The individual must

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme hot, humidity, avoid

concentrated exposure to vibrations and atmospheric conditions, including

fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation and the individual would need to

avoid exposure to all hazards, including unprotected heights, heavy machinery

and commercial driving. In light of these limitations, would there be jobs in

the national economy that the individual could perform? And if yes, please

identify the jobs and numbers?

(Id. at 51.)

The VE testified this hypothetical would be sedentary rather than light work. (Id.) The VE further

testified the hypothetical individual would be able to perform other representative jobs in the economy,

such as addresser, table worker, and circuit board assembler. (Id. at 52.)

The ALJ modified the hypothetical to change the exertional level to sedentary, limit the

hypothetical individual to no climbing and occasional crouching, and add the use of a cane for assistance

in ambulation. (Id.) The VE testified the previously identified jobs would remain. (Id. at 52-53.)

The ALJ further modified the hypothetical to add that in addition to using a cane for walking, the

hypothetical individual would need to use the cane for balance as well. (Id. at 53.) The VE testified as

follows:

Your Honor, the use of balance, again, those are sedentary work examples

where the essential functions are performed in one postural position and so the

use of the cane for balance is not going to impact those essential functions.

It’s going to go to the off task, how much off task the individual has in

changing his postural positions. That sit/stand variance is not addressed in the

DOT or the SCO, so it’s going to be based on how much off task the

individual is in this postural positions [sic] while performing those essential

functions of those work examples that I gave.

(Id.) The VE further testified the allowance for time off task would be 10% outside of scheduled breaks

and the lunch period. (Id.)

Hunt’s attorney asked the VE whether, in the jobs identified, the individual is typically sitting eight

hours a day doing their job. (Id. at 55.) The VE testified that was correct. (Id.) Hunt’s attorney then

asked, “So when the Judge was talking about the cane for balance and ambulation both, they would

basically not – they would need some sort of sit/stand option at the workforce for it to become work

preclusive? Am I correct on that?” (Id.) The VE testified:

Well, the sit/stand variance is not addressed in the DOT or the SCO. Based

on my experience in the labor market, the essential functions of this work

examples that I gave, the essential functions can be performed both sitting and

standing, but it’s going to go to the off task. How much change are they

doing, the postural change. Are they using that cane while staying in a

standing position at the workstation. Is it taking away from the work product

or the essential function of the job by using that one upper extremity for

balance.

(Id. at 56.)

III. STANDARD FOR DISABILITY

A disabled claimant may be entitled to receive SSI benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905; Kirk v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). To receive SSI benefits, a claimant must meet

certain income and resource limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100, 416.1201.

The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-

stage process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). See also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594

F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant

must demonstrate that they are not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time of the

disability application. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that they

suffer from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities.” Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923. Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful

activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment, or

combination of impairments, meets or medically equals a required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments does not prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant work, the claimant is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s

impairment does prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant work, if other work exists in the

national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g),

404.1560(c), 416.920(g).

IV. SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 26, 2021,

the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: right lower extremity

fractures; left ankle arthritis; acute myocardial infarctions; coronary artery disease,

status-post stent placement and catheterization; and hyperlipidemia (20 CFR

416.920(c)).

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined

in 20 CFR 416.967(a) with the following additional limitations: he can

occasionally push/pull with the right lower extremity. He can never climb ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally stoop, knee, crouch, and climb

ramps/stairs. He can occasionally balance as that term is defined in the Dictionary

of Occupational Titles (DOT). He can never crouch or crawl. He must avoid

concentrated exposure to humidity, vibrations, extreme heat/cold, and atmospheric

conditions such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. He must avoid

exposure to hazards, including unprotected heights, commercial driving, and

heavy machinery. He also requires the use of a cane to aid in ambulation.

5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6. The claimant was born on December **, 1976 and was 44 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 45-49, on the date the application was filed

(20 CFR 416.963).

7. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 416.964).

8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding

that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job

skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

since August 26, 2021, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 18-27.)

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes narrow judicial review of the final decision of the Social

Security Administration (SSA).” Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).

Specifically, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. See Ealy v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir.

2009). Substantial evidence has been defined as “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y

of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In determining whether an ALJ’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence, the Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility

determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681

(6th Cir. 1989).

