Red Cedar Harmonia, LLC v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

Nos. 24-1862, 24-1863, 24-1875 (consolidated)

(Filed Under Seal: April 18, 2025)

Reissued: April 28, 2025 1

)

RED CEDAR HARMONIA, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS )

CORPORATION, )

)

Consolidated Plaintiff, )

)

and )

)

INTELLECT SOLUTIONS, LLC, )

)

Consolidated Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant, )

)

and )

)

IGNITEACTION, LLC, )

)

Defendant-Intervenor. )

)

John Davidson Levin, Womble Bond Dickinson, Huntsville, AL, for Red Cedar Harmonia, LLC;

Samuel S. Finnerty, PilieroMazza PLLC, Washington, DC, for Systems Engineering Solutions

Corporation; Tracye Winfrey Howard, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, for Intellect Solutions,

Inc.

Sosun Bae, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for defendant.

Elizabeth Newell Jochum, Blank Rome, Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor.

1

An unredacted version of this opinion was issued under seal on April 18, 2025. The parties proposed

redactions, which the Court adopts only in part owing to the “presumption of public access to judicial records.”

Allied Tech. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 16, 23 n.1 (2010) (quoting Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bowers, 283

Fed.Appx. 808, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

OPINION AND ORDER

SMITH, Senior Judge

In this consolidated post-award bid protest, the plaintiffs—Red Cedar Harmonia, LLC

(“Red Cedar”), Systems Engineering Solutions Corporation (“SES”), and Intellect Solutions,

LLC (“Intellect”)—challenge the decision of the U.S. Census Bureau (“Census”) to award a

small-business set-aside contract for IT support services to defendant-intervenor, IgniteAction,

LLC (“IgniteAction”). Among other things, each protestor challenges the Agency’s evaluation

of IgniteAction’s proposal as well as the protestor’s own proposal. Finding no error, the Court

denied the protest soon after oral argument. See Order of February 18, 2025, ECF No. 60. 2 This

opinion follows.

I. Background

A. Solicitation

The Census Bureau is the largest statistical agency in the federal government. Taylor R.

Knoedl, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL47847, The U.S. Census Bureau: An Overview (2023). Until

recently, Census stored most of its data, including confidential data, in “on-premise data center

infrastructure.” AR 6; see 13 U.S.C. §§ 9, 214 (requiring non-disclosure of confidential data).

In 2022, Census launched the Census Acceleration to Secure Cloud (“CASC”) Initiative, an

ambitious program to modernize data management practices by migrating data to secure cloud

infrastructure. AR 11, 13. To address the logistical and cybersecurity challenges arising from

the move, Census sought to “leverage industry knowledge and expertise” on “proven approaches

and best practices in the adaptation and implementation of modern technologies” that would help

“accelerate the . . . adoption of secure cloud capabilities” but also “continue to support existing

IT and infrastructure.” AR6.

The instant solicitation resulted. On June 10, 2024, Census issued RFQ No. 1333-LB-24-

JK0001 under Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 8.405-3, seeking quotations for a single-

award blanket purchase agreement (“BPA”) 3 for “on-premises and cloud infrastructure support

services” supporting the CASC Initiative. AR 180, 508, 673. The Solicitation was issued as a

small business set-aside, and to be eligible for consideration, quoters were further required to

hold a General Services Administration (“GSA”) Multiple Award Schedule (“MAS”) contract

under Special Item Number 518210C, Cloud Computing and Cloud Related IT Professional

Services. AR 673; see also FAR 8.4 (Federal Supply Schedules). The BPA would be applicable

2

Unless stated otherwise, this Opinion cites to filings and docket entries in the lead case, Red Cedar

Harmonia, LLC v. United States, No. 24-1862.

3

A BPA is a “simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by

establishing ‘charge accounts’ with qualified sources of supply.” FAR 13.303-1(a). BPAs are not contracts as such.

They specify a “set of terms and conditions that will be applicable to future purchases” but do not commit the

government to “any specific purchase.” J. Cibinic, Jr., et al., Formation of Government Contracts § 8.04[E] (5th ed.

2023). Contracting officers use them as a “convenient way . . . to negotiate an across-the-board discount for all of

the supplies or services furnished by a single supplier.” Id.; FAR 13.303-2(d)(1) (“[s]ecuring maximum discounts”).

2

for a base period of one year with four additional one-year option periods, during which time

Census would procure services by issuing individual orders. AR 673. Census assigned an

estimated value of $557,000,000.00 to the BPA. AR 674.

The Solicitation stated that Census would evaluate the proposals on three factors—

demonstrated prior experience, technical approach, and price. AR 761. Both the submission of

offers and their evaluation would be done in two phases. 4

In Phase I, Census would evaluate the offerors’ prior experience. Offerors would submit

the first volume (dubbed Volume I) describing their “demonstrated prior experience . . . as a

prime or subcontractor on a maximum of three (3) contracts . . . similar [in] size, scope, and

complexity” to the Solicitation “that have been performed or are currently being performed

within the last five (5) years.” AR 765. Offerors were asked to describe their past performance

in relation to five “Experience Elements”:

• 1001: “supporting On-Premises operational tasks,”

• 1002: “monitoring . . . enclaves, both On-Premises and within Cloud

environments,”

• 1003: “designing, building, and maintaining a multi-cloud/hybrid-cloud

architecture” that is “centralized” and “interoperab[le] with workloads hosted in a

traditional data center,”

• 1004: “migrat[ing] on-premises applications to the cloud” and “facilitat[ing] the

development of cloud native applications,” and

• 1005: “providing detailed cost analysis and enforcing compliance” with

“prescribed financial design factors.”

