Colella v. Starpoint Central School District

S STATES DISTRIG>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EE FILED COP

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LS □□

APR 25 2025

Lag we

A.A.C. and T.C., on behalf of their minor West loewensul ee □□

ISTRICT

children G.C. and A.C.,

v.

24-CV-1047 (JLS)

STARPOINT CENTRAL SCHOOL

DISTRICT, DR. SEAN CROFT,

individually and in his official capacity as

current Superintendent, MAUREEN

BRAUNSCHEIDEL, individually and in

his [sic] official capacity as former

Superintendent, DR. ALAN INGRAHAM,

individually and in his official capacity as

High School Principal, DR. COREY

GRAY, individually and in his official

capacity as Middle School Principal, DR.

THOMAS SZALKOWSKI, individually

and in his official capacity as School

Physician, FRAN ANDERSON,

individually and in her official capacity as

Middle School Nurse, JOHN ANDREWS,

individually and in his official capacity as

Director of Administrative Services,

VINCENT DELL’OSO, individually and

in his official capacity as Athletic

Director, JOHN DOE(s), individually and

in their official capacities,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of their minor children, who are students

in the Starpoint Central School District (the “District”). Plaintiffs sue the District,

and several District officials, based on their refusal to allow Plaintiffs’ daughter,

A.C., to attend school unless she receives a Tdap vaccination which, according to

Plaintiffs, would be detrimental to her health. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion

for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Defendants from excluding A.C. from

school for failure to receive the Tdap vaccine. The motion is now granted.

In New York, “a child may be exempted from school immunization if ‘any’

state-licensed physician ‘certifies that such immunization may be detrimental to

[the] child’s health.” Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting N.Y.

Pub. Health Law § 2164(8)). Plaintiffs submitted a facially and procedurally valid

exemption request on behalf of A.C., which was completed by A.C.’s treating

physician based on his conclusion that A.C. should temporarily delay vaccination

while he explores possible impacts on her heath. The District, however, denied that

request after the school physician improperly second-guessed the treating

physician’s conclusion.

Plaintiffs maintain that, as a result of Defendants’ actions, their rights have

been violated under a plethora of federal and state constitutional provisions and

statutes. As set forth below, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits of their claims under the United States Constitution, the New York State

Constitution, or a federal statute. But they do make that showing as to one state-

law claim based on the District’s improper denial of the valid exemption request.

Indeed, “the statute does not create a system in which school officials are given

improper discretion to evaluate the reasons given for a requested medical

exemption.” Miller v. McDonald, 130 F.4th 258, 269 (2d Cir. 2025). This Court

has—and finds no basis to decline—supplemental jurisdiction over that state-law

claim. And as set forth below, the preliminary injunction factors require ruling for

Plaintiffs on this record. The preliminary injunction motion, therefore, is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs A.A.C. and T.C. assert claims under federal and New York law on

behalf of their minor children, G.C. and A.C. See Dkt. 25 J] 15-17. G.C. and A.C.

have attended school in the District for their “entire academic career[s].” Id. {| 16-

17. Currently, A.C. is a student at Starpoint Middle School. Id { 17. A.C. is the

focus of this motion.

Plaintiffs sue the District, as well as several District officials—namely,

Maureen Braunscheidel, Dr. Alan Ingraham, Dr. Corey Gray, Dr. Thomas

Szalkowski, Fran Anderson, John Andrews, and Vincent Dell’Oso (collectively, the

“Individual Defendants”). See id. {| 22-28. The Individual Defendants are named

in both their official and individual capacities. See id.

I. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS!

According to Plaintiffs, G.C. and A.C. have “documented medical conditions.”

Id. | 32. These include “histories of adverse reactions to vaccines that make

vaccination medically contraindicated.” Id. Specifically, both “G.C. and A.C. have

1 This section contains a summary of the Amended Complaint filed on December 29,

2024, which is the operative Complaint. See Dkt. 25.

documented histories of neurological symptoms following previous vaccinations.”

Id. ¥ 38.

On September 13, 2024, Plaintiffs “submitted requests for medical

exemptions from immunization requirements to the District.” Id. | 43. But on

September 27, 2024, Defendant Braunscheidel—acting superintendent at the

time—‘denied the medical exemption requests for G.C. and A.C.” Id. J 91.

Plaintiffs believe this was an “improper and unsupported decision to reject

Plaintiffs’ request for a vaccine waiver for their children.” Id. {| 56. Plaintiffs

appealed the decision to the New York State Commissioner of Education on October

10, 2024, but “voluntarily dismissed” the appeal on December 5, 2024. See id.

{4 105, 110.2

On December 4, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted another exemption request to the

District for A.C. See id. § 73. The previous day, Plaintiffs had “obtained a medical

exemption from Dr. Joseph A. Riccione for A.C.’s Tdap vaccination, citing the risk of

exacerbating her documented neurological conditions.” Id. { 71. But on December

23, 2024, the District denied the request and “announced its intention to exclude

A.C. from school beginning January 2, 2025....” Id. J 75.

Plaintiffs believe that the “District’s denial again exceeded its statutory

authority, and in violation of New York State law, by substituting its lay judgment

for that of a New York State licensed physician who personally examined A.C.” Id.

2 Plaintiffs purport that the appeal was “moot” because “G.C. had been coerced into

receiving the meningitis vaccine on October 23, 2024, and A.C. obtained a valid

medical exemption for the Tdap vaccine on December 3, 2024.” Id. § 110.

476. And they claim that the “District has engaged in a pattern of discriminatory

treatment regarding vaccination appointments, specifically targeting A.C. and G.C.

while accommodating other students... Id. { 77. They also purport that the

District has taken “broader retaliatory and discriminatory actions” against them.

Id. § 111.

The Amended Complaint includes ten named causes of action:

1. Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et

seq.) (“ADA”) against all Defendants;

2. Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) (“RA”)

against the District and Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski,

Anderson, Gray, Ingraham, and Dell’Oso;

3. Violation of HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. § 164.502, et seq.) against the

District and Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Andrews,

Anderson, Gray, and Ingraham;

4. First Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all

Defendants;

5. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Gray, Ingraham, Anderson,

and Andrews;

6. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Dell’Oso, Gray, Ingraham, and

Anderson;

7. Right To Refuse Medical Treatment under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Ingraham, Dell’Oso, Gray,

and Anderson;

8. Constitutional Privacy Claim under Section 1983 against Defendants

Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Andrews, Anderson, Gray, and

Ingraham;

9. Monell Claim under Section 1983 against the District; and

10. New York State Constitutional Violation against All Defendants.

See id. J] 168-264. And as discussed in detail below, the Amended Complaint,

fairly read, also contains a claim under New York State law based on the allegedly

improper denial of A.C.’s exemption request.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek—ultimately—an order enjoining Defendants

from “excluding Plaintiffs’ children from school,” requiring Defendants to “accept

the medical exemptions of Plaintiffs’ children,” and “[p]rohibiting any retaliation

against Plaintiffs or their children.” Id. at 47.3 They also seek declaratory relief,

compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.

Id. at 46-47.

3 Unless otherwise noted, page numbers refer to the CM/ECF numbering in the

header of each page.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 28, 2024. Dkt. 1. That same

day, they filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a

preliminary injunction (“PI”). Dkt. 2.