Review of the Commissioner’s decision must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The findings of the Commissioner are not subject

to reversal, however, merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different

conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d

535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999)

(“Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law

Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached.”). This is so because

there is a “zone of choice” within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.

Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).

In addition to considering whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must determine whether proper legal standards were applied. Failure of the

Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations is grounds for

reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence in the

record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and

logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.

Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)); accord Shrader v. Astrue, No.

11-1300, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (“If relevant evidence is not mentioned, the

Court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.”); McHugh v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-734,

2011 WL 6130824 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2011); Gilliam v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 2837260

(E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2010); Hook v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-1982, 2010 WL 2929562 (N.D. Ohio July 9,

2010).

VI. ANALYSIS

A. RFC Challenge

In his second assignment of error, Hunt argues that the ALJ erred in analyzing the medical

opinions and prior administrative medical findings in the record. (Doc. No. 8 at 12.) In addition, Hunt

asserts the ALJ further erred in her subjective symptom analysis. (Id.) Finally, Hunt maintains that the

ALJ failed to identify substantial evidence in support of the RFC. (Id.) The Court addresses each of these

subclaims in turn.

1. Opinion Evidence

a. Dr. Norris

Hunt challenges the ALJ’s reasoning in finding the opinion of consulting examiner Dr. Norris

vague and unpersuasive. (Id. at 13.) Hunt argues that “it is unclear how an ejection fraction in a certain

range and other clinical findings regarding the ankle and foot support the abilities reflected in the RFC

finding, and Dr. Norris’ opinion does not support the abilities contained in the RFC finding.” (Id. at 14.)

Hunt maintains that the ALJ failed to build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the

RFC finding. (Id.) Hunt argues that the ALJ failed to explain how the clinical findings regarding Hunt’s

foot and ankle “support the ability to stand and walk for up to 2 hours out of an 8-hour workday, which is

still required for sedentary work, . . . as opposed to standing and walking for no minutes, 30 minutes, 60

minutes, etc. out of an 8-hour workday.” (Id. at 15.) Even though the RFC included greater walking and

standing limitations than those opined by Dr. Norris, Hunt asserts that the decision is unclear as to “why

[Hunt’s] impairments and symptoms would be expected to cause the assessed limitations and not

additional or greater limitations.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ rejected Dr. Norris’ opinion as vague because Dr. Norris

“failed to quantify the ‘other limitations’ and because he did not explain how the quantified limitations

were substantiated by the evidence.” (Doc. No. 10 at 14.) In addition, the ALJ rejected Dr. Norris’

opinion in part to credit Hunt’s allegations and the medical evidence regarding his chronic conditions.

(Id.) The Commissioner maintains that “it is unclear what harm Plaintiff is alleging from the ALJ’s

supposed error in evaluating Dr. Norris’ opinion,” as if the ALJ had found Dr. Norris’ opinion fully

persuasive, the ALJ would have imposed a less restrictive RFC. (Id.)

Since Hunt’s claim was filed after March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration’s new

regulations (“Revised Regulations”) for evaluation of medical opinion evidence apply to this claim. See

Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (Revisions to Rules), 2017 WL 168819,

82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c.

Under the Revised Regulations, the Commissioner will not “defer or give any specific evidentiary

weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical findings,

including those from your medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Rather, the Commissioner shall

“evaluate the persuasiveness” of all medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings using the

factors set forth in the regulations: (1) supportability;3 (2) consistency;4 (3) relationship with the claimant,

including length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment

3 The Revised Regulations explain the “supportability” factor as follows: “The more relevant the objective

medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her

medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or

prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1).

4 The Revised Regulations explain the “consistency” factor as follows: “The more consistent a medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and

nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative

medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2).

relationship, extent of the treatment relationship, and examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5)

other factors, including but not limited to evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other

evidence in the claim or an understanding of the agency’s disability program’s policies and evidentiary

requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (c)(1)-(5). However, supportability and consistency are the most

important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2).

