State of Tennessee v. Jeffery W. Dean

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 8, 2013

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEFFERY W. DEAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County

No. 2011-CR-267 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2013-00340-CCA-R3-CD Filed October 24, 2013

Appellant, Jeffery W. Dean, challenges his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and

carjacking, for which he received concurrent sentences of thirteen years. In this appeal, he

contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain either of his convictions. Following

our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

R OGER A. P AGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD W ITT, J R.,

and R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

R.N. “Bo” Taylor, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffery W. Dean.

Robert E. Cooper, Attorney General and Reporter; Tracy L. Bradshaw, Assistant Attorney

General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Jason White, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case involves the aggravated kidnapping and carjacking of the victim, Demetria

Cantrell, from a Walmart parking lot in Springfield, Tennessee.

The victim testified as the State’s first witness. She stated that on September 24,

2010, she drove a 2003 silver Chevrolet Cavalier that was owned by her mother. That

evening, she drove to Walmart and parked on the side of the building. After shopping, she

left the store and walked toward her car. As she was about to open her car door, she heard

the sound of footsteps running behind her. She turned around, jumped, and screamed, at

which point appellant “looked [her] dead in [the] eyes” and told her to take him where he

needed to go or he would kill her. It appeared that appellant was holding something with his

right hand as if to threaten or scare her, but it was concealed under his shirt. The victim

testified that appellant’s eyes looked “[a]s though he meant every word he was saying.”

The victim stated that she allowed appellant to enter her car and sit in the back seat

as he requested. She asked appellant why he was doing this, and he responded that he did

not intend to frighten her but that someone was trying to “jump” him and he was trying to

escape. However, the victim was so terrified that she did not know whether to believe him.

She shifted the car into reverse and began to leave the parking lot. Appellant stated that he

wanted to be taken to Taco Bell. As they drove, he changed his mind and said that he would

rather be taken to Wendy’s. The victim was worried because based on the distance to

Wendy’s, she would have to be in the car with appellant for a longer time. She searched the

road for police, intending to “drive crazy” or operate her lights to get their attention, but she

saw none.

The victim testified that after she executed a turn, appellant eased forward from the

back seat and began looking at her purse in the passenger’s seat. She became fearful that he

was going to rob her, so she asked if appellant still wanted to be taken to Wendy’s. He

responded in the negative and told her to keep driving straight without making any turns. The

victim believed appellant’s demeanor to be extremely threatening. His face was almost to

her seat when he gave her the instructions, and she could not see his hands. She thought that

if she ever wanted to see her family, she would have to “hop” out of the car when she could.

She knew that to travel “straight” would be to travel toward Cedar Hill or perhaps Kentucky,

in a rural area. She was scared because it was dark, she was alone, and she had a petite build.

When they arrived at a red traffic light, she eased off her seat belt, gently placed her car into

park, opened the car door, and started running toward a bar across the street. To do so, she

had to dodge oncoming traffic. She did not turn around at all until she reached another

vehicle in the parking lot. When she did, she saw her car being driven away by appellant.

The victim explained that when she arrived at the parked SUV, she began beating on

the window and screaming for help. A young man exited the SUV and asked what was

wrong. She jumped into his SUV and asked him to get in and lock the door because she was

terrified. When the victim calmed down enough to explain the events to the man, he dialed

the police for her. After placing the call to the police, the victim borrowed his telephone to

call her mother. An officer drove her home, and after she spoke with her mother for a while,

she realized that her telephone had a tracking device on it and that her telephone was inside

her purse, which was still in her car. When the victim fled from the car, she left all of her

belongings behind. When an officer arrived at her home, he and her step-father used a

computer in the house and tracked her telephone. Based on the tracking device, officers

located the car and returned it to her. However, it had been damaged. The air conditioner

had been knocked out, and the bumper was damaged. The victim confirmed that appellant

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did not have permission to take her car. She never received any of the items that she left in

the car except for her driver’s license, which was mailed back to her with no return address.

The victim testified that a detective showed her several photographs on a digital

camera, and she identified appellant as the person who committed these acts. She identified

appellant in court as the perpetrator. She confirmed that when appellant accosted her, she

felt that she did not have a choice in letting him into her car and that she felt extremely scared

during the ordeal.

On cross-examination, the victim stated that she had viewed the security footage from

Walmart. She stated that the police told her that appellant had been “after” other women at

Walmart prior to his accosting her and that she had seen appellant engaging in such behavior

when she viewed the video footage.

