explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CORRECTED
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-642C
(Filed: April 28, 2025)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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SUZETTE GRACE RODRIGUEZ, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
*
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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Suzette Grace Rodriguez, proceeding pro se, raises claims that appear
to allege wrongful court proceedings in Florida. See Complaint (ECF 1); Am. Compl.
(ECF 9). The government has moved to dismiss. See Motion (ECF 13). The motion to
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff has submitted a motion entitled “Objection-
Settlement Conference RCFC-V(a)(b)(c)” (ECF 16). That motion is DENIED AS
MOOT.1 Plaintiff has submitted documents to the Clerk entitled “Motion-Subpoena
RCFB/45-2” received by the Court on July 11, 2024; “Entry of Judgment” received by
the Court on August 6, 2024; and “Entry of Judgment-Appx(I)/RCFC/3(c)” received
by the Court on August 9, 2024. Those documents shall be FILED BY MY LEAVE.
To the extent they request any relief, they are DENIED AS MOOT.
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort
claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see
also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Perhaps confusingly for pro se litigants, it
is not a forum for “federal claims” generally. Claims that are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3).
1The Government interpreted Plaintiff’s motion as a response to the motion to dismiss, and filed a
reply. Reply (ECF 17). Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Objection to Docket/17-RCFC-46/C” (ECF
19), which the Court construed as Plaintiff’s Reply in support of her previous motion. See Order (ECF
18).
“In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts
asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared
by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements.”
Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted)
(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74
Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal
construction of [their] pleadings”) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21
(1972)).
Many of Plaintiff’s allegations involve wrongdoing by state and local
government officials or institutions. But this Court has no jurisdiction over claims
against defendants other than the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 588 (1941). Claims arising from those allegations must be dismissed.
To the extent some of Plaintiff’s claims do implicate the United States, many
of them are outside the Court’s jurisdiction for other reasons. Claims for money in
this Court under the Tucker Act are premised on (1) contracts between the plaintiff
and the United States, (2) illegal exactions of money by the United States, or (3) laws
or constitutional provisions that require the United States to pay money to the
plaintiff. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349, 355 (2011). I have been
unable to identify allegations in Plaintiff’s filings that suggest those types of claims.
Plaintiff may intend to challenge decisions of state or federal courts. This Court
has no jurisdiction over such claims. Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918
(Fed Cir. 2011); see also Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion
(ECF 16) is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s documents entitled “Motion-Subpoena
RCFB/45-2” received by the Court on July 11, 2024; “Entry of Judgment” received by
the Court on August 6, 2024; and “Entry of Judgment-Appx(I)/RCFC/3(c)” received
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by the Court on August 9, 2024, shall be FILED BY MY LEAVE. To the extent they
request any relief, they are DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
Judge
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