The Revised Regulations also changed the articulation required by ALJs in their consideration of

medical opinions. The new articulation requirements are as follows:

(1) Source-level articulation. Because many claims have voluminous case

records containing many types of evidence from different sources, it is not

administratively feasible for us to articulate in each determination or decision

how we considered all of the factors for all of the medical opinions and prior

administrative medical findings in your case record. Instead, when a medical

source provides multiple medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s), we will articulate how we considered the medical opinions or prior

administrative medical findings from that medical source together in a single

analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this

section, as appropriate. We are not required to articulate how we considered

each medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding from one

medical source individually.

(2) Most important factors. The factors of supportability (paragraph (c)(1) of

this section) and consistency (paragraph (c)(2) of this section) are the most

important factors we consider when we determine how persuasive we find a

medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings to

be. Therefore, we will explain how we considered the supportability and

consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or prior

administrative medical findings in your determination or decision. We may,

but are not required to, explain how we considered the factors in paragraphs

(c)(3) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate, when we articulate how

we consider medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings in

your case record.

(3) Equally persuasive medical opinions or prior administrative medical

findings about the same issue. When we find that two or more medical

opinions or prior administrative medical findings about the same issue are

both equally well-supported (paragraph (c)(1) of this section) and consistent

with the record (paragraph (c)(2) of this section) but are not exactly the same,

we will articulate how we considered the other most persuasive factors in

paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5) of this section for those medical opinions or

prior administrative medical findings in your determination or decision.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(1)-(3).

“Although the regulations eliminate the ‘physician hierarchy,’ deference to specific medical

opinions, and assigning ‘weight’ to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still ‘articulate how [he/she]

considered the medical opinions’ and ‘how persuasive [he/she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.’” Ryan

L.F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:18-cv-01958-BR, 2019 WL 6468560, at *4 (D. Ore. Dec. 2, 2019)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b)(1)). A reviewing court “evaluates whether the ALJ properly

considered the factors as set forth in the regulations to determine the persuasiveness of a medical opinion.”

Id.

The ALJ analyzed Dr. Norris’ opinion as follows:

As for opinion evidence, the consultative examination said the claimant

should be able to walk for 2 or 3 hours out of an 8-hour day. Dr. Norris said

the claimant could probably be on his feet for a combined total of 3 hours out

of an 8-hour day. He said the claimant probably could carry less than 30

pounds frequently and more than 40 pounds occasionally. Additionally, Dr.

Norris said other functioning limitations include lifting, carrying, pushing,

pulling, crawling, kneeling, crouching, climbing, stooping, and bending. The

undersigned found this opinion unpersuasive, as it is vague, unclear, and non-

policy compliant. While Dr. Norris provides some specific function- by-

function limitations (with regard to standing, walking, and carrying), the

remainder of his limitations provide no such analysis – that is, it does not

specific how much the claimant lift, push, and pull, how often she can kneel,

crouch, etc.).

As such, it lessens the overall probative value of this opinion, as it such

vagueness provides little assistance in determining the most the claimant can

do despite her impairments. What is more, those limitations that do provide

more specifics are not well supported, as he points to range of

motion/decreased strength in the right leg and the claimant’s history of heart

attacks as his support for his functioning limitations but does not specific

which limitations these address and why these impairments/symptoms would

be expected to cause the assessed limitations (5F/8).

Further, his opinion that the claimant can lift up to 40 pounds is inconsistent

with the record, which clearly demonstrates a history of heart-related issues,

including 3 heart attacks and stent place with associated shortness of breath

with strenuous exertional activity, as well as well ongoing right leg/foot pain

that, when considered as a whole, would make lifting/carrying that amount of

weight difficulty, especially if the claimant must also carry an assistive

device. While this opinion is unpersuasive, the undersigned notes that the

limitations described therein, although vague, are account for the in the

claimant’s residual functional capacity. Additionally, the undersigned notes

that subsequent evidence, including the treatment records in 12F showing

ejection fraction percentages in the mid-20s supports greater limitations

(12F/15).

(Id. at 24-25) (emphasis in original).

The ALJ considered the supportability and consistency of Dr. Norris’ opinion as required by the

regulations. (Id.) The ALJ credited Dr. Norris’ opinion as to Hunt’s ability to stand and/or walk for two

to three hours by incorporating a restriction to standing and walking for two hours in the RFC. (Id. at 24.)

