“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the P[risoner] L[itigation] R[eform] A[ct], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
How later courts described this case
- “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the P[risoner] L[itigation] R[eform] A[ct], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LEONARD CUMINOTTO,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 8:24-cv-1014-SDM-NHA
SGT. RYAN DOLL,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Cuminotto alleges that Sgt. Ryan Doll violated his civil rights by retaliating
against him. An earlier order (Doc. 5) both dismisses Ricky Dixon, the Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections, from this action and allows the action to proceed
against Sgt. Doll, who moves (Doc. 10) to dismiss under Rule 12, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, based on Cuminotto’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies
before he filed this action. Cuminotto opposes. (Doc. 11)
Sgt. Doll correctly argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required
before a prisoner files a Section 1983 action. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Citing Patsy
v. Board of Regents, Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982), Cuminotto asserts that exhaustion is not
required. Cuminotto’s reliance on Patsy is misplaced because Patsy was not a prisoner
Section 1983 action and the case was issued before the exhaustion requirement was
established by Section 1997e(a) for a prisoner Section 1983 action. Contrary to
Cuminotto’s assertion, a prisoner must “properly exhaust” the available administrative
remedies. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and
other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). The failure to “properly exhaust” the administrative
remedies will bar a prisoner from pursuing a claim in federal court. “[S]aying that a
party may not sue in federal court until the party first pursues all available avenues of
administrative review necessarily means that, if the party never pursues all available
avenues of administrative review, the person will never be able to sue in federal court.”
Ngo, 548 U.S. at 100 (italics original). See Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1159
(11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does contain a
procedural default component: Prisoners must timely meet the deadlines or the good
cause standard of Georgia’s administrative grievance procedures before filing a federal
claim. Therefore, Johnson’s grievance, which he filed out-of-time and without good
cause, is not sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies for purposes of the PLRA
exhaustion requirement.”).
This mandatory exhaustion requirement applies even when administrative
remedies do not allow the requested relief. Ngo, 548 U.S. 85 (“[A] prisoner must now
exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought –– monetary damages ––
cannot be granted by the administrative process.”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736
(2001) (“[W]e think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless
of the relief offered through administrative procedures.”); accord Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of
Corr., 254 F.2d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (“This means that ‘until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted,’ a prisoner is precluded from filing suit in
federal court.”) (citation omitted).
The attachments to the complaint show that Cuminotto’s grievance and appeal
were rejected for not conforming with the grievance procedures, specifically, Cuminotto
attached too many pages to the grievance and he addressed more than one issue in the
appeal.* To meet the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must conform with the
institutional procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“The level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system
to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the P[risoner]
L[itigation] R[eform] A[ct], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). See also
Maldonado v. Unnamed Defendant, 648 F. App’x 939, 951–52 (11th Cir. 2016) (“To
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must complete the administrative process
in accordance with the applicable grievance procedures set by the prison. The prison’s
requirements, rather than the PLRA, dictate the level of detail necessary for proper
exhaustion.”) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007))
* Presumably Cuminotto was well versed in the grievance procedures because in one of the attachments
Cuminotto reveals that he has been imprisoned in the Florida Department of Corrections for fifteen years.
Lastly, as the earlier order explains, ‘““Cuminotto cannot pursue a Section 1983
action based only on the defendant’s position as the employer of someone who
allegedly wronged Cuminotto [because] respondent superior is inapplicable in a Section
1983 action.” (Doc. 5 at 2)
The motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The clerk must close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 30, 2025.
ALTA. WAAdgelen
STEVEND.MERRYDAY □□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-4-