Cathy Lee Ferrell was the State’s next witness. Ms. Ferrell was employed by Walmart

as an asset protection manager. She stated that Walmart had video surveillance covering all

areas of both the front and the side parking lots. Reviewing the video footage, Ms. Ferrell

noted that appellant arrived at 6:26 p.m. on September 24, 2010, and exited a vehicle just

outside of the “general merchandise” entrance. Appellant was inside the store for

approximately forty-five seconds, during which time the driver of the vehicle circled the

parking lot. Appellant then exited the store and approached the vehicle, which was then out

of the line of traffic and stopped alongside the garden center. Appellant opened the

passenger door and displayed “very exaggerating movements, like there might be a

confrontation. At that point, he’s leaning down and he’s talking and he . . . pushes the door

very hard and slams the door and turns around and goes back into the building.” From 6:29

until 6:50 p.m., appellant walked along “the front end action alley,” the area in the front of

the store where the restrooms were located. He would look at various areas of the parking

lot and then return to the store. Ms. Ferrell characterized his movements as going “in and

out and in and out of the store.” He never entered the merchandise area of the store. Through

Ms. Ferrell, the State entered two video recordings, one that depicted appellant’s actions

from 6:26 through 6:50 and another that recorded his interaction with the victim.

Ms. Ferrell narrated the second video recording, noting that at 6:50 p.m., the victim

entered the camera’s range. The video displayed the interaction between appellant and the

victim, as well as the car being driven away from Walmart. Ms. Ferrell stated that in the first

video, from 6:46 to 6:50 p.m.:

[H]e had walked on the outside of the building to the general merchandise

side. [He] [e]ntered the general merchandise side, came straight down past the

restrooms, past the service desk[,] and was standing . . . near the grocery

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vestibule[,] but not actually in it. He was standing more like register two area,

standing there. Ms. Cantrell checked out on the grocery side. She exited[,]

and he was directly behind her at that point.

She noted that appellant encountered a different woman exiting the garden center at 6:35

p.m., and he looked in her direction. That raised concerns with Ms. Ferrell.

On cross-examination, Ms. Ferrell characterized appellant’s encounter with the other

woman as “stalking,” based on appellant’s looking at her, turning around, then walking in

her direction. In her opinion, appellant turned around because he realized that the woman

was parked in a “high profile position” in the front parking lot. Ms. Ferrell alluded to a

second woman in Walmart whom she felt appellant was “stalking.” She also acknowledged

that due to a technical error, the footage skipped the time between 6:26 and 6:29 p.m.

Jacob Bibb testified next and stated that he was parked in a gravel parking lot near a

sports bar. He was waiting to meet some friends, and they were going to drive to Nashville

together. A friend was with him, and they were cleaning trash out of the vehicle to make

room for additional occupants. His friend exclaimed, “Somebody is coming,” and he saw

the victim running toward them and screaming. She appeared to be panicked as she jumped

into his vehicle. When Mr. Bibb looked toward the road, he saw the victim’s car being

driven down the road. He dialed 9-1-1 and tried to calm the victim, who was “almost

hyperventilating.” The police arrived and began their investigation.

Sybill Cantrell, the victim’s mother, testified next. She stated that in September 2010,

she had provided the victim with a 2003 Chevrolet Cavalier for her primary use. On

September 24, 2010, Ms. Cantrell and the victim discussed the victim’s plan to go shopping

at Walmart. Later in the evening, Ms. Cantrell received a telephone call wherein she could

only hear the victim crying “hysterically;” Ms. Cantrell had never heard the victim so upset.

She finally ascertained what had happened to the victim. Before Ms. Cantrell could proceed

to the location where the victim was located, she received a telephone call from the police

informing her that the victim was safe with them and that they would drive her home.

Ms. Cantrell testified that upon the victim’s arrival at home, the victim said that “a

stranger had taken her by force and . . . stated that he wanted her to take him to his

destinations[,] and if she didn’t[,] . . . he had threatened to do harm to her.” The event upset

the victim to such a degree that she was afraid to leave her home for “a couple of months.”

Ms. Cantrell stated that it “kind of messed her up a little bit.”

After the victim arrived at home, they were able to locate the victim’s vehicle by

utilizing the Global Positioning System (“GPS”) in her cellular telephone. They received the

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vehicle from the “garage company” that located it. Ms. Cantrell confirmed that when they

received the vehicle, the victim’s purse was no longer in it. Rather, authorities tracked the

purse to an “abandoned” location based on the GPS.

Officer Seth Lata with the Springfield Police Department was the State’s next witness.