However, the ALJ rejected Dr. Norris’ opined limitations outside of standing, walking, and carrying as

vague because they were not accompanied by an explanation of the limitations. (Id. at 24-25.)

“Vagueness, or the failure to propose specific functional limitations, can be a reason to discount a medical

opinion. See Quisenberry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 757 F. App’x 422, 434 (6th Cir. 2018).” Springer v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 5:19 CV 2562, 2020 WL 9259707, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2020). Dr.

Norris’ opinion lacked specific functional limitations. Dr. Norris stated only that “Other limitations in

function include lifting, carrying, pushing, crawling, kneeling, crouching, climbing, stooping, and

bending.” (Tr. 444.) This opinion “lack[s] the specificity required for the ALJ to determine ‘the most

[Plaintiff] can still do despite [Plaintiff’s] limitations’. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). Therefore, the ALJ’s

assessment that the opinion was vague is not erroneous.” Springer, 2020 WL 9259707, at *9.

In addition, the ALJ imposed more restrictive carrying limitations in the RFC than Dr. Norris

opined, in part because of Hunt’s heart condition and reduced ejection fraction. (Tr. 25.) It is the ALJ’s

job to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts, and she did so here. While Hunt would weigh the

evidence differently, it is not for the Court to do so on appeal.

b. State agency reviewing physicians

Hunt argues that, while the ALJ found the opinions of the state agency reviewing physicians to be

unpersuasive because of additional evidence presented at the hearing, including worsening heart-related

examination findings and evidence showing the medical need for a cane, the ALJ “failed to build an

accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence and the ALJ’s findings regarding the use of a cane and

leg elevation. (Doc. No. 8 at 20.) Hunt asserts that there is no evidence Hunt required a cane only for

walking, and Hunt himself testified he needed the cane for walking and balance. (Id.) Hunt recites

evidence from Dr. Lynn that he argues undermines the ALJ’s findings. (Id.) Hunt maintains that the

ALJ’s findings were not tied to the record. (Id.) In addition, Hunt asserts the ALJ failed to address the

need for leg elevation. (Id. at 20-21.)

The Commissioner responds that Hunt’s argument is nothing more than an improper request for

the Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor. (Doc. No. 10 at 17.) The ALJ “properly evaluated” the

opinion evidence in the record and identified substantial evidence in support of her findings. (Id.) The

Commissioner argues that the Court can trace the ALJ’s reasoning on judicial review. (Id. at 18.)

Therefore, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id.)

In reply, Hunt argues that he testified to using a cane for both ambulation and balance, and the

only reference to a cane in the medical records is for ambulation and balance. (Doc. No. 12 at 4-5.) Hunt

argues that the “ALJ’s contrary finding is not tied to any evidence in the record, including Plaintiff’s

testimony.” (Id. at 5.) Hunt maintains he is not asking the Court to reweigh the evidence, but rather is

asking the Court to remand the case for proper application of the appropriate legal standards. (Id.) Hunt

argues the Commissioner fails to identify the substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s findings. (Id.)

The ALJ analyzed the state agency reviewing physicians’ opinions as follows:

The state level consultants limited the claimant to light work except the can

could stand/walk for 2 hours in an 8-hour workday. He can occasionally

push/pull right lower leg. He can never climb ladders ropes, or scaffolds. He

can occasionally climb ramps/stairs. He can occasionally balance and/or

stoop, and frequently kneel, crouch, and crawl. He must avoid concentrated

exposure to extreme cold, extreme hot, humidity, vibrations, atmospheric

conditions - fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation. He should avoid

moderate exposure to hazards, including unprotected heights, commercial

driving and heavy machinery (2A/4A). While the state level consultants

supported their assessments with specific references to the medical and other

evidence of record, (2A/4A), the claimant submitted additional treatment

records at the hearing, including evidence showing worsening heart-related

findings on diagnostic testing, which, in combination with the claimant’s

testimony and medical evidence show medical need for a cane, the evidence,

when considered as a whole, supports further limitations than determined

below. As such, these opinions are generally unnpersuasive.

(Tr. 25.)

