CONKLIN v. ABEC, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

__________________________________________

TAMMY CONKLIN, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action. No.: 2:24-cv-00857

:

v. :

:

ABEC, INC. :

:

:

Defendant. :

__________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Tammy Conklin (Conklin) is a former employee of Defendant ABEC,

Inc. (ABEC). Conklin claims that ABEC unlawfully interfered with her rights under

the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Conklin further

claims unlawful retaliation under FMLA.

ABEC moves for summary judgment – asserting that there is no competent

evidence indicating it interfered with Conklin’s FMLA rights or retaliated against

her for requesting leave. ABEC further argues that its Chief Operating Officer and

decision maker in this case, Martin Pleyer (Pleyer), was entirely unaware of Conklin’s

FMLA activity or the underlying medical condition that precipitated her request. For

the reasons that follow, ABEC’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Conklin began her employment with ABEC in January of 2021 as an

Import/Export Specialist at their corporate headquarters located in Bethlehem, Pa.

By June of that same year, Conklin had been promoted to Global Logistics Manager.

Conklin’s direct report for the duration of her employment was ABEC’s Global

Director of Supply Chain, Laura Hassler (Hassler).

In early August 2022, Conklin requested intermittent FMLA leave in

connection with her Celiac Disease.1 Renee Gallo (Gallo), ABEC’s Human Resources

Coordinator, emailed Conklin the required FMLA certification paperwork and

instructed her to have it completed by her physician and returned within 15 calendar

days. Rachel Edwards (Edwards), ABEC’s then-HR Generalist, also forwarded

Conklin information related to her FMLA eligibility. Conklin timely returned the

completed FMLA certification to both Gallo and Edwards. However, Conklin never

submitted a request to actually use any FMLA leave during her employment.

Conklin never spoke with Pleyer regarding her request for FMLA leave or disclosed

to him that she suffered from Celiac Disease.

In early September 2022, just weeks after Plaintiff’s FMLA documentation was

received and processed, Conklin was called into a meeting with Hassler and Edwards

where she was informed by Edwards that she was terminated effective immediately.

The purported reason for Conklin’s termination was her failure to meet expectations

1 Both parties incorrectly refer to Ms. Conklin’s condition as “Celiac’s” Disease. This mistake is

with respect to her duties, which included: “(1) ensuring barcode scanning was

implemented in the warehouse and semi-sterile kitting room; (2) Customs Trade

Partnership Against Terrorism application and approval; (3) identifying and

implementing a Syteline shipping system; (4) ensuring that regular cycle counting

was implemented and at a level in excess of 95% (i.e. inventory accuracy).” Dkt. 32-

6 at ¶¶ 5-8. During the meeting it was made clear that Pleyer instructed Hassler

and/or Edwards to terminate her due to performance deficiencies.

In February 2024, Conklin filed her initial Complaint containing the above

FMLA claims as well as a state law wrongful termination claim. Subsequently,

Conklin filed an Amended Complaint containing only the FMLA claims, to which

ABEC filed an Answer. Notably, discovery closed without Plaintiff’s counsel deposing

Hassler or Pleyer. Defendant’s motion is now ripe for consideration.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to [] judgment as a matter of law.” Mann v. Palmerton Area School District,

872 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A

fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is essential to the proper

disposition of the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.

The party moving under Rule 56 “bears the burden of demonstrating the

absence of any genuine issues of material fact. When determining whether there is

a triable dispute of material fact, the court draws all inferences in favor of the non-

moving party.” Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820-

821 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The movant’s initial burden does not relieve complainant’s obligation of

producing evidence that would support a jury verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

Because a motion for summary judgment looks beyond the pleadings, the opposing

party must advance specific facts showing that there is a genuine factual dispute.

See Marshall v. Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F.Supp.2d 597, 598 (E.D. Pa.

2005). The non-movant may not rest on their pleadings but must point to probative

evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.” Id. at 252. If the “evidence presented by the non-movant is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id.

at 249-250.

IV. DISCUSSION

The FMLA generally prohibits employers from interfering with or restraining

employees from exercising rights provided under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2915(a)(1).

Employers are further prohibited from discharging any employee for opposing such

unlawful interference. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). “The former provision is generally

… referred to as interference whereas the latter is often referred to as retaliation.”

Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir.

2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To succeed on an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff-employee must

demonstrate that (1) she was entitled to take FMLA leave, and (2) defendant-

employer denied her this entitlement. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 312. “To prevail

on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the [plaintiff-employee] must prove that (1)

she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse

employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to her

invocation of her [FMLA] rights.” Id. at 301-302 (emphasis added).

The FMLA does not provide employees with a right against termination for legitimate

reasons unrelated to their exercise of their rights under the act. Sarnowski v. Air

Brooke Limousine, Inc., 519 F.3d 398, 403 (3d Cir. 2007). Finally, it is within the

sound discretion of district courts to dismiss interference claims that are wholly

duplicative of concurrently plead retaliation claims. Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 312

n.25 (citing Lovland v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 674 F.3d 806, 811-812 (8th

Cir. 2012)

Retaliation claims are analyzed under the oft-cited burden shifting framework

distilled in McDonnel Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Lichtenstein,

691 F.3d at 302. Under McDonnel Douglas, plaintiff-employee has the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case. Accordingly, plaintiff must point to record evidence

sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute relating to invocation of an FMLA right,

termination, and causation. See Id. at 302. Once plaintiff makes a prima facie

showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If and when the

employer meets this burden, plaintiff must show that the legitimate reasons offered

by employer are a pretext for the alleged FMLA violation. See Zimmerman v. Health

Network Laboratories, L.P., 5:24-cv-01142, 2025 WL 457100, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10,

2025).

a. Conklin’s Interference Claim

Here, Conklin’s interference claim is dead in the water. It is undisputed that

Conklin did not request to actually use any intermittent FMLA leave. Compare Def’s

Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 32-2), at ¶17 with Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Undisputed Facts (Dkt.

