Jackson v. Stevens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ROBERT JACKSON, Case No. 1:25-cv-209

Plaintiff,

Cole, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

DAVID STEVENS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the complaint and paid the

requisite filing fee in the above captioned case. For the reasons that follow, the

undersigned now recommends that this case be DISMISSED sua sponte for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, for failure to state any claim.

I. Background

Many pro se litigants seek to file their complaints in forma pauperis, or without

payment of a filing fee. In such cases, Congress has authorized Courts to conduct an

initial evaluation of the complaint prior to authorizing service on any defendant. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e). Because Plaintiff paid the full filing fee, his complaint is not subject to

statutory sua sponte screening under § 1915(e).1 Nevertheless, this Court retains the

authority to dismiss frivolous lawsuits under Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.

1999). Moreover, a federal court has the obligation to dismiss a lawsuit at any time that it

determines it is without subject matter jurisdiction.

1 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis after he paid the filing fee. Plaintiff’s motion will

be addressed by a separate order.

A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By

the same token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see

also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly

governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that

offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Erickson, 551 and U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff brings this action against the First District Appellate Court of

Appeals, Joseph Deters, State of Ohio, David Stevens, The Cincinnati Police Law

Enforcement Officers, The Hamilton County Prosecutors Office and The United States

Government. Plaintiff asserts federal and state civil rights claims against defendants and

asks the Court to delete his prior offenses and convictions. (Doc. 1 at 4). For relief,

Plaintiff seeks “0.5M 4hundred thousand dollars.” Id. Attached to his complaint are

documents and pleadings related to his state court appeal, See State of Ohio v. Jackson,

Case No. C181060, as well as his Hamilton County Juvenile Court record. (Doc. 1 at 15-

19).

II. Plaintiff's Complaint Should be Dismissed

Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted in this federal court. Plaintiff fails to include any

supporting factual allegations that would allow the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 556 (2007)). Notably,

other than the caption, Plaintiff does not include any allegations relating to the named

defendants.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages for alleged constitutional

violations stemming from his criminal conviction, his § 1983 claims are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A judgment in plaintiff's favor on any claim stemming

from the state criminal proceedings against him would necessarily imply that his

conviction and resulting imprisonment are invalid. See id., 512 U.S. at 487. Because

Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating that his conviction and resulting confinement have

been invalidated by a federal or state court or other appropriate tribunal, he may not

proceed with such a claim for damages in this § 1983 action.

Plaintiff’s complaint is also time-barred. A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

is governed by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims.

See Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Ewing v. O'Brien,

115 F. App'x 780, 783 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Section 1983 claims brought in federal court in

Ohio are subject to the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2305.11.”); Huffer v. Bogen, No. 1:10-cv-312, 2011 WL 5037209, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Oct.

24, 2011) (and authorities cited therein) (“With respect to alleged violation[s] of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, such claims are governed by Ohio's personal injury statute of limitations, which

is two years.”). Here, Plaintiff's allegations all concern conduct that occurred in 2018,

during Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings. Therefore, the complaint under § 1983,

filed approximately seven years later, is time-barred.

Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be

DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further

RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the

foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma

pauperis.

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ROBERT JACKSON, Case No. 1:25-cv-209

Plaintiff,

Cole, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

DAVID STEVENS, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after

being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the

portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in

support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within

FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).