holding 17 plaintiff’s failure to correct deficiencies in its second amended complaint was a “strong 18 indication” that plaintiff had “no additional facts to plead.”
How later courts described this case
- holding 17 plaintiff’s failure to correct deficiencies in its second amended complaint was a “strong 18 indication” that plaintiff had “no additional facts to plead.”
- “[A] government agency implements a ‘land 11 use regulation’ only when it acts pursuant to a ‘zoning or landmarking law’ that limits the 12 manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an 13 interest.”
- “It is not 13 the Court’s role to make arguments for any party.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 SUMANA FOREST RETREAT, et al., Case No.: 24-cv-1196-RSH-DDL
12 Plaintiffs,
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S
13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED
14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
COMPLAINT
15 Defendant.
[ECF No. 23]
16
17
18
19 Before the Court is the County of San Diego’s (“the County’s”) motion to dismiss
20 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22, “SAC”). ECF No. 23. Pursuant to
21 Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the motion presented appropriate for resolution
22 without oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion.
23 I. BACKGROUND
24 A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
25 The instant case arises from the County’s permitting and code enforcement actions
26 taken in relation to property Plaintiffs intended for religious use. The SAC alleges as
27
28
1 follows.
2 1. The Valley Center Property
3 Plaintiff William Chu is a professor of Buddhist studies and ordained Buddhist
4 minister. SAC ¶¶ 9–10. Plaintiff Sumana Forest Retreat (“SFR”) is a nonprofit Buddhist
5 religious organization. Id. ¶ 12. SFR practices and teaches Forest Tradition Theravada
6 Buddhism, a faith centered on meditation in secluded, remote forest settings. Id. ¶¶ 21–23.
7 Chu is the leader and founding minister of SFR. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
8 In 2018, Chu purchased a 9.9-acre property located at 11923 Via Campestre, Valley
9 Center, California (the “Valley Center Property”). Id. ¶ 14. SFR leases the Valley Center
10 Property from Chu. Id. ¶ 16. Shortly after purchase, Plaintiffs began to prepare the property
11 to host meditative retreats. Id. ¶ 26. To that end, between 2018 and 2019, Plaintiffs built
12 ten yurts to serve as places for retreatants to meditate and rest. Id. ¶¶ 29, 65.2
13 2. Major and Minor Use Permits
14 The Valley Center Property is located in the A70 Zoning District of San Diego
15 County—a Limited Agricultural Use District. Id. ¶ 33–34. Land use permits are required
16 to use property within the A70 District in certain ways. Id. ¶¶ 36–62. Of relevance to the
17 dispute, under the County’s zoning ordinance, property owners do not need a permit to use
18 property for “essential services”—which include “public passive parks and recreational
19 areas.” SAC ¶¶ 37–38; ECF Nos. 22-4 at 2; 22-5 at 2; 22-6 at 2. In contrast, property owners
20 must obtain a “Minor Use Permit” for “small schools, farm labor camps, and cottage
21 industries.” SAC ¶ 44; ECF No. 22-4 at 3. Finally, property owners must obtain a “Major
22
23
24
1 The facts as alleged in this case were set forth in the Court’s prior February 24, 2025
25 order on the County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. ECF No.
21 at 1–5. For completeness, the Court repeats this background and supplements with
26
relevant additional allegations set forth in Plaintiffs’ SAC.
27 2 The County disagrees that the structures are properly described as “yurts,” arguing
that that term indicates a simple cloth structure, but that the structures at issue have
28
1 Use Permit” to use land for, among other purposes, “religious assembly.” SAC ¶¶ 54, 179;
2 ECF No. 22-4 at 4. Major Use Permit applications require approval by the County Board
3 of Supervisors or Planning Commission. SAC ¶ 60; ECF No. 22-8 at 2. In contrast, Minor
4 Use Permits may be approved by the Director of Planning & Development Services. SAC
5 ¶ 61; ECF No. 22-8 at 2. Applying for a Major Use Permit may also require additional
6 costs. SAC ¶ 62.
