holding that the trial court was divested of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a notice of appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court was divested of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a notice of appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-12764 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/30/2025 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-12764
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUIS BATISTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20866-AMC-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12764
Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Batista appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se
motion for compassionate release, filed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion because he met the “extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons” requirements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 based on his long-term
medical conditions. He also contends that the district court erred
in finding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against
granting compassionate release.
I
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Giron, 15
F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we
review a district court’s denial of an eligible defendant’s request for
compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discre-
tion. See id. A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an in-
correct legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the
determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.
See id.
Notably, the district court order must show a reasoned basis
for its decision. See United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th
Cir. 2021). “[E]ven though our review is only for abuse of discre-
tion, the district court must still provide this Court with enough
explanation in order to determine whether such an abuse has
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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 3
occurred.” Id. Where the explanation is inadequate, we will re-
mand to the district court for a more complete explanation. See id.
For example, in Stevens we held that the district court had failed to
provide the minimum explanation required, as it provided no indi-
cation of what, if anything, it had considered in making its deter-
mination, did not mention or reference the § 3553(a) factors or any
other facts or circumstances that it had considered, and did not ad-
dress the defendant’s specific arguments, including those related to
post-offense rehabilitation. See id.
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed. See Tannen-
baum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Never-
theless, an issue is deemed abandoned if a pro se appellant makes
only a passing reference to it, or he raises it in a perfunctory manner
without supporting authority or arguments. See United States v.
Horn, 129 F.4th 1275, 1305 (11th Cir. 2025). Typically, the district
court is divested of jurisdiction over matters at issue on appeal once
a timely notice of appeal is filed, except to the extent that the court
must act in aid of the appeal. See Shewchun v. United States, 797 F.2d
941, 942 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court was divested
of authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after he had filed a
notice of appeal).
II
In general, a district court may not modify a sentence once
it has been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12764
Cir. 2021). Either the Bureau of Prisons, or a defendant who has
fully exhausted administrative remedies, may move the court to
reduce the term of imprisonment based on compassionate release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing so;
(2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so;
and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and a reduction is con-
sistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements.
See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2021). A court need not address these three conditions in a
specific sequence, as the lack of even one forecloses a sentence re-
duction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38. If the court finds against
the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief
and need not analyze the other requirements. See id.
The applicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A) is set out
in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, p.s. As amended in 2023, § 1B1.13 lists six cat-
egories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons”: (1) the defend-
ant’s medical condition; (2) the defendant’s age; (3) the defendant’s
family circumstances; (4) the defendant being a victim of sexual or
physical abuse while in custody; (5) “[o]ther [r]easons”; and (6) an
“unusually long sentence.” § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6); see also U.S.S.G.
App. C, Amend. 814 (effective Nov. 1, 2023). When reviewing the
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we apply
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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 5
the version in effect at the time of the district court’s decision. See
United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011).
Under § 1B1.13(b)(1) there are four ways for the defendant
to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons for release
based on a defendant’s medical conditions. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–
(D). First, the defendant can show that he is suffering from a ter-
minal illness, such as metastatic solid-tumor cancer, end-stage or-
gan disease, or advanced dementia, but a specific prognosis of life
expectancy is not required. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Second, the de-
fendant can show that he is suffering from a serious physical or
medical condition, a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
“experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of
the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correc-
tional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.”
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). Third, the defendant can show that he
suffers from a medical condition that requires long-term or special-
ized medical care that is not being provided, and without such
medical care, the defendant faces a risk of serious deterioration in
health or death. See § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Lastly, the defendant can
show that he is at a facility with an imminent risk of or is affected
by an outbreak of an infectious disease or ongoing public health
emergency, or is at increased risk of suffering severe medical com-
plications or death because of exposure to the disease because of
personal factors, and such risk cannot be adequately mitigated. See
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i)–(iii).
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12764
As to age, § 1B1.13(b)(2) states that the defendant qualifies
for compassionate release if he is “(A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health
because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or
75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.”
There is a catchall provision for “[o]ther [r]easons,” which
states that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction if he
“presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances
that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the
reasons described [above], are similar in gravity” to the other ex-
amples listed. See § 1B1.13(b)(5). And § 1B1.13(b)(6) provides that,
if a defendant received an “unusually long sentence” and has served
at least ten years, a change in law, other than a non-retroactive
amendment to the Guidelines, may be considered if the change
would produce a gross disparity between the defendant’s sentence
at the time it was imposed and when the motion was filed.
