Odom, Laroyce v. State of Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case Number: 25-21851-CIV-MARTINEZ

LAROYCE ODOM,

Petitioner,

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

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ORDER DISMISSING 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION AS TIME BARRED

THIS CAUSE came before this Court on Petitioner Laroyce Odom’s pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”) (ECF. No. 1), challenging

his convictions and sentences in Case No. F13-5848 in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for

Miami-Dade County, Florida.! This Court has undertaken its initial review of the Petition required

by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and concludes that the Petition should be

DISMISSED as time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).?

Rule 4 requires the district court to dismiss a section 2254 petition without ordering the

State to respond “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, R. 4. To survive Rule 4 review,

' Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, federal district courts may take judicial notice

of online state court records. See Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir.

2020). The online docket in Petitioner’s state criminal case is available at:

https://www2.miamidadeclerk.gov/cjis/CaseSearch.aspx (search case number “F-2013-005848”").

* The dismissal of a habeas petition as time bared is with prejudice and is a merits

adjudication for purposes of successiveness. See Jordan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351,

1353 (11th Cir. 2007).

the petition “must set forth facts that, if true, would establish a constitutional violation entitling

the petitioner to relief.” Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 653 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citing Borden vy, Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011)). “Both a procedural bar and a merits-

based deficiency could lead a district court to conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”

Id, at 654 (internal quotation omitted).

Under Rule 4, “a district court may sua sponte dismiss a § 2254 petition if the petition’s

untimeliness is clear from the face of the petition itself.” /d. at 654 (quotation and citation omitted).

The petitioner must be given “notice and [an] opportunity to explain why his petition [1]s timely”

prior to its dismissal as time barred. /d. at 655. In assessing the timeliness of the petition, the Court

may take judicial notice of dates on online state court dockets pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence

201.3 Id. at 652—54. Here, it is evident from the face of the Petition itself that it is time barred.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “‘AEDPA”) establishes a one-year

statute of limitations for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Under AEDPA, the limitations period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

3 Tn accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s instructions in Paez, the Court has included with

this Order copies of the online docket sheets of Petitioner’s circuit court and district court of appeal

cases. See Paez, 957 F.3d at 653 (“We think the best practice would be to include copies of any

judicially noticed records as part of the Order that relies upon them, so as to ensure the inmate

receives them.”).

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

§§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, the relevant provision set forth above is sub-section (A). Petitioner

does not assert that the State created an unconstitutional impediment to his filing the Petition, and

his claims are not based on either a newly recognized constitutional right or a newly discovered

factual predicate. Petitioner raises one ground: that the state trial court violated his due process

rights when it failed to hold a Williams rule hearing prior to the State’s introduction of Williams

rule evidence at trial. (Pet. at 2, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner contends that he “only discovered the

constitutional significance of the trial court’s failure to hold a Williams rule hearing several years

after his conviction, when he was finally able to access legal resources and begin learning about

relevant law.” Ud.) But under section 2244(d)(1)(D), “[t]ime begins when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal

significance.” Cole v. Warden, Ga. State Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1157 (1th Cir. 2014) (emphasis

in original) (quoting Owens v, Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the trigger in §

2244(d)(1)(D) is (actual or imputed) discovery of the claim’s ‘factual predicate’, not recognition

of the facts’ legal significance.”)). Petitioner was clearly aware of the factual predicate of this

claim—the state trial court’s failure to hold a Williams rule hearing—at the time of his trial.

Petitioner’s failure to recognize the legal significance of this fact does not place his claim within

the circumstances described in section 2244(d)(1)(D).

4 The “Williams rule,” see Williams v. State, 110 So, 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), codified at Fla. Stat.

§ 90.404, provides that evidence of similar acts by the defendant, known as “collateral crime

evidence,” is admissible if relevant, except to prove bad character or propensity. /d. § 90.404(2)(a);

McLean y. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1255 (Fla. 2006).

Thus, Petitioner had one year from the date on which his judgment became final to file a

section 2254 petition. See § 2244(d)(1)(A). The date on which a judgment becomes final is the day

that (1) direct review concludes or (2) the time for seeking such review expires. See Gonzalez v.

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-50 (2012) (citing § 2244(d)(1)(A)). Petitioner was sentenced on May

24, 2017. See State v. Odom, No. F13-5848, Doc. 436 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. June 15, 2017). He filed

a direct appeal, and the Third District Court of Appeal (“Third DCA”) affirmed per curiam with a

written opinion on May 8, 2019. See Odom v. State, 273 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019),

Petitioner did not seek discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court, so his judgment

became final on June 7, 2019-—thirty days later—-when the period for seeking discretionary review

with the Florida Supreme Court expired. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.120(b); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565

U.S. 134, 137 (2012) (‘[F]or a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court,

the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date that the time for seeking such review expires”); Cook v.

Dixon, No. 21-CV-14108-BB, 2022 WL 20582638, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2022) (“In Florida,

if the appellate court affirms a conviction in a written or elaborated opinion, a petitioner may seek

discretionary relief in the Florida Supreme Court. If discretionary review is not sought, the

conviction becomes final when the 30-day period for seeking review in the Florida Supreme Court

expires.” (citation omitted)).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year limitations period is tolled while a properly

filed state post-conviction motion is pending. See Thompson vy. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 595 F.3d

1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, the one-year clock continues to tick during any gaps

in the post-conviction review process. See San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.