7 3. Permit Pre-Application
8 In 2018, Chu began the process of applying for a land use permit. Id. ¶ 63. In January
9 2021, Chu submitted a Major Use pre-application. SAC ¶ 70; ECF No. 22-20 at 2. On
10 February 1, 2021, the County informed Plaintiffs it would review their permit application.
11 SAC ¶ 71. However, Plaintiffs did not hear anything from the County regarding their pre-
12 application in the following two years. Id. ¶ 72. During the same time period, in May 2021,
13 January 2022, and January 2023, Brandy Contreras, a Land Use/Environmental Planner in
14 the County’s Code Compliance Division, randomly conducted inspections of the Valley
15 Center Property. Id. ¶ 73.
16 Chu and other SFR members eventually met with County officials to discuss
17 Plaintiffs’ application. Id. ¶ 75. The SAC alleges that over the course of two meetings,
18 County Officials informed Chu and other SFR members that the County would never
19 approve Plaintiffs’ application because of the yurts erected on the Valley Center Property.
20 Id. ¶¶ 76–77.
21 4. Plaintiffs Retain Counsel
22 Plaintiffs subsequently sought and retained counsel. SAC ¶ 85. In a July 6, 2023
23 letter, Plaintiffs’ counsel advised the County that the zoning ordinance placed a substantial
24 burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise by requiring them to obtain a Major Use Permit.
25 ECF No. 22-16. The letter set forth Plaintiffs’ intent to bring a federal lawsuit if the Parties
26 were “unable to come to an agreement on a Minor Use Permit.” Id. at 2.
27 On October 16, 2023, the County responded that the Valley Center Property’s “yurts
28 in their current condition present serious concerns related to fire safety, structural integrity,
1 and environmental hazards.” ECF No. 22-17 at 2. The County’s response further stated:
2
The future use of the property will need to match the permit for which
3 Dr. Chu and the Sumana Forest Refuge apply. If the planned use is
fewer than 50 people meditating and exploring Buddhism, without
4
taking up residence in the yurts, the County would consider a minor use
5 permit, as it would for the arguably analogous use case of a small
school. However, if transient habitation is to be a use, whether primary
6
or accessory, a major use permit is required to ensure the resulting
7 health, safety, and environmental concerns are adequately examined.
8 Id. at 2. Finally, the County cautioned Plaintiffs that “[r]egardless of the permit ultimately
9 applied for and obtained,” the Valley Center Property yurts had to “be brought into
10 conformance with the building code.” Id. Although the letter recognized that this could be
11 “impractical with the existing yurts,” it noted the County’s willingness to “explore options”
12 with Chu and SFR as to how to do so. Id. at 2–3.
13 On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that Plaintiffs’ planned use of
14 the property would be for less than 50 persons and reasserted their position Plaintiffs should
15 be permitted to apply for a Minor Use Permit and maintain yurts on their property ECF No.
16 22-18 at 2–3.
17 5. Application for Initial Consultation
18 Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an application for a meeting with the County, known as
19 an initial consultation. ECF No. 22-20 at 2. In a letter dated May 28, 2024, the County
20 informed Plaintiffs it had reviewed Plaintiffs’ initial consultation application. ECF No. 22-
21 19 at 2. Based on the project description submitted with Plaintiffs’ application, the
22 County’s Planning & Development Services Department concluded that Plaintiffs’ project
23 required a Major Use Permit. Id. at 3. The letter indicated that Plaintiffs could seek a second
24 opinion from the County’s Chief of Project Planning and Chief of Land Development. Id.
25 at 4.
26 6. Termination of Power
27 In early 2024, plaintiff Chu consented to have Ms. Contreras and other County
28 officials inspect the Valley Center Property. SAC ¶ 95. Thereafter, on March 31, 2024, he
1 received a Notice from the County’s Department of Environmental Health and Quality
2 Division indicating that graywater was “being illegally discharged onto the ground” at the
3 property. SAC ¶ 100; ECF No. 22-20 at 2. The Notice stated that at the time of the
4 inspection, officials observed ten yurts and several “accessory structures.” ECF No. 22-20
5 at 2. Most of the yurts had “electrical, gas plumbing, and water plumbing.” Id. Wastewater
6 discharge pipes “were observed from all plumbed yurts” and portable restrooms “were also
7 observed on property,” despite there being “no approved means of wastewater
8 treatment/disposal on the property.” Id.