He testified that he was a patrol officer on the night in question and responded to the call that

originated from the parking lot next to a sports bar. When he arrived, he observed the victim,

a young African-American female who was “shaken up, scared, crying, [and] trembling.” She

explained to him that “she had jumped from her vehicle [and] that a white male had taken

her.” Officer Lata opined that the victim was “terrified” and “in fear for her life” when he

spoke with her. He attempted to calm the victim and determine what had happened.

Detective Madison Burnett with the Springfield Police Department testified next. He

furthered the investigation by first interviewing the victim at her home. He recalled that the

victim told him that she was frightened because appellant had keys to her home. Detective

Burnett drove the victim to Walmart so she could demonstrate for him where and how the

offenses had occurred. Based on the victim’s description of appellant, Detective Burnett

believed that appellant was one of several individuals with whom he had spoken earlier in

the day regarding an unrelated case. During that investigation, Detective Burnett had

photographed appellant and others, and as he drove the victim to Walmart, he showed her

several pictures on his digital camera that he had taken earlier that day. As the victim

scrolled backward through the images, she exclaimed, “Oh my God, that’s him[!]” The

victim appeared to become more relaxed at that point.

Detective Burnett testified that he was subsequently involved in recovering the

victim’s vehicle and personal property. He received a call that the vehicle had been located

in a wooded area outside of the city limits, and as he was speaking with county deputies, he

mentioned the appellant as being the suspect. Deputies indicated that appellant lived close

by, so they proceeded to his residence, but appellant was not there. Subsequently, Detective

Burnett secured a warrant for appellant’s arrest and returned to his residence. His

grandmother answered the door and informed officers that appellant was not there, but she

allowed them to enter and verify her statement. In a bedroom in the residence, officers found

the yellow shirt that appellant had been wearing on the night in question as seen in the video

footage from Walmart and as described by the victim.

At the close of Detective Burnett’s testimony, the State rested its case-in-chief.

Appellant presented Mindy Veard, his counsel’s paralegal, as his first witness. She testified

that when she interviewed the victim, the victim said that she had viewed the surveillance

tapes at Walmart and that she had witnessed appellant stalk two other women prior to

accosting her.

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Appellant testified in his own defense and stated that he was at Walmart on the night

in question to borrow money from a friend who worked there. He said that he had an

altercation with the driver of the vehicle from which he had exited, and he declined to re-

enter the vehicle. The driver said something to appellant that made him think that the driver

would try to shoot him later. Appellant had decided that if the driver returned to Walmart,

he would walk inside the store. Appellant admitted he had been convicted of three prior

aggravated assaults.

Appellant denied that he had approached any women at Walmart other than the victim

in this case. He stated that he left the building behind another customer because he was

looking for a ride. He explained that he followed the victim to her car because he needed to

try to get a ride, and he told her, “[L]ook, . . . they are trying to kill me[,] and I need a way

from Walmart . . . .” Appellant stated that the victim said, “Yes,” but he “could tell she was

spooked.” He attempted to reassure her, saying, “I swear to God, I’m not trying to hurt

you[;] I just need to get away from Walmart.” He originally requested a ride to Taco Bell

just to get away from Walmart, but he reconsidered and asked to go to Wendy’s because his

child’s mother had a friend who worked there. He did not believe the victim was upset

because they were conversing calmly.

Appellant explained that as he was riding in the victim’s car, he was not paying close

attention, so when she asked if he still wanted to go to Wendy’s and he said to continue

driving straight, he simply meant to drive to Wendy’s, not past Wendy’s. Appellant saw the

victim take off her seat belt and place the car in park. He stated that although he had no

intention of taking her car, he had been to prison before and knew that if the police arrived

at the scene, he would go to jail. Thus, he drove the car to his grandmother’s house and

parked it. He denied removing any of the victim’s belongings from the car and intimated that

“some people on that road that take[] pills” were responsible for the theft of the victim’s

personal property. He also denied ever having his hand in his pocket when he approached

the victim.

On cross-examination, appellant confirmed that he was frightened that the driver of

the vehicle from which he exited would return to harm him. He acknowledged that he could

have walked away, but he thought Walmart would be the safer option. Appellant did not call

the police, although a police station was located within two miles of Walmart. He claimed

that he left for Kentucky immediately following the incident to see his step-mother but not

to flee the jurisdiction.

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Appellant rested his case, and following deliberations, the jury found him guilty of

aggravated kidnapping and carjacking.1 The trial court imposed concurrent thirteen-year

sentences for both convictions. Appellant challenges his convictions in this appeal.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing Johnson

v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Davis, 354

S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). To obtain relief on a claim of insufficient evidence, appellant

must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This standard of

review is identical whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial evidence,

or a combination of both. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011); State v.

Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977).

