O'Driscoll v. Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

WILLIAM O’DRISCOLL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1984-VMC-LSG

ARBOR GROVE CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida

not for profit corporation and

RESOURCE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Order

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of

Defendants Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc. (“Arbor

Grove”) and Resource Property Management’s (“RPM”) Motion for

Costs (Doc. # 72), and Plaintiff William O’Driscoll’s

Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs and for

Multiplier (Doc. # 73), both filed on November 18, 2024. For

the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted in

part and denied in part, and Mr. O’Driscoll’s Motion is

granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Mr. O’Driscoll initiated this action against Arbor Grove

and RPM on August 29, 2022. (Doc. # 1). On November 14, 2022,

Mr. O’Driscoll filed an amended complaint, which is the

operative complaint. (Doc. # 9). Count One of the complaint

alleged a violation by both RPM and Arbor Grove of the Florida

Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), and Count Two

alleged a violation by RPM of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”). (Id. at 6-7). Given the extensive

litigation history of this case and the parties’ familiarity

with the same, the Court will only recite the facts relevant

to this Motion.

On February 7, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied

in part Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

(Doc. # 49). The Court ordered that “[s]ummary judgment is

granted in favor of Arbor Grove and RPM and against Plaintiff

William O’Driscoll as to whether Arbor Grove and RPM properly

imposed the $300 and $200 fines, and whether O’Driscoll can

recover attorney’s fees for his defense during the state court

action seeking an injunction against him. The case will

proceed to trial on all other issues.” (Id. at 37).

Before trial, RPM and Arbor Grove stipulated that they

violated the FCCPA, and RPM stipulated that it violated the

FDCPA. (Doc. # 50 at 1-2). The two-day jury trial concluded

with a verdict of $2,000 in statutory damages against RPM —

$1,000 for violating the FDCPA and $1,000 for violating the

FCCPA — and $0 in statutory damages against Arbor Grove. (Doc.

# 60). The jury awarded no actual damages to Mr. O’Driscoll.

(Id.). On April 30, 2024, the Court accordingly entered

judgment in favor of Mr. O’Driscoll and against Arbor Grove

and RPM for $2,000. (Doc. # 68).

Mr. O’Driscoll and Defendants filed cross-motions for

entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. ## 65, 67).

On November 4, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in

part each of the motions. (Doc. # 71). The Court determined

that “Mr. O’Driscoll is entitled to recover reasonable

attorney’s fees from RPM incurred during the entirety of this

action . . . [and] reasonable costs from RPM incurred up until

the point of the service of the Offer of Judgment on March 9,

2023.” (Id. at 18). The Court further concluded that “RPM and

Arbor Grove are entitled to recover reasonable costs incurred

after the service of the Offer of Judgment on March 9, 2023.”

(Id.).

Defendants also move for costs (Doc. # 72), and Mr.

O’Driscoll moves for attorney’s fees, costs, and a

multiplier. (Doc. # 73). Mr. O’Driscoll filed two notices of

supplemental authority in support of his Motion. (Doc. ## 77,

78). The Motions are fully briefed (Doc. ## 72, 73, 74, 75,

77, 78), and now ripe for review.

II. Discussion

A. Defendants’ Motion for Costs

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits the Court to

tax the following as costs: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts

necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and

disbursements for printing and witnesses; and (4) fees for

exemplification and the costs of making copies of any

materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use

in the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(4). This includes

depositions. See United States v. Kolesar, 313 F.2d 835, 837–

38 (5th Cir.1963) (“Though 1920(2) does not specifically

mention a deposition, . . . depositions are included by

implication in the phrase ‘stenographic transcript.’”).

Defendants seek to recover $2,388.35 in costs incurred

after March 9, 2023. (Doc. # 72 at 4). Specifically, the

following itemized costs: (1) $434.75 for a transcript of the

deposition of Ed Evans, Defendants’ corporate representative,

taken on May 18, 2023; (2) $1,726.60 for costs associated

with Mr. O’Driscoll’s deposition, including a Court Reporter

and transcript, taken on April 25, 2023; (3) $130.00 in costs,

including an $85.00 rush fee, for a private process server to

subpoena records from Dr. Harshadkumar Patel, Mr.

O’Driscoll’s treating psychiatrist and expert witness; and

(4) $97.00 for the costs of production of Mr. O’Driscoll’s

records from Dr. Patel. (Id. at 3); see also (Doc. ## 72-1,

72-2, 72-3, 72-4).

Mr. O’Driscoll does not oppose $1,420.60 of the costs

sought – namely, $1,375.60 of the costs incurred for a court

reporter for Mr. O’Driscoll’s deposition, and $45.00 of the

fees associated with serving the subpoena upon Dr. Patel.

(Doc. # 75 at 3). However, Mr. O’Driscoll opposes the

remainder of the costs.

Upon review, the Court finds that Defendants’ proposed

costs are recoverable and reasonable, with one exception.

Defendants did not explain why a rush fee was necessary to

subpoena Dr. Patel, particularly as Mr. O’Driscoll points

out, the invoice indicates that the process server took nearly

two weeks to even attempt service. Therefore, the Court finds

the $85.00 rush fee unreasonable.