AR 766–67. For each element, the offerors were also required to describe the tools and approach

they used to the objective. AR 766–67. Based on the submissions, Census would assign a rating

of either “low,” “some,” or “high” confidence to each offeror’s prior experience. AR 778.

Quoters whose submissions “provide[d] the Government with the greatest levels of confidence”

would be advised to participate in Phase II. AR 768. Quoters “not amongst the most highly rated”

would be informed that they “are unlikely to be viable competitors,” but they would nevertheless be

permitted to participate in Phase II. AR 768.

In Phase II, Census would evaluate offerors on the other two factors, technical approach

and price. Offerors electing to participate in Phase II would submit two more volumes, Volumes

II and III. In Volume II, they would propose “methodologies and approaches for fulfilling the

requirements” of the Solicitation. AR 769. The factor was subdivided into five “Functional

Areas”:

• 0001: “Operational Support (On-Premises),”

• 0002: “Enterprise Multi-Cloud/Hybrid-Cloud Vision,”

• 0003: “Integration and Migration Engineering,”

• 0004: “Operational Support (Cloud),” and

4

The Solicitation provided for an optional third phase, but Census eventually made the award decision at the

end of Phase II. AR 772–73, 1496.

3

• 0005: “Program and BPA Management.”

AR 769–70. Like the first factor (demonstrated prior experience), offerors’ technical approach

would be assigned “low,” “some,” or “high” confidence. AR 778.

In Volume III, offerors would provide a “Business/Price Quote” consisting of a narrative

explanation and filled out “BPA Rate Mapping” and “BPA Rate Card” schedules. AR 761, 770–

71. The rate mapping schedule specified a list of exactly fifty “BPA Role[s]” that the awardee’s

employees would be expected to perform. AR 783–87. The roles described a type of position

and in some cases also seniority level (such as “Backup/Recovery Engineer – Senior Level” and

“Financial Analyst”), and each role was accompanied by a detailed “BPA Role Description” in

narrative form. AR 783–87. Offerors—who, recall, each held a GSA MAS contract for Cloud

Computing and Cloud Related IT Professional Services—were asked to (1) “map” each BPA

Role to a labor category (“LCAT”) in the Federal Supply Schedule covered by their MAS

contract, and (2) describe the minimum education and experience requirements associated with

the chosen labor category for each BPA role. AR 783–87. Then, in the BPA Rate Card, the

offeror would, for each BPA role and for each annual period: (1) the GSA MAS hourly wage for

the chosen LCAT, and (2) the offeror’s proposed (and ideally discounted) hourly wage. AR

788–89.

For example, IgniteAction mapped BPA Role of “Backup/Recovery Engineer – Senior

Level” to “ .” AR 1155. IgniteAction then

described the job duties of employees in that LCAT and specified that such employees must have

a degree and work experience. AR 1155. Finally, in the BPA Rate

Card, IgniteAction stated that the posted hourly rate for that LCAT for the base period was

$ , but IgniteAction would offer a discount and charge $ per hour. AR 1163.

The Solicitation stated that Census would evaluate the Business/Price Quotes as follows.

A price submission would be deemed “complete[] and accura[te]” if “the Quoter has properly

understood the price quote instructions” contained in the RFQ and rate card attachment. AR

778. The quoters’ submissions would “be checked for mathematical correctness to include . . .

arithmetic” accuracy and Census would also check whether “all prices were summarized

correctly.” AR 778. Census would then determine the total evaluated price using the “Rates

Only for Price Evaluation” (“ROPE”) method, under which the total evaluated price is

determined by multiplying the rates provided by the offeror in their Rate Card and a “pre-

determined estimated number of hours for each labor category.” AR 779. Prices would be

evaluated for reasonableness. AR 779.

Finally, Census would make an award to “the responsible Quoter whose quote provides

the greatest overall value to the Government, price and all other factors considered.” AR 776.

The Solicitation advised offerors that “Factor 1 [demonstrated prior experience] is more

important than Phase II . . . evaluation factors [technical approach and price].” AR 768

(emphasis deleted). It also advised that “[w]hen combined, non-price evaluation factors are

significantly more important than Factor 3 (Price),” and that price will become “more important

in the assessment” only if competing quotes “approach parity” along the non-price factors. AR

776.

4

The Court granted the motion the following day. Order Granting Motion to Complete the

Administrative Record, ECF No. 38.

Red Cedar, SES, and Intellect filed their respective motions for judgment on the

administrative record (“MJARs”) on December 11, 2024. ECF Nos. 41, 44, 45-2 [hereinafter,

respectively, “Red Cedar MJAR,” “SES MJAR,” and “Intellect MJAR”]. In addition, two

plaintiffs—Intellect and SES—amended their respective complaints. ECF Nos. 42, 43. On

January 3, 2025, defendant and defendant-intervenor filed their respective cross-motions for

judgment on the administrative record (“CMJARs” or “MJARs”). ECF Nos. 48, 49 [hereinafter,

respectively, “US MJAR” and “IgniteAction MJAR”]. On January 15 and 16, 2025, plaintiffs

filed their respective response-and-reply briefs. ECF Nos. 51, 52, 53 [hereinafter, respectively,

“Intellect Reply,” “SES Reply,” and “Red Cedar Reply”]. On January 28, 2025, defendant and

defendant-intervenor filed their respective reply briefs. ECF Nos. 54, 55 [hereinafter,

respectively, “US Reply” and “IgniteAction Reply”].