A. First Motion for a TRO and PI

In their original motion, Plaintiffs stated that A.C. “ha[d] an appointment

scheduled for December 3, 2024, with Dr. Joseph Riccione[.]” Dkt. 2-1 at 3. But the

District, they claimed, was “excluding” A.C. from school “despite her scheduled

appointment.” Id. As such, Plaintiffs sought “narrow” relief—namely, an order

“allowing [A.C.] to return to school pending her December 3, 2024 medical

appointment.” Id. Defendants opposed the motion. Dkt. 9. On November 5, 2024,

the Court heard argument. See Dkt. 12.

On November 18, 2024, this Court so-ordered a stipulation, Dkt. 14,

providing that A.C. would “be permitted to return to her classes and school-related

activities at Starpoint Middle School, effective as of November 6, 2024,” and

“continue attending classes and participating in activities” until “her doctor’s

appointment on December 3, 2024.” Id. at 2. In addition, Plaintiffs agreed to

“withdraw their motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction without prejudice.” Id.

B. Amended Complaint and Second Motion for a TRO and PI

On December 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which is now

the operative Complaint. Dkt. 25. That same day, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion

for a TRO anda PI. Dkt. 26-27.4 As to the TRO component, Plaintiffs sought an

order “enjoining Defendants from denying A.C.’s medical exemption and excluding

her from attending school during the pendency of this action.” Dkt. 26 at 1.

On January 2, 2025, the Court heard argument on the TRO request. See Dkt.

33. The Court then issued an Order (Dkt. 34) providing that:

Defendants, as well as their officers, agents, servants, employees, and

attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them,

are enjoined, effective immediately, from (a) excluding A.C. from

attending school based on Defendants’ denial of her medical exemption

under New York Public Health Law § 2164(8); or (b) taking any

retaliatory actions against Plaintiffs related to their pursuit of legal

remedies in this matter....

Id. at 2.8 The Court further ordered that “this TRO shall remain in effect through

the disposition of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.” Id.

C. Instant Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ outstanding request for a preliminary

injunction. See Dkt. 26. Plaintiffs argue that the District’s denial of A.C’s

exemption request violates “statutory, constitutional, and federal disability

4 Defendants opposed the motion, Dkt. 32, and Plaintiffs filed a supplemental

memorandum in support. Dkt. 31.

5 The Court stated the reasons for its decision on the record at the January 2, 2025

proceeding. Jd. at 1. A transcript of that proceeding is at Dkt. 35.

protections.” Dkt. 26-13 at 4. As such, they seek an order “requiring Defendants to

accept A.C.’s medical exemption and allow her to attend school pending final

resolution of this matter.” Dkt. 26 at 1.

1. The Parties’ Initial Submissions

In their motion, Plaintiffs state that A.C.’s “documented medical conditions,

including a history of adverse vaccine reactions,” have been “corroborated by a

licensed physician’s medical exemption form... .” Dkt. 26-13 at 3. But the District,

they claim, “unlawfully denied A.C.’s exemption request, disregarding her

physician’s expertise and substituting its own lay judgment.” Id. They argue that

the exclusion of A.C. from school “will cause A.C. irreparable harm, including loss of

educational access, emotional distress, social stigmatization, and academic

disruption.” Id.

Plaintiffs claim that they have “demonstrated a compelling likelihood of

success on the merits of their claims, which encompass violations of statutory,

constitutional, and federal disability protections.” Id. at 4. And they maintain that

the “District’s exclusion of A.C. from school, based on its arbitrary and

discriminatory denial of a valid medical exemption, deprives her of fundamental

constitutional and statutory rights that cannot be remedied through monetary

damages alone.” Id. at 18. According to Plaintiffs, the “balance of hardships

overwhelmingly favors Plaintiffs,” and “[g]ranting Plaintiffs’ requested relief aligns

with the public interest in safeguarding constitutional rights, promoting equitable

access to education, and maintaining trust in the integrity of public institutions.”

Id. at 16-18.

In opposition, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ application for injunctive

relief should be denied for a number of reasons.” Dkt. 32-1 at 4. They claim that

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and should abstain from adjudicating

Plaintiffs’ claims under various doctrines. Jd. at 5-6.6 They also maintain that

Plaintiffs “cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 6.

The parties filed pre-hearing briefs, Dkt. 50, 51, as well as supplemental

briefs. Dkt. 55, 57. In addition, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum “summarizing key

deposition testimony relevant to the issues in the preliminary injunction hearing.”

Dkt. 71.

2. Pre-Hearing Discovery and Motions

The Court permitted discovery in advance of the preliminary injunction

hearing. See Dkt. 36. The parties filed motions relating to various issues including,

for example, depositions and interrogatories. See, e.g., Dkt. 41, 42, 43. The Court

heard argument on these motions and, thereafter, resolved them by text order. Dkt.

46.

6 The Court addressed abstention at the January 2, 2025 TRO argument, and

concluded that it need not abstain. See Dkt. 35 at 5 (The Court: “I’m not seeing an

abstention here under any of the abstention doctrines, Younger, Burford, Colorado

River, Pullman ....I have looked at the caselaw and I’m satisfied that there is no

cause for abstention here, to the extent that there is a live Federal question here or

there, abstention is not appropriate”).

10

The parties also filed motions in limine. See Dkt. 47 (Plaintiffs); Dkt. 48

(Defendants).? On February 7, 2025, the Court issued an order resolving these

motions. Dkt. 53. In its order, the Court specified that, regarding likelihood of

success on the merits, the hearing would focus on:

1. Whether the exemption request was facially and procedurally valid;

2. The reason(s) that Defendants sought more information, and

scrutinized and rejected the exemption; and

3. Whether any such proffered reason offends the Constitution.

Id.8

On February 9, 2025, Defendants filed a motion seeking “an Order from this

Court vacating the TRO (Dkt. 34) and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction.” Dkt. 56. Defendants argued that, by its rulings on the motions in

limine, the Court has “foreclosed the possibility that Plaintiffs can meet their

burden of proof necessary to secure a preliminary injunction.” Id. In response, the

Court ordered that, because the issues in this case hinge partially on credibility

7 Both sides opposed the other’s motions. See Dkt. 49, 52.

8 As such, the Court: (1) granted Plaintiffs’ [47] motion to the extent that medical

opinion evidence shall not exceed the specified topics; (2) ordered that A.C.’s

substantive entitlement to the exemption, as a matter of medical opinions, is not a

proper inquiry for this Court; (3) granted Defendants’ [48] motion to preclude

opinion testimony that the tic disorder is progressive or unstable in accordance with

the parameters identified by the Court; and (4) granted Defendants’ [48] motion to

preclude opinion testimony that the tic disorder was caused by a 2018 vaccination.

Id.

11

determinations, the Court will address Defendants’ [56] motion following the

preliminary injunction hearing. Dkt. 65.

The Court then addressed additional discovery motions. See Dkt. 62.

Specifically, on February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs moved to strike declarations of: (1) Dr.

Eric Thierman, who “provided pediatric medical care for A.C. from her birth .. . up

to November 7 of 2023 (Dkt. 58 § 2); and (2) Dr. Debra S. Blog, Medical Director of

the Division of Vaccine Excellence, New York State Department of Health (Dkt. 59).

See Dkt. 62-2 at 5-11. They also moved to compel disclosure of “unredacted medical

exemptions issued to other students in the [D]istrict.” Dkt. 62 at 1-2. Defendants

opposed the motions, Dkt. 66, and Plaintiffs replied. Dkt. 67. The Court resolved

the motions by text order on March 5, 2025. Dkt. 68.9

3. Preliminary Injunction Hearing and Post-Hearing Submissions

On March 13 and 14, 2025, the Court held the preliminary injunction

hearing. See Dkt. 73-74. Dr. Riccione, Plaintiff A.A.C., and Defendants

Braunscheidel, Croft, and Dr. Szalkowski credibly testified at the hearing. See id.