2011). An application is “properly filed” when it is filed in accordance with state laws and rules

governing such filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

Here, the statute of limitations ran untolled for 76 days until August 22, 2019, when

Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.° See Odom,

No. F13-5848, Doc, 524. The statute of limitations was then tolled until September 21, 2021, when

the Third DCA issued its mandate affirming the denial of post-conviction relief. See Odom v. State,

No. 3D21-1926 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 21, 2021). The statute of limitations then ran untolled for

another 34 days until October 25, 2021, when Petitioner filed his second motion for post-

conviction relief. See Odom, No. F13-5848, Doc. 599. The statute of limitations then remained

tolled until, at the latest, February 8, 2022, when the state trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for

rehearing. See id., Doc. 605.° The statute of limitations then ran untolled for 814 days until May

2, 2024, when Petitioner filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.800(a). See id., Doc. 606. Because the statute of limitations had run untolled for more than a

year, this filing could not toll the statute of limitations. See Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001) (a post-conviction motion cannot toll the AEDPA’s limitations period after it has

expired). Accordingly, more than a year of untolled time elapsed, and the Petition, filed on April

18, 2025, is untimely.

Petitioner acknowledges that his Petition is untimely, but he argues that he is entitled to

equitable tolling. (Pet. at 3.) AEDPA’s one-year limitation period “is subject to equitable tolling

> “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314

(11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). Here, the stamp on the first page of the motion for post-

conviction relief states that it was provided to prison authorities for mailing on August 22, 2019.

See Order Denying Def.’s Mot. for Post-Conviction Relief, Odom, No. F13-5848, Doc. 581 at 11.

® Jtis unclear from the record (a) the date on which this second motion for post-conviction

relief was mailed; and (b) whether this motion was “properly filed.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)

(providing that successive motions for post-conviction relief are generally prohibited).

Nonetheless, this Court need not resolve these issues because, as noted above, there are other gaps

in the post-conviction review process of over a year.

in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). The Supreme Court has

established a two-part test for equitable tolling: the petitioner “must show ‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and

prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). To show he is entitled to equitable tolling, “an inmate

bears a strong burden to show specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances

and due diligence.” Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008).

Here, Petitioner argues that he has shown “extraordinary circumstances” because “for

several years following [his] conviction, Petitioner was incarcerated without access to a law library

or legal counsel. He relied on inadequate or misleading legal advise [sic], and was unaware of

critical deadlines or legal remedies.” (Pet. at 3.) The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that an

inmate’s ignorance of deadlines, his reliance on prison law clerks, and his lack of counsel or access

to a prison law library are not “extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. See

Perez v. Florida, 519 F. App’x 995, 997 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have not accepted a lack of a

legal education and related confusion or ignorance about the law as excuses for a failure to file in

a timely fashion”); DeLeon vy. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 470 F. App’x 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The

lack of a legal education, the absence of legal counsel in this collateral context, and the resulting

consequence of reliance upon a bilingual inmate law clerk [ ] do not excuse a failure to file a §

2254 petition in a timely fashion”); Bland v. State, No. 16-17144-J, 2017 WL 5668005, at *3 (11th

Cir. Sept. 7, 2017) (‘[O]ur caselaw is clear that an inadequate prison law library or limited access

to the library or prison law clerks does not establish extraordinary circumstances for equitable

tolling”). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Finally, a petitioner may satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” to the

statute of limitations by making a “credible showing of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins,

569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). This exception, however, “applies to a severely confined category:

cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted the petitioner.’” /d. at 395 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). To make

a credible showing of actual innocence, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence—whether

it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner has not presented

any new evidence of his actual innocence. As mentioned, his sole claim concern’s the trial court’s

failure to hold a Williams rule hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot overcome the statute of

limitations.

This Court may summarily dismiss the Petition, without affording Petitioner an additional

opportunity to demonstrate timeliness, because Petitioner had sufficient “notice and [an]

opportunity to explain why his petition was timely” when he filed his Petition. Paez, 947 F.3d at

655; see also Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 824 F. App’x 914, 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Williams was

provided notice and an opportunity to explain why his petition was timely, not only when he filed

the petition itself but also when he filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation and his

motion for rehearing on the district court’s order”); Silva-Martinez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 808 F.

App’x 846, 848-49 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Mr. Silva-Martinez was provided ample notice and an

opportunity to explain why his petition was timely, both in the petition itself and again when he

was given the chance to respond to the R&R.”). Because Petitioner addressed the time bar and

equitable tolling in his Petition, he clearly had notice of the statute of limitations and an opportunity

to explain why his Petition should not be dismissed as time barred. Therefore, summary dismissal

is warranted,

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (ECF No. 1), is

DISMISSED as time barred.

2. Nocertificate of appealability shall issue. See Slack vy. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

3. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case and mail a copy of this order, along with the attached

state-court docket sheets, to Petitioner.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 2, day of April 2025.

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JOSE E}| MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies provided to:

Laroyce Odom, pro se

Noticing 2254 SAG Miami-Dade/Monroe

Email: CrimAppMIA@MyFloridaLegal.com