The Court held oral argument on February 6, 2025. On February 18, 2025, the Court

denied the plaintiffs’ MJARs and granted defendant’s and defendant-intervenor’s CMJARs.

Order of February 18, 2025, ECF No. 60. The Clerk of Court entered judgment on February 19,

2025. Judgment, ECF No. 61. The Court’s Order ruling on the motions stated that an opinion

would follow in due course. Order of February 18, 2025, at 1. This is that opinion.

II. Standard of Review

The Tucker Act, as amended, confers jurisdiction upon this Court to “to render judgment

on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or

proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any

alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed

procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). The Court’s jurisdiction therefrom includes bid protests

arising from a BPA award pursuant to FAR Part 8. Labat-Anderson Inc. v. United States, 50

Fed. Cl. 99, 104 (2001).

Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) governs

motions for judgment on the administrative record. In ruling on such motions, the Court’s task is

to determine whether the agency concerned acted in compliance with the legal standards

governing the decision under review, given all disputed and undisputed facts in the record. R.

Ct. Fed. Cl. 52.1; see also Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 369, 382

(2013) (citing Fort Carson Support Servs. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 571, 585 (2006)). Our

Court’s review is generally limited to the administrative record, and we must make findings of

fact as if conducting a trial on a paper record. R. Ct. Fed. Cl. 52.1; Bannum, Inc. v. United

States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

This Court reviews bid protests in accordance with the standards set forth in the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (incorporating by reference 5

U.S.C. § 706); Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing

Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir.

2001)). Agency procurement actions may be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

6

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To prevail,

the protestor who must show that the agency’s decision either lacks a rational basis or involves a

“a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at

1333 (quoting Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).

Rational basis review is “highly deferential” and contracting officers are “entitled to

exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them in the procurement process.”

See Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (first

quoting CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008) then

quoting Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court cannot

substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if reasonable minds could reach differing

conclusions. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974);

Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co.

v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)) (“If the court finds a reasonable basis for [an]

agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, as an original proposition,

have reached a different conclusion as to the proper administration and application of the

procurement regulations.”). Accordingly, the Court will “interfere with the government

procurement process ‘only in extremely limited circumstances.’” EP Productions, Inc. v. United

States, 63 Fed. Cl. 220, 223 (2005) (quoting CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567,

1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

III. Discussion

The protestors have collectively raised a bevy of objections to the award decision. The

Court considers each in turn.

A. Census’s Evaluation of IgniteAction’s Demonstrated Prior Experience (Factor 1)

Two protestors, SES and Intellect, take issue with Census’s evaluation of IgniteAction’s

quote under Factor 1, “demonstrated prior experience.” IgniteAction—a joint venture between

mentor ActioNet, Inc. (“ActioNet”) and protégé Ignite IT, LLC (“Ignite”)—submitted three

contracts for evaluation: two contracts performed by ActioNet for the Department of Energy

(“DOE”) and the Department of Transportation (“DOT”), respectively; and one contract with the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) for which Ignite was the subcontractor. AR 824.

IgniteAction stated that, as against the BPA’s estimated value of $557 million, the value of these

contracts was $1.3 billion, $305.1 million, and $111 million, respectively. AR 824. Census

assigned a “high confidence” rating on Factor 1 to IgniteAction based on its determinations that

the submission demonstrated ample experience along all five Experience Elements, and there

were “no notable aspects which decreased the Government’s confidence.” AR 1707; 1505–10.

a. Past Performance Evaluation: Recency of IgniteAction’s Prior Work

Experience.

SES and Intellect argue, firstly, that Census should have disregarded most of the work

performed under the first contract cited by IgniteAction—ActioNet’s DOE contract—because

the period of performance of that contract (February 2019 through July 2019) overlapped only

7

slightly with the five-year recency window specified in the Solicitation (which began sometime

in June 2019). 5 SES MJAR at 20; Intellect MJAR at 26. The protestors present two distinct

theories. First, they suggest that Census should have treated the DOE contract—an omnibus

indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (“IDIQ”) contract—as a series of delivery orders under

which the work was performed, and considered only those delivery orders that overlapped with

the five-year recency period. SES Reply at 10. According to protestors, publicly available data

shows that the DOE contract is associated with six separate delivery orders, only three of which

overlap with the recency window. Intellect MJAR at 27. The protestors would have Census

ignore, on recency grounds, the work performed under the other three orders. Id. at 27; SES

MJAR at 15.