After the hearing, the parties submitted deposition designations. See Dkt. 76

(Defendants); Dkt. 82 (Plaintiffs).!° Plaintiffs designated testimony from Dr.

9 The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to strike and granted their motion to

compel—provided that the parties coordinate regarding logistics and any details

relating to confidentiality protections. Id.

10 Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ designations, arguing that the Court should

“disregard these submissions in their entirety. ...” See Dkt. 89.

12

Riccione, Defendants Dr. Szalkowski, Croft, Andrews, Braunscheidel, and Gray, as

well as Plaintiffs T.C. and A.A.C. See Dkt. 82. Defendants designated testimony

from Plaintiff T.C. See Dkt. 76.

On March 24, 2025, the Court issued an order (Dkt. 77) stating that, in post-

hearing briefs, the parties “should be sure to address, in depth, Plaintiffs’ state-law

claim for failure to grant a valid exemption ....” See Dkt. 77 at 1-2. The Court

further stated that its “recent review of additional caselaw” revealed that

“supplemental jurisdiction may be appropriate in certain exceptional

circumstances.” See id. at 2. The Court ordered, therefore, that the parties’ post-

hearing briefs should “address all aspects of [28 U.S.C. §] 1367, including reasons

and factors relevant to whether the Court ought to retain or decline jurisdiction,” as

well as “the merits of this state-law claim... Id. The Court explained:

Given the Court’s prior statements on the issue, including its decision

on the motions in limine, and its evidentiary rulings—which were driven

by the Court’s then-current view of the issue prompted by Defendants’

arguments and caselaw citations addressing it—the scope of evidence

received at the preliminary injunction hearing, as a result, may have

been constrained, slightly, as it might have related to this claim. Thus,

in fairness to both sides, the forthcoming briefing may include reference

to new affidavits, or additional deposition transcripts, that would bear

on the Section 1367 and merits issues discussed above.

Id.}2

12 The Court’s prior statements and rulings are hereby reconsidered as appropriate

and as set forth below, consistent with the March 24, 2025 Order. See Sanderson v.

Leg Apparel, LLC, No. 1:19-CV-8423-GHW, 2023 WL 8039499, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

20, 2023) (“a district court has discretion to reconsider its non-final orders sua

sponte.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54).

13

The parties then filed their post-hearing briefs. See Dkt. 86-87 (Plaintiffs);

Dkt. 88 (Defendants). Plaintiffs attached various materials, including additional

declarations from Plaintiffs A.C. and A.A.C. dated April 10, 2025. See Dkt. 86-5; 86-

6. Defendants submitted—among other materials—an additional declaration from

Defendant Dr. Szalkowski dated April 4, 2025. See Dkt. 88-1.

DISCUSSION

On this record, and in this preliminary injunction posture, Plaintiffs have not

shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims under the United States

Constitution, the New York State Constitution, and federal statutes. But this

record reveals the opposite as to the state-law claim based on Defendants’ denial of

the facially and procedurally valid exemption request that Dr. Riccione completed

on A.C.’s behalf. In the absence of a basis to decline jurisdiction over that claim—

and because the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor Plaintiffs—the

preliminary injunction motion is granted.

I. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FACTORS

To “obtain a preliminary injunction against governmental action taken

pursuant to a statute, the movant has to demonstrate (1) irreparable harm absent

injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of success on the merits, and (8) public interest

weighing in favor of granting the injunction.” Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Lamont,

977 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal citation and alteration omitted). In

addition, (4) the “movant also must show that the balance of equities tips in [its]

favor.” Id. See also Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (“The

14

default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear

showing that ‘[s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, that [s]he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities

tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest”) (quoting Winter

uv. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). With respect to the state-law

claim addressed below, all of the preliminary injunction factors favor Plaintiffs.'*

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

As noted above, Plaintiffs assert the following enumerated causes of action:

e Violation of the ADA against all Defendants;

e Violation of the RA against the District and Defendants Croft,

Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Anderson, Gray, Ingraham, and Dell’Oso;

e Violation of HIPAA Privacy Rule against the District and Defendants

Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Andrews, Anderson, Gray, and

Ingraham;

e First Amendment Retaliation under Section 1983 against all Defendants;

e Fourteenth Amendment Due Process under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Gray, Ingraham, Anderson,

and Andrews;

13 To “warrant a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs need not show that there is a

likelihood of success on the merits of all of their claims for relief. Rather, Plaintiffs

need to show a likelihood of success on the merits of at least one of their claims.”

L.V.M. v. Lloyd, 318 F. Supp. 3d 601, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) Gnternal citation,

alternations, and quotation marks omitted).

15

e Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Dell’Oso, Gray, Ingraham, and

Anderson;

e Right To Refuse Medical Treatment under Section 1983 against

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Ingraham, Dell’Oso, Gray,

and Anderson;

e Constitutional Privacy Claim under Section 1983 against Defendants

Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Andrews, Anderson, Gray, and

Ingraham;

e Monell Claim under Section 19838 against the District; and

e New York State Constitutional Violation against All Defendants.

See Dkt. 25 J 168-264.

In addition, Plaintiffs’ allegations across the Amended Complaint include a

state-law claim that the District’s denial of A.C.’s exemption request was improper.

See, e.g., id. J§ 1-5, 10-14, 71-76, 112, 141-42, 270-74. Plaintiffs allege—for

example—that “the District denied [A.C.’s] valid medical exemption[,] and

announced its intention to exclude A.C. from school . . .”—and that the denial

“exceeded its statutory authority, and in violation of New York State law, by

substituting its lay judgment for that of a New York State licensed physician who

personally examined A.C.” Id. (75-76. If brought in state court, such a claim

would typically fall within Article 78 of the State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules

(“CPLR”). See Goe, 43 F.4th at 34 (“if a medical exemption is denied by school

16

authorities, a parent has the right to .. . seek judicial review in state court through

an Article 78 proceeding”).4

14 Article 78 “is a method for challenging state administrative action.” Davis v.

Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275

(2d Cir. 1986)). The “substantive scope of an Article 78 proceeding is limited.”

Whitfield v. City of New York, 96 F.4th 504, 519 (2d Cir. 2024). The “only questions

that may be raised in a proceeding under this [78] article are:

1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it

by law; or

2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to

proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or

3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure,

was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an

abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure

or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or

4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at

which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the

entire record, supported by substantial evidence.

Id. (citing CPLR 7803). The fact that Plaintiffs do not out call this claim as a

separate enumerated cause of action does not preclude this Court’s consideration of

the claim on this motion. Indeed, a “complaint need not set out the correct legal

theory on which the claim is based, so long as the complaint provides full notice of

the circumstances giving rise to the plaintiffs claim.” Morris v. Schroder Cap.

