Opinion

United States v. Luis Batista

Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Apr 30, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.0%

holding that the trial court was divested of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a notice of appeal

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the trial court was divested of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a notice of appeal

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12764 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/30/2025 Page: 1 of 10

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12764

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUIS BATISTA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20866-AMC-2

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12764

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Luis Batista appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se

motion for compassionate release, filed under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion because he met the “extraordinary and compelling rea-

sons” requirements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 based on his long-term

medical conditions. He also contends that the district court erred

in finding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against

granting compassionate release.

I

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-

tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Giron, 15

F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we

review a district court’s denial of an eligible defendant’s request for

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discre-

tion. See id. A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an in-

correct legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the

determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.

See id.

Notably, the district court order must show a reasoned basis

for its decision. See United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th

Cir. 2021). “[E]ven though our review is only for abuse of discre-

tion, the district court must still provide this Court with enough

explanation in order to determine whether such an abuse has

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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 3

occurred.” Id. Where the explanation is inadequate, we will re-

mand to the district court for a more complete explanation. See id.

For example, in Stevens we held that the district court had failed to

provide the minimum explanation required, as it provided no indi-

cation of what, if anything, it had considered in making its deter-

mination, did not mention or reference the § 3553(a) factors or any

other facts or circumstances that it had considered, and did not ad-

dress the defendant’s specific arguments, including those related to

post-offense rehabilitation. See id.

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed. See Tannen-

baum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Never-

theless, an issue is deemed abandoned if a pro se appellant makes

only a passing reference to it, or he raises it in a perfunctory manner

without supporting authority or arguments. See United States v.

Horn, 129 F.4th 1275, 1305 (11th Cir. 2025). Typically, the district

court is divested of jurisdiction over matters at issue on appeal once

a timely notice of appeal is filed, except to the extent that the court

must act in aid of the appeal. See Shewchun v. United States, 797 F.2d

941, 942 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court was divested

of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a

notice of appeal).

II

In general, a district court may not modify a sentence once

it has been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12764

Cir. 2021). Either the Bureau of Prisons, or a defendant who has

fully exhausted administrative remedies, may move the court to

reduce the term of imprisonment based on compassionate release.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing so;

(2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so;

and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community

within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and a reduction is con-

sistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements.

See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th

Cir. 2021). A court need not address these three conditions in a

specific sequence, as the lack of even one forecloses a sentence re-

duction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38. If the court finds against

the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief

and need not analyze the other requirements. See id.

The applicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A) is set out

in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, p.s. As amended in 2023, § 1B1.13 lists six cat-

egories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons”: (1) the defend-

ant’s medical condition; (2) the defendant’s age; (3) the defendant’s

family circumstances; (4) the defendant being a victim of sexual or

physical abuse while in custody; (5) “[o]ther [r]easons”; and (6) an

“unusually long sentence.” § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6); see also U.S.S.G.

App. C, Amend. 814 (effective Nov. 1, 2023). When reviewing the

district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we apply

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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 5

the version in effect at the time of the district court’s decision. See

United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011).

Under § 1B1.13(b)(1) there are four ways for the defendant

to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons for release

based on a defendant’s medical conditions. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–

(D). First, the defendant can show that he is suffering from a ter-

minal illness, such as metastatic solid-tumor cancer, end-stage or-

gan disease, or advanced dementia, but a specific prognosis of life

expectancy is not required. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Second, the de-

fendant can show that he is suffering from a serious physical or

medical condition, a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or

“experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of

the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the

defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correc-

tional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.”

§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). Third, the defendant can show that he

suffers from a medical condition that requires long-term or special-

ized medical care that is not being provided, and without such

medical care, the defendant faces a risk of serious deterioration in

health or death. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Lastly, the defendant can

show that he is at a facility with an imminent risk of or is affected

by an outbreak of an infectious disease or ongoing public health

emergency, or is at increased risk of suffering severe medical com-

plications or death because of exposure to the disease because of

personal factors, and such risk cannot be adequately mitigated. See

§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i)–(iii).

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12764

As to age, § 1B1.13(b)(2) states that the defendant qualifies

for compassionate release if he is “(A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is

experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health

because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or

75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.”

There is a catchall provision for “[o]ther [r]easons,” which

states that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction if he

“presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances

that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the

reasons described [above], are similar in gravity” to the other ex-

amples listed. See § 1B1.13(b)(5). And § 1B1.13(b)(6) provides that,

if a defendant received an “unusually long sentence” and has served

at least ten years, a change in law, other than a non-retroactive

amendment to the Guidelines, may be considered if the change

would produce a gross disparity between the defendant’s sentence

at the time it was imposed and when the motion was filed.