The Court disagrees that Census was required, or even permitted, to break down the DOE

contract into individual delivery orders for purposes of determining recency. Start with the plain

language of the Solicitation, which must be gleaned using “principles governing interpretation of

[g]overnment contracts.” Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1353 n.4

(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also FAR 8.405-3(b)(2)(vi) (requiring the contracting officer to “ensure

[that] all quotes received are fairly considered and award is made in accordance with the basis

for selection in the [Solicitation]”). As the protestors themselves acknowledge, the DOE

contract is a government contract. Intellect Reply at 17 (citing PAE-Parsons Glob. Logistics

Servs., LLC v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 294, 303 (2020)). Thus, it is also a contract within the

meaning of the Solicitation, and Census has no discretion to replace the contract proffered by

IgniteAction with some other contract while evaluating IgniteAction’s proposal. Indeed, if

Census did so, it would be imposing unstated evaluation criteria, rendering the decision arbitrary

and capricious. Samsara Inc. v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 457, 471 (2023). To be sure,

protestors are right that the six individual delivery orders are also contracts. But the fact that

individual delivery orders are also contracts vests discretion in IgniteAction, not Census.

IgniteAction could have chosen to cite to just one delivery order, but given IgniteAction’s choice

to rely on the master contract, Census properly evaluated that contract for recency rather than

any other.

Intellect argues that the reading just adopted by the Court would lead to disparate

treatment, because Census treated two directly related task orders cited by Intellect in its own

past performance submission as two distinct contracts. Intellect MJAR at 27 n.5 (citing AR

1527); Intellect Reply at 18. That objection is misplaced. As a preliminary matter, Census

followed the terms of the Solicitation. Unlike IgniteAction, Intellect rested on its task orders, not

a master contract. 6 AR 859. Therefore, Census had no legal basis to treat Intellect’s task orders

5

The parties disagree about when the five-year look-back period begins. The Solicitation describes the time

limitation as “within the last five (5) years of the date of RFQ release.” AR 765. The RFQ (i.e., the Solicitation)

was initially released on June 10, 2024, but amended on June 26, 2024. The five-year recency window therefore

began either on June 10, 2019, or on June 26, 2019. Either way, the period of performance of the DOE contract

overlaps with the recency window.

6

In its reply brief, Intellect clarifies that its task orders were issued pursuant to the same IDIQ contract, and

that its submission mentioned that contract by number. Intellect Reply at 23. Intellect misses the point. Unlike

IgniteAction, Intellect chose to present its task orders for consideration, not the overall IDIQ contract. Census

properly took the submissions on face value. Just as Census was not required, for purposes of determining recency,

8

as a single contract. And while that does mean that the Solicitation permits a master contract to

count for more than the sum of its parts, that is sensible. To prevail on a disparate evaluation

claim, “a protestor must show that the agency unreasonably downgraded its proposal for

deficiencies that were substantively indistinguishable [from] or nearly identical [to] those

contained in other proposals.” Off. Design Grp. v. United States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.

2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, an agency is searching for a contractor

with a comprehensive approach to fulfilling a BPA—itself a master contract—it may reasonably

conclude that a master contract is more probative of the offeror’s fitness for the award than

constituent task orders. In other words, it is proper for an agency to treat a master contract as

relevantly different from task orders if the agency cares about the offeror’s ability to be a long-

term partner in a complex federal initiative, as opposed to simply executing discrete deliveries.

See Hanford Tank Disposition All., LLC v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 269, 289 (2024) (offeror’s

“comprehensive” solution strategy pivotal to agency’s evaluation of quotes for a master

contract). That is the case here. See AR 766–67 (Solicitation emphasizing under each

Experience Element, by using terms such as “general approach,” “strategies,” and

“methodologies,” that offerors should describe their big picture approach). Thus, the Solicitation

reasonably puts IgniteAction’s master contract on a different footing than Intellect’s task orders

for the purpose of counting the number of contracts submitted for consideration.

Second, and in the alternative, SES and Intellect argue that Census should have sliced the

DOE contract (or the individual delivery orders) into work done before and after the

commencement of the recency window, and considered only the work “actually performed . . .

during the relevant period.” SES MJAR at 14, 2020; Intellect MJAR at 26. The Court

acknowledges that dictum in a recent case, albeit with readily distinguishable facts, could lend

some support to protestors’ theory. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 70, 80

(2023) (“[A]ny consideration of past performance information . . . outside the stated recency

window would be unreasonable.”). Nonetheless, the Court need not address that argument

because protestors lack standing to make it. SES and Intellect themselves submitted contracts

that overlap only partially with the recency window, and Census evaluated those contracts in

their entirety. AR 858 ( the performance period outside recency window) (Intellect);

AR 969 (same) (SES); AR 1511–14, 1524–27 (Census’s evaluation). “There has been no

prejudice when a bid protestor benefited from the same potentially unlawful discretion from

which the awardee benefited.” DigiFlight, Inc. v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 588, 606 (2023)

(citation omitted).

Thus, the Court rejects Intellect’s and SES’s arguments that Census should have excluded

on recency grounds work done pursuant to three delivery orders under the DOE contract, or work

done prior to the commencement of the five-year look-back period. Census properly considered

the entire contract. 7

to unbundle the contract proffered by IgniteAction, it was also not required to bundle the contracts proffered by

Intellect.

7

To be clear, the Court only holds that Census was prohibited from excluding from consideration any work

done under the master contract on recency grounds. Nothing in the opinion should be understood to require Census

to treat work performed at different times as equally probative; the agency was free to treat “more recent experience

[as] more relevant than old experience.” Intellect Reply at 20.

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scope of [Census’s] intended effort” and stressed that it is “rare” to find experience “relative in

size” to Census’s planned initiative. AR 1508.