Mgmt. Int, 445 F.3d 525, 5380 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006). See Chinchilla v. New York City

Police Dep’t, No. 23 CIV. 8986 (DEH), 2024 WL 3400526, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,

2024) (courts “look beyond the labels a plaintiff uses to determine if an action

should be brought as an Article 78 proceeding”); Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629

F.2d 705, 712 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Generally[,] a complaint that gives full notice of

the circumstances giving rise to the plaintiffs claim for relief need not also correctly

plead the legal theory or theories and statutory basis supporting the claim”); New

York State Waterways Ass’n, Inc. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972)

(“While plaintiffs’ complaint is hardly a model of compliance with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requirement of a ‘short and plain’ statement of the

claimed jurisdictional basis of a suit, it is our duty to read it liberally, to determine

whether the facts set forth justify taking jurisdiction on grounds other than those

17

For the reasons below, each of the claims in Plaintiffs’ enumerated causes of

actions is unlikely to succeed on the merits. But Plaintiffs’ “Article 7 8”-type claim is

likely to succeed on the merits.

1. First Amendment Retaliation (Fourth Claim)

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants took various actions with respect to A.C.’s

exemption request—and ultimately denied the request—to retaliate against

Plaintiffs for: (1) retaining counsel; and/or (2) filing an appeal with the New York

State Commissioner of Education as to an earlier request. There is no likelihood of

success on the merits of this claim.!®

The Second Circuit has “described the elements of a First Amendment

retaliation claim in several ways, depending on the factual context.” Zherka v.

Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 2011) Gnternal citation and quotation marks

omitted). In the context of Section 1983 claims brought on behalf of a minor student

against a school district and its officials, the Second Circuit has used the following

test: To “state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that:

(1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant

took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between

this adverse action and the protected [conduct].” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch.

most artistically pleaded”). Defendants, moreover, raised the “Article 78-claim”

issue themselves, and litigated it fully as if it existed in the Amended Complaint.

15 Plaintiffs’ theories of First Amendment retaliation have evolved over the course of

this litigation. To the extent Plaintiffs assert additional theories not addressed in

this decision, those theories are undeveloped and lack merit.

18

Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287

(2d Cir. 2008); Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010)).

An “adverse action in a First Amendment retaliation case is ‘conduct that

would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his

or her constitutional rights.” Jd. (quoting Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d

217, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)). Under “this ‘objective’ standard, an adverse action must be

more than ‘de minimis’ to support a First Amendment retaliation claim.” Id.

(quoting Zelnik, 464 F.3d at 226). Recognizing “that this test is highly context-

specific,” the Second Circuit applies it “in light of the special characteristics of the

school environment.” Jd. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393

U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).

Here, Plaintiffs point to several supposedly retaliatory acts in connection

with A.C.’s request, none of which amounts—in this preliminary injunction

posture—to unlawful retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.!¢

a. Escalation of A.C.’s Request

Plaintiffs rely on the fact that A.C.’s exemption request was administratively

handled at the District level, rather than at the building level, per usual procedure.

The escalation of Plaintiffs’ request, however, does not give rise to a retaliation

claim because it is not an actionable adverse action. The credible testimony of

multiple witnesses confirmed that, regardless of whether a request is

16 Defendants do not dispute, for purposes of this motion, that retaining counsel and

filing a Commissioner’s appeal are protected activities. See Dkt. 50 at 12.

19

administratively handled at the district level or the building level, it is ultimately

reviewed by Dr. Szalkowski (and never before has the District rejected his

recommendation). Because the outcome would have been the same with or without

the escalation, there is no basis to conclude that such conduct “would deter a

similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her

constitutional rights.” See Cox, 654 F.3d at 273 (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to establish the required causal link. They rely

heavily on an internal e-mail in which Braunscheidel indicated that A.C.’s request

will be handled at the district level because Plaintiffs “involved attorneys.” Indeed,

Braunscheidel testified that, as Acting Superintendent, she issued a directive in or

around October 2024 to building administrators and nurses stating that A.C.’s

exemption request will be handled at the District level. She credibly explained,

however, that her directive closely followed an e-mail communication from A.C.’s

father that expressed concern about medical information being shared by the

middle school nurse with the children. Braunscheidel was also aware that the

family had previously submitted a fraudulent medical document to the District

regarding their other daughter, which further explains why she believed that closer

attention was necessary, and thereby undercuts any causal link between the

escalation and any protected activity.

b. Temporary Exclusion of A.C. from School

Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that A.C. was excluded from school for

approximately two weeks because she did not have the required Tdap vaccination

20

—even though she had an appointment scheduled for December 3, 2024 with Dr.

Riccione. The record does not support a causal link between A.C.’s exclusion from

school and Plaintiffs’ protected activities.

Braunscheidel credibly testified that, upon receiving a letter from the office of

the Education Commissioner in or around October 2024 indicating that Plaintiffs’

request for a stay of the District's exclusion order had been denied, she believed

that she lacked authority to allow A.C. to remain in school (without the Tdap

vaccine or an exemption). Braunscheidel, therefore, believed she had no choice but

to disallow A.C. from attending school—despite her previous position that A.C.

should be allowed to stay in school pending the outcome of the appeal because it

was “the right thing to do.”

In addition, Braunscheidel credibly testified that she believed that, under

District policy, a student without a required vaccine (or an exemption) may remain

in school pending a doctor’s appointment only where the vaccination is scheduled to

occur at the appointment—not where, like in A.C.’s case, the appointment was to

determine whether to receive the vaccine."

On these facts, there is no basis to conclude that A.C.’s temporary exclusion

from school was causally connected to Plaintiffs’ protected activities.

17 There is no evidence in this record of a contrary policy.

21

c. Dr. Szalkowski’s Recommendation

Plaintiffs also cannot rely on Dr. Szalkowski’s recommendation to deny the

December 3, 2024 request that had been completed and signed by Dr. Riccione.

Indeed, Dr. Szalkowski took numerous steps that amounted to second-guessing Dr.

Riccione’s medical opinion regarding A.C.’s need for an exemption. And that

exceeds the bounds of his statutory authority in reviewing a request. See Miller,

130 F.4th at 269 (Even “though school officials have the authority to conclude that

the documents submitted in support of a medical exemption contain sufficient (or

insufficient) information, they do not have ‘discretion to approve or deny exemptions

on a case-by-case basis’ for any reason”) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, that,

itself, does not give rise to unlawful retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment.18

Dr. Szalkowski also testified that he had previously reviewed an exemption

request from the same family that was “full of red flags.” It is thus reasonable to

infer that, as a result, he was primed to consider this request with closer scrutiny.

There is no evidence to suggest that Dr. Szalkowski proceeded in this matter

because Plaintiffs engaged in any protected activity.

d. Department of Health Inquiry

Plaintiffs also point to the fact that Dr. Croft sought a second opinion from

the Department of Health regarding Dr. Szalkowski’s recommendation to deny

18 But see the analysis of Plaintiffs’ state-law claim below.

22

A.C.’s exemption request. Dr. Croft credibly testified that, even without input from

the Department of Health, he still would have denied the request. Accordingly,

there is no actionable adverse action because such conduct would not “deter a

similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her

constitutional rights.” See Cox, 654 F.3d at 273 Gnternal citation omitted).

e. The District’s Ultimate Decision

Lastly, the record does not support that the District’s ultimate decision to

deny A.C.’s exemption request was unlawfully retaliatory. The decision was issued

in late December of 2024—several weeks after Plaintiffs withdrew their

Commissioner's appeal. In addition, Dr. Croft credibly testified that the District

always accepts Dr. Szalkowski’s recommendation regarding an exemption request

—which aligns with what happened here.

In sum, in this posture, the record does not support a First Amendment

retaliation claim.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection (Sixth Claim)

Plaintiffs also “assert a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim” under Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). See Dkt. 51 at 17. They purport

that “A.C.’s exemption [request] was treated differently than all others as no other

medical exemption had ever been escalated to NYSDOH for review before A.C.’s

request” and “no rational explanation exists for why A.C.’s exemption was singled

23

out for heightened scrutiny while other exemptions were granted without question.”