Elsewhere in the RFC analysis, the ALJ found as follows:

While such evidence, when viewed in its entirety, fails to fully support the

extent of limitation that the claimant alleges, the record certainly describes

findings that would limit his overall work-related functioning ability and as

such, the undersigned must include limitations in the claimant’s residual

functional capacity to account for them. As noted above, the claimant suffered

significant right foot fracture, which required a period of non-weightbearing

followed by surgical intervention and subsequent residual pain, gait

disturbance, and swelling, causing difficulty with prolonged standing/walking.

This evidence, in combination with the claimant’s left foot osteoarthritis,

which likely reduces walking ability further, as well as the claimant’s

myocardial infarction history, his associated stent placement, and evidence of

continued symptoms such pain/pressure and shortness of breath, supports

limiting the claimant to sedentary work.

Sedentary work limits the claimant to standing/walking no more than two

hours in an 8-hour workday, which accounts for evidence of foot/ankle pain,

limited right foot/ankle ranger of motion, antalgic gait, ankle swelling, and the

claimant’s reported difficulty standing/walking for prolonged periods.

Sedentary work also limits him to lifting/carrying to no more than 10 pounds,

which accounts for and addresses the claimant’s shortness of breath, which he

said worsens with strenuous activities, as well as fatigue, right leg/foot pain,

and lumbar tenderness.

To account for the claimant’s residual ankle/foot pain, right leg pain,

decreased right ankle, and decreased right ankle, foot, and knee strength, the

undersigned limited the claimant included postural limitations and limited the

claimant’s pushing/pulling with the right lower extremity. Given evidence of

stability and balance problems, the undersigned limited the claimant to

occasionally balance, no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no work

at unprotected heights, commercial driving, and heavy machinery. To account

for the claimant’s heart-related shortness of breath, the undersigned included a

limitation he avoids concentration to pulmonary irritants such dusts, fumes,

gases, etc. Finally, the undersigned included a limitation that the claimant

requires a cane when ambulating.

(Id. at 24.)

Hunt’s argument regarding leg elevation is not well-taken, as Hunt failed to testify to the need for

elevating his legs. During the hearing, Hunt’s attorney asked, “Do you do any ice, heat, leg elevation

during the day, anything like that?” (Tr. 45.) Hunt testified:

No. I was told the whole ice thing was pretty no good as far as rehab too

because I have to move out of going to rehab, which rehab for both of me is

awkward because I can’t do anything for my heart as far as rehab because I

can’t run on a treadmill. You know, I can’t be on an elliptical. I can’t do

anything physically like that for, you know, my cardiac rehab. And then for

the foot rehab, he said since it’s fused together, he didn’t want anybody

pushing and pulling on it because if they break the fusion, then we could have

a real major problem.

(Id.) Furthermore, the medical evidence cited by the parties regarding the need for leg elevation consisted

of a period of 2-8 weeks in 2022 (id. at 512-15), and Hunt makes no argument that the medical need for

leg elevation continued after that point. (Doc. Nos. 8, 12.)

Regarding Hunt’s use of a cane, the Court agrees that the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge

between the evidence and her conclusions. The ALJ acknowledged Hunt’s testimony that he used a cane

for both ambulation and walking (Tr. 21), but then without explanation found Hunt needed a cane for

ambulation only and included that limitation in the RFC. (Id. at 24.) However, this error was harmless,

for as the Commissioner points out, the VE testified that the use of a cane for balance would not impact

the essential functions of the sedentary jobs identified at Step Five.5 (Id. at 53.)

5 Hunt fails to respond to the Commissioner’s harmless error argument. (Doc. No. 12.) In addition, Hunt

makes no argument that the addition of the use of a cane for balance would increase his time off task.

(Id.)

2. Subjective Symptom Analysis

Hunt argues that the ALJ’s findings are inconsistent with Hunt’s testimony, and the ALJ “failed to

provide adequate reasons for rejecting [Hunt’s] allegations of greater limitations.” (Doc. No. 8 at 16.)

Hunt asserts the ALJ failed to explain how the evidence was inconsistent with Hunt’s allegations, which

limitations were unsupported, and why the evidence was inconsistent with those limitations. (Id. at 18.)