Intellect argues that the scale of the effort under the DOT contract was “much smaller in

scope and complexity,” because the DOT contract involved 126 applications to be exact, which

is a much smaller number than the “250 applications” contemplated in the Solicitation. Intellect

MJAR at 30 (citing AR 271, 832). But comparability is determined in context, and Intellect

supplies no reason to think that a contract involving 126 applications is “much smaller in scope

and complexity” that one involving 250 applications. Especially because experience at the larger

end of the scale was “rare,” Census had reasonable grounds to decide that 126 applications and

250 applications are in the same ballpark.

Third, for Experience Element 1005—providing detailed cost analysis and enforcing

compliance with prescribed financial design factors—Census favorably rated ActioNet’s

“strategy for Tagging/Billing Governance and Control” under the DOE contract because Census

was impressed by the “strategy to track costs by ” and the

“Cost Monitoring Tool utilized” by ActioNet. AR 1509. Intellect objects on the grounds that

IgniteAction did no more than “restate the Solicitation’s minimum requirements,” and therefore

should not have been assigned a strength. Intellect Reply at 31; Intellect MJAR at 25–26; see

also, e.g., Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 716, 726–27 (2013) (upholding

agency determination that “meeting solicitation requirements should not be considered a

strength”).

But IgniteAction did more than just rephrase the question in the form of an answer.

Under Experience Element 1005, offerors were to “describe your specific experience” with,

among other things, “tagging.” AR 360. IgniteAction addressed tagging briefly, but it did state

that its tagging strategy “track[ed] costs by .” AR 833.

That is plainly more information than the question prompt provided, and Intellect does not

explain why Census was wrong to have been impressed. Similarly, the Solicitation asked for a

“description of the tools.” AR 360. If IgniteAction had responded by saying, for example, that

‘We used tools,’ Intellect’s objection would have been justified. In fact, however, IgniteAction

specified which tools it used: and . AR 833. Intellect’s

contention is, therefore, factually incorrect. And neither the record nor Intellect supplies a

reason to think that Census’s preference for those specific tools is in some way irrational.

Finally, returning to the argument from recency, SES and Intellect argue that Census

assigned too much weight to work done by ActioNet under the DOE contract prior to the

commencement of the recency window, in June 2019. Intellect mounts the most forceful case

for this position, arguing that Census failed to consider that much of the work done under the

contract is “stale and outdated,” “particularly in the constantly changing area of cloud services.”

Intellect Reply at 21, 28. Although plausible in theory, this argument lacks any factual

substantiation. Intellect merely argues that work done several years ago is ipso facto stale:

“[F]ast-paced innovation [in the IT industry] means that practices, knowledge, and experience

from more [than] five years ago [are] already outdated.” Intellect MJAR at 28. But that

sweeping assertion is hardly amenable to meaningful fact-finding. IgniteAction devoted several

pages to describing ActioNet’s activities under the DOE contract in detail. AR 824–36, passim.

11

The protestors should have identified precisely what aspect of the work, in their opinion, was

“stale” yet blindly relied on by Census. Since they did not, the argument fails.

Intellect

In Census’s technical evaluation of Intellect’s past performance, the agency noted three

strengths and two weaknesses. AR 1524–26. Broken down by Experience Elements, the agency

assigned neither strengths nor weaknesses as to two elements—1001 and 1002; a mixed picture

with two strengths and one weakness for element 1003; a weakness but no strength for element

1004; and a strength but no weakness for element 1005. AR 1524–26. Overall, Census assigned

Intellect a “some confidence” rating on Factor 1. AR 1524.

Intellect argues that as to both weaknesses, Census’s explanation runs contrary to the

record. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Intellect was assigned no strengths for three

out of the five Experience Elements: 1001, 1002, and 1004. Thus, Intellect may well not have

been upgraded to “high confidence” even if the weaknesses were expunged. In any case, the

Court is not persuaded that Census ventured outside its zone of discretion in assigning either

weakness rating.

For Experience Element 1003, Census assigned two strengths but also faulted Intellect

for “not provid[ing] sufficient detail on the employed cloud security strategies

to demonstrate success strengthening the security posture” and instead

“focus[ing] on the tools utilized.” AR 1525. Intellect counters that it described its strategies in

detail. Intellect MJAR at 15–16. Setting aside the fact that even a lot of detail is not necessarily

sufficient detail, the very passages highlighted by Intellect for support, see id. at 16 (quoting AR

848, 852), seem to back up Census’s finding. To take but one example, Intellect picks out the

following sentence from its submission: “We implement continuous monitoring and logging

using , , , , and .” Id. (quoting AR 852)

(emphasis in Intellect’s brief). Respectfully, if that is not focusing on the tools utilized without

describing the strategy, the Court does not know what is.

For Experience Element 1004, Census assigned Intellect a weakness on the grounds that

Intellect only has experience supporting cloud migration in relation to “[s]ites [that] service

approximately internal users and of external users and have a size

of [terabytes],” whereas Census’s systems “can include up to 22,000 [internal] users per

Sections C.1 and C.4.1 of RFQ and multiple Petabytes of information transferred.” AR 1526.