34-1), at ¶17. Additionally, the FMLA documentation Conklin provides from her

doctor authorizes prospective use of her FMLA leave beginning August 12, 2022.

See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at Ex. F-G (Dkt. 32-9, 10). Any suggestion that

FMLA was to be used or applied retroactively is not borne out by the record evidence.

It follows that since Conklin never attempted to use her FMLA leave, ABEC did not

actually deny her this entitlement. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 312.

Because Conklin never attempted to use time associated with her FMLA

qualifying condition — hence ABEC could not interfere with or deny her that right —

her Complaint can be distilled down to an allegation that she was fired because she

simply qualified for FMLA. In this way, her interference claim is wholly duplicative

of her retaliation claim. This supports dismissal of her interference claim as it “is so

clearly redundant to the retaliation claim.” Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 312 n.25.

Conklin’s response to ABEC’s motion for summary judgment fails to even address

ABEC’s arguments regarding her FMLA interference claim. Accordingly, Conklin’s

FMLA interference claim is dismissed.

b. Conklin’s Retaliation Claim

Conklin’s retaliation claim similarly fails. As an initial matter, Conklin must

show that the decision maker responsible for her termination was aware of her FMLA

status at the time they made the decision to separate her from employment. Daniels

v. School Dist. Of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 196-197 (3d Cir. 2015). Conklin has put forth

no evidence that Pleyer, the decision maker in this case, knew of her condition or her

qualification for FMLA. Additionally, Conklin never deposed Pleyer on this point.

Therefore, the only record evidence relative to Pleyer’s knowledge is his sworn

affidavit attesting that he fired her due to her inability to meet her work expectations.

See Dkt. 32-11. Conklin’s attempt to rest on her pleadings in light of Defendant’s

legitimate proffered reason, wholly unrelated to her invocation of FMLA, does not

survive the analysis under McDonnell Douglas. Stated differently, based on the

record, it would be impossible for Conklin to establish that Pleyer fired her because

of her FMLA status.

Conklin makes some interesting allegations related to the temporal proximity

between her termination and qualification under FMLA. Conklin also claims that

Pleyer had “constructive knowledge” of her FMLA status by way of Conklin’s

communications with Hassler and Edwards. First, temporal proximity of adverse

action to protect conduct does not, by itself, establish that the decision maker knew

of the protected conduct. See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 197. A Plaintiff asserting an FMLA

retaliation claim must also show that the decision maker had knowledge of the

protected activity. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006).

With respect to Conklin’s assertion that Pleyer constructively knew of her

FMLA status, this argument is generally disfavored by district courts around the

country. While there may be good policy reasons to impute the knowledge of a direct

supervisor or human resources officer to a decision maker2 (in this case the COO of

ABEC), courts have uniformly rejected the concept of constructive knowledge in the

context of discrimination. Cf. Silvera v. Orange County School Bd., 244 F.3d 1253,

1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not

constructive knowledge and assumed intent.”); Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 297

(7th Cir. 1992) (constructive knowledge does not show actual intent in the context of

discrimination); Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F. Supp. 3d 702, 721 (E.D.

Pa. 2021) (Beetlestone, J.) (suggestion that jury could infer decision maker’s

knowledge of claimants protected activity based on claimants conversations with

another party was unreasonable absent evidence that the third party communicated

information to decision maker). The Third Circuit is similarly partial to the actual

2 An employee may reasonably believe that once they communicate administrative requests to

HR, those requests are, for all intents and purposes, relayed to those in charge of personnel decisions.

This position is more salient in situations where an employee has little day-to-day contact with

decision makers. Separately, this Court is curious about the relationship between the weight afforded

the temporal proximity as an inference of discrimination and Plaintiff’s theory of constructive

knowledge. It would seem that a greater the amount of time between HR’s awareness of Plaintiff’s

FMLA status and the adverse employment decision rendered by a decision maker would increase the

weight given any sort of constructive knowledge theory. Conversely, a shorter, more suggestive time

frame would decrease the likelihood that a decision maker had time to confer with HR to become

informed of a Plaintiff’s FMLA status. Neither party raises this issue, and the Court does not purport

to address it here, as the concept of constructive knowledge is generally disfavored in the context of

knowledge standard. See Moore, 461 F.3d 331, 351; Walsh v Wal Mart Stores, Inc.,

200 Fed.Appx 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2006).

Finally, none of Plaintiffs theories address the non-discriminatory reasons

ABEC asserts were the basis for her dismissal. Hassler, Plaintiffs direct report,

indicated in her affidavit that Conklin “repeatedly made incorrect transactions,

demonstrated a lack of accountability, and required constant follow-up from

management.” Dkt. 32-6 at {12. Assuming for argument’s sake that Pleyer did know

of Conklin’s FMLA status, she would still need to demonstrate that her failure to

perform was not the real reason for her termination. She has pled as much, but in

light of her failure to depose Hassler or Pleyer, that is all she has done. Unfortunately

for Plaintiff, Rule 56 requires more.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ABEC’s motion for summary judgment is granted

and Conklin’s complaint is dismissed. An appropriate order to follow.

BY THE COURT:

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J.