Hunt maintains that his testimony is inconsistent with the two hours of standing and walking “typically

required for sedentary work,” and his testimony regarding position changes is inconsistent with sedentary

work and would support time off task. (Id.) Hunt argues that “[t]he ALJ’s findings are premised on the

unsupported and unexplained finding that Plaintiff would not require position changes and would not

require time off task as a result of position changes.” (Id. at 19.)

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ considered Hunt’s subjective complaints and found the

record did not support those complaints to the extent alleged. (Doc. No. 10 at 12-13.)

In reply, Hunt argues that the ALJ’s recitation of the medical evidence is not sufficient to explain

the ALJ’s rejection of Hunt’s subjective complaints, and the ALJ failed to explain why greater limitations

were rejected. (Doc. No. 12 at 5-6.)

When a claimant alleges symptoms of disabling severity, the ALJ must follow a two-step process

for evaluating these symptoms. See e.g., Massey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 409 F. App’x 917, 921 (6th Cir.

2011). First, the ALJ must determine if there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce a claimant’s symptoms. Second, the ALJ “must

evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms so that [the ALJ] can determine how

[those] symptoms limit [the claimant’s] capacity for work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1). See also SSR 16-

3p,6 2016 WL 1119029 (March 16, 2016).

If these claims are not substantiated by the medical record, the ALJ must make a credibility7

determination of the individual’s statements based on the entire case record. Credibility determinations

regarding a claimant’s subjective complaints rest with the ALJ. See Siterlet v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir.

2007) (noting that “credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”). The

ALJ’s credibility findings are entitled to considerable deference and should not be discarded lightly. See

Villareal v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.2d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the ALJ’s

“decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms ... and be

clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated

the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029; see also Felisky, 35 F.2d at 1036 (“If an ALJ

rejects a claimant's testimony as incredible, he must clearly state his reason for doing so”).

To evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms,” the ALJ

must look to medical evidence, statements by the claimant, other information provided by medical

sources, and any other relevant evidence on the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16-3p,

2016 WL 1119029 (March 16, 2016). Beyond medical evidence, there are seven factors that the ALJ

6 SSR 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996) on March 28, 2016. Thus, SSR 16-3

was in effect at the time of the August 25, 2023 hearing.

7 SSR 16-3p has removed the term “credibility” from the analysis. Rather, SSR 16-3p directs the ALJ to

consider a claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms,”

and “evaluate whether the statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence.”

SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *6. The Sixth Circuit has characterized SSR 16-3p as merely

eliminating “the use of the word ‘credibility’ ... to ‘clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an

examination of an individual’s character.’” Dooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 656 F. App’x 113, 119 n.1 (6th

Cir. 2016).

should consider.8 The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors but should show that he considered the

relevant evidence. See Cross, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 733; Masch v. Barnhart, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046

(E.D. Wis. 2005).

Here, the ALJ acknowledged Hunt’s testimony and other statements regarding his symptoms and

limitations, including his use of an ankle brace and cane, difficulty standing and walking, standing for no

more than 15 minutes, and sitting for more than 25 minutes. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ determined Hunt’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (Id.)

However, the ALJ found his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these

symptoms were not entirely consistent with medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons set forth in the decision. (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

At the hearing in August 2023, the claimant said that he is able to drive a

vehicle and that he helps care for his grandmother with dementia, assisting

with household chores, dishes laundry, etc. which suggests that the claimant

engages in relatively normal activities of daily living despite his impairments

(Hearing Testimony). He also said that the” only time [his heart] gets out of

whack is when he is out in a function or...out in the heat,” which suggest that

if the claimant avoids these known triggers, his heart-related symptoms and

episodes would decrease (Hearing Testimony).

While such evidence, when viewed in its entirety, fails to fully support the

extent of limitation that the claimant alleges, the record certainly describes

findings that would limit his overall work-related functioning ability and as

such, the undersigned must include limitations in the claimant’s residual

functional capacity to account for them. As noted above, the claimant suffered

significant right foot fracture, which required a period of non-weightbearing

8 The seven factors are: (1) the individual’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and

intensity of the individual’s pain; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type,

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain

or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for relief

of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve

pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7; see also Cross v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732–733 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (stating that an ALJ, in a unified

statement, should explain his or her credibility findings in terms of the factors set forth in the regulations,

thereby permitting the court to “trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.”)