The opinion
2013 IL 114853
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 114853)
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PEORIA SCHOOL DISTRICT
No. 150, Appellee, v. PEORIA FEDERATION OF SUPPORT
STAFF, SECURITY/POLICEMAN’S BENEVOLENT AND
PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION UNIT No. 114 (The Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed October 18, 2013.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred
in the judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether plaintiff
school district had the right to bring a declaratory judgment action in
the circuit court challenging the jurisdiction of the Illinois Labor
Relations Board over a dispute involving the district and its security
officers; and (2) whether Public Act 96-1257 is special legislation
violative of article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13). The appellate court answered the first
question in the affirmative (2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 38) and
suggested an affirmative answer to the second question (2012 IL App
(4th) 110875, ¶¶ 28-29), reversing the circuit court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s action and remanding “for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 41. We affirm the
judgment of the appellate court, rendering, however, an unequivocally
affirmative answer with respect to the second question.
¶2 SPECIAL LEGISLATION CLAUSE OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION
¶3 “The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when
a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is
or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial
determination.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 The following facts are taken, for the most part, from the
uncontested averments of plaintiff’s complaint and the motion to
dismiss subsequently filed by the defendants.
¶6 On March 15, 2011, plaintiff, the Board of Education of Peoria
School District No. 150 (the District), filed a complaint in the circuit
court of Sangamon County naming as defendants the Peoria
Federation of Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent and
Protective Association Unit No. 114 (the Union), the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board (the IELRB), and the Illinois
Labor Relations Board (the ILRB). In count I of the complaint, the
District sought a declaration that Public Act 96-1257 constituted
special legislation violative of the Illinois Constitution, and injunctive
relief appurtenant to such a finding. In count II, the District sought a
declaration that the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA)
(115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2010)), rather than the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2010)),
governed labor disputes between the District and its security officers.
¶7 According to the complaint, the District employed 26 full-time
and part-time employees who worked as “security agents and guards.”
At the time this litigation commenced, the Union represented those
employees. The Union had first been certified by the IELRB to
represent the District’s “full and part time security guards and truant
officers” in November of 1989. In October of 1996, the IELRB again
certified the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
for “all full and part-time guards, agents, security and police
employees” employed by the District. Collective-bargaining
agreements negotiated between October 1996 and August 2008 were
all pursuant to IELRB certification and under the provisions of the
-2-
IELRA. The last of these agreements expired on June 30, 2010.
Public Act 96-1257 became effective on July 23, 2010. It
amended the IPLRA, purporting to remove “peace officers” employed
by “a school district” in “its own police department in existence on
the effective date of this amendatory Act” from the purview of the
IELRA, and the oversight IELRB, and to redefine them as “public
employees,” subject to the IPLRA and the jurisdiction of the ILRB.
Correlatively, Public Act 96-1257 redefined “public employer” so as
to remove “a school district” that employed “peace officers” in “its
own police department in existence on the effective date of this
amendatory Act” from the scope of the IELRA and place it under the
provisions of the IPLRA.
¶8 On or about December 8, 2010, the District and the Union began
negotiations on a new collective-bargaining agreement. During the
course of contract negotiations between the District and the Union, a
dispute arose over the time of day when negotiations would occur.
Although it was the position of the Union that the IELRA no longer
governed the Union’s relationship with the District, in a letter dated
December 28, 2010, the Union stated it was “prepared to file a
charge, duplicate if necessary[,] with the IELRB and the ILRB.” On
March 3, 2011, the Union filed a representation petition with the
ILRB seeking certification of the Union as the exclusive
representative for the same bargaining unit that had been previously
certified by the IELRB. That action prompted the filing of the
District’s complaint for declaratory judgment 12 days thereafter.
¶9 In paragraphs 25 and 26 of the complaint, the District presented
the parties’ conflicting interests as follows:
“25. Under the IPLRA, if the parties reach an impasse
during their negotiations, the employer does not have a right
to impose the terms and conditions that it presented during
negotiations, the matter goes directly to interest arbitration.
26. Under the IELRA, however, if the parties reach an
impasse during their negotiations and the educational
employer has exercised good faith during bargaining, then the
educational employer has a right to impose the terms and
conditions that were presented during negotiations and
employees have the right to strike.”
The complaint alleged that the District “has an interest in having the
IELRA rather than the IPLRA apply to *** negotiations,” and the
Union a converse interest. When counsel for the District was
-3-
subsequently asked, at oral argument before this court, to clarify what
select group was favored by the amendment over others similarly
situated, counsel’s answers shifted and were initially ambiguous.
Later, however, counsel was asked: “Does the Union benefit by being
subject to the ILRB instead of the IELRB?” Counsel for the District
responded that smaller groups—like the security personnel employed
by District—are favored by interest arbitration because their smaller
numbers afford them less leverage than larger groups in a strike.