9 On June 7, 2024, San Diego Gas & Electric (“SDG&E”) terminated power to the
10 Valley Center Property. SAC ¶ 104. In a letter received by Chu several days later, SDG&E
11 informed Chu it had received notification from the County that the “electrical and gas
12 services” at the Valley Center Property presented “an immediate hazard to life and
13 property” and that SDG&E could not reconnect power until authorized in writing to do so
14 by the County. SAC ¶ 108; ECF No. 22-22 at 2. As of the date of the SAC, SDG&E had
15 not reconnected power to the property. SAC ¶ 125.
16 B. Procedural Background
17 On July 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against the County. ECF No. 1.
18 On July 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
19 preliminary injunction. ECF No. 4. The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion on July
20 18, 2024, and denied it without prejudice. ECF No. 8.
21 On September 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 15.
22 The FAC asserted seven claims: (1) a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
23 Act (“RLUIPA”) substantial burden claim; (2) a RLUIPA equal terms claim; (3) a RLUIPA
24 nondiscrimination claim; (4) a claim for violation of the First Amendment’s right to free
25 exercise of religion; (5) a claim for violation of the First Amendment’s right to free speech
26 and assembly; (6) a claim for violation of due process under the First and Fourteenth
27 Amendments; and (7) a claim for violation of free exercise and freedom of association
28 under the California Constitution. FAC ¶¶ 111–186. On September 30, 2024, the County
1 filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 16. Plaintiffs filed
2 an opposition and the County filed a reply. ECF Nos. 19; 20.
3 On February 24, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the County’s
4 motion. See ECF No. 21. Specifically, the Court denied the County’s motion to dismiss
5 Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA equal terms claim, to the extent Plaintiffs were asserting a facial
6 challenge to the County’s ordinances governing Major Use and Minor Use permits. Id. at
7 22. The Court granted the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claims in all
8 other respects. Id. Additionally, the Court granted the County’s motion to dismiss
9 Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of free exercise and free speech under the First Amendment
10 but denied the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ due process claim. Id. at 23. Finally,
11 the Court granted the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the
12 California Constitution. Id.
13 On March 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their SAC. The SAC asserts the same seven
14 claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ FAC. SAC ¶¶ 139–253. On March 24, 2025, the County filed
15 the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC. ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs filed an opposition,
16 and the County filed a reply. ECF Nos. 26; 28.
17 II. LEGAL STANDARD
18 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.”
19 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
20 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
21 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
22 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[T]he non-conclusory ‘factual content,’
23 and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
24 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
25 The plausibility review is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
26 on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Pleading facts
27 “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of a plausible entitlement to
28 relief. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
1 not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
2 has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal
3 quotation marks omitted). A court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true
4 and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
5 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the
6 other hand, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
7 allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 III. ANALYSIS
9 A. RLUIPLA (Claims 1-3)
10 Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claims are based on two general categories of County actions:
11 (1) the County’s handling of Plaintiffs’ pre-application for a land use permit; and (2) the
12 County’s enforcement of its building codes to terminate electricity and gas to the Valley
13 Center Property. SAC ¶¶ 139–98.
14 In its February 24, 2025 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claims to
15 the extent they were based on the County’s building code. ECF No. 21 at 8–9. As Plaintiffs
16 had not specified what sections of the building code they alleged were “land use
17 regulations” under RLUIPA, the Court inferred Plaintiffs were challenging the County’s
18 termination of electric and gas to the Valley Center Property under County Construction
19 and Fire Code Section 91.1.112.3. Id. at 9. The Court concluded dismissal of these claims
20 was appropriate as: (1) Plaintiffs had not adequately explained how provisions of the
21 County’s fire code were “land use regulations” under RLUIPA; and (2) Plaintiffs had not
22 alleged sufficient facts to establish that the County had “disingenuously” used the fire code
23 to make its zoning decisions. Id. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims that
24 the Country violated RLUIPA by requiring Plaintiffs to obtain a Major Use Permit. Id. at
25 13–15. Specifically, the Court held Plaintiffs’ as-applied claims were barred by RLUIPA’s
26 final decision requirement, as Plaintiffs had not yet submitted a complete permit
27 application. Id.
28 ///
1 The Parties dispute whether the newly raised allegations in Plaintiffs’ SAC have
2 adequately cured the above deficiencies. See ECF Nos. 23-1 at 4–5; 26 at 8–12; 28 at 2–4.