Id. at 17-18. Their claim fails on this record.

In Olech, the “Supreme Court held that [a plaintiff] could... state an Equal

Protection claim by alleging ‘[1] that she has been intentionally treated differently

from others similarly situated and [2] that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2019)

(quoting Olech, 528 U.S. at 564)). The Court in Olech “declined to specify the degree

of similarity required between a plaintiff and her comparator.” Id. at 91-92.

The Second Circuit, however, “addressed that omission and set forth the...

similarity standard for an Olech cause of action.” Id. at 92 (citing Neilson v.

D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2005)).19 It concluded that “the level of similarity

between plaintiffs and the persons with whom they compare themselves must be

extremely high.” Id. (internal citation omitted). More precisely,

a plaintiff must establish that he and a comparator are ‘prima facie

identical’ by showing that[:] (i) no rational person could regard the

circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a

degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a

legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances

and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that

the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And “the existence of highly

similar circumstances provides the basis for inferring that the plaintiff was

19 The Second Circuit “later overruled Neilson insofar as it allowed public employees

to assert Olech claims against their government employers,” but it “left intact

Neilson’s articulation of the elements of an Olech claim.” Id. at 92 n.3.

24

intentionally singled out for reasons that so lack any reasonable nexus with a

legitimate governmental policy that an improper purpose—whether personal or

otherwise—is all but certain.” Jd. (internal citation, quotation marks, and

alterations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs fail to identify a “prima facie identical” comparator. The

circumstances surrounding the A.C.’s exemption request are unique in several

respects. For example, Plaintiffs had previously submitted a separate exemption

request on behalf of A.C. issued by an out-of-state organization that, according to

Dr. Szalkowski, was “full of red flags.” A.C.’s mother also submitted a medical

record to the District that she had intentionally altered to erroneously depict her

other daughter’s vaccination status. In addition, shortly before A.C.’s exemption

request was escalated to the District level, A.C.’s father had contacted the District

to express concern about the middle school nurse supposedly sharing medical

information with students. Moreover, the submission, review, and rejection of

A.C.’s December exemption request all occurred after this lawsuit was commenced.

There is no evidence, in this record, of another similar situation in the District's

history.

In sum, the “facts presented by this case are, to say the least, sui generis.” In

re Joe’s Friendly Serv. & Son, Inc., 645 B.R. 94, 130 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022).

Because Plaintiffs fail, on this record, to identify a comparator with anywhere near

25

the “extremely high” degree of similarity required, there is no likelihood of success

on an Olech claim.'®

3. ADA and RA (First and Second Claims)

Plaintiffs also assert disability discrimination claims, specifically, under Title

Il of the ADA against all Defendants, and under the RA against the District and

Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Anderson, Gray, Ingraham, and

Dell’Oso. See Dkt. 25 168-190. These claims also fall short in this posture.

As a preliminary matter, to the extent Plaintiffs assert ADA or RA claims

against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, those claims fail

because neither provision provides for individual liability. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y.

Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Insofar as [the

plaintiff] is suing the individual defendants in their individual capacities, neither

Title II of the ADA nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for individual

capacity suits against state officials”).

19 Plaintiffs also fail, in this posture, under the separate equal protection theory of

non-class-based discrimination set forth in LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 607

(2d Cir. 1980). To “prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the

person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated, and (2) the

selective treatment was motivated by an intention to discriminate on the basis of

impermissible considerations, such as race or religion, to punish or inhibit the

exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the

person.” Hu, 927 F.3d at 91. Leclair “requires a reasonably close resemblance

between a plaintiffs and comparator’s circumstances.” Id. at 93 Gnternal citation

and quotation marks omitted). On this record, Plaintiffs fail to establish intent to

discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, or malicious or bad faith

intent to injure Plaintiffs. Nor do they identify a valid comparator, for the reasons

discussed above.

26

In addition, all of Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims lack merit on this

preliminary injunction record. To “make out a prima facie case under the ADA or

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that [she] is a qualified individual with

a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to [the pertinent statute]; and (8)

that [she] was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by

defendants, by reason of [her] disability.” Preston v. Hilton Cent. Sch. Dist., 876 F.

Supp. 2d 235, 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73-74 (2d

Cir. 2009)).

A “person has a ‘disability’ under the ADA (or Rehabilitation Act) if [s]he has:

(a) ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more [of his]

major life activities,’ (b) ‘a record of such an impairment,’ or (c) is ‘regarded as

having such an impairment.” Veldran v. Dejoy, 839 F. App’x 577, 579 (2d Cir. 2020)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B)). Major life activities “include

‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working.” Jones v. New York City Transit Auth., 838 F.

App’x 642, 644 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.38()(2)(ii)).

Here, the record does not support that A.C. is a qualified individual with a

disability within the meaning of these statutes. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how

any verbal or motor tics A.C. may experience substantially limit any major life

activity. In fact, Dr. Riccione’s testimony indicates that A.C. generally functions

27

normally, and that her tics occur only sporadically. A.C.’s mother also testified that

A.C. has done well in school and participates in activities such as cheerleading.

In sum, because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that A.C.’s tic disorder

substantially limits a major life activity—or that she has a record of, or is regarded

as having, such an impairment-——Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims fail to support a

preliminary injunction.

4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process (Fifth Claim)

Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants Croft, Braunscheidel, Szalkowski, Gray,

Ingraham, Anderson, and Andrews violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Rights. See Dkt. 25 J 214-228. The “touchstone of due process is

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Leebaert v.

Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) Gnternal citation and quotation marks

omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs assert both substantive due process and procedural

due process claims. They fail on this record.

a. Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process rights “safeguard persons against the government’s

exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate

governmental objective.” Matzell v. Annucct, 64 F.4th 425, 436 (2d Cir. 2023)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). An “as applied challenged,” like

Plaintiffs assert here, “requires an analysis of the facts of a particular case to

determine whether the application of a statute, even one constitutional on its face,

28

deprived the [plaintiff] to whom it was applied of a protected right.” Goe, 43 F.4th

at 30 (quoting Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2006)).

For non-legislative conduct, like that alleged here, the Second Circuit “use[es]

the shocks the conscience test to assess substantive due process challenges to

government conduct.” Goe, 43 F.4th at 30. Accordingly, “to determine whether

government conduct infringes on a substantive due process right,” the Second

Circuit “first identif[ies] the ‘constitutional right at stake[,]’ or the ‘deprivation of

property’ interest at issue.” Id. (quoting Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d

202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995)). And if the court “identiflies] either,” it “then asses[es]

whether the government’s alleged conduct shocks the conscience.” Id.?°

Here, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong. They allege that they have “a

protected property interest in their children’s public education.” Dkt. 25 § 215.7!

Indeed, while the “right to education does not rise to the level of a fundamental

right, New York law ‘does appear to create a property interest in education

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Doe v. Zucker, 520 F. Supp. 3d 217, 258

(N.D.N.Y. 2021), affd sub nom. Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting

Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2006)). And courts “have

20 To “satisfy the second prong, ‘[t]he interference with the plaintiffs protected right

must be so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would

not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.”

Maitzell, 64 F.4th at 486 (quoting Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127,

152 (2d Cir. 2012)).