¶ 10 Citing attached transcripts of legislative history, the complaint
avers that legislators knew, when they passed the amendment, that it
would only apply to the District. The complaint further states in
paragraphs 34 through 36:
“34. Since the amendment only applies to a school district
which employs peace officers in its own police department in
existence on the effective date of the amendment, the
amendment by its own terms will never apply to any other
school district which may, after the effective date of the
amendment, decide to employ peace officers in its own police
department.
35. This classification is arbitrary and treats similarly
situated individuals and districts differently without an
adequate justification or connection to the purpose of the
statute.
36. This classification is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”
In light of the foregoing, the District concluded count I of the
complaint with the assertion that “Public Act 96-1257 is special
legislation prohibited by Section 13 of Article 4 of the Illinois
Constitution.”
¶ 11 In count II, the District contended, alternatively, that its
circumstances did not bring it within the purview of the statutory
amendment, arguing that the District “neither maintains nor is
authorized to establish and maintain a Police Department,” “has not
certified or appointed its security employees as truant officers,” and
“does not employee [sic] peace officers as defined by the IPLRA.”
¶ 12 On April 22, 2011, the Union filed a section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-
615 (West 2010)) “Motion to Strike/Amend Pleadings,” complaining
that the District had “intentionally misnamed” the Union “to claim
those officers are not really police or peace officers,”even though
-4-
documents indicate they: (1) are supervised by a “Chief of Police,”
(2) are assigned “to the Campus police department,” (3) are “required
to appear in court, on School related cases” as police “officers,” (4)
wear uniforms and patches identifying them as “campus POLICE,”
(5) wear badges describing each officer as “OFFICER District 150
POLICE,” (6) are issued a “Peoria Public Schools Campus Police
Operations Manual” informing them that those who complete course
work at the Police Training Institute “possess full police authority for
the school district and by state law are invested with full police
powers,” (7) may “[d]isplay and carry loaded weapons while on the
premises of Peoria Public School District 150,” and (8) “[e]ffect
arrests and document those arrests with police reports submitted to
the Peoria County State’s Attorney for criminal prosecution.”
¶ 13 On April 29, 2011, a motion to dismiss was filed by the IELRB
and the ILRB. In that motion, the Boards argued that: (1) the
challenged statutory provision does not classify school districts with
their own police departments differently from school districts which
do not have their own police departments; rather, it classifies all
peace officers employed by educational institutions as public
employees and is, therefore, not special legislation; (2) even if the
statute applies to school districts which employ peace officers in their
own police departments on the effective date of the amendment,
applying it to plaintiff does not constitute improper special
legislation; and (3) contrary to what the complaint alleges, this group
of employees is not excluded from the jurisdiction of either the ILRB
or the IELRB.
¶ 14 In a supporting memorandum, the Boards first took issue with the
District’s suggestion that the challenged statutory provision classified
school districts with their own police departments differently from
districts which did not maintain their own departments. The Boards
opined that the provision merely classified all peace officers
employed by educational institutions as public employees; therefore,
the Boards suggested that the amendment was not unconstitutional as
special legislation. Quoting this court’s opinion in Illinois Polygraph
Society v. Pellicano, 83 Ill. 2d 130, 137-38 (1980), the Boards stated
that special legislation must “arbitrarily, and without a sound,
reasonable basis, discriminate[ ] in favor of a select group.”
(Emphasis in original.) The Boards argued that the group at issue here
is not employees of educational institutions; it is peace officers
employed by public educational institutions. The Boards contended:
-5-
“Plaintiff has not alleged a group of similarly situated persons who
are treated differently.” The Boards concluded that the amendment
actually “fixed” an irrational scheme of classification by “bringing
members of a similarly situated group—peace officers employed by
public educational institutions—together within the province of one
statute, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.”
¶ 15 The Boards submitted, even if the relevant group consists of
“school districts which employ peace officers in their own police
departments on the effective date of the amendment,” applying it to
plaintiff does not constitute improper special legislation. Citing the
appellate court’s decision in Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 348
Ill. App. 3d 44, 58 (2004), the Boards stated that “classes of one are
permissible if there is a rational justification for the limited
application, and the narrow classification is reasonably related to the
justification.” On this point, the Boards concluded:
“Here, the governmental interest in putting all peace officers
employed by school districts—whether in their own police
department or not—under the umbrella of one labor board
makes this classification constitutional. Speculating whether
some school district in the future may create a police force
and claim its police department employees do not fall under
the definition of public employee is not a reason for declaring
the legislation unconstitutional now.”
¶ 16 In a supplemental memorandum, filed May 9, 2011, the Boards
challenged the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the controversy. The
Boards argued that the IPLRA and the IELRA “give exclusive
jurisdiction over deciding what group of employees belongs to what
type of bargaining unit to the Labor Boards” and, under both acts,
those decisions are “reviewable directly by the Appellate Court.” The
supplemental memorandum was not responsive to a situation—such
as this—where the question is which Board has jurisdiction of the
matter.
¶ 17 On July 20, 2011, the District filed a response to the Boards’
motion to dismiss. The District averred, inter alia, that the “effect
(and purpose) of the Amendment is to deny the affected employees
the right to strike and, instead, to grant them the power to invoke
interest arbitration to settle labor disputes with their employing school
district.”