3 The Court addresses this dispute below.
4 1. Building Codes
5 The Court turns first to Plaintiffs’ claim the County utilized “inapplicable building
6 and fire codes” to prevent Plaintiffs’ religious exercise. SAC ¶ 130.3
7 Under RLUIPA, a “land use regulation” is “a zoning or landmarking law, or the
8 application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land
9 (including a structure affixed to land)[.]” 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-5(5); see Prater v. City of
10 Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A] government agency implements a ‘land
11 use regulation’ only when it acts pursuant to a ‘zoning or landmarking law’ that limits the
12 manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an
13 interest.”). Multiple courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that “[s]afety laws such as
14 building or construction code provisions do not qualify as ‘land use regulations’ under
15 RLUIPA, at least where they do not explicitly reference zoning laws.” Temp. of 1001
16 Buddhas v. City of Fremont, 588 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2022); see Salman v.
17 Phoenix, City of, No. CV-12-01219-PHX-JAT, 2015 WL 5043437, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug.
18 27, 2015) (code sections that regulate “construction, safety, and traffic” are not land use
19 regulations); Anselmo v. Cty. of Shasta, 873 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1257 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
20 (building and construction code that prohibited construction without a permit and did not
21 reference zoning laws was not a “land use regulation.”).
22 Here, Plaintiffs do not contend that the County’s fire code, by its own terms,
23 constitutes a zoning or landmarking law under RLUIPA. See ECF No. 26. Instead,
24
25
3 Like in their SAC, Plaintiffs do not identify the specific “building code” sections
26
they claim fall under the scope of the RLUIPA. See SAC; ECF No. 26. For the sake of
27 argument, the Court will again infer Plaintiffs are challenging the County’s termination of
power to the Valley Center Property under County Construction and Fire Code Section
28
1 Plaintiffs argue the County enforced the fire code “disingenuously” as a vehicle to make a
2 zoning decision, thereby making the code subject to RLUIPA. Id. at 10. As the Court
3 already outlined in its prior February 24, 2025 Order, this argument is unpersuasive.
4 Plaintiffs cite only out-of-circuit cases in support of their argument. Id. Even if these
5 cases were binding, they are inapposite to the facts alleged here. In Fortress Bible Church
6 v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2012), plaintiffs asserted a RLUIPA claim against
7 town officials over plans to construct a structure to house a worship facility and school.
8 The Church’s proposal triggered a state environmental review process. Id. at 213. The court
9 held that while the environmental review process was not itself “a zoning or landmarking
10 law for purposes of RLUIPA . . . when a government uses a statutory environmental review
11 process as the primary vehicle for making zoning decisions, those decisions constitute the
12 application of a zoning law and are within the purview of RLUIPA.” Id. at 216. In doing
13 so, the court was careful to note “that ordinary environmental review considerations” are
14 not subject to RLUIPA. Id. at 218. Instead, the state environmental review process
15 implicated RLUIPA because: (1) the process had been triggered when the Church’s project
16 required discretionary approvals from the Town which related “to zoning and land use
17 rather than traditional environmental concerns”; (2) the Town had “intertwined” the
18 environmental review process “with its zoning regulations”; and (3) once the review
19 process was underway, the Town “focused on zoning issues rather than traditional
20 environmental issues.” Id. at 217–18.
21 In contrast, unlike in Fortress Bible, there is no evidence that the County
22 “intertwined” its fire code with its zoning regulations to such an extent that the fire code
23 became the County’s instrument for making zoning decisions. Under County Construction
24 and Fire Code Section 91.1.112.3, a “building official may authorize disconnection of
25 utility service to a building, structure or system regulated by this chapter in case of
26 emergency where the building official determines it is necessary to eliminate an immediate
27 hazard to life or property.” ECF No. 22-25 at 2. Section 91.1.112.3 makes no reference to
28 any zoning or landmarking laws. It simply allows the County to disconnect utility services
1 to a property if necessary to eliminate an “immediate hazard to life or property.” Id.