Intellect argues that Census deviated from the Solicitation because the question prompt

for element 1004 asks about the total “user base size,” whereas Census’s demerit focuses on the

internal user base size. Intellect MJAR at 17 (quoting AR 767); Intellect Reply at 17–18.

Intellect also argues that Census’s reliance on data volumes— terabytes versus multiple

petabytes—introduced an unstated evaluation criterion into the agency’s analysis. Intellect

MJAR at 17–18. The Court does not agree. The Solicitation clearly states that, under Factor 1,

Census will consider which offeror has experience “most similar in scope” to the work

contemplated under the BPA. AR 767. Contrary to Intellect’s suggestion, the Solicitation did

not—and did not need to—provide an exhaustive list of all facts that Census could find useful

12

when comparing the scope of a past migration effort with Census’s planned migration effort.

Indeed, it would be surprising if the Solicitation had stated that Census would disregard the

breakdown of the user base or the data volume: Common sense suggests that the largest

statistical agency in the federal government would find those factors relevant when determining

whether an offeror can support Census’s own migration effort. Thus, Census did not err by

relying on the internal user base size and data volume of Intellect’s past migration experience. 8

SES

Census assigned one strength and three weaknesses to SES’s past performance

submission and assigned it a “some confidence” rating on Factor 1. AR 1511–13. SES contests

all three weaknesses, and further argues that Census should have assigned it more strengths.

SES MJAR at 17–26.

SES first takes issue with Census’s assignment of a weakness under Experience Element

1001, which pertains to on-site services. Under that element, Census assigned SES a strength for

“experience managing . . . data centers and facilities,” which “far exceeds the

footprint of [Census] HQ as well as the multiple regional offices.” AR 1511. However, Census

also assigned a weakness for lack of “sufficient detail on methodologies and strategies.” AR

1511. Census then elaborated on the methodologies and strategies to which it was referring. AR

1511.

SES’s counterargument is a legal one. It contends that because the question prompt for

element 1001 invited offerors to describe “strategies, methodologies and/or architecture,” AR

1511 (emphasis added), the Solicitation prohibited Census from penalizing SES for describing

architecture but not methodologies and strategies, SES MJAR at 18.

That argument is unavailing. This Court must interpret the Solicitation in accordance

with its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Banknote, 365 F.3d at 1353. An invitation to speak on

one or more of three subjects does not negate the possibility that the listener would ideally like to

hear about all three. It was no error for Census to treat nonresponsiveness to a portion of the

prompt as a drawback. At best, the word ‘or’ promises that Census could assign a favorable

rating to a submission that does not describe strategies, methodologies and architecture. For

example, if Intellect had made such a strong case under the architecture prong as to overcome the

8

Intellect also argues that Census disparately evaluated its experience under element 1004, because Census

concluded that a contract cited by IgniteAction was “comparable to the size and scope of [Census’s] intended effort”

even though it had a small number of users and involved a low data volume. AR1737; Intellect MJAR at 18–19.

But Census specifically stated that its assessment traded off on another factor relevant to the scope determination:

“Number of Applications.” AR1737. Intellect does not dispute that its own migration experience involved

number of applications. Thus, Intellect has failed to show that its migration experience was “substantively

indistinguishable or nearly identical” to that of IgniteAction. Off. Design Grp., 951 F.3d at 1372 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Intellect also makes another disparate evaluation argument based on a comparison of its evaluation under

element 1004, which addresses cloud services, and IgniteAction’s evaluation under element 1001, which addresses

on-site services. That argument falters for the same reason: A comparison across elements, by definition, finds

Intellect and IgniteAction in non-identical postures.

13

The first weakness pertains to Functional Area 0001, on-premises operational support.

Aside from assigning two strengths, Census assigned a weakness on the grounds that Intellect’s

“proposed and management services approach lacked sufficient

information to instill confidence in the methodologies or the ‘how’ to the determine likelihood of

success.” AR 1548. Census further explained that Intellect’s proposed approach “is currently in

place at Census and has proven to be time consuming and cumbersome,” and “inefficient or

ineffective.” AR 1548.

Intellect argues that Census assigned the weakness for a lack of detail, and then points the

Court to the details it presented. Intellect MJAR at 20–21. But the crux of Census’s evaluation

is that Census did not like the approach proposed by Intellect because of past adverse

experiences. In the Court’s judgment, even if Intellect were correct that its presentation was

“sufficient,” Census would still have assigned it a weakness. Therefore, Intellect’s argument

goes nowhere.

Intellect’s second weakness was assigned in Functional Area 0003, integration and

migration engineering. Census stated its concern that using containers can be

“counterproductive,” and “costly” if done “incorrectly,” and although Census credited Intellect

for explaining how it would “deploy[] containers,” it also faulted Intellect for providing

“insufficient detail” on “methodologies to instill confidence in the effective

of the containers after deployment.” AR 1549–50.

Intellect argues that it provided sufficient detail, pointing the Court to several paragraphs

in its proposal. Intellect MJAR at 21 (quoting AR 1178–79). There is no need to reproduce that

language; suffice to say that they primarily address deployment rather than steps “after

deployment.” In the relevant sections as a whole, Intellect mentioned decommissioning

only in passing. AR 1180, 1184. Census’s conclusion about post-

deployment methodologies was therefore rational.