21 Plaintiffs also allege that they “have a protected liberty interest in making

medical decisions for their children.” Id. { 216. They have not, however, pursued

this theory or cited any caselaw supporting a substantive due process claim on this

basis.

29

thus found the deprivation of education to be a valid basis for a substantive due

process claim by a student expelled from school.” Id. (citing DeFabio v. E. Hampton

Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2010)).

At “the same time,” however, “Plaintiffs’ right to an education under New

York State law is limited by the New York’s mandatory school vaccination

requirement, and ‘[t]he case law clearly establishes that conditioning school

enrollment on vaccination has long been accepted by courts as a permissible way for

States to inoculate large numbers of young people and prevent the spread of

contagious diseases.” Id. (quoting V.D. v. State of New York, 403 F. Supp. 3d 76, 87

(S.D.N.Y. 2019)). As such, in Goe, the court concluded that the plaintiffs “did not

plausibly allege an infringement of a constitutional right or the deprivation of a

property interest in education.” Goe, 43 F.4th at 34 (affirming district court’s

conclusion that “the Plaintiffs’ exclusion from school ultimately resulted from their

decisions not to comply with a condition for school enrollment permissibly set by the

state; the fact that Plaintiffs felt that their serious medical issues compelled them

not to comply with that condition does not change that”). See Doe, 520 F. Supp. 3d

at 258-59.

In sum, because Plaintiffs fail to identify a constitutional right at stake, or

deprivation of a property interest, their substantive due process claim fails.22

22 Because Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of the test, the Court need not

assess whether the Individual Defendants engaged in conscious-shocking conduct.

30

b. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants violated their procedural due process

rights by: (1) “failing to provide adequate notice”; (2) “failing to provide a

meaningful opportunity to be heard”; (3) “failing to follow established procedures”;

(4) “making arbitrary decisions without proper basis”; and (4) “failing to provide

proper appeals processes.” See Dkt. 25 217-221.

To “prevail on this claim, [Plaintiffs] must show that [they] possessed a

protected liberty or property interest, and that [they were] deprived of that interest

without due process.” McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285~-86 (2d Cir.

2001) Gnternal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, even if Plaintiffs possessed a protected liberty or property interest, they

were not deprived of that interest without due process of law. In “evaluating what

process satisfies the Due Process Clause, ‘the Supreme Court has distinguished

between (a) claims based on established state procedures[;] and (b) claims based on

random, unauthorized acts by state employees.” Rivera-Powell v. New York City

Bad. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hellenic Am.

Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1996)).

In the “latter case, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not

violated when a state employee intentionally deprives an individual of property or

liberty, so long as the State provides a meaningful post[-]deprivation remedy.”

Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm., 101 F.3d at 880.

31

In this case, Plaintiffs base their claim on individual acts of District

employees, rather than on established state procedures. See, e.g., Dkt. 25 J 226(a)

(alleging that Braunscheidel “[m]ade arbitrary decisions without proper basis”);

{ 226(f) (alleging that Andrews “[p]articipated in medical decisions without proper

authority and reviewed confidential information beyond his scope”). Anda

meaningful post-deprivation remedy—namely, an Article 78 proceeding—does exist,

thereby defeating Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.

In an analogous posture, the Second Circuit held that, if a “medical

exemption is denied by school authorities, a parent has the right to... seek judicial

review in state court through an Article 78 proceeding.” Goe, 43 F.4th at 34. And

the “Second Circuit has squarely held that a post-deprivation hearing via the

Article 78 process satisfies constitutional due process requirements.” Carnell v.

Myers, No. 17-CV-7693 (KMK), 2019 WL 1171489, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019).

See Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (“An Article 78 proceeding

therefore constitutes a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process

purposes”); McMenemy, 241 F.3d at 289 (“We agree with the district court that the

availability of an Article 78 proceeding under New York law provided [the plaintiff]

with an adequate post-deprivation remedy such that no procedural due process

violation occurred, even if [the plaintiff] possessed a cognizable property interest”).

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails on this record.

32

5. Monell Liability (Ninth Claim)

Plaintiffs also assert a Monell claim against the District under Section 1983

on the grounds that the District allegedly maintained various unlawful policies and

customs. See Dkt. 25 § 259-276. Because Plaintiffs fail to establish any

underlying Constitutional violations, however, their Monell claim is not viable. See

Goe, 43 F.4th at 34 (“as the district court correctly concluded that the [complaint]

failed to plausibly allege any underlying constitutional violations, it did not err in

dismissing the municipal liability claims against the School District Defendants’);

Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the district

court properly found no underlying constitutional violation, its decision not to

address the municipal defendants’ liability under Monell was entirely correct”).

6. Remaining Federal Claims

To the extent Plaintiffs assert additional federal claims in their Amended

Complaint, including under HIPAA (Third Claim), Right to Refuse Medical

Treatment (Seventh Claim), and Constitutional Privacy (Eighth Claim), those

claims are undeveloped on this record and provide no grounds for relief here.?°

7. State Law Claims

Lastly, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ state law claims. The Amended

Complaint asserts a claim for “New York State Constitutional Violations” (Tenth

23 Plaintiffs make no mention of these claims in their preliminary injunction motion,

pre-hearing brief, or post-hearing brief.

33

Claim) on the grounds that “Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive A.C.

of her constitutional right to education” in various ways. See Dkt. 25 |{ 277-264

[sic].25 In addition, as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint includes an

Article 78-type claim based on the improper denial of A.C.’s exemption request. See,

e.g., id. Jf 1-5, 10-14, 71-76, 112, 141-42, 270-74.

For the reasons below, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over each of

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.26 And the Article 78-type claim is likely to succeed on

the merits.

a. Supplemental Jurisdiction Framework

The Supreme Court “has long adhered to principles of pendent and ancillary

jurisdiction by which the federal courts’ original jurisdiction over federal questions

carries with it jurisdiction over state law claims that derive from a common nucleus

of operative fact, such that the relationship between [the federal] claim and the

state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises

but one constitutional case.” City of Chicago v. Intl Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,

164-65 (1997) (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

25 These allegations appear on pages 45-46 of the Amended Complaint, which

contain errors in paragraph numbering.

26 Where, like here, “[{d]liversity jurisdiction .. . appears to be absent,” the “state

claims may lie only if the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction.” E-Smart

Techs., Inc. v. Corse, No. 03 CIV. 7060 (RO), 2004 WL 2093531, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 17, 2004).

34

Congress “has codified those principles in the supplemental jurisdiction

statute, which combines the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under a

common heading.” Id. at 165 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). The “statute provides[:] ‘in

any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related

to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the

same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Id.

(quoting § 1367(a)). In short, “[p]endent jurisdiction exists only where the state and

federal claims comprise one case under Article III, tested by whether they share a

‘common nucleus of operative fact, such that the plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be

expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr.

Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).

After “establishing that supplemental jurisdiction encompasses ‘other claims’

in the same case or controversy as a claim within the district courts’ original

jurisdiction ... the statute confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental

jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its

exercise.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173 (quoting Section 1367(a)). Specifically, a

district court’s “discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction is available only if

founded upon an enumerated category of subsection 1367(c).” Catzin v. Thank You

& Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Shahriar v. Smith &

Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original).

35

Those categories include: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of

State law[;] (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction[;] (8) the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[;] or (4) in exceptional

circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id.

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).

