“[I]f the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the [qualified-immunity] defense should be sustained.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]f the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the [qualified-immunity] defense should be sustained.”
- “[T]o the extent that the denial of qualified immunity is based on a factual dispute, such a denial falls outside of the narrow jurisdiction of this Court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0913n.06
No. 12-4205 FILED
Oct 24, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LARRY LEWIS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
RONALD E. WECK, ) DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Ronald Weck appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
that Weck violated Plaintiff Larry Lewis’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when, without
a warrant, he entered a house owned by Lewis to inspect the house for health and safety hazards.
We AFFIRM.
Weck contends that the inspection was not a Fourth Amendment search because the house
was unoccupied, unused, and in poor condition at the time. On the other hand, he argues, if the
inspection was a Fourth Amendment search, it was constitutional because Lewis consented and
exigent circumstances justified the entry. Finally, Weck insists, if the search did, in fact, violate
Lewis’s Fourth Amendment rights, he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because a
reasonable officer in Weck’s position would have believed that his conduct was lawful.
No. 12-4205
Lewis v. Weck
Lewis disputes our jurisdiction. Although most denials of summary judgment are nonfinal
orders that cannot be appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an order denying qualified immunity
is immediately appealable. Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–27 (1985)). Still, our jurisdiction over such appeals is limited: we may
review the district court’s order only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell, 472
U.S. at 530; Harrison, 539 F.3d at 517 (“[T]o the extent that the denial of qualified immunity is
based on a factual dispute, such a denial falls outside of the narrow jurisdiction of this Court.”). A
defendant bringing an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity must accept the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assert issues of law. Although, as Lewis argues,
portions of Weck’s brief appear to dispute, rather than accept arguendo, Lewis’s version of the facts,
that does not deprive us of jurisdiction over the legal questions presented. Estate of Carter v. City
of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2005) (where defendant “raises the purely legal question .
. . whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law . . . this court
can ignore the defendant’s attempts to dispute the facts and nonetheless resolve the legal issue,
obviating the need to dismiss the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Accordingly, we deny Lewis’s motion to dismiss.
As to the merits of Weck’s appeal, we find no error in the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. The court correctly noted that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies to
private residences and commercial premises, and that the warrant requirement “applies with similar
force even where municipal fire, health, or housing inspectors are conducting administrative
searches.” R. 61, Order at 4 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967)). The
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No. 12-4205
Lewis v. Weck
court rejected Weck’s arguments that as a matter of law Lewis lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the structure, Lewis consented to the search, and the condition of the property justified
an exception to the warrant requirement. We agree that taken in the light most favorable to Lewis,
the evidence undermines these arguments.
Addressing Weck’s qualified-immunity defense, the court correctly found that the right to
be free from an administrative search conducted without a warrant, and without consent, is clearly
established. Although Weck had argued that his reliance on an attorney’s advice that he had the
right to enter the house constituted an “extraordinary circumstance” that entitles him to qualified
immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (“[I]f the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of
the relevant legal standard, the [qualified-immunity] defense should be sustained.”), the district court
did not err in finding that fact issues remain with respect to the attorney’s “prominence and
competence” under the relevant legal test. See York v. Purkey, 14 F. App’x 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990)). Relying on the same issue
of fact, the court also denied Lewis’s motion for summary judgment.
Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the reasons stated
in its order filed September 20, 2012.
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