The policy statement, in § 1B1.13(c), provides the following

regarding limitations on consideration of changes in law:

Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in

the law . . . shall not be considered for purposes of de-

termining whether an extraordinary and compelling

reason exists under this policy statement. However,

if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordi-

nary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence re-

duction under this policy statement, a change in the

law . . . may be considered for purposes of determin-

ing the extent of any such reduction.

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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 7

In order to qualify for compassionate release, § 1B1.13(a)(2)

also provides that the district court must find that the defendant is

not a danger to any other person or to the community under 18

U.S.C. § 3142(g). To determine whether a defendant is a danger to

the community under § 3142(g), the court must consider (1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including

whether it is a crime of violence, a terrorism crime, involved a mi-

nor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destruc-

tive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3)

the history and characteristics of the defendant, and (4) the nature

and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that

would be posed by the defendant’s release. See § 3142(g).

III

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-

tion in denying Mr. Batista compassionate release based on the

standards in § 1B1.13. Mr. Batista did not show that his medical

conditions or age, or a combination of both, were extraordinary

and compelling reasons for release.

The district court stated that it had (a) considered Mr. Ba-

tista’s motion, which described his lung scan and (b) reviewed the

attachments, which included the results of the scan, and then found

that Mr. Batista was not eligible for a sentence reduction. See D.E.

99 at 17; D.E. 99-1 at 28–31; D.E. 103. The court also explicitly

stated that Mr. Batista’s medical circumstances did not meet the

extraordinary and compelling reasons identified in § 1B1.13. See

D.E. 103.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12764

Mr. Batista alleged in his motion that there was a possibility

he could develop cancer from his lung nodules, but he did not show

that the condition was terminal, seriously impaired his functioning,

or required specialized care because his supporting doctor’s notes

only indicated that he would require follow up. See D.E. 99 at 17;

D.E. 99-1 at 28–31. In his reply to the government’s response to his

motion for compassionate release, Mr. Batista noted that he did not

have a timely follow-up appointment to the CT scan, despite eight

months having passed, but this fact does not indicate that the dis-

trict court abused its discretion, especially given that the report

stated that there was a “very low likelihood” of the nodules becom-

ing active cancer. See D.E. 99 at 28–31; D.E. 102 at 3; Giron, 15 F.4th

at 1345. As such, the court’s explanation for its denial of Batista’s

motion for compassionate release based on his CT scan was rea-

soned and not an abuse of discretion. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317.

With respect to whether the other medical conditions that

Mr. Batista alleged in his motion for reconsideration—including

obesity, Type 2 diabetes, hypertension, anxiety, depression, deteri-

orating physical capabilities, and a lack of vision and dental care—

qualified, he arguably abandoned those conditions on appeal be-

cause he only specifically mentioned his lung CT scan in his brief.

See D.E. 99 at 6–8; Horn, 129 F.4th at 1305. But even if he had raised

those other matters, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that none of his other medical conditions were an

extraordinary or compelling reason for release. None of these

medical conditions rose to the level of severity required by

§ 1B1.13, given that Mr. Batista was still able to take care of himself

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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 9

and maneuver around the prison facility, and he did not allege that

any of the conditions were terminal. See D.E. 99 at 6–8; D.E. 99-1

at 5. The court did not err in finding that these conditions were

not extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13, see D.E.

103, and this provided enough explanation for us to determine that

it did not abuse its discretion. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317.

As for his risk of exposure to COVID-19 and his age, Mr. Ba-

tista does not raise these concerns in his initial brief, and the district

court included in its reasoning that these factors did not qualify him

for release. See Appellant’s Br. at 5–6; D.E. 103; § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(2).

Although Mr. Batista was 70 years old and had served nearly 10

years of his sentence, the court did not find that he was experienc-

ing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of

the aging process. See § 1B1.13(b)(2). While § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i)–

(iii) covers the risk of exposure to an infectious disease, the court

found that COVID-19 was not an extraordinary and compelling

reason to grant Mr. Batista release. While Mr. Batista may be at a

higher risk of the harmful effects of COVID-19 at his age, there was

no indication that the court relied on clearly erroneous facts or an

improper legal standard in denying his motion. See Giron, 15 F.4th

at 1345.

The district court also noted that no combination of circum-

stances qualified Mr. Batista for relief, indicating that it had con-

templated the catchall provision under § 1B1.13(b)(5). See D.E. 103.

We see no error in this determination either.

As noted, if one of the three necessary conditions for com-

passionate release is not met, the district court need not examine

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-12764

the other prongs. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348. The last prong that

must be met for the court to grant compassionate release is that

the § 3553(a) factors support release. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237.

We need not determine whether the district court properly found

that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against Mr. Batista’s release be-

cause the court’s determination that he did not meet the § 1B1.13

criteria alone was sufficient to deny his motion.

IV

The district court’s order denying Mr. Batista’s motion for

compassionate release is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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