Caldwell v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 24-2074C

(Filed: April 30, 2025)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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KENNETH LESLIE CALDWELL, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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ORDER

Plaintiff Kenneth Leslie Caldwell, proceeding pro se, makes a variety of

allegations and seeks various forms of relief. See Complaint (ECF 1). The complaint

is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. See RCFC 12(h). Plaintiff’s

motion for judgment on the administrative record (ECF 8) and “Amended Motion for

Estoppel by Silence and for Ex Parte Judgment” (ECF 16) are DENIED AS MOOT.

This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on

the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort

claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see

also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal

Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Perhaps confusingly for pro se litigants, it

is not a forum for “federal claims” generally. Claims that are outside the Court’s

jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).

“In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts

asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir.

2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a

pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared

by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements.”

Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted)

(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74

Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal

construction of [their] pleadings”) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21

(1972)).

Because Plaintiff identified this case as directly related to other cases that

were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, this Court previously ordered him to show

cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as well. See

Order (ECF 6). Plaintiff was directed, in particular, to “identify[] specific claims and

issues that are new to this case and within this Court’s jurisdiction.” Id. Plaintiff’s

response to that order does not appear to identify any such claims. See Am. Brief in

Resp. to Show Cause Order (ECF 17). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show grounds for

jurisdiction, and dismissal is an appropriate remedy for that reason alone.

Examining Plaintiff’s briefing nonetheless, it also appears that no claims

within this Court’s jurisdiction appear in Plaintiff’s complaint or briefs. Many involve

misconduct by Idaho state agencies, courts, and officers, or by individuals and

businesses. This Court, though, cannot hear claims against defendants other than

the United States, and it cannot review the decisions of other courts. Innovair

Aviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Jones v. United

States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378,

380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Vehr v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 332, 333 (2014). This

Court has no jurisdiction over claims based on state law. Cabral v. United States, 317

F. App’x 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d

1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

Claims for money in this Court under the Tucker Act are premised on (1)

contracts between the plaintiff and the United States, (2) illegal exactions of money

by the United States, or (3) laws or constitutional provisions that require the United

States to pay money to the plaintiff. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl.

349, 355 (2011). Plaintiff does not allege a contract with the federal government or

raise a claim for recovery of money the United States exacted.

Although Plaintiff identifies a large number of laws the United States has

allegedly violated, none of them requires payment of money. Many — including

criminal laws, civil rights laws, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–254, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,

Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and antitrust

laws — have been previously addressed in a prior case brought by Plaintiff. See

Caldwell v. United States, No. 23-320C, 2023 WL 5624109, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 31,

2023), aff’d, No. 2024-1122, 2024 WL 413456 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2024), cert. denied, 144

S. Ct. 2624 (2024), reh’g denied, 144 S. Ct. 2725 (2024). The current complaint

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mentions several more laws, but none of them requires payment of money either.

Wopsock v. Natchees, 454 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Administrative Procedure

Act); Klingenschmitt v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 163, 184 (2014), aff’d, 623 F. App’x

1013 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1025–

1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Lopez v. United States,

No. 21-1166, 2022 WL 199887, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 21, 2022), aff’d, No. 2022-1426,

2022 WL 17660982 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2022) (Article III); Taylor v. United States, 747

F. App’x 863, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Sixth Amendment). Other laws cited by the

Plaintiff relate only to government powers or court processes, and do not mandate

payment of money to private litigants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 535, 1491, 1505, 1915. The

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act does not apply to the federal

government in relevant part, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5, and does not authorize

recovery of money even when it does apply to states, see Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S.

277, 288 (2011). On review of Plaintiff’s filings, I am unable to identify claims within

this Court’s jurisdiction.

The complaint is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. See RCFC

12(h). Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative record (ECF 8) and

“Amended Motion for Estoppel by Silence and for Ex Parte Judgment” (ECF 16) are

DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is directed to serve this opinion and order on

Plaintiff by electronic mail.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge

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