¶ 18 The District argued that the amendment created an arbitrary split
in the Boards’ jurisdiction over peace officers employed by
-6-
educational employers, opining that the ILRB “will now have
jurisdiction over peace officers employed by a school district’s own
police departments as well as peace officers employed by a state
university” (see, for the latter assertion, 5 ILCS 315/3(n), (o) (West
2012)), while the IELRB “retains jurisdiction over peace officers
employed by a school district which does not have a police
department and peace officers employed by any other educational
employer.” In response, to the Boards’ assertions that the amendment
merely brought “all peace officers employed by public educational
institutions” under the jurisdiction of the same Board (the ILRB), and
that there are no similarly situated groups who remain covered by the
IELRA, the District cited, as controverting examples, peace officers
employed by the following educational employers:
(1) charter schools;
(2) contract schools or turnaround schools;
(3) community colleges;
(4) combination of public schools, including joint
agreements of any type formed by two or more school
districts;
(5) a subcontractor of institutional services of a school
district; and
(6) any state agency whose major function is providing
educational services.
In that regard, the District referenced subsections (a) and (b) of
section 2 of the IELRA (115 ILCS 5/2(a), (b) (West 2012)). In its
brief before this court, the District emphasizes that community
colleges, in particular, are statutorily authorized to employ peace
officers (see 110 ILCS 805/3-42.1 (West 2012)); yet, the District
claims, they “continue to fall under the IELRA.”
¶ 19 The District contended there is “no rational reason why all other
employees in a school district do not have the right to go to interest
arbitration while school district peace officers have the right,” opining
that it “cannot be based on public safety concerns.” The District
noted:
“All school districts except for one operate without their own
police officers. In the event of a strike, city and county offices
would still provide police protection, as they do now. Nor
could the reason be that a peace officer strike would shut
-7-
down a school district. Other employee strikes prevent school
districts from operating.”
The District concluded its constitutional argument reiterating its
position that there is no justification for the disparate treatment
effected by the amendment insofar as “the interests of the peace
officers existing in the Peoria School District are identical to peace
officers that could be or are employed by other school districts or
educational employers in the state in relation to the purpose of the
statute.”
¶ 20 With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the District argued that
“Illinois courts have jurisdiction when presented with a challenge to
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency,” citing People ex rel.
Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 321
(1974), as such a challenge “presents a matter of law determinable by
the courts and not a matter of fact determinable by the administrative
body,” citing Office of the Lake County State’s Attorney v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm’n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156 (1990). The
District argued that it was “imperative” that the circuit court “decide
the issue of jurisdiction because there is a risk of conflicting
administrative decisions.” The District also noted that an appeal from
an ILRB decision must be to the Third District of the Appellate
Court, while an IELRB decision must be appealed to the Fourth or
First Districts.
¶ 21 On September 7, 2011, the circuit court issued orders denying the
Union’s motion and granting the Boards’ motion as to both count I
and count II of the complaint. With respect to the former, the court
found that “peace officers are public employees under the IPLR Act,
and that the amendment “is not unconstitutional as special
legislation.” The court dismissed count II, finding it “clear that the
IELRB and ILRB have jurisdiction over collective bargaining unit
determinations.”
¶ 22 As noted, the appellate court reversed and remanded, in a
unanimous decision. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875. At the outset, the
court acknowledged the legislature’s determination that “where the
right of employees to strike is prohibited by law, it is necessary to
afford an alternate, expeditious, equitable and effective procedure for
the resolution of labor disputes.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 16
(quoting 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2010)). The appellate court recognized
that “alternate” procedure—interest arbitration—to be “ ‘qualitatively
similar to the right to strike.’ ” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 16
-8-
(quoting State of Illinois Department of Central Management
Services v. State of Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 373
Ill. App. 3d 242, 255 (2007) (hereafter CMS)).
¶ 23 Addressing count I of the District’s complaint, and quoting from
this court’s decision in Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d
315, 325 (2005), the appellate court reiterated the standards of review
this court found applicable to a special legislation challenge. 2012 IL
App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18. The court noted that the special legislation
clause prohibits the legislature from “ ‘conferring a special benefit or
privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are
similarly situated.’ ” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting
Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325). There are two requisite elements to a
successful special legislation challenge: (1) “ ‘the statutory
classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group,’ ” and
(2) “ ‘the classification is arbitrary.’ ” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18
(quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325). Where, as here, no fundamental
right or suspect class is affected by the statute in question, “ ‘the
deferential rational basis test’ ” applies. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875,
¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325). Applying those standards,
the appellate court determined that plaintiff’s complaint “makes out
a claim that Public Act No. 96-1257 is special legislation.” 2012 IL
App (4th) 110875, ¶ 20.
¶ 24 Assuming the amendment applied to the parties, the court
determined “the relevant distinctions are (1) between peace officers
employed by plaintiff, the only district currently employing police
officers directly, and any peace officers who may be employed
directly by other school districts in the future; and (2) between
plaintiff and any school district that, in the future, may employ peace
officers directly.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 20.
