OWENS v. DUDEK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MELISSA ANNE OWENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-268-E

)

LELAND DUDEK,1 )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of April, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,

48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported

1 Leland Dudek is substituted as the defendant in this matter, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend

the docket to reflect this change.

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by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court

may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff contends that remand is required because the ALJ acted improperly in

crafting her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as there are no medical opinions in the

record from any treating or examining medical sources and the ALJ failed to adequately

explain how he crafted Plaintiff’s mental RFC. (Doc. No. 7 at 12-14). Additionally,

Plaintiff argues that the record was insufficient as it was missing her mental health

treatment records. (Id. at 14-15). Upon consideration, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff

and finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s action in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC without

treating or examining medical opinions within the record. Plaintiff contends that “[r]arely

can a decision be made regarding a claimant’s [RFC] without an assessment from a physician

regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” (Doc. No. 7 at 12) (citing, inter alia,

Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. This

Court has previously explained that Doak “does not, as Plaintiff suggests, hold that an ALJ's

RFC findings must be based on a particular medical opinion . . .” Mangyik v. Dudek, No.

23-148-J, 2025 WL 714116, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2025) (quoting Doty v. Colvin, No.

CIV.A. 13–80–J, 2014 WL 29036, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2014)). Rather, in Doak,

“[t]he Third Circuit did nothing more than make a substantial evidence finding in light of a

limited record . . . and subsequent Third Circuit case law confirms this understanding.”

Doty, 2014 WL 29036, at *1 n.1; see also Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d

Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular

findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”). Indeed, “[s]urveying

the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ's duties.” Titterington, 174 Fed.

Appx. at 11. Accordingly, it was not inherent error for the ALJ to craft an RFC without a

treating or examining medical source opinion.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s reliance on Dellaquila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-584,

2022 WL 4236621, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2022) is unpersuasive. In Dellaquila, the

court remanded because the ALJ insufficiently explained how he crafted the plaintiff’s

RFC after rejecting the only opinion as to plaintiff’s mental functioning capacity. Id.

This combination left the Court with no other choice but to remand for further discussion.

Id. Here, however, the ALJ adequately explained how he determined Plaintiff’s mental

RFC limitations and found the initial state agency psychological consultant’s opinion as to

Plaintiff’s mental impairments somewhat persuasive. (R. 24). After reviewing all the

evidence, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following mental RFC:

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After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform . . . jobs that have only

simple tasks, decisions, and instructions, meaning work which needs little or

no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period

of time, usually no more than 30 days; and she is limited to jobs that are not

performed in a production-rate environment, such as an assembly line.

(R. 20). The ALJ based these limitations on all the evidence, which he surveyed throughout

his decision, his finding that Plaintiff had the severe impairment of a mood disorder at Step

Two of the sequential process, and on his analysis of Plaintiff’s mental functioning under the

“paragraph B criteria” at Step Three of the sequential process. (R. 18-24).

The ALJ explained that the record showed that Plaintiff was on medication for

depression and anxiety from her primary care provider and that there was no evidence in

the record that she had any mental health treatment during the relevant period. (R. 23).

The ALJ also acknowledged that Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depressive disorder,

that she sometimes reported improvement on medication and other times reported no relief

from medication, and that her medication was changed several times during the relevant

period. (Id.). Her doctor reported that her depression and anxiety were stable and

controlled. (Id. (citing Ex. C2F/69-73)). The ALJ noted that he weighed this evidence

most favorably to Plaintiff and included appropriate limitations into the RFC. (R. 23-24).

He also stated that the RFC “assessment adopted in this decision contains sufficient

restrictions to adequately account for any limitations that could reasonably be expected to

arise as a result of claimant’s impairments.” (R. 24).

Additionally, the ALJ evaluated the opinion of the state agency psychological

consultants, who found at the initial level that Plaintiff had the nonsevere impairment of

anxiety and at the reconsideration level that Plaintiff had the nonsevere impairments of

anxiety and depression. (Id.). The ALJ found these opinions somewhat persuasive and

not persuasive, respectively, but noted that “weighing the evidence most favorably to

claimant, the undersigned has considered her mental health condition to be severe and

added additional limitations based on that.” (R. 24).

Moreover, at Step Three of the sequential process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information, and in adapting

and managing herself; and a moderate limitation in concentration, persisting, or

maintaining pace. (R. 19). The ALJ assessed these limitations after evaluating

Plaintiff’s testimony, which showed that Plaintiff has difficulty focusing and concentrating,

has issues with anger, has crying episodes, and has difficulties maintaining a schedule,

among other things. (R. 19). The ALJ also noted that his RFC assessment reflected the

degree of limitations he found in this analysis. (R. 20).

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

The ALJ’s findings as to Plaintiff’s mental functioning and assessment of the

evidence, as a whole, logically led to the ALJ’s mental RFC finding. While the ALJ did

not precisely articulate how each limitation was found, he articulated that he incorporated

mental limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC after “[w]eighing the evidence most favorably to

claimant” and determining Plaintiff’s mood disorder to be “severe[,]” such that “appropriate

limitations [were] included in the residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 24); see

Ellinger v. Kijakazi, No. 22-349-E, 2023 WL 8282057, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2023)

(noting the ALJ provided an “accurate and logical bridge” connecting plaintiff’s mental

limitations to the RFC when stating that he considered past mental history, Plaintiff’s

testimony, and incorporated several limitations in the RFC after “[c]onsidering the evidence

in a way most favorable to the claimant[.]”); Taylor v. Dudek, No. 23-2109, 2025 WL

692116, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2025) (affirming where the ALJ explained how he

accounted for plaintiff’s mental limitations despite rejecting all medical opinions of record).

Moreover, he articulated that the RFC reflected the degrees of limitations he found at Step

Three of the sequential process. (R. 20). In this regard, the Court takes the ALJ “at his

word.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 297 Fed. Appx. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s mental RFC is supported by substantial evidence.

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that it should remand based on

her missing mental health treatment records. (Doc. No. 7 at 14-15). Plaintiff

specifically refers to her records from mental health therapy in 2019-21. (Id.; R. 77).

Plaintiff’s argument overlooks that it was her burden to secure medical evidence that could

have helped her prove her disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Plaintiff

was represented at the administrative level and, as such, the ALJ was permitted to assume

that she put forth her best case. See Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, this argument is at odds with the fact that the ALJ granted Plaintiff’s request to

keep her record open post-hearing, but Plaintiff did not take that time to submit these

records. (R. 91-92). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.

In sum, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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