The Court, however, is not persuaded by Mr. O’Driscoll’s

remaining objections. He provides no legal basis for his

arguments. Although Mr. Evans’ was not called to testify at

trial, which Mr. O’Driscoll submits should bar recovery of

the costs associated with his deposition transcript, his

deposition was used at the summary judgment stage and the

costs are recoverable. See EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600,

621 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A district court may tax costs

‘associated with the depositions submitted by the parties in

support of their summary judgment motions.’” (citation

omitted)). The subpoenaed medical records used at summary

judgment are recoverable as well.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and

denied in part. Defendants are entitled to recover costs in

the amount of $2,303.35.

B. Mr. O’Driscoll’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

and for Multiplier

Next, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel moves for an award of

$92,033.75 in attorney’s fees and partial costs, which

reflects a 2.15 multiplier of counsel’s proposed lodestar.

(Doc. # 73 at 1-2). Defendant RPM opposes counsel’s hourly

rate, hours expended, and entitlement to a multiplier. (Doc.

# 74).

In determining a reasonable attorney’s fees award,

courts engage in a three-step process: (1) determine whether

the party prevailed in the litigation; (2) calculate the

lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably

expended in litigating the case by a reasonable hourly rate;

and (3) adjust the lodestar to account for the results

obtained by the prevailing party, if needed. Atlanta J. &

Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep’t of Aviation, 442 F.3d 1283,

1289 (11th Cir. 2006). “The fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate

hours and hourly rates.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of

Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).

Courts are afforded broad discretion in addressing

attorney’s fees issues. See Villano v. City of Boynton Beach,

254 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Ultimately, the

computation of a fee award is necessarily an exercise of

judgment because there is no precise rule or formula for

making these determinations.” (internal citation omitted)).

Indeed, the Court, being “itself an expert,” may rely on its

own knowledge and experience in determining reasonable and

proper fees. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.

The Court has already determined that Mr. O’Driscoll is

the prevailing party and thus entitled to reasonable

attorney’s fees and partial costs. (Doc. # 71). Accordingly,

the Court turns to calculating the lodestar and evaluating

whether any further adjustment is needed.

1. Reasonableness of Counsel’s Hourly Rate

To calculate the lodestar here, the first step is to

determine the reasonable hourly rate for the work performed

by Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel. “A reasonable hourly rate is the

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,

experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303

(citation omitted). The fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing that the requested hourly rate aligns with

prevailing market rates. Id. at 1299.

Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel is a solo practitioner billing

at a rate of $450.00 per hour. (Doc. # 73). In support of his

hourly rate, counsel offers his declaration and CV, as well

as the United States Consumer Law Survey, 2017-2018, and the

2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix (formerly, the Laffey Matrix),

published by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of

Columbia. (Doc. ## 73-1, 73-2, 73-3, 73-5). Notably, “this

district has repeatedly found that the surveys [that Mr.

O’Driscoll’s counsel] relies upon are not persuasive for

purposes of determining a reasonable rate.” Raimondi v.

Zakheim & Lavrar, P.A., No. 6:11-cv-480-GAP-DAB, 2012 WL

1382255, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (rejecting the United

States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report, 2010–2011,

and the Laffey Matrix, prepared by the United States

Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 6:11-CV-480-GAP-DAB, 2012 WL

1382221 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2012).

Indeed, the relevant community here is Tampa, and

counsel provides no case in this district that has awarded an

hourly rate of $450.00 for similar services. Furthermore,

while counsel asks the Court to adjust rates awarded by other

courts for inflation in order to justify his $450.00 hourly

rate, he has not provided any case in this district — or even

within this circuit — where a court has done so. Accordingly,

counsel has not met his burden of establishing that his hourly

rate is the prevailing market rate for similar services

performed by comparably skilled attorneys in this community.

Based on a careful review of the documentation submitted

by Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel and the Court’s own expertise,

the Court finds it appropriate to reduce counsel’s hourly

rate to $325.00 per hour. See Johnson v. Critical Resol.

Mediation LLC, No. 3:16-cv-632-MMH-MCR, 2017 WL 2590007, at

*7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2017) (collecting cases and reducing

Mr. Smith’s hourly rate from $450.00 to $325.00 and Mr.

Marco’s hourly rate from $385.00 to $325.00), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-cv-632-MMH-MCR, 2017 WL

2578705 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2017); LoBello v. HSNi, LLC; No.

8:24-cv-00026-VMC-SPF, Doc. # 63 at 8-9 (M.D. Fla. March 25,

2025) (approving hourly rate of $325 for attorney who had

been practicing for seventeen years).

2. Reasonableness of Compensable Hours

The next step in calculating the lodestar is to determine

the reasonable number of hours counsel expended on this case.

The applicant must establish its hours worked. Hours that are

“excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary” should be

excluded from the amount claimed. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.

Furthermore, “[a] court may deduct hours from the time billed

if it finds that the billing entries are either unacceptably

vague or so heavily redacted that it cannot discern the legal

services provided.” Arnold v. Source Sols. Mgmt., LLC, No.