SES

Census assigned a rating of “some confidence” to SES’s technical approach after finding

nine strengths and seven weaknesses. AR 1544–47. SES correctly notes that all seven

weaknesses are based on findings that SES had failed to provide “sufficient detail about

particular Functional Areas and subtasks.” SES MJAR at 26. SES argues that, in doing so,

Census misread the submission, applied unstated evaluation criteria, failed to document its

reasoning, and failed to explain how the lack of detail increased the risk of successful

performance. Id.

SES first alleges that Census applied unstated evaluation criteria as to Functional Areas

0001 and 0004. The Court is not persuaded. For example, for Functional Area 0001, on-

premises operational support, Census assigned SES a weakness for proposing a security

management approach that “focused primarily on maintaining the status quo” but did “offer[]

detailed strategic approaches . . . to reduce effort.” AR 1544–45. SES argues that Census

applied unstated evaluation criteria while assigning this weakness because security management

is not a subtask listed in Functional Area 0001. SES MJAR at 26. This is a befuddling

15

argument. SES elected to discuss security management, highlighting it as a separately titled

subpart, in its proposal for that functional area. AR 1279. It cannot now turn around and argue

that Census should have disregarded the information. 10 See, e.g., Weston Sols., Inc. v. United

States, 95 Fed. Cl. 311, 325 (2010) (consideration of additional information volunteered by

offeror not reliance on unstated evaluation criteria). The same is true for SES’s objection as to

Functional Area 0004.

Next, SES alleges that for Functional Areas 0001 through 0003, Census erred by faulting

SES for failing to provide sufficient detail as to particular subtasks. Rather than go through each

objection in detail, the Court simply notes that it has compared the level of detail provided by

SES with that by other offerors and with SES’s own answers to other subparts, and concludes

that Census’s conclusions are well-justified. The Court also disagrees with SES’s objection that

Census failed to document the reasons why the details were not sufficient. Although Census did

not explain “precisely what detail was missing” as to each weakness, SES MJAR at 38, the

agency did briefly summarize its reasons, AR 1544–47. No more was required. CAN Softtech,

Inc. v. United States, No. 24-670, 2024 WL 4434253, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 4, 2024) (“The

streamlined or minimum documentation required by FAR Subpart 8.4 [means that] the Agency

did not have to explain in exhaustive detail when it awarded a[n adjectival rating].”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 11

Red Cedar

Red Cedar received a “low confidence” rating for its technical approach after Census

found three strengths and sixteen weaknesses. AR 1552–57. Red Cedar takes issue with twelve

findings of weakness. The Court will not go into them in detail, because Red Cedar’s arguments

are the quintessential example of protestors inviting courts to “micro[]manage the minutiae of a

procurement to ferret out technical deficiencies.” Info. Scis. Corp., 73 Fed. Cl. at 104.

Take one example. Red Cedar proposed to use a project management framework called

Scrumban. In one finding of weakness, Census commended Red Cedar’s “bold thinking,” but

demurred on the grounds that Scrumban “is not well understood.” AR 1786. In its motion, Red

Cedar asks this Court to read the Wikipedia article on Scrumban and conclude that Scrumban “is

far from not well understood.” Red Cedar MJAR at 16. Red Cedar insists that the Court should

participate in the debate because such matters “do not take a degree in computer science to

understand.” Red Cedar Reply at 1. Red Cedar has it backwards. Our Court refrains from

wading into technical arguments not because they are too difficult to understand, but because our

power of judicial review does not include the power to “second-guess the agency's discretionary

determinations underlying its technical ratings.” Off. Design Grp., 951 F.3d at 1373. Since all

10

Besides, other offerors’ proposals for the same functional area also discuss security management

throughout, see, e.g., AR 1054–57, passim (IgniteAction), indicating that offerors understood that security

management was integral to the functional area.

11

SES also complains that Census treated SES and IgniteAction disparately while assigning strengths for

Functional Area 0004, cloud security management. SES MJAR at 38–39. SES’s argument is that its discussion of

the topic is similar to IgniteAction’s. The Court has gone through the proposals and sees no basis for second-

guessing Census’s judgment.

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- The Quoter shall enter the proposed GSA MAS Labor Category

in Column C that corresponds to the BPA Role listed in Column

A. The Quoter shall consider the BPA Role Description as a

basis for labor category mapping.

- The Quoter shall enter the description of the proposed labor

category from their GSA MAS Contract in Column D that

corresponds to the GSA Labor Category in Column C.

AR 783 (emphasis added). The protestors further cite the evaluation criteria stating that Census

would determine whether offerors “properly understood the price quote instructions” and

“properly completed and provided all the required components” outlined in the BPA role-

mapping materials. AR 1565. Relying on this language, protestors argue that the Solicitation

“committed” Census to “investigat[ing] the qualifications for [all proposed] LCATs [and]

whether those personnel could accomplish the Agency’s requirements.” Intellect MJAR at 11.

The Court is not persuaded. The excerpts cited from the Solicitation are clearly a

requirement to ensure that offerors dot their i’s and cross their t’s. Census did that thoroughly,

checking IgniteAction’s price submission for “completeness and accuracy” by “conduct[ing] a[] .