2 Plaintiffs also do not plausibly allege the County’s enforcement of its fire code was
3 triggered by Plaintiffs’ application for a land use permit. Unlike in Fortress Bible, where
4 plaintiffs request for land use approvals automatically triggered the state’s environmental
5 review process, there are no analogous allegations here. Finally, Plaintiffs do not plausibly
6 allege that the County focused on zoning issues when enforcing its fire code. Indeed, the
7 County’s October 16, 2023 letter specifically noted the County’s position that the Valley
8 Center Property’s yurts would have to be brought into conformance with the building code
9 regardless of whether Plaintiffs ultimately applied for and obtained a Major Use or Minor
10 Use Permit. See ECF No. 22-17 at 2.4
11 Plaintiffs do not explain how the additional allegations in their SAC have cured these
12 deficiencies. See Ortiz v. Pacific, 973 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“It is not
13 the Court’s role to make arguments for any party.”). The SAC’s newly asserted
14 allegations—that the County’s fire code is not applicable to the yurts built on the Valley
15 Center Property and Plaintiffs’ contractors reported that the issues identified by the County
16 were only “minor” in nature—does not transform the fire code into the County’s “primary
17
18
19 4 The other cases Plaintiffs cite are similarly distinguishable. In United States v. Cnty.
of Culpeper, 245 F. Supp. 3d 758, 762, 766 (W.D. Va. 2017), defendant contended a
20
“pump-and-haul permit”—used for when municipal sewers cannot service a property and
21 the local soil cannot effectively support a septic system—was a public health and not a
zoning law. In that case, however, binding authority supported the court’s holding that
22
water and sewer regulations were construed as “zoning laws” under RLUIPA. Id. at 767.
23 Plaintiffs have not presented similarly binding authority from the Ninth Circuit that fire
code provisions or any of the other County building codes are properly considered “zoning
24
laws” under RLUIPA.
25 In Layman Lessons, Inc. v. City of Millersville, 636 F. Supp. 2d 620, 645–46 (M.D.
Tenn. 2008), the court considered whether a proposed ordinance that had never actually
26
been enacted could constitute a “land use” regulation under RLUIPA. The court held
27 defendants’ attempted imposition of the proposed ordinance could fall under the RLUIPA.
Id. Plaintiffs have not explained—and the Court is unable to determine—how the Layman
28
1 vehicle for making zoning decisions.” Fortress Bible Church, 694 F.3d at 216. As Plaintiffs
2 themselves note, property owners must obtain a “Major Use Permit” to use land in the A70
3 Zoning District for “religious assembly.” SAC ¶¶ 54, 179. Even if the fire code did not
4 apply or Plaintiffs could easily remedy any violations, the requirement that property owners
5 obtain a land use permit would remain.
6 For these reasons, the Court grants the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
7 RLIUPA claims, to the extent these claims are based on the County’s code enforcement
8 actions.
9 2. Zoning Ordinance
10 The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ claims that the County violated RLUIPA by
11 requiring Plaintiffs to obtain a Major Use permit.
12 “Article III of the Constitution empowers [courts] to adjudicate only live cases or
13 controversies, not to issue advisory opinions [or] to declare rights in hypothetical cases.”
14 Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
15 omitted). “The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through
16 avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
17 disagreements.” Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 835
18 (9th Cir. 2012). “The ripeness inquiry has a constitutional component rooted in the ‘case
19 or controversy’ requirement of Article III, and a prudential component that focuses on
20 whether the record is adequate to ensure effective review.” City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp.,
21 260 F.3d 1160, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).
22 In a land use context, the Court’s analysis of ripeness is guided by the Ninth Circuit’s
23 decision in Guatay. In Guatay, a church used property located in a “rural residential” zone
24 for religious assembly purposes, despite not having obtained the proper land use permits.
25 670 F.3d at 959–60. Instead, the church and property owner twice proceeded only partway
26 through the permit application process. Id. at 962–64. Because the church had never
27 completed this process, the district court found its RLUIPA claims were not ripe for review.
28 Id. at 969. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Id. at 979–82.
1 To determine whether the church’s RLUIPA claims were ripe, Guatay drew upon
2 the “final decision” requirement in the Supreme Court’s Williamson County Regional
3 Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) decision. Id. at 976–79.
4 Williamson held, in the regulatory takings context, that “a claim that the application of
5 government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the
6 government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
7 regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” 473 U.S. at 186.
8 Applying Williamson’s “final decision” requirement, Guatay held the church’s “failure to
9 complete even one full Use Permit” left the court “unable to discern whether there is a true
10 case or controversy, and any resulting injury.” 670 F.3d at 980.
