Brown v. English

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMES MICHAEL BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:24-CV-1017-TLS-APR

BRIAN ENGLISH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

James Michael Brown, a prisoner without a lawyer, was ordered to show cause why he

did not pay the initial partial filing fee. The docket reflects that payment has now been received.

ECF No. 4. Therefore, the case will proceed to screening.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To proceed beyond the pleading

stage, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Brown is proceeding without counsel, and therefore the Court must give his allegations

liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Brown is an inmate at Miami Correctional Facility (MCF). He claims that on the night of

October 24, 2024, MCF Warden Brian English and former Indiana Department of Correction

(IDOC) Commissioner Christina Reagle made a decision to shut off the electricity in the

restrictive housing unit due to multiple fires that had occurred.1 While the lights were out,

several inmates plugged their toilets and flooded the unit with water. Some of the water came

into Brown’s cell. A correctional officer whom he identifies as “Sgt. John Doe” was working

that night. Brown asked him for help cleaning up the water, and Sgt. John Doe allegedly yelled,

“F--- it, I am not getting this cleaned up. Y’all can sit in it.” ECF No. 1 at 2.

Around 2:30 a.m., Brown got up to go to the bathroom and could not see because the

electricity was still out, which meant his night light was not working. He slipped and fell in the

water, hitting his head and knocking himself unconscious. When he awoke, he pressed the

emergency call button in his cell but neither Sgt. John Doe nor anyone else came to help him.

The following day, a non-party officer took him to the medical unit and he was diagnosed with a

concussion. He claims to have lingering problems as a result of the fall, including migraines.

Based on these events, he sues Warden English, former Commissioner Reagle, and Sgt. John

Doe for money damages.

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety” of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). To state a

claim, an inmate must allege that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk”

to his health or safety. Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). This encompasses

two elements: “(1) the harm to which the prisoner was exposed must be an objectively serious

one; and (2) judged subjectively, the prison official must have actual, and not merely

constructive, knowledge of the risk.” Id. (cleaned up). On the second prong, the plaintiff must

allege that “the defendant had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that

a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to

1 Reagle was replaced by a new Commissioner in 2025. See https://www.in.gov/idoc/about/wall-of-

commissioners.

prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

“[N]egligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as the term is used in tort cases is not

enough” to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir.

2020).

In general, a fall caused by exposure to wet floors does not amount to an Eighth

Amendment violation. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[S]lippery surfaces . .

. without more, cannot constitute a hazardous condition of confinement.”); Perkins v. Atrisco,

No. 3:22-CV-1052, 2023 WL 2346275, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2023) (“[F]ederal courts are

consistent in holding that slip-and-fall incidents, whether on ice, water, or slippery floors, do not

meet the deliberate indifference standard of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement

claims.”). The mere fact that Brown fell and injured himself on the slippery floor, though

unfortunate, is not enough to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Brown alleges that there was an

extenuating circumstance in that the power was out, making it difficult for him to navigate the

water. These combined conditions could amount to an excessive risk to his safety.

However, as to the Warden and Commissioner, there is no general respondeat superior

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and these high-ranking officials cannot be held liable for these

conditions simply because they oversee operations at the prison or within the IDOC. See Mitchell

v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.

2009). Although these officials made the decision to shut off the electricity in his unit, his

complaint makes clear that this was because of a risk of fire. Brown thinks these Defendants

should have taken a more conservative approach by simply shutting off breakers in individual

cells, but “the mere failure . . . to choose the best course of action does not amount to a

constitutional violation.” Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court also

considers that the power was shut off during the overnight hours when inmates would likely be

sleeping. Had the unit not been flooded by other inmates, there is no indication the lack of power

posed an undue risk to Brown’s safety for this brief period. Brown does not allege that Warden

English and former Commissioner Reagle had actual knowledge that the unit was flooded and

deliberately turned a blind eye to the risk posed by these combined conditions. See Sinn, 911

F.3d at 419. He has not stated a plausible claim against them.

As for Sgt. John Doe, Brown alleges that this defendant did have actual knowledge that

Brown’s cell was flooded with toilet water and that there was no lighting because the power had

been turned off. When Brown asked him for help, he allegedly made a flippant comment

suggesting he did not care if Brown injured himself. Brown has alleged enough to proceed

further against this defendant under the Eighth Amendment. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849,

855 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that where inmate complained about severe deprivations but was

ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate indifference”).

He also appears to be claiming a denial of medical care. To state a claim for the denial of

medical care under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must allege (1) he had an objectively

serious medical need and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical

need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a

physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious even a lay person

would recognize as needing medical attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.

2005). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or

criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious

risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even

though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005)

(cleaned up).

Brown states that he suffered a head injury in the fall, which caused him pain and

lingering problems for months. The Court will presume at this stage that he had a serious

medical need. He further claims that he pushed the emergency call button but no one answered.

It can be plausibly inferred from his allegations that Sgt. John Doe was in a position to hear the

call button but did not respond because he was angry the inmates had flooded the unit. Further

factual development may show that the sergeant was not the individual who failed to respond to

the call button, but at this stage the Court must draw all inferences in Brown’s favor. He has

alleged enough to proceed further against the officer.

Brown next asserts a claim for “retaliation . . . in violation of Amendment I United States

Constitution.” ECF No. 1 at 3. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must

allege: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a

deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First

Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the

retaliatory action.” Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

The third factor requires some “causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.”

Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020).

Brown does not describe any protected First Amendment activity he engaged in, such as

filing a legal claim or grievance. See Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020). As

best as can be discerned, he claims Sgt. John Doe refused to clean up the water because he was

angry that the other inmates plugged their toilets. While perhaps unprofessional, this not the type

of action prohibited by the First Amendment. See Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 707–08. He will be not

permitted to proceed on a claim under the First Amendment.

As a final matter, Brown is being permitted to proceed against an unnamed defendant. It

is permissible to sue a “placeholder defendant” in federal court, but as a practical matter an

unnamed defendant cannot be served with process. See Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th

1120, 1121 (7th Cir. 2022). Sgt. John Doe must be identified and served within the two-year

statute of limitations period and the deadline specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Id. The Court has an obligation to assist Brown in trying to identify and serve this defendant. See

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996); Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598,

602 (7th Cir. 1990). To expedite that process, the Court will order the Warden to provide the

name of this individual, to the extent he is able, based on the information Brown has provided.

For these reasons, the Court hereby:

(1) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Sgt. John Doe in his personal capacity

for money damages for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to the Plaintiff’s safety by

allowing him to remain in a cell with no lights that was flooded with toilet water on or about

October 24, 2024, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

(2) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Sgt. John Doe in his personal capacity

for money damages for deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s need for medical care after he

slipped and injured himself in the early morning hours of October 25, 2024, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment;

(3) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Warden Brian English in his official

capacity solely to identify Sgt. John Doe;

(4) DISMISSES all other claims;

(5) DISMISSES Christina Reagle as a Defendant;

(6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to request a Waiver of Service from (and if necessary,

the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to locate and serve process on)

Warden Brian English at the Indiana Department of Correction and to send him a copy of this

order and the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

(7) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the United States Marshal

Service with the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any Defendant who

does not waive service, to the extent such information is available;

(8) WAIVES the Warden’s obligation to answer the complaint; and

(9) ORDERS the Warden to provide on or before June 18, 2025, the name of the male

correctional sergeant who was working in the restrictive housing unit at Miami Correctional

Facility near the area of the Plaintiff’s cell during the evening hours of October 24, 2024, or to

file a notice by the above date explaining why the name of this individual cannot be provided.

SO ORDERED on April 28, 2025.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT