Guggino v. Medical Department-Yaphank Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Luke Guggino,

Plaintiff,

-v- 2:25-cv-597

(NJC) (SIL)

Medical Department - Yaphank Correctional Facility,

Suffolk County Sheriff Dept.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by pro se plaintiff

Luke Guggino (“Guggino”) in relation to his Complaint filed while incarcerated at the Suffolk

County Correctional Facility (the “Jail”) and complaining about the conditions of his

confinement while detained at the Jail. (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2; Compl., ECF No. 1.) For the

reasons that follow, the Court grants the IFP motion and dismisses the Complaint without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1) and with leave to file an

amended complaint as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2025, Guggino filed a Complaint against the Medical Department at the

Yaphank Correctional Facility and the Suffolk County Sheriff Department (together,

“Defendants”) using the Court’s civil rights complaint form for actions brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (Compl.) Guggino also filed an IFP motion but did not file the

required Prisoner Litigation Authorization form (“PLA”). (See IFP Mot.) Accordingly, by Notice

of Deficiency dated February 4, 2025, the Court instructed Guggino to complete and return the

enclosed PLA within fourteen days, and, on February 18, 2025, Guggino did so. (See PLA, ECF

No. 5.)

I. The Complaint1

The Complaint alleges that, since his August 16, 2024 arrest and while detained at the

Jail, Guggino has been forced to shower in “uncleaned” facilities containing “mold, fungus, and

other bacteria,” which resulted in Guggino contracting an infection on both feet, skin rashes, and

bumps on his back. (Compl. ¶ II.) The Complaint alleges that the water at the Jail is “sometimes

brown.” (Id.) Guggino allegedly did not have shower shoes because he lacked commissary funds

and was therefore in direct contact with the fungus, mold, and bacteria in the showers. (Id.)

Because of this exposure, “the fungus spreaded” and Guggino’s “right and left pinky toenails

came off and never grew back.” (Id.) Guggino was provided with an unspecified medication that

“doesn’t work,” and Guggino’s right big toenail has since “turned brown” due to infection. (Id.)

The Complaint alleges that Guggino is “forever in pain when [he] walk[s]” and has “no feeling”

in his right foot. (Id. ¶¶ II-II.A.) Further, Guggino’s “back hurts when [he] lay[s] down.” (Id.

¶ II.A.)

As a result, Guggino seeks to recover a damages award in the sum of $600,000 for pain

and suffering, mental anguish, and punitive damages. (Id. ¶ III.) Guggino also requests that: (1)

he receive “medical attention” and treatment for his ailments; (2) the bathroom and showers at

the Jail be cleaned with bleach; and (3) shower shoes be provided to inmates upon entering the

facility. (Id. ¶ III.)

1 Excerpts from the Complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original.

Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

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LEGAL STANDARDS

I. In Forma Pauperis

Upon review of Guggino’s IFP Motion (IFP Mot.), the Court finds that Guggino is

qualified by his financial status to commence this action without the prepayment of the filing fee.

Therefore, the IFP Motion (ECF No. 2) is granted.

II. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

When an incarcerated pro se plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court is required to

“review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).2 At the pleading

stage, the Court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in

the Complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009)), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).

This Court is required to construe pleadings “filed by pro se litigants liberally and

interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th

62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted).

2 The term “prisoner” is defined in this statute to include “any person incarcerated or detained in

any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).

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Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation

omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut Off. of Early Childhood

Dev., 76 F.4th 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2023). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678–79 (citation omitted). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The factual allegations of

a complaint must be sufficient to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks omitted).

If a liberal reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be

stated,” the court must grant leave to amend the complaint. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th

353, 365 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)). If,

however, amendment of the complaint would not cure the substantive defects of the claim, leave

to amend should be denied. See Yamashita v. Scholastic, Inc., 936 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2019).

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

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be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure

for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519

(2d Cir. 1993) (citing Cty. of Oklahoma Cty. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)); accord Jean-

Baptiste v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 23-441, 2024 WL 1193062, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 20,

2024) (noting that Section 1983 does not provide an independent source of substantive rights).

To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted under color

of state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or federal law.

See Sykes, 13 F.3d at 519. Here, the Complaint does not allege a plausible Section 1983 claim

because it does not plausibly allege a deprivation of a right afforded by the U.S. Constitution.

(See Compl.) Even if it did, the Complaint does not name a proper defendant, and, even upon a

liberal construction of the claims as against Suffolk County, the Complaint does not plausibly

allege a claim for municipal liability. (See id.)

A. Absence of a Constitutional Deprivation

As explained below, the Complaint’s allegations that Guggino contracted an infection in

his toenails from “mold, fungus, and other bacteria” in the Jail’s showers and experienced “skin

rashes and bumps on [his] back” from showering in brown water at the Jail do not state a

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constitutional violation that is actionable under either the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth

Amendment.3

Liberally construed, the Complaint’s allegations suggest that Guggino challenges both

the conditions of his confinement and the sufficiency of the medical care he received. (See

Compl. ¶ II-II.A.) A conditions of confinement claim and a denial of adequate medical care

claim each require the plaintiff to satisfy both an objective prong and a subjective prong.

Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29.

For a conditions of confinement claim, the objective prong is the same under both the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and requires a showing that the challenged conditions were

sufficiently serious such “that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the plaintiff’s] health.” Id. at 30. “There is no static test

to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious; instead, ‘the conditions themselves

must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. (quoting Blissett v.

Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1995). For a denial of adequate medical care claim, the

objective prong is also the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Horace v.

3 The Complaint does not expressly allege whether Guggino experienced the alleged

constitutional violations in pretrial detention or following a criminal conviction, although the

Complaint’s allegation that the relevant incidents began “[u]pon [Guggino’s] arrest on August

16, 2024” suggests that at least some of the alleged violations occurred while Guggino was in

pre-trial detention. Regardless, all “‘[p]risoners and detainees have constitutionally protected

rights to receive humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter,

medical care, and security.’” Arroyo v. Nassau Cnty. Corr., No. 22-cv-5611, 2022 WL

16636774, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2022); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). To the extent the Complaint brings claims arising from incidents occurring during

Guggino’s pre-trial detention, he is entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; to

the extent the Complaint brings claims arising from incidents occurring while Guggino served a

post-conviction sentence, Guggino is protected by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel

and unusual punishment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).

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Gibbs, 802 F. App’x 11, 13–14 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32). It

requires that:

the alleged deprivation in medical care be sufficiently serious . . . . A deprivation

in medical care is sufficiently serious if (1) the prisoner was actually deprived of

adequate medical care and (2) the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently

serious . . . The latter inquiry contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that

may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.

Culbreth v. Manuel, No. 24-cv-00497, 2025 WL 35059, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2025) (citations

and quotation marks omitted); see also Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2000)

(holding that the medical need must be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”).

As for the subjective prong, the analysis differs under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. For conditions of confinement claims and for denial of adequate medical care

claims, the Eighth Amendment requires a showing “that a prison official had the requisite

‘culpable intent,’ which is present if the official ‘has knowledge that an inmate faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures

to abate the harm.’ . . . As such, ‘mere negligence will not suffice.’” Smith v. New York State,

No. 23-6601-CV, 2024 WL 4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (quoting Hayes v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the

subjective prong requires the plaintiff to “show[] that the officer acted with at least deliberate

indifference to the challenged conditions.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. In other words, “a detainee

asserting a ‘claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs can allege either that the

defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would pose a

substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that failing to provide the

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omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to the detainee’s health.’” Culbreth,

2025 WL 35059, at *6 (quoting Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021))

(quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

At this stage, the Court takes as true the Complaint’s allegation that a fungus or bacteria

in the Jail’s showers caused Guggino to contract an infection, which has not abated, and that the

brown water caused him to suffer skin irritations. Nevertheless, analyzing Guggino’s claims

under both the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court finds that the

Complaint does not state a conditions of confinement claim or a denial of adequate medical care

claim.

As an initial matter, the Complaint satisfies the objective prong with respect to all of

Guggino’s four claims. Under the Eighth Amendment standard, the Complaint plausibly alleges

that the conditions posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to Guggino’s health. See

Compl. ¶ 2; see also Christian v. Saunders, No. 17-cv-2587, 2018 WL 3300695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 28, 2018) (plaintiff stated claim where foot fungus “could’ve been prevented from

spreading with proper hygiene care”), report and recommendation adopted at 2018 WL

1441401. Under the Fourteenth Amendment standard, the Complaint’s allegations (taken as true

at this stage) that Guggino’s constant rashes and unabated foot infection—which has caused him

to lose two toenails, have a third toenail turn brown, and experience “constant physical pain

when [he] walk[s]”—are sufficient to establish “a condition of urgency such as one that may

produce . . . degeneration, or extreme pain.” See Compl. ¶ 2; see also Culbreth, 2025 WL 35059,

at *6.

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The Complaint does not, however, satisfy the subjective prong with respect to any claims.

These claims fail under the Eighth Amendment standard because the Complaint does not allege

facts plausibly alleging that officers at the Jail acted with more than “mere negligence” by

disregarding a known risk of serious harm to Guggino. See Smith, 2024 WL 4746554, at *2. The

claims also fail under the Fourteenth Amendment standard because the Complaint does not

allege facts plausibly alleging that the officers acted with deliberate indifference to Guggino’s

serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[D]eliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.’”). By contrast, the Complaint alleges that Jail’s medical center has been

providing Guggino medication, although this treatment has not cured the infection. (Compl. ¶ 2.)

In summary:

(1) The Complaint does not state a claim for inadequate conditions of confinement under the

Eighth Amendment. The Complaint plausibly alleges facts satisfying the objective

prong—that the “mold,” “fungus,” and “bacteria” infested showers caused a foot

infection posing an unreasonable risk to Guggino’s health. It does not, however, plausibly

allege facts satisfying the subjective prong, which requires that the Jail officials knew or

should have known that failing to take action to treat the alleged medical issue would

cause a substantial risk to Guggino’s health.

(2) The Complaint does not state a claim for inadequate conditions of confinement under the

Fourteenth Amendment. The Complaint plausibly alleges facts satisfying the objective

prong—that the “mold,” “fungus,” and “bacteria” infested showers caused a foot

infection posing an unreasonable risk to Guggino’s health. With respect to the subjective

prong, it does not plausibly allege that any Jail officials had knowledge that Guggino had

a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate the harm.

(3) The Complaint does not state a claim for denial of adequate medical care under the

Eighth Amendment. The Complaint’s allegations (taken as true at this stage) that his

constant rashes and unabated foot infection—which has caused him to lose two toenails,

have a third toenail turn brown, and experience “constant physical pain when [he]

walk[s]”—are sufficient to establish “a condition of urgency such as one that may

produce . . . extreme pain.” Nevertheless, the Complaint does not satisfy the subjective

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prong because it does not plausibly allege that the Jail officials knew or should have

known that failing to take action to treat the alleged medical issue would cause a

substantial risk to Guggino’s health.

(4) The Complaint does not state a claim for denial of adequate medical care under the

Fourteenth Amendment. As noted, the objective prong is satisfied because the Complaint

plausibly alleges that Guggino has suffered from abated conditions that establish “a

condition of urgency.” However, the subjective prong is not satisfied because the

Complaint does not plausibly allege that any Jail officers acted with deliberate

indifference to Guggino’s serious medical needs.

Accordingly, the Complaint’s Section 1983 claim is dismissed without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

B. Lack of Legal Capacity to Be Sued

The Section 1983 claims necessarily fail for the additional reason that the Complaint does

not name a proper defendant. Guggino cannot sue the Jail’s Medical Department or the Suffolk

County Sheriff’s Department because these entities are administrative arms of a municipality—

Suffolk County—and do not have independent legal identities. See Harris v. Med. Unit,

Yamphank, No. 2:23-cv-6839, 2024 WL 1934448, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2024); Sturgis v.

Suffolk County Jail, No. 12-cv-5263, 2013 WL 245052, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (sua

sponte dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Suffolk County Jail, among others, because it

is an “administrative arm[ ] of the County of Suffolk” and “lack[s] the capacity to be sued”).

Further, neither of the Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. See, e.g.,

Harris, 2024 WL 193448 at *3; Murphy v. Rodriguez, No. 23-cv-6998, 2023 WL 5586051, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2023) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against “Orange County Jail Medical

Dept. Wellpath” because it is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 and is therefore not a

proper defendant in a Section 1983 action).

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C. Municipal Liability

In light Guggino’s pro se status and in an abundance of caution, the Court has also

considered whether the allegations of the Complaint, liberally construed, plausibly allege a

Section 1983 claim against the municipality, Suffolk County. For the reasons set forth below,

they do not.

In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must

show: “(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right;

(3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the

constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). Thus, “a municipality can be held liable

under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is caused by a

governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691

F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). “The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘a municipality cannot be

made liable’ under § 1983 for acts of its employees ‘by application of the doctrine of respondeat

superior.’” Roe, 542 F.3d at 36 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986)).

“Rather, a plaintiff must identify either an ‘express rule or regulation,’ a practice that ‘was so

persistent or widespread as to [carry] the force of law,’ or misconduct of ‘subordinate

employees’ that ‘was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-

making officials.’” Swinton v. Livingston Cnty., No. 21-1434, 2023 WL 2317838, at *1 (2d Cir.

Mar. 2, 2023) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 315 (2d Cir. 2015)).

Here, the Complaint does not allege any facts from which this Court could reasonably

construe that the challenged conditions in the Suffolk County Correctional Facility were the

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product of any custom, policy, or practice of Suffolk County. Thus, the Section 1983 claims

against Suffolk County are implausible and are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against the Defendants are not plausible and are

thus dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

II. State Law Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over

all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.” However, courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim”

if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Where “all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to

be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

Here, because the Complaint contains no plausible federal claim, the interests of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction

over any state law claims in the Complaint. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims in Guggino’s Complaint.

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once

when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

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Shomo v. Cty. of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). In an abundance of caution, Guggino is granted leave to file an amended complaint to

afford him an opportunity to allege a plausible claim. If Guggino chooses to amend his

complaint, he shall: (1) do so within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and

Order; (2) clearly labeled it “Amended Complaint”; (3) and include the same docket number as

this Order, No. 25-cv-00597. Guggino must include those individuals who were allegedly

involved in the deprivation of his federal rights as defendant(s) in the caption and in the

statement of claim. If Guggino does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that

individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended

complaint. Further, Guggino is reminded to review the Court’s guidance set forth above

concerning the requirements to allege facts supporting plausible deliberate indifference claims

and Monell claims against Suffolk County. (See supra at I.A., I.C.) Guggino is cautioned that the

amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, so any facts

or claims that Guggino wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the

amended complaint. If Guggino does not timely file an amended complaint, judgment shall enter

without further notice and this case will be closed. Alternatively, Guggino may pursue any valid

claims he may have including negligence or medical malpractice against the Defendants in state

court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Guggino’s IFP motion (ECF No. 2), and

dismisses the Complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1) and with leave to file an amended complaint. The Clerk of

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the Court shall mail a copy of this Order to Guggino at his address of record in an envelope

marked “Legal Mail” and shall record such mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

April 25, 2025

/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY

United States District Judge

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