11 The Supreme Court recently clarified the “final decision” requirement in Pakdel v.
12 City & Cty. of S.F., 594 U.S. 474 (2021). In Pakdel, petitioners owned a multi-unit
13 residential building organized as a tenancy-in-common. 594 U.S. at 475. The City of San
14 Francisco established a program by which such tenancy-in-common owners could convert
15 their interests into condominium-style arrangements allowing for individual ownership of
16 certain parts of the building. Id. at 476. One of the conditions of this conversion was that
17 nonoccupant owners who rented out their units were required to offer their tenants a
18 lifetime lease. Id. Petitioners obtained such a conversion, but then requested a few months
19 later that the City either excuse them from executing the lifetime lease or compensate them
20 for doing so. Id. The City refused both requests, informing petitioners that the failure to
21 execute the lifetime lease could result in an enforcement action. Id.
22 The Ninth Circuit held petitioners’ claim was not ripe because petitioners did not
23 comply with the proper “administrative processes” in obtaining the City’s decision. Id. at
24 479. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the “finality requirement is relatively
25 modest. All a plaintiff must show is that there [is] no question . . . about how the regulations
26 at issue apply to the particular land in question.” Id. at 478. For these reasons, Pakdel held
27 because the City had twice denied petitioners’ request to be excused and threatened an
28 enforcement action, there was “no question” about the City’s position. Id. at 478–79.
1 Pakdel further clarified that:
2
[The] administrative exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite
3 for a takings claim when the government has reached a conclusive
position. To be sure, we have indicated that a plaintiff’s failure to
4
properly pursue administrative procedures may render a claim
5 unripe if avenues still remain for the government to clarify or change
its decision. But, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s view, administrative
6
missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government has adopted its
7 final position.
8 Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9 Here, Plaintiffs contend that the allegations in their SAC “make clear” that the
10 County arrived at a definitive decision on Plaintiffs’ permit application. ECF No. 26 at 12.
11 In particular, Plaintiffs point to their allegations Chu and other SFR members met twice
12 with County officials, who reportedly stated that Plaintiffs’ permit applications would be
13 “futile” due to the presence of yurts on the Valley Center Property. Id.
14 These allegations are not new and were already considered by the Court in its
15 decision on the County’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC. See ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 76–77. As
16 the Court held in that Order, under Pakdel, “a plaintiff’s failure to properly pursue
17 administrative procedures may render a claim unripe if avenues still remain for the
18 government to clarify or change its decision.” 594 U.S. at 480. Here, the record does not
19 support Plaintiffs’ position that there are no avenues for the County to clarify or change its
20 preliminary determinations on Plaintiffs’ permit application. See ECF No. 22-17 at 2
21 (October 16, 2023 letter from the County indicating if the planned use of the Valley Center
22 Property was for fewer than fifty people meditating without “taking up residence in the
23 yurts, the County would consider a minor use permit[.]”); 22-19 at 4 (May 28, 2024 letter
24 from County indicating Plaintiffs could request a second opinion from the County’s Chief
25 of Project Planning and Chief of Land Development regarding the County’s initial
26 determination that the Plaintiffs’ project would require a Major Use Permit); SAC ¶ 167
27 (alleging County has ability to grant Plaintiffs temporary structure or temporary occupancy
28 permits). As in Guatay, Plaintiffs have “presented no evidence that the County will not or
1 cannot issue a Use Permit once it has received a complete application, and once [Plaintiffs
2 have] complied with what is required of all applicants.” Guatay, 670 F.3d at 981–82; see
3 Little Woods Mobile Villa LLC v. City of Petaluma, 736 F. Supp. 3d 757, 766 (N.D. Cal.
4 2024) (“After Pakdel, the finality requirement is modest, but it is still a finality
5 requirement: where there has been no decision at all from the government and no effort to
6 seek one, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be ripe.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); DiVittorio
7 v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No. 21-CV-03501-BLF, 2022 WL 409699, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
8 10, 2022) (finding that regulatory takings claim was not ripe where plaintiffs “elected to
9 sue in the middle of the administrative process when avenues still remain for the
10 government to render a decision favorable to them”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
11 Davis v. City of Selma, No. 1:12-CV-01362-AWI, 2013 WL 3354443, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July
12 3, 2013) (“[A] final decision at a local level may provide the plaintiff’s relief without
13 requiring the court to engage in unnecessary constitutional analysis, and it accords with
14 principles of federalism by allowing local disputes to be resolved at a local level.”).