The policy statement, in § 1B1.13(c), provides the following
regarding limitations on consideration of changes in law:
Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in
the law . . . shall not be considered for purposes of de-
termining whether an extraordinary and compelling
reason exists under this policy statement. However,
if a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence re-
duction under this policy statement, a change in the
law . . . may be considered for purposes of determin-
ing the extent of any such reduction.
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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 7
In order to qualify for compassionate release, § 1B1.13(a)(2)
also provides that the district court must find that the defendant is
not a danger to any other person or to the community under 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g). To determine whether a defendant is a danger to
the community under § 3142(g), the court must consider (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether it is a crime of violence, a terrorism crime, involved a mi-
nor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destruc-
tive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3)
the history and characteristics of the defendant, and (4) the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the defendant’s release. See § 3142(g).
III
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Mr. Batista compassionate release based on the
standards in § 1B1.13. Mr. Batista did not show that his medical
conditions or age, or a combination of both, were extraordinary
and compelling reasons for release.
The district court stated that it had (a) considered Mr. Ba-
tista’s motion, which described his lung scan and (b) reviewed the
attachments, which included the results of the scan, and then found
that Mr. Batista was not eligible for a sentence reduction. See D.E.
99 at 17; D.E. 99-1 at 28–31; D.E. 103. The court also explicitly
stated that Mr. Batista’s medical circumstances did not meet the
extraordinary and compelling reasons identified in § 1B1.13. See
D.E. 103.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12764
Mr. Batista alleged in his motion that there was a possibility
he could develop cancer from his lung nodules, but he did not show
that the condition was terminal, seriously impaired his functioning,
or required specialized care because his supporting doctor’s notes
only indicated that he would require follow up. See D.E. 99 at 17;
D.E. 99-1 at 28–31. In his reply to the government’s response to his
motion for compassionate release, Mr. Batista noted that he did not
have a timely follow-up appointment to the CT scan, despite eight
months having passed, but this fact does not indicate that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion, especially given that the report
stated that there was a “very low likelihood” of the nodules becom-
ing active cancer. See D.E. 99 at 28–31; D.E. 102 at 3; Giron, 15 F.4th
at 1345. As such, the court’s explanation for its denial of Batista’s
motion for compassionate release based on his CT scan was rea-
soned and not an abuse of discretion. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317.
With respect to whether the other medical conditions that
Mr. Batista alleged in his motion for reconsideration—including
obesity, Type 2 diabetes, hypertension, anxiety, depression, deteri-
orating physical capabilities, and a lack of vision and dental care—
qualified, he arguably abandoned those conditions on appeal be-
cause he only specifically mentioned his lung CT scan in his brief.
See D.E. 99 at 6–8; Horn, 129 F.4th at 1305. But even if he had raised
those other matters, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that none of his other medical conditions were an
extraordinary or compelling reason for release. None of these
medical conditions rose to the level of severity required by
§ 1B1.13, given that Mr. Batista was still able to take care of himself
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24-12764 Opinion of the Court 9
and maneuver around the prison facility, and he did not allege that
any of the conditions were terminal. See D.E. 99 at 6–8; D.E. 99-1
at 5. The court did not err in finding that these conditions were
not extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 1B1.13, see D.E.
103, and this provided enough explanation for us to determine that
it did not abuse its discretion. See Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317.
As for his risk of exposure to COVID-19 and his age, Mr. Ba-
tista does not raise these concerns in his initial brief, and the district
court included in its reasoning that these factors did not qualify him
for release. See Appellant’s Br. at 5–6; D.E. 103; § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(2).
Although Mr. Batista was 70 years old and had served nearly 10
years of his sentence, the court did not find that he was experienc-
ing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of
the aging process. See § 1B1.13(b)(2). While § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i)–
(iii) covers the risk of exposure to an infectious disease, the court
found that COVID-19 was not an extraordinary and compelling
reason to grant Mr. Batista release. While Mr. Batista may be at a
higher risk of the harmful effects of COVID-19 at his age, there was
no indication that the court relied on clearly erroneous facts or an
improper legal standard in denying his motion. See Giron, 15 F.4th
at 1345.
The district court also noted that no combination of circum-
stances qualified Mr. Batista for relief, indicating that it had con-
templated the catchall provision under § 1B1.13(b)(5). See D.E. 103.
We see no error in this determination either.
As noted, if one of the three necessary conditions for com-
passionate release is not met, the district court need not examine
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-12764
the other prongs. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348. The last prong that
must be met for the court to grant compassionate release is that
the § 3553(a) factors support release. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237.
We need not determine whether the district court properly found
that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against Mr. Batista’s release be-
cause the court’s determination that he did not meet the § 1B1.13
criteria alone was sufficient to deny his motion.
IV
The district court’s order denying Mr. Batista’s motion for
compassionate release is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.