If “one of the [Section] 1367(c) categories applies, the district court may then

undertake the discretionary inquiry of whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction.” Jd. And the court “should not decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction unless it also determines that doing so would not promote . . . [judicial]

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Jd. (quoting Jones v. Ford Motor

Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 2004)).

b. Plaintiffs’ “Article 78”-Type Claim

In the following subsections, the Court discusses its jurisdiction over, and the

merits of, Plaintiffs’ Article 78-type claim. In short, this Court has supplemental

jurisdiction over this claim. Indeed, the claim arises from the same core set of facts

as Plaintiffs’ federal claims. And the limited exceptions that would permit the

Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction do not apply. All of the relevant

circumstances favor retaining jurisdiction.

Moreover, this state-law claim is meritorious on this record. Defendants

exceeded the bounds of their statutory authority by impermissibly second-guessing

Dr. Riccione’s conclusion that the Tdap vaccine would be detrimental to A.C.’s

36

health. In the absence of any rational basis for the District’s decision to deny the

exemption request, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of this claim.

i. Supplemental Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, there is no impediment—generally speaking—to

exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim simply because it would fall under

Article 78 if brought in state court. The Second Circuit has stated that the question

whether “federal courts may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims

seeking relief under Article 78 is an unsettled [one] ....” DiMartile v. Hochul, 80

F.4th 443, 446 n.1 (2d Cir. 2023). See also Carver v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin.

Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2013), as corrected (Sept. 27, 2013) (“We need not

decide, however, whether Article 78 can, on its own, deprive a federal court of

jurisdiction over claims brought under that provision, as some district court cases

have held”).

In Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir.

2007), however, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s exercise of

jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Article 78 claim under the All Writs Act and the

court’s supplemental jurisdiction. In the district court proceeding, the plaintiffs

asserted an Article 78 claim that challenged the zoning board’s denial of the

plaintiffs application for a special use permit. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of

Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.

2007). The district court concluded that it was “incumbent” upon it to “address the

legality” of the zoning board’s decision, in order to “protect the integrity” of a prior

37

order of the court and “to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it.” Id. at 559-60

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court further reasoned that it

had “become intimately familiar with the merits of this case,” noting, in particular,

that a “full record ha[d] been developed after significant discovery ....” Id. at 561.

Cf. Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 864-65 (2d Cir. 1988)

(affirming district court’s decision authorizing removal of an Article 78 proceeding

under the All Writs Act, where the district court had ordered the state court case to

be removed because the issues raised by the Article 78 proceeding went to the “very

essence” of a consent decree that had been entered by the district court).

Indeed, district courts in this circuit have “exercised supplemental

jurisdiction over Article 78 claims where the court otherwise had federal jurisdiction

over other claims raised.” Garofalo v. City of New York, No. 1:22-CV-07620-NRM-

VMS, 2023 WL 3792514, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2023) (citing Casale v. Metro

Transp. Auth., No. 05 Civ. 4232 (MBM), 2005 WL 3466405, at *5—6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

19, 2005); Residents & Fams. United, 2017 WL 5496277, at *13; Doe v. Zucker, No.

1:17-CV-1005 (GTS/CFH), 2018 WL 3520422, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2018); Cedar

Dev. E., LLC v. Town Bd. of Hurley, No. 1:21-cv-289 (MAD/TWD), 2021 WL

3422342, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2021)).26

26 The Court acknowledges, however, that the “overwhelming majority of district

courts confronted with the question of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Article 78 claims have found that they are without power to do so or have

declined to do so.” Coastal Commc’ns Serv., Inc. v. City of New York, 658 F. Supp.

2d 425, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). But that does not preclude this Court from exercising

jurisdiction here, particularly given the extraordinary circumstances presented.

38

Casale, in particular, is persuasive.2” There, the court recognized that,

although state law “may direct that ‘[a] proceeding under this article shall be

brought in [state] supreme court,’ . . . this requirement has nothing to do with

whether the proceeding falls within a federal jurisdictional statute.” Id. at *6

(quoting CPLR 7804). And if “such a directive could deprive federal courts of

jurisdiction, state legislatures, not Congress, would control the power of the federal

judiciary.” Id. Such a result would be “plainly inconsistent with the structure of

the U.S. Constitution and its Supremacy Clause.” Doe v. New York Univ., 537 F.

Supp. 3d 483, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). Moreover,

Congress has “never excluded disputes of the kinds within an Article 78 proceeding,

or any similar state-law proceeding, from the subject matter jurisdiction of federal

courts.” Elite Med. Supply of New York, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 13-

CV-918-A, 2014 WL 823439, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (citing Horton v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961); Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 204

F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Finding no impediment, in general, to exercising jurisdiction over such a

claim, the Court next applies the established framework set forth in Section 1367.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ claim is “so related to” Plaintiffs’ federal

claims in this action “that they form part of the same case or controversy” under

Article III. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Each of them is based on various actions that

27 Casale addressed a motion for remand where the case had been removed to

federal court following commencement in state court as a “hybrid special proceeding

and action.” Jd. at *1.

39

Defendants took with respect to A.C.’s exemption request—and the ultimate

decision to deny the request. As such, they “share a ‘common nucleus of operative

fact,’ such that [Plaintiffs] ‘would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one

judicial proceeding.” Lyndonville, 211 F.3d at 704 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).

Next, the enumerated Section 1367(c) categories do not apply. First,

Plaintiffs’ Article 78 claim does not raise “a novel or complex issue of State law.”

See Section 1867(c)(1). Rather, it involves a straightforward application of N.Y.

Pub. Health Law § 2164(8) and its implementing regulations, paired with clear

Second Circuit authority regarding school officials’ discretion in evaluating

requests. See Miller, 130 F.4th at 269; We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Connecticut

Off. of Early Childhood Dev., 76 F.4th 130, 151 (2d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 2682 (2024).29 Second, Plaintiffs’ Article 78 claim does not “substantially

predominate[] over” their federal claims. See Section 1367(c)(2). Plaintiffs assert

nine federal causes of action claiming that Defendants’ actions violate their rights

under various Constitutional provisions and federal laws. Plaintiffs’ state-law

claim is no more complex, and does not overshadow, their federal claims in terms of

proof required or relief requested. Indeed, Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs fail

to “plead an Article 78 claim or allege a cause of action for violations of Public

Health Law § 2164,” Dkt. 88 at 19, undercuts any argument that such claim

23 Defendants’ argument that Lynch v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 155 Misc. 2d

846, 849 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, 1992), is the “only” reported New York State

court decision interpreting the relevant provisions, see Dkt. 88 at 24, ignores these

Second Circuit authorities and is, therefore, unavailing.

AO

“predominates” over Plaintiffs’ other causes of action. Third, the Court has not

finally determined any of Plaintiffs’ federal claims. See Section § 1367(c)(8).2°

Fourth, on this record, no “exceptional circumstances” give rise to “compelling

reasons” to decline jurisdiction—particularly in light of the extensive litigation that

has already occurred before this Court. See id. § 1367(c)(4).

Furthermore, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor

retaining jurisdiction. The Court and parties have invested significant resources

into this case thus far. The case has been actively litigated in this Court for more

than five months. The parties have engaged in meaningful discovery. The Court

resolved numerous discovery motions and motions in limine. The Court also held a

multi-day preliminary injunction hearing at which multiple witnesses testified.

Indeed, it would be a “pointless waste of judicial resources to require a state court to

invest the time and effort necessary to familiarize itself with a case well-known to

the presiding federal judge.” Enercomp, Inc. v. McCorhill Pub., Inc., 873 F.2d 536,

546 (2d Cir. 1989) (retaining jurisdiction where “it would have ‘stood judicial

economy on its head’ not to proceed with the state claims even if the [federal] action

30 As discussed above, none of Plaintiffs’ federal claims is likely to succeed on the

merits. And the Court recognizes that, “the elimination of federal-law claims prior

to trial generally points to declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the

usual case....” Catzin, 899 F.3d at 86 Gnternal citation and quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis added). That “clearly does not mean,” however, “that the

balance of the factors always points that way.” Id. Rather, the “district court must

still meaningfully balance the supplemental jurisdiction factors.” Id. On this

record, those factors heavily favor retaining jurisdiction—even in the absence of any

likely meritorious federal claim.

4]

had been dismissed prior to trial”). The most economical and convenient approach

is to retain jurisdiction.

Concerns of fairness also counsel against forcing Plaintiffs to start over in

state court. Plaintiffs have expended significant effort litigating the case in this

Court—and, as discussed below, their “Article 78”-type claim is likely to succeed on

the merits. Duplicative litigation in state court would undoubtedly delay any relief

they may receive. In addition, the risk of harm to A.C. is substantial, as the District

would likely seek to exclude her from school pending relief in state court.

Defendants, meanwhile, suffer no prejudice from this issue remaining in federal

court.3!

Lastly, this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction does not implicate

comity concerns. The Second Circuit provides dispositive analysis of the issue on

the merits, as set forth below. And this is not a case in which Plaintiffs are forum

shopping or seeking to use federal court to litigate a purely state matter.

In sum, even if Plaintiff’s federal claims were dismissed prior to trial, this is

“one of the rare cases in which the court should exercise its pendent jurisdiction

despite dismissal of plaintiffs’ . . . federal cause[s] of action ....” Boucher v. Sears,

31 The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that, at the preliminary injunction

hearing, they were “not permitted to examine A.C.’s substantive entitlement to an

exemption, could not explore her underlying conditions, and could not offer proof as

to whether or not a tic disorder constitutes a neurological condition that would serve

as a contraindication for the Tdap vaccine.” See Dkt. 88 at 29-30. The Court

permitted both sides to supplement the record after the hearing. See Dkt. 77 (“in

fairness to both sides, the forthcoming briefing may include reference to new

affidavits, or additional deposition transcripts, that would bear on the Section 1367

and merits issues... .”).

42,

No. 89-CV-1353, 1995 WL 283742, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 1995) (retaining pendant

jurisdiction despite dismissal of federal claims where the “parties and the court

have expended vast resources in making this case trial-ready; [d]iscovery is

complete, and none of plaintiffs’ state law claims presently appear[s] to involve

novel interpretations of state law”). All of the relevant circumstances support

retaining jurisdiction.

i. Merits

Plaintiffs’ Article 78-type claim is likely to succeed on the merits. Ina

“proceeding seeking judicial review of administrative action, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the

determination, but must ascertain only whether there is a rational basis for the

decision or whether it is arbitrary and capricious.” Weiss v. Cnty. of Nassau, 176

A.D.3d 1085, 1086 (2d Dep’t 2019) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

If the “determination has a rational basis, it will be sustained, even if a different

result would not be unreasonable.” Ward v. City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042,

1043 (2013).

Here, the evidence demonstrates that, under New York State’s statutory and

regulatory framework regarding mandatory vaccination for students attending

school, A.C. was entitled to an exemption from the Tdap vaccine. An overview of

that framework, as well an analysis of Defendants’ decision to deny A.C.’s

exemption request, follow.

43

For “more than a century,” New York “has required mandatory immunization

for children to attend school.” Goe, 43 F.4th at 25 (citing Act of Apr. 16, 1860, ch.

438, 1860 N.Y. Laws 761, 761-62). Today, “all children between the ages of two

months and eighteen years must be immunized against a number of diseases to be

admitted to school or to attend school for more than fourteen days.” Jd. (citing N.Y.

Pub. Health Law § 2164(7)(a)). These diseases “include ‘poliomyelitis, mumps,

measles, diphtheria, rubella, varicella, hepatitis B, pertussis, tetanus, and, where

applicable, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), meningococcal disease, and

pneumococcal disease.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(7)(a)).

The State “has also permitted exemptions from school immunization

requirements for many decades.” Id. Currently, however, it “only allows medical

exemptions from school immunization.” Id. at 26. Under “the State’s present

requirements, a child may be exempted from school immunization if ‘any’ state-

licensed physician ‘certifies that such immunization may be detrimental to [the]

child’s health.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(8)). The “request must

‘contain|[ ] sufficient information to identify a medical contraindication to a specific

immunization.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 66-1.3(c)).

School “officials enforce these requirements.” Id. (citing N.Y. Pub. Health Law §

2164(7)(a)). And they “may require additional supporting information before

granting requests for exemptions.” Id. (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, §

66-1.3(c)).

44

The regulations “require the use of a medical exemption form approved by

the Health Department . . . completed and signed by a physician, certifying that

‘immunization may be detrimental to the child’s health.” Id. A “completed form

must provide ‘sufficient information to identify a medical contraindication to a

specific immunization and specify[ ] the length of time the immunization is

medically contraindicated.” Id. The regulations “also define the phrase ‘[m]Jay be

detrimental to a child’s health,’ as used in section 2164(8) of the New York Public

Health Law, to mean ‘that a physician has determined that a child has a medical

contraindication or precaution to a specific immunization consistent with ACIP

guidance or other nationally recognized evidence-based standard of care.” Id.

(quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 66-1.1(1)).

Here, Plaintiffs submitted a facially and procedurally valid exemption

request on behalf of A.C. Specifically, they provided the District with a completed

New York State Department of Health form signed by a state-licensed physician

(Dr. Riccione). See Dkt. 26-2. The form describes “chronic” neurological vocal and

motor tics, which are a “precaution” to the Tdap vaccine pursuant to guidelines

issued by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee on

Immunization Practices. See Dkt. 32-7 at 5 (identifying “progressive or unstable

neurological disorder” as a precaution to Tdap). And Dr. Riccione testified that he

was familiar with ACIP guidance when he completed the form. He further testified

that he plans to assess A.C.’s need for an exemption on a year-by-year basis.

45

To be sure, the “statutory exemption is mandatory... and applies to an

objectively defined group.” Miller, 130 F.4th at 269 (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted). And the “authority conferred to physicians is not discretionary; a

physician’s use of [his] professional medical judgment is limited by the statute and

regulations.” Jd. The “same is true of the authority conferred upon school officials.”

Id. Even “though school officials have the authority to conclude that the documents

submitted in support of a medical exemption contain sufficient (or insufficient)

information, they do not have ‘discretion to approve or deny exemptions on a case-

by-case basis’ for any reason.” Id. (quoting We The Patriots USA, Inc., 76 F.4th at

151) (emphasis in original).

As such, the law required the District to accept A.C.’s valid exemption

request. Dr. Szalkowski had no authority under New York law to second-guess Dr.

Riccione’s medical opinion. Indeed, the “statute does not allow school officials to

‘decide which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude.”

Id. at *7 n.14 (quoting Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 537 (2021).

Because the District had no rational basis to deny the exemption request, there is a

likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.

c. The New York State Constitutional Claim

Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have deprived A.C. of her rights

under “Article XI § 1 of the New York State Constitution[,]” which “guarantees all

children the right to a free basic education.” Dkt. 25 277-264 [sic]. Article XI,

Section 1 of the New York State Constitution “provides that ‘[t]he legislature shall

46