8:20-cv-2519-SCB-SPF, 2021 WL 2515204, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.

27, 2021) (citation omitted).

Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel submits that 95.20 hours were

expended litigating this case. According to the submitted

billing invoice, 95.10 hours were billed by counsel himself,

while .10 hours were billed by his assistant. (Doc. # 73 at

6; Doc. # 73-4).

RPM argues that most entries in the submitted invoice

“are so vague it is impossible to determine whether the task

was one that required an attorney, was an administrative task,

or involved a legal service.” (Doc. # 74 at 18). The Court

agrees with RPM. “[A] fee applicant is not entitled to

compensation at an attorney's rate simply because an attorney

undertook tasks which were mundane, clerical or which did not

require the full exercise of an attorney's education and

judgment.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306. Even though Mr.

O’Driscoll’s counsel is a solo practitioner, “costs

associated with solely clerical tasks are overhead expenses

which are not compensable in the attorneys' fee award.” Rynd

v. Nat'l Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:09-cv-1556-JDW-TGW, 2012

WL 939387, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 8:09-cv-1556-JDW-TGW, 2012 WL

939247 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2012).

The Court has reviewed counsel’s billing records and

finds multiple entries which are clearly clerical. (Doc. #

73-4). These entries include checking the case status,

emailing with opposing counsel to schedule events like the

mediation conference, reviewing invoices, and calendaring

dates. (Id.). The Court concludes that these hours devoted to

clerical tasks should be reduced. There are also dozens of

entries which vaguely refer to calls and emails with Mr.

O’Driscoll. (Id.). While the Court of course understands the

importance of keeping the client informed on the status of

the case, the Court also infers that some of these

communications could have been handled by a legal assistant.

For example, a legal assistant could handle tasks like

scheduling dates with Mr. O’Driscoll for holding the

mediation. A legal assistant could also handle providing

basic updates on the status of the case. Accordingly, the

Court finds that a portion of these entries dedicated to

communicating with the client should be reduced.

Given the vagueness of counsel’s entries, the Court is

unable to determine exactly how many hours were dedicated to

clerical tasks. Thus, the Court must deduct the overall hours

by a certain percentage. See Rynd, 2012 WL 939387, at *5

(“[I]n determining the hours to be reduced, the court ‘may

conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the

requested hours with an across-the-board cut.’” (quoting

Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th

Cir.2008)). The Court finds that reducing counsel’s overall

hours by 25% across-the-board appropriately reflects the

amount of time that counsel likely devoted to clerical

matters. See Freedom Med., Inc. v. Sewpersaud, No. 6:20-cv-

771-RBD-GJK, 2021 WL 252213, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2021)

(applying 25% across-the-board reduction because “some, but

not all, of the entries included clerical work”); St. Fleur

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 149 F. App'x 849, 853 (11th Cir.

2005) (approving 30% reduction because “Plaintiff's lawyers

had included time spent on . . . duplicated efforts, excessive

meetings between attorneys, billing for administrative tasks,

senior counsel's billing for legal research that could have

been assigned to an associate or paralegal, and billing at

full rates for non-legal tasks like travel and clerical

functions”); Miller v. Heritage Manor Assisted Living

Facility, Corp., No. 8:19-cv-2500-WFJ-AAS, 2020 WL 6363883,

at *2 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2020) (“The alternate method of

an across-the-board reduction of fees typically ranges from

10 to 35 percent but may be higher.”).

Accordingly, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel may recover for

68.85 hours, reflecting his hours expended reduced by 25%, at

an hourly rate of $325.00. Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel may also

recover the .10 hours billed by his assistant at a rate of

$125.00 per hour, as the parties do not dispute her billing

or hourly rate. Upon review of the Motion, billing invoice,

and counsel’s additional submissions, the Court finds that

$22,388.75 is a reasonable award of attorney’s fees under the

circumstances of this case.

3. Adjustment of the Lodestar

Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel contends that the Court should

apply a 2.15 contingency multiplier to his lodestar. The Court

finds no justification to do so. “[T]here is a ‘strong’

presumption that the lodestar reflects a reasonable statutory

fee.” Ottaviano v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1259,

1272 (M.D. Fla. 2010). “If the results obtained were

exceptional, then some enhancement of the lodestar might be

called for.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Here, the results

obtained were not exceptional. Mr. O’Driscoll only obtained

statutory damages and failed to obtain actual damages. (Doc.

# 60). Thus, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel is not entitled to any

adjustment of the lodestar.

Therefore, the Motion is granted in part and denied in

part as set forth in this Order.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendants Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc. and

Resource Property Management’s Motion for Costs (Doc. #

72) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk is

directed to enter judgment for costs in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiff William O’Driscoll in

the amount of $2,303.35.

(2) Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and

Costs and for Multiplier (Doc. # 73) is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. The Clerk is directed to enter

judgment for attorney’s fees in favor of Plaintiff and

against Defendants in the amount of $22,388.75.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

30th day of April, 2025.

fai Or. Hecrvaply

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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