The opinion
12-3679
Blasi v. New York City Board of Education
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th
4 day of October, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 Circuit Judges,
10 JOHN G. KOELTL,*
11 District Judge.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 William J. Blasi,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 v. 12-3679
19
20 New York City Board of Education,
21 Dennis M. Walcott, in his official
22 capacity as Chancellor of the New
23 York City Board of Education, Susan
24 Friedman, individually and in her
25 official capacity as Principal at
26 Sheepshead Bay High School, Elaine
27 Farran, individually and in her
28 official capacity as Assistant
29 Principal of Social Studies at
*
Judge John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
1 Sheepshead Bay High School, Joyce
2 Coppin, individually and in her
3 official capacity as Superintendent
4 of Brooklyn High Schools, City of
5 New York,
6
7 Defendants-Appellees.
8 _____________________________________
9
10 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: William J. Blasi, pro se, Pen
11 Argyl, PA
12
13 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Francis F. Caputo, Assistant
14 Corporation Counsel, for Michael A.
15 Cardozo, Corporation Counsel for
16 the City of New York, New York,
17 N.Y.
18
19 Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court
20 for the Eastern District of New York (Mauskopf, J.; Go, M.J.).
21 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
22 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
23 Appellant William Blasi, a former attorney proceeding pro
24 se, appeals from the judgment of the district court granting the
25 defendants’ summary judgment motion in his employment
26 discrimination action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
27 the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
28 issues presented for review.
29 We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. See
30 Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.
31 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
32 dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
33 to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In determining whether
2
1 there are genuine disputes of material fact, this Court is
2 “‘required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
3 factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
4 judgment is sought.’” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d
5 Cir. 2003) (quoting Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of
6 New York, 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)). Summary judgment is
7 appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a
8 rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.”
9 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
10 587 (1986).
11 As an initial matter, Blasi has waived appellate review of
12 the district court’s treatment of all the claims raised in his
13 consolidated complaints save for his due process claim relating
14 to the New York City Department of Education’s administrative
15 C-31 hearing, which is the only claim for which he provides any
16 specific arguments in his appellate brief. We have held that
17 “[i]ssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered
18 waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” Norton v.
19 Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1998). Pursuant to this
20 rule, we have concluded that “merely incorporating by reference
21 an argument presented to the district court [or] stating an issue
22 without advancing an argument” is insufficient to raise an issue
23 for appellate review. Id. at 117. Moreover, while this rule is
24 “tempered in pro se cases by our duty to construe liberally
3
1 papers filed by pro se litigants,” id. at 118 n.1, we have also
2 recognized that the degree of solicitude due to pro se litigants
3 is “lessened” in situations where, as here, the litigant has
4 previous legal experience, see Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90,
5 102 (2d Cir. 2010).
6 Here, aside from his due process claim, Blasi – a former
7 attorney with years of litigation experience – asserts only that
8 “there was sufficient evidence to deny [the defendants’] summary
9 judgment motion.” He has advanced no specific arguments in
10 support of this assertion, nor has he called our attention to the
11 specific “evidence” upon which his assertion is based.
12 Accordingly, we conclude that he has waived appellate review of
13 the district court’s treatment of his remaining claims. Cf.
14 Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2012)
15 (finding a challenge to the dismissal of a claim to be abandoned
16 where an appellate brief “contain[ed] no authority or argument as
17 to how the court erred in dealing with [a] claim”).
18 With respect to Blasi’s due process claim, we conclude,
19 following an independent and de novo review of the record, that
20 the district court properly determined that he was collaterally
21 estopped from relitigating that issue by the New York state
22 court’s September 2005 decision dismissing Blasi’s Article 78
23 petition and that, in any event, the claim is without merit.
24 Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons set
4
1 forth by the magistrate judge in her March 12, 2012 report and
2 recommendation and by the district court in its August 12, 2012
3 memorandum and order. On appeal, Blasi reiterates his argument
4 that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review used by the
5 Article 78 court to review the C-31 hearing was “not adequate due
6 process” where he had alleged a stigma-plus due process claim.
7 Even assuming that he was not precluded from raising this
8 argument, we have specifically held that, in cases involving
9 probationary Department of Education employees like Blasi, “the
10 availability of an adequate, reasonably prompt, post-termination
11 name-clearing hearing is sufficient to defeat a stigma-plus
12 claim” and that the procedures available at C-31 hearings are
13 “adequate to protect [a plaintiff’s] reputational and
14 professional interests.” Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d
15 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2006).**
16 We have considered all of Blasi’s remaining arguments and
17 find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
18 judgment of the district court.
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
**
We further reject as “patently frivolous” Blasi’s argument
that the district court judge was required to recuse herself
because of her faith. See Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64,
70-71 (2d Cir. 2013).
5