¶ 25 Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
District—the party against which dismissal was sought and
obtained—the appellate court gave “plaintiff the benefit of the doubt”
when plaintiff asserted that Public Act 96-1257, “if it applies to these
parties, favors Unit No. 114 and disfavors plaintiff by substituting
interest arbitration for the employees’ right to strike.” 2012 IL App
(4th) 110875, ¶ 23. The court rejected the labor boards’ “implication”
that the court had, in CMS, evaluated the desirability of interest
arbitration versus striking from either the employees’ or the
employer’s perspective, let alone concluded that “the alternative
proceedings were a wash for all parties.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875,
-9-
¶ 24. The court observed that the labor boards had “cited no cases
stating or holding the right to strike benefits an employee as much as
the right to engage in interest arbitration, which is the crux of the
labor boards’ position.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 24.
¶ 26 Having found a statutory classification that arguably
discriminated in favor of a select group, the appellate court next held
that classification was arbitrary insofar as the statute only applied to
peace officers employed by a school district in its own police
department in existence on the effective date of the amendment. 2012
IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 26. In that regard, the court rejected the
Union’s contention that the language of the amendment supported a
prospective application, concluding instead that the class of officers
affected by the amendment closed on July 23, 2010, the public act’s
effective date, and officers directly employed by school districts in the
future would remain under the purview of the IELRA. 2012 IL App
(4th) 110875, ¶ 27. From that finding, the court continued:
“If the legitimate interest justifying the classification in the
amendment is to ensure that police officers, no matter who
employs them, are not allowed to strike, then the distinction
between police employees of school districts currently
employing police officers and those of school districts that
may employ police in the future is irrational. No legitimate
state interest identified by the parties—and none we can
conceive of—accounts for the closing of the affected class by
reference to the statute’s effective date.” 2012 IL App (4th)
110875, ¶ 27.
The appellate court found that the District’s “right not to be
disadvantaged by special legislation is at issue now in ongoing
bargaining and labor disputes.” The court indicated it would “not wait
to see whether another school district actually establishes its own
police force in the future,” finding that “plaintiff’s constitutional
challenge does not depend on this contingency.” (Emphasis in
original.) 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 29.
¶ 27 Although the appellate court’s analysis bespeaks its belief that
Public Act 96-1257 is special legislation, violative of the Illinois
Constitution (2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶¶ 28-29 (finding the
legislature’s “classification” and “distinctions” “arbitrary”), the court
did not actually declare it to be such. Instead, the appellate court
simply found the allegations of count I “sufficient to withstand the
labor boards’ motion to dismiss.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 39.
-10-
¶ 28 With respect to the jurisdictional issue—whether a declaratory
judgment action was properly brought in the circuit court under these
circumstances challenging the jurisdiction of the ILRB—the appellate
court relied principally upon this court’s opinion in County of Kane
v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 199 (1987) (“The rule [of exhaustion of
remedies] does not apply when a party challenges the constitutionality
of a statute on its face [citations] or contests the authority or
jurisdiction of the administrative agency [citations] ***.”), and an
appellate court decision in Office of the Lake County State’s Attorney
v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 151, 155 (1990),
in holding that the action was properly brought in the circuit court.
¶ 29 In County of Kane, the chief judge of a judicial circuit challenged
the Illinois Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction over charges of
unfair labor practices filed against him by a union of probation
officers. The chief judge argued, inter alia, that he was not a public
employer and, thus, “not within the scope of the [Public Labor
Relations] Act.” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 201. Because he
challenged the labor board’s jurisdiction, and because “the questions
presented [were] entirely legal and [did] not require fact finding by
the administrative agency or an application of its particular
expertise,” this court held the judge was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in the circuit court. County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 199-200.
¶ 30 In Lake County, in a complaint before the circuit court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, a State’s Attorney challenged the
jurisdiction of the Department of Human Rights over an assistant
State’s Attorney’s charge before that agency of race- and sex-based
discrimination. The State’s Attorney alleged, inter alia, that the
assistant State’s Attorney was not an “employee” and the State’s
Attorney was not an “employer” or a “person” as used in the Illinois
Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, ¶¶ 2-101(A), (B),
1-103(L)). Lake County, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 153-54. The circuit court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the State’s Attorney failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. The appellate court, however,
found the circuit court had jurisdiction over the State’s Attorney’s
complaint because it attacked the administrative jurisdiction of the
Department of Human Rights and was therefore exempt from
exhaustion requirements. Lake County, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 156-57. As
in County of Kane, the appellate court found the State’s Attorney’s
jurisdictional challenge raised “entirely legal” questions, and the court
-11-
ultimately held: “The State’s Attorney need not first subject himself
to an exercise of jurisdiction of the [Human Rights] Commission,
which is not authorized by law[,] simply to obtain a decision from
which he could” pursue administrative relief and, ultimately, appeal.
Lake County, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 157.