15 Plaintiffs’ newly raised argument that the County has made at least a definitive
16 determination they must obtain some type of permit is also without merit. ECF No. 26 at
17 12. In support, Plaintiffs allege that they would not need a permit if they were to use their
18 property as a “public passive park.” SAC ¶¶ 37–38, 153. As the County notes, however,
19 there is no evidence Plaintiffs ever proposed to the County that they intended to use the
20 Valley Center Property as a “public passive park” and did not need a permit. Instead, it has
21 been Plaintiffs’ position that they should be allowed to apply for and obtain a Minor Use
22 Permit. See ECF No. 22-16 at 6 (“My clients ask only that they be permitted to apply for
23 and obtain a Minor Use Permit to use the Property for their religious exercise, including
24 but not limited to the use of yurts on the Property.”).
25 For these reasons, the Court concludes dismissal is appropriate as to Plaintiffs’
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1 RLUIPA claims on ripeness grounds.
2 B. First Amendment Claims (Claims 4 and 5)
3 The Court next turns to Plaintiffs’ claim that the County’s enforcement of its zoning
4 ordinance violates their rights under the free exercise, free speech, and free assembly
5 clauses of the First Amendment. SAC ¶¶ 199–236. In its February 24, 2025 Order, the
6 Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims on ripeness ground under
7 Guatay. ECF No. 21 at 16–18. In Guatay, the Ninth Circuit held that the church had not
8 established its first amendment claims were ripe, where the church made “no “discernible
9 independent argument” of ripeness, but merely cited “RLUIPA and general precedent
10 recognizing the existence of these constitutional rights, and attempt[ed] to distinguish [the
11 final decision requirement] in Williamson County.” 670 F.3d at 987. Notably, the church
12 in Guatay did not adequately “address[] why [their] claims would not be better suited for
13 consideration once a final decision on the Use Permit application issues and the extent of
14 the injury is fully defined.” Id.
15 Here, again, Plaintiffs have offered no independent argument or legal authority as to
16 why their First Amendment claims are ripe for adjudication. See ECF No. 26 at 12–13.
17 Instead, Plaintiffs repeat their argument that the County arrived at a final decision—an
18 argument the Court has rejected above. See id. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the
19 County’s motion to dismiss Claims 4 and 5 on ripeness grounds.
20 C. California Constitution (Claim 7)
21 Lastly, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ claim the County’s enforcement of its zoning
22 ordinance violates Plaintiffs’ rights to the free exercise of religion and to freely assemble
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25 5 As before, the Court’s decision excludes Plaintiffs’ facial equal terms challenge to
the County’s zoning ordinance. See ECF No. 21 at 12–13, 22. As the Court noted in its
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earlier Order, “[f]acial challenges are exempt from the first prong of the Williamson
27 ripeness analysis because a facial challenge by its nature does not involve a decision
applying the statute or regulation.” Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill,
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1 under the California Constitution. SAC ¶¶ 247–253. The Court previously dismissed this
2 claim for lack of ripeness as Plaintiffs offered no independent or legal authority as to why
3 their state constitutional claim was ripe for adjudication. ECF No. 21 at 21–22. Plaintiffs’
4 state law claim fails for the same reasons here. See ECF No. 26 at 14. For these reasons,
5 the Court GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss Claim 7.
6 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the court should “freely give leave
8 [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, the “liberality
9 in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4
10 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district
11 court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has
12 previously amended the complaint.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149,
13 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the Court already provided Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
14 their pleading. As Plaintiffs have not been able to cure the deficiencies previously
15 identified in the Court’s prior Order, the Court finds further amendment would be futile.
16 See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
17 plaintiff’s failure to correct deficiencies in its second amended complaint was a “strong
18 indication” that plaintiff had “no additional facts to plead.”) (internal quotation marks
19 omitted).
20 V. CONCLUSION
21 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss as
22 follows:
23 1. The Court GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss Claims 1-3, excluding
24 Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the County’s ordinance governing the land use
25 permits in the A70 Zoning District WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 2. The Court further GRANTS the County’s motion to dismiss Claim 4-5 and 7
2 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 || Dated: May 5, 2025 ‘
5 Jekut ¢ [ove
6 Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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