On appellate review, “‘we afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of the

evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn

therefrom.’” Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857

(Tenn. 2010)); State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Cabbage, 571

S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In a jury trial, questions involving the credibility of

witnesses and the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual disputes

raised by the evidence, are resolved by the jury as trier of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d

651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). This court

presumes that the jury has afforded the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence and

resolved all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State; as such, we will not substitute our

1

We note that neither party raised the issue of whether the aggravated kidnapping was incidental

to the accompanying felony, i.e., carjacking. See State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). This court

may review issues not raised by the parties pursuant to our “plain error” review, wherein an “appellate court

may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at any time, even though the error was

not raised in the motion for a new trial or assigned as error on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). We decline

to employ plain error review of this issue because we have determined that under the unique circumstances

of this case, failure to give the jury instruction enunciated in White was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v. Cecil, — S.W.3d —, No. M2011-01210-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 4046608, at *12 (Tenn. Aug.

12, 2013) (holding that analysis of a White issue necessarily involves a harmless error analysis rather than

an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence); White, 362 S.W.3d at 580-81.

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own inferences drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, nor will we re-weigh

or re-evaluate the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379; Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835; see

State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984). Because a jury conviction removes

the presumption of innocence that appellant enjoyed at trial and replaces it with one of guilt

at the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts from the State to the convicted appellant,

who must demonstrate to this court that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

findings. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citing State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying the Conviction

for Aggravated Kidnapping

The elements of especially aggravated kidnapping, as charged in this case, are that

appellant “knowingly remove[d] or confine[d] another unlawfully so as to interfere

substantially with the other’s liberty” and that he did so “with the intent to inflict serious

bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-302,

-304. Appellant contends that the evidence was sufficient to prove false imprisonment but

that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to terrorize the victim.

Appellant having conceded the sufficiency of the evidence of false imprisonment, we

will only address the additional element of intent to inflict serious bodily injury or to terrorize

the victim. In the light most favorable to the State, the jury heard testimony from the victim

that appellant declared that he would kill her if she did not drive him where he instructed her

to go. The victim testified that appellant held his hand beneath his shirt in such a way that

it appeared that he was concealing a weapon. Appellant changed his mind twice with regard

to where he wanted the victim to drive, and the victim became fearful when he instructed her

to drive toward what she considered to be a rural area. During the drive, appellant leaned

forward in his seat so that he was very close to the victim. She could not see his hands at all,

and she characterized appellant’s demeanor as extremely threatening. Although appellant

offered contradicting testimony, the jury accredited the victim’s account. The jury resolved

the issues of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented,

see Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659, and we will neither substitute our own inferences for those

drawn by the jury nor re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence, see Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379.

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying the Conviction for Carjacking

To sustain a conviction for carjacking as charged in the indictment, the State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly took the victim’s

vehicle from her possession by use of force or intimidation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-404.

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In a similar case, this court has opined:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude a rational jury could have determined that the defendant’s repeated

statement, “Don’t make me hurt you,” was intimidating to the victim and made

her fear for her life, resulting in her jumping from and abandoning her car.

Additionally, even after the victim jumped out of the car, the defendant kept

using it, even stopping at a convenience store to purchase beer. We conclude

the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant knowingly took the victim’s

car through intimidation or threat and to support the conviction for carjacking.

State v. Kerry L. Dowell, No. M2002-00630-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21486978, at *8 (Tenn.

Crim. App. June 27, 2003).

Similarly, in this case, appellant accosted the victim at Walmart and told her to drive

him where he needed to go or he would kill her. She stated that appellant’s eyes looked “[a]s

though he meant every word he was saying.” She did not see a weapon, but she perceived

that appellant may have been holding it in the hand that was concealed under his shirt. She

became fearful when appellant changed his desired destination from Taco Bell to Wendy’s,

which was further away, and then again when he told her to drive straight and not make any

turns. The victim was apprehensive about driving into a rural area. Appellant intimidated

the victim by leaning up very close to her seat. She could not see his hands at that time, and

she was still unsure about whether he held a concealed weapon under his shirt. The victim

found appellant’s demeanor to be extremely threatening. Believing that escape was her only

option, the victim leapt from her car as soon as she could do so. After she escaped, she

turned around and saw appellant drive away in her vehicle. Law enforcement officers later

found her car parked at the home of appellant’s grandmother. In the light most favorable to

the State, and based on this court’s prior opinion, the jury had before it sufficient evidence

to conclude that appellant took the victim’s car through threats or intimidation.

CONCLUSION

Based on our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable legal

authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

_________________________________

ROGER A. PAGE, JUDGE

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