¶ 31 The appellate court in this case found the reasoning of County of
Kane and Lake County controlling. It distinguished its decision in
Nestle USA, Inc. v. Dunlap, 365 Ill. App. 3d 727, 735 (2006), a case
in which the court held the plaintiff was required to exhaust
administrative remedies.
¶ 32 The court noted, in Nestle, the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission had
exceeded its statutory powers when an arbitrator working on the
agency’s behalf reinstated a claim beyond, the plaintiff argued, the
time allotted for doing so. The appellate court found the plaintiff was
improperly attempting to “skip review [by the administrative agency]
and seek judicial review by alleging that the arbitrator’s decision was
not authorized by statute.” Nestle, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 734-35. The
Nestle court noted that circuit courts “would be forced [in such
circumstances] to first determine if arbitrators’ decisions were wrong
in order to determine if they had jurisdiction.” Nestle, 365 Ill. App. 3d
at 735.
¶ 33 This appellate panel noted that the “merits,” as that term was used
in Nestle—“among other things whether the petitioned unit is
‘appropriate’ and whether the petitioners complied with mandated
voting procedures”—were not the subject of the District’s circuit
court complaint in this case. 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 38. The
court found the questions that were posed in the complaint for
declaratory judgment—“whether the unit’s members are public
employees and their employer a public employer”—“are jurisdictional
prerequisites apart from the merits of the case” and those questions
are “appropriately addressed by a trial court prior to a plaintiff’s
submission to an administrative agency’s unauthorized exercise of its
jurisdiction.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 38.
¶ 34 In light of its findings on the constitutional and jurisdictional
issues before it, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court
and remanded for “further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 41. Given the parameters and content of
the appellate court’s analysis, it does not appear there would be much
for the circuit court to do upon remand.
-12-
¶ 35 ANALYSIS
¶ 36 Jurisdiction
¶ 37 With regard to the jurisdictional issue presented herein, the parties
cite no case with comparable facts, i.e., a constitutional challenge to
a statute that would potentially divest one labor board (the IELRB) of
jurisdiction, with specified dispute resolution procedures, and confer
it upon another (the ILRB), with different procedures. Disposition of
the constitutional issue dictates which of the two boards has
jurisdiction of this matter. That decision is properly one for the
courts, and, in the first instance, the circuit court.
¶ 38 As this court recently confirmed in Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d
398, 411 (2011), administrative agencies have no authority to declare
statutes unconstitutional or even to question their validity. The
appellate court’s reliance upon County of Kane was well placed. In
that case, this court held that a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies when that party challenges the constitutionality of a statute
on its face or contests the authority or jurisdiction of the
administrative agency. County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at 199. This court
found it significant that “the questions presented are entirely legal and
do not require fact finding by the administrative agency or an
application of its particular expertise.” County of Kane, 116 Ill. 2d at
199.
¶ 39 The constitutional issue here is compounded, beyond that
presented in County of Kane, insofar as the question is not simply if
an agency has jurisdiction, but rather which of two agencies has
jurisdiction. That question is one for the courts.
¶ 40 Constitutionality
¶ 41 Where a statute is challenged as special legislation, we review, de
novo, a circuit court’s determination of constitutionality. Crusius v.
Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 324 (2005). We apply the
same standard in review of a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Bell v. Hutsell, 2011 IL 110724, ¶ 9.
¶ 42 We begin with a principal point of argument raised by the District
in the circuit court, and the basis for the appellate court’s suggestion
that Public Act 96-1257 is special legislation violative of article IV,
section 13, of the Illinois Constitution, i.e., the “troubling distinction”
in “(1) the statute’s treatment of officers currently employed by
school districts and those who may be employed by other school
-13-
districts in the future and (2) its corresponding treatment of the school
districts employing such officers.” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 27.
The appellate court found: “[T]he distinction between police
employees of school districts currently employing police officers and
those of school districts that may employ police in the future is
irrational. No legitimate state interest identified by the parties—and
none we can conceive of—accounts for the closing of the affected
class by reference to the statute’s effective date.” 2012 IL App (4th)
110875, ¶ 27. The appellate court concluded: “Plaintiff’s right not to
be disadvantaged by special legislation is at issue now in ongoing
bargaining and labor disputes. We will not wait to see whether
another school district actually establishes its own police force in the
future; plaintiff’s constitutional challenge does not depend on this
contingency.” (Emphasis in original.) 2012 IL App (4th) 110875,
¶ 29.
¶ 43 The appellate court’s analysis, which accounts for those who
might occupy a similar position in the future, is not foreign to our
special legislation jurisprudence. In fact, in that regard it is consistent
with opinions rendered by this court under the Illinois Constitution of
1870 (Ill. Const. 1870, art. IV, § 22)—Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 70
(1883); Pettibone v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 215 Ill. 304
(1905); Dawson Soap Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 314 (1908);
Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120 (1930)—and at least two
cases decided after the effective date of our current
constitution—People ex rel. East Side Levee & Sanitary District v.
Madison County Levee & Sanitary District, 54 Ill. 2d 442 (1973);
Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass’n, 63 Ill. 2d 313 (1976).