. . line-by-line review of,” among other things, the “BPA Rate Card by resource (BPA Role and

Labor Category).” AR 1567. The Court can see that the review was not perfunctory, because at

one point Census was “unable to map” some proposed LCATs to the publicly available GSA

MAS Price List and reached out to the GSA for clarification. AR 1567. The GSA then

acknowledged that the data on its website (the GSA eLibrary) was “not the most current.” AR

1567. That is competent, thorough work.

As for whether IgniteAction “consider[ed]” role descriptions while mapping BPA roles to

LCATs, protestors have not pointed to even one instance where IgniteAction’s mapping is such a

poor fit as to reflect a lack of consideration of role descriptions. See Consider, Merriam-

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (“to think of especially with regard to taking

some action; to take into account”). If a recruiter recommended a Level 2 IT systems

administrator for the role of a senior-level backup/recovery engineer, she could truthfully say

that she had “considered” the posted role description.

Protestors’ contention that more was needed by the FAR itself, proves too much. In the

context of a price evaluation, requiring a heightened correlation 12 between BPA role descriptions

and LCAT job descriptions amounts to a price realism analysis. See FAR 2.101 (defining a

realism analysis to include whether the proposed costs are “realistic for the work to be

performed” and “[r]eflect a clear understanding of the requirements.”). But a price realism

analysis is optional, see Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 448, 473

(2023) (“A price realism analysis is performed only if the solicitation requires one.”), and Census

explicitly stated that it “will not consider Price Realism,” AR 648. Given the clarification by

12

To be clear, an agency must always “consider[] . . . the mix of labor” proposed by an offeror. FAR 8.405-

3(b)(2)(vi). In this case, Census’s thorough line-by-line analysis meets that standard. To wit, the Court is convinced

that Census would have caught any egregious or embarrassing discrepancies between BPA roles and proposed

LCATs job descriptions.

18

Census, protestors faced at best a patent ambiguity, which should have been litigated pre-award.

Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Kearney & Co.,

P.C. v. United States, No. 24-162, 2024 WL 2209767, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 30, 2024) (“To the

extent that any party had understood the RFQ to require a heightened correlation, or an exact

match, between the PWS work and the offeror's LCATs . . . that would have been a patent

ambiguity given [that the Solicitation] did not limit the ability to map as normal.”).

In sum, neither the Solicitation nor the FAR require a price realism analysis, yet that is

precisely what protestors desire. That ends the matter. 13

D. Census’s Best-Value Determination

Finally, protestors argue that Census did not conduct an adequate best-value

determination, because Census’s Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) blindly relied on the

adjectival ratings and failed to exercise her independent judgment. Intellect MJAR at 29–30.

The Court agrees that the SSA must independently assess the evidence in every case, but

disagrees that she failed to do so here. The SSA may not rely solely on adjectival ratings. Mil-

Mar Century, 111 Fed. Cl. at 553 (interpreting FAR 15.308). That said, the purpose of looking

beyond adjectival ratings is not paperwork for paperwork’s sake, but to ensure that proposals

“with the same adjectival ratings” but “[un]equal quality” are not treated as identical. Femme

Comp Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, 758 (2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). Therefore, where (as here) there is no real tradeoff based on the adjectival ratings, the

Court’s only job is to check if the SSA made the mistake of treating two parties with the same

adjectival ratings as perfectly equivalent.

The SSA did in fact look beyond the adjectival ratings. To be sure, she did state the

following:

IgniteAction’s total evaluated price to the Government was the

lowest in comparison to the three (3) competing submissions.

Looking at both technical factors, IgniteAction is the highest

technically rated quoter whom instilled the greatest degree of

confidence at the lowest overall price. There are no superior non-

price benefits to be offered by another Quoter to warrant an award

at a significantly higher overall price. Following the basis of award

in the RFQ, there is nothing additional to compare in my best value

determination and no tradeoffs to be made.

AR1709 (emphasis added). However, the SSA also compared offerors with the same adjectival

rating, explicitly noting strengths and weaknesses associated with each offeror. For example,

13

Protestors also argue that IgniteAction did not propose its own LCATs, but that of the mentor partner. The

Court finds no basis for that assertion. All the LCATs proposed by IgniteAction are on its own GSA MAS contract;

that they might also be on the mentor partner’s GSA MAS contract is irrelevant. To the extent that protestors argue

that IgniteAction intends to violate the requirement that “the protégé partner [perform] at least 40% of the total

[work] done by the partners,” 13 C.F.R. § 125.8(c)(3), protestors have failed to provide any supporting evidence.

19

recall that even though Census had “high confidence” in both IgniteAction’s and Intellect’s

technical approach, Census identified weaknesses in Intellect’s approach but not in

IgniteAction’s. Far from glossing over that fact, the SSA’s decisional document explicitly notes

those weaknesses. Compare AR 1708 (“no notable aspects which decreased the Government’s

confidence” in IgniteAction’s technical approach) with AR 1709 (“two noted aspects which

reduced the Government’s confidence” in Intellect’s technical approach). Thus, the SSA assured

herself that the adjectival ratings did not hide relevant nuances. Her conclusion is sound and it

must stand.

IV. Conclusion

As indicated in a prior Order, and for the reasons explained in this opinion, the

protestors’ MOTIONS for Judgment on the Administrative Record, ECF Nos. 41, 44 & 45, are

DENIED. Defendant and defendant-intervenor’s CROSS-MOTIONS for Judgment on the

Administrative Record, ECF Nos. 48 & 49, are GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Loren A. Smith

Loren A. Smith,

Senior Judge

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