Opinion

FOSTER-GRADY v. DUDEK

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
May 2, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.1%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FREEDOM FOSTER-GRADY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-2169

)

LELAND DUDEK, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of May, 2025, upon reconsideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment,1 the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claims for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for supplemental security

income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary

of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v.

Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944

(W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it

1 The Court previously granted Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration.

would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.

1981)).2

2 Plaintiff Freedom Foster-Grady contends that the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) erred in evaluating much of the medical evidence of record. (Doc. No. 11).

Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of the opinion of Dr. Angela

Chiodo, Psy.D., her reasoning in finding the opinion of Dr. Nickolas Summa, Ph.D.,

LMFT, persuasive, and her consideration of the opinion of Rachael Goss, LPC. (Id.).

Upon review of the record, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ evaluated many medical opinions in deciding that Plaintiff was not

disabled, including those of Drs. Chiodo, Summa, and LPC Goss. Dr. Chiodo, a

psychological consultative examiner, opined that Plaintiff had mild to extreme

limitations concerning the ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers,

and the public, as well as respond to changes in a routine work setting, and had no

limitations in the area of understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions.

(Ex. 11F/9-10). The ALJ found this opinion partially persuasive because while it was

supported by Dr. Chiodo’s examination of Plaintiff, it was not consistent with medical

records, mental status examinations, Plaintiff’s testimony, and Plaintiff’s functional

report. (R. 23).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ selectively cited to evidence contradicting Dr.

Chiodo’s opinion, but that the overall record supported Dr. Chiodo’s opinion. (Doc.

No. 11 at 15-16). Specifically, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ selectively referenced

Plaintiff’s “intact attention, good eye contact, intact concentration, frequent smiles,

average fund of knowledge, cooperativeness, normal speech, normal language, normal

intelligence, a normal mood, and linear goal directed thought processes” to show

inconsistency between Dr. Chiodo’s opinion and the record as a whole. (Id. at 15-16

n.1). The Court disagrees. The ALJ did not selectively cite evidence, but summarized

information contained in Plaintiff’s medical records and highlighted relevant findings.

The ALJ did not overlook evidence showing abnormal findings, such as Plaintiff’s

depressed mood and suicidal ideation, (see R. 21-22), but the ALJ accurately

summarized that Plaintiff’s exams were largely unremarkable and that Plaintiff’s

functioning was largely intact. (Id.). In recognizing this and that Dr. Chiodo’s opinion

was supported by her examination, the ALJ logically concluded that this opinion was

partially persuasive. (R. 23).

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in analyzing Dr. Summa’s opinion,

specifically by stating that “Dr. Summa opined in August 2022 that the claimant ha[d]

very good to limited, but satisfactory, mental abilities and aptitudes needed to interact

with others.” (Doc. No. 11 at 16 n.2 (citing R. 23)). Plaintiff contends that this

statement was misleading because the specific categories about which Dr. Summa

opined did not relate to interacting with the public, coworkers, or supervisors. (Id.).

After review of Dr. Summa’s opinion, the Court disagrees. In Dr. Summa’s opinion, he

stated that Plaintiff had “unlimited or very good” to “limited but satisfactory” abilities

needed to interact with others including understanding and responding to social cues,

initiating and sustaining conversations, and stating their own point of view. (Doc. No.

13 at 1263). The ALJ’s statement that “Dr. Summa opined in August 2022 that the

claimant ha[d] very good to limited, but satisfactory, mental abilities and aptitudes

needed to interact with others” logically flowed from this portion of Dr. Summa’s

opinion. (R. 23). It appears Plaintiff’s argument may be taking issue with Dr. Summa’s

statement that he could not opine on Plaintiff’s ability to interact appropriately with the

general public because this was “outside of the scope” of his treatment. (Doc. No. 13 at

1263). However, even if this is the case, the ALJ did not misrepresent Dr. Summa’s

opined limitations, as the ALJ’s statement about Dr. Summa’s opinion accurately

summarized the opined limitations and did not purport to make a statement on Dr.

Summa’s opinion in regard to Plaintiff’s ability to interact appropriately with the

general public. Accordingly, the Court finds no error on this point.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the opinion of

LPC Goss. (Doc. No. 11 at 14). Plaintiff argues that LPC Goss’s opinion supported

disabling mental health conditions and that the ALJ should have found this opinion

persuasive. (Id.). For cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the

regulations provide that “the two most important factors for determining the

persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at

5853; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c), 416.920c(b) and (c). In this matter,

the ALJ considered LPC Goss’s opinion and found it not to be persuasive. (R. 24).

LPC Goss opined that Plaintiff was limited in being unable to meet competitive

standards in several areas of mental abilities and aptitudes, and seriously limited and

unable to meet competitive standards in some mental abilities and aptitudes needed to

interact with others and do particular types of jobs. (R. 24; Ex. 15F/3-4). The ALJ

found this opinion unsupported by LPC Goss’s own examination, which indicated

mostly normal findings, and found it was inconsistent with medical records. (R. 24).

Accordingly, the ALJ properly analyzed this opinion in accordance with the relevant

regulations and her conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

Lastly, Plaintiff references “substantive notes, opinions, and limitations of

record” that supposedly “overwhelm” the ALJ’s decision seemingly in relation to

Plaintiff’s disabling mental health conditions, but Plaintiff does not otherwise develop

this argument or cite any specific evidence supporting this proposition. (Doc. No. 11 at

16). To the extent that Plaintiff’s brief could be construed as raising any additional

argument as to these points, such arguments are too under-developed and conclusory to

be addressed by the Court. See Hyer v. Colvin, No. CV 15-297-GMS, 2016 WL

5719683, at *11 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (noting that it is the obligation of counsel to

state and develop arguments presented to the ALJ with discussion of applicable law and

record facts); Ve Thi Nguyen v. Colvin, No. C13-882, 2014 WL 1871054, at *2 (W.D.

Wash. May 8, 2014).

In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is

GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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