¶ 44 In Potwin, which was later quoted approvingly in Dawson Soap
Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 314, 317 (1908), this court employed
the following rationale in finding an act affecting cities and villages
acceptably general:
“[T]he act in relation to cities and villages is a general law,
and not local or special, although there may be municipal
corporations to which it is not applicable, namely, municipal
corporations in existence under special charters at the time of
the adoption of the constitution, which have not since sought
to have their charters changed or amended. It is general and of
uniform application to all cities, towns and villages thereafter
becoming incorporated, or thereafter having their charters
changed or amended, to the extent of such change or
-14-
amendment, and thus fully conforms to the definition of a
general law.” (Emphases added.) Potwin, 108 Ill. at 80-81.
In other words, a “general law” is one that applies to all who are
similarly situated at the time of passage or in the future.
¶ 45 In Pettibone, this court concluded that the use of the phrases
“which is now included within the limits of any city” and “shall now
exist” in the act under scrutiny supported a finding that the act was
special legislation:
“The use of the word, ‘now,’ in section 1 of the act excludes
the idea that the act was intended to apply to the future, or to
any town, which in the future might have its limits co-
extensive with the limits of the park district. The provisions
of the act are limited to the present, and to a town now
complying with the description indicated. Therefore, the
decisions referring to such towns, as might in the future come
within the designation specified in the act, can have no
application to the act now under consideration. For the
reasons thus stated, we are of the opinion that the act *** is
unconstitutional as being a local or special law, and as being
in conflict with section 22 of article 4 [of the Illinois
Constitution of 1870].” Pettibone, 215 Ill. at 336-37.
¶ 46 A quarter of a century after this court issued its decision in
Pettibone, this court appears to have remained steadfast in analyzing
special legislation challenges by reference to not only classes
presently existing, but also those that might be similarly situated in
the future. In Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 128-29
(1930), this court stated: “We have repeatedly held that a law may be
general and yet operative in a single place where the condition
necessary to its operation exists. [Citations.] Whether the condition
exists in one place or many, if the classification is reasonable and just
it does not violate the Constitution and it applies to all places now
within its terms and to all that may hereafter come within its terms.”
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 47 Statements this court made shortly after the advent of our current
constitution of 1970 acknowledge that the new constitution effected
no change in this court’s special legislation jurisprudence, other than
the framers’ expressed intention that courts not defer to legislative
determinations as to whether a general law can be made applicable.
¶ 48 In Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 109 (1972), this court
determined that “[s]ound rules of construction require that in those
-15-
instances in which this court, prior to the adoption of the constitution
of 1970, has defined a term found therein, that it be given the same
definition, unless it is clearly apparent that some other meaning was
intended.” This court noted, pursuant to its precedent, “Laws are
general and uniform when alike in their operation upon all persons in
like situation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgewater, 51
Ill. 2d at 109. The term “special” refers to “laws which impose a
particular burden or confer a special right, privilege or immunity upon
a portion of the people of the State.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109-10. Quoting from Latham v.
Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 31 Ill. 2d 178, 183 (1964),
the Bridgewater court acknowledged that the constitutional
prohibition against special legislation “ ‘does not mean that every law
shall affect alike every place and every person in the State but it does
mean that it shall operate alike in all places and on all persons in the
same condition.’ ” Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109.
¶ 49 The court emphasized that the principal change effected by the
new constitution was that it specifically rejected the rule, enunciated
in a line of decisions, that whether a general law can be made
applicable is for the legislature to determine, the framers specifically
providing that question henceforth “shall be a matter for judicial
determination.” (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 110. The Bridgewater court
acknowledged that “[a] law is general not because it embraces all of
the governed, but because it may, from its terms, embrace all who
occupy a like position to those included.” (Emphasis added.)
Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 111.
¶ 50 One year after Bridgewater, this court rendered its opinion in
People ex rel. East Side Levee & Sanitary District v. Madison County
Levee & Sanitary District, 54 Ill. 2d 442 (1973). In East Side Levee,
this court cited, inter alia, its earlier decision in Bridgewater for the
propositions that “the criteria developed under the earlier constitution
for determining whether a law is local or special are still valid”;
however, given the changes in the 1970 Constitution, “the deference
previously accorded the legislative judgment whether a general law
could be made applicable has been largely eliminated.” East Side
Levee, 54 Ill. 2d at 447.
¶ 51 At issue in East Side Levee was an enactment which purported to
divide, into two separate districts, any sanitary district “which lies in
2 counties and which has an equalized assessed valuation for tax
-16-
purposes of $100,000,000 or more, upon the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1972,” to provide for “more effective
administration and fiscal control.” See East Side Levee, 54 Ill. 2d at
447. The original sanitary district challenged the constitutionality of
the enactment in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The “not yet
organized” sanitary district, and two trustees of the original district,
sought an injunction in the circuit court of Madison County to restrain
the depositories of the original district, the county collector, and the
trustees of the “St. Clair Levee and Sanitary District” from disbursing
any funds pending resolution of the legal questions stemming from
the questioned legislation. East Side Levee, 54 Ill. 2d at 445.
¶ 52 Applying the applicable criteria developed under the earlier
constitution, and citing Pettibone, this court found the enactment
violated the constitution’s prohibition against special legislation,
noting:
“The briefs cite no reasons, and none are apparent to us, for
restricting the advantages of ‘more effective administrative
and fiscal control’ to those two-county districts which on
December 22, 1972 (the effective date of the Act), had an
equalized assessed valuation of $100,000,000, and not
extending the same advantages to those districts reaching that
valuation at a subsequent time.” East Side Levee, 54 Ill. 2d at
447.
This court concluded: “It is our opinion that a general law could have
been made applicable, and that Public Act 77-2819 therefore violates
the constitution’s prohibition against special legislation.” East Side
Levee, 54 Ill. 2d at 447.
¶ 53 East Side Levee was cited approvingly, and dispositively, in
Wright. At issue in Wright was the constitutionality of section 401a
of the Illinois Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 73, ¶ 1013a),
which was added by section 3 of Public Act 79-960. That new section
provided:
“No insurance company licensed or authorized to write
insurance covering medical, hospital or other healing art
malpractice shall refuse to renew any existing policy
providing such coverage at the rates existing on June 10,
1975, unless such company shall have provided sufficient
evidence to justify such increase to the Director of Insurance,
provided that the Director shall not approve such increase
until after public hearings have been held and the increase
-17-
justified from data from the books and records of such
company.”
See Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 330. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the
enactment constituted special legislation in violation of section 13 of
article IV of the Illinois Constitution. This court noted: “By its terms
section 401a regulates medical malpractice insurance rates on policies
that were in existence on June 10, 1975, and not those written after
that date.” Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 330. Citing East Side Levee, the court
found that a general law could have been made applicable and held
the statute’s temporal dichotomy “violative of section 13 of article IV
of the Constitution of 1970.” Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 331.
¶ 54 The cases cited—Potwin, Pettibone, Dawson Soap Co., Mathews,
East Side Levee, and Wright—collectively stand for the principle that
a law the legislature considers appropriately applied to a generic class
presently existing, with attributes that are in no sense unique or
unlikely of repetition in the future, cannot rationally, and hence
constitutionally, be limited of application by a date restriction that
closes the class as of the statute’s effective date. Barring some viable
rationale for doing so, it would, for example, violate the proscription
of the constitution for the legislature to apply a law to a person or
entity in existence on the effective date of enactment, but make it
inapplicable to a person or entity who assumed those attributes or
characteristics the day after the statute’s effective date.
¶ 55 That said, as we have noted, article IV, section 13, of our
constitution “only prohibits passage of a special or local law when ‘a
general law is or can be made applicable.’ ” Elementary School
District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006) (quoting in part
Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13). Nothing in the constitution bars the
legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions
of an entity that is uniquely situated. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d at 154.
¶ 56 It is that principle that underpins our decisions in Schiller, Big Sky
Excavation, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221 (2005),
Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315 (2005), and County
of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323 (1990), notwithstanding
instances of broader language included in the analyses. See Schiller,
221 Ill. 2d at 135-37 (legislation was tailored to address a specific
annexation issue involving a particular piece of property and a limited
geographical area); Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 227-29 (legislation in effect
abated a complex Commerce Commission case against Illinois Bell,
rendered all its business services “competitive” within the meaning
-18-
of the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law without further
review, compelled Bell to make $90 million in refunds to the
customers who would have been affected by the abated Commission
proceedings, and obligated the company to make separate deposits of
$15 million into two different funds); Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 319-20
(while Emerald Casino’s administrative appeal was pending before
the Illinois Gaming Board, legislation was enacted allowing “[a]
licensee that was not conducting riverboat gambling on January 1,
1998” (Emerald) to apply for a license renewal and approval of
relocation, and directing the Board to “grant the application and
approval upon receipt by the licensee of approval from the new
municipality or county *** in which the licensee wishes to relocate”);
County of Bureau, 139 Ill. 2d at 328-29 (legislation directed the
governmental units otherwise responsible for maintaining highway
and bridge infrastructure within their territories to maintain
infrastructure associated with the Illinois and Mississippi Canal,
which the state acquired from the federal government).
¶ 57 With respect to the case now before us, County of Bureau,
Crusius, Big Sky, and Schiller are distinguishable on their facts
insofar as the legislature, in each case, was addressing a problem
unique to a particular geographical area and/or one involving
peculiar, multifaceted economic considerations. In such
circumstances, a general law could not have been applied, as no other
person or entity did, or could, occupy the precise position of the party
or class affected. In this case, however, a general law clearly could
have been enacted that would have affected what is, and henceforth
would be, a generic class of individuals.
¶ 58 We reject, in passing, the contention that this language applies,
prospectively, to school districts that may, in the future, employ peace
officers in their own police departments. Similar language in the acts
at issue in Pettibone, East Side Levee, and Wright was interpreted by
this court as restrictive, closing the affected class as of the effective
date of the statute. See Pettibone, 215 Ill. at 336-37; East Side Levee,
54 Ill. 2d at 447; Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 330.1 We interpret it similarly
here. If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be
applied as written, without resort to further aids of statutory
1
The ILRB’s website suggests that it may interpret this language more
broadly (see http://www.state.il.us/ilrb/subsections/frequent/index.asp), but
such an interpretation is contrary to our precedent.
-19-
construction. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire
Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56.
¶ 59 We, like the appellate court, find no basis for restricting the reach
of the amendment herein to “peace officers employed by a school
district in its own police department in existence on the effective date
of [the] amendatory Act.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 315/3(n) (West
2010). In the policy statement of the IPLRA, the legislature itself set
forth the rationale for according “[e]ssential services employees” the
remedy of arbitration as a means to settle labor disputes: “To prevent
labor strife and to protect the public health and safety ***.” 5 ILCS
315/2 (West 2010). The legislature obviously deems peace officers
employed by a school district, in its own police department, to be “so
essential that the interruption or termination of [their] function will
constitute a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the
persons in the affected community.” See 5 ILCS 315/3(e) (West
2010) (defining “[e]ssential services employees”). Having made that
determination, it is irrational, and inconsistent with the reasoning of
this court’s decision in East Side Levee, not to extend the benefits and
protection of interest arbitration to citizens of those school districts
that may hereafter employ peace officers in their own police
departments. As in East Side Levee, there is no reason “for restricting
the advantages” of the legislation to a district with characteristics
currently qualifying and “not extending the same advantages to those
districts” qualifying “at a subsequent time.” See East Side Levee, 54
Ill. 2d at 447.
¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, we find that a general law could have
been made applicable in this case, that there is no rational
justification for the amendment’s limited application via effective-
date restriction. Thus, we hold that Public Act 96-1257 violates
article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution. Unlike the appellate
court, we do not feel constrained, by the procedural posture of this
case, from concluding this litigation with our judgment. The appellate
court provided the rationale for holding Public Act 96-1257 violative
of the constitution’s special legislation clause, but felt compelled to
remand “for further proceedings” consistent with its opinion. 2012 IL
App (4th) 110875, ¶ 41. We do not know what such proceedings
would entail, as the parties appear to have brought every applicable
argument and consideration to bear in this appeal. Therefore, we enter
declaratory judgment for the District on the question of the statute’s
constitutionality. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) (this
-20-
court may “enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have
been given or made, and *** grant any relief *** that the case may
require”). Thus, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court outright,
with no remand, and affirm the judgment of the appellate court, as
modified.
¶ 61 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 62 Appellate court judgment affirmed, as modified.
¶ 63 CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:
¶ 64 Although I agree with the majority’s resolution of the
constitutional issue, I write separately to emphasize that the circuit
court’s initial consideration of that issue in the underlying declaratory
judgment action was proper only under the circumstances here.
Indeed, recognizing the unique nature of this case, the majority
correctly notes that no other Illinois decision analyzes the primary
legal issue—a constitutional challenge to a statute that would
potentially divest the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board
(IELRB) of jurisdiction and confer it upon the Illinois Labor
Relations Board (ILRB). Supra ¶ 37. In other words, our holding is
applicable only to the facts and issue presented in this appeal.
¶ 65 This distinction is important because the IELRB and ILRB are
governed by comprehensive statutory schemes that extensively
address public sector collective-bargaining matters, respectively the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West
2010)) and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et
seq. (West 2010)). As this court has long recognized, when “the
legislature enacts a comprehensive statutory scheme, creating rights
and duties which have no counterpart in common law or equity, the
legislature may define the ‘justiciable matter’ in such a way as to
preclude or limit the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.” Board of
Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren
Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d
155, 165 (1989). Accordingly, this court has consistently held that the
IELRB and ILRB have exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes that fall
within their respective statutory schemes. Board of Education of
Community School District No. 1, Coles County v. Compton, 123 Ill.
2d 216, 221-22 (1988); City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor
Relations Board, 135 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (1990); Warren Township High
-21-
School District 121, 128 Ill. 2d at 166. Our well-founded holding on
that issue is not disturbed by this decision.
¶ 66 Moreover, in relevant part, the respective statutory schemes
governing the ILRB and IELRB provide that final decisions from
those boards are reviewable by direct appeal to the appellate court. 5
ILCS 315/9(i), 11(e) (West 2010); 115 ILCS 5/16 (West 2010).
Accordingly, we have discouraged litigants involved in school-related
labor disputes from attempting to circumvent the authority of the
review board by filing actions in the circuit court because “[t]o allow
the parties in school labor disputes to freely seek circuit court
intervention would disrupt the statutory scheme.” Warren Township
High School District 121, 128 Ill. 2d at 165-66. Nothing in this
decision should be construed as deviating from this admonishment,
or otherwise altering the typical process required under the applicable
statutory provisions to resolve labor disputes before the IELRB or
ILRB.
¶ 67 For these additional reasons, I respectfully concur in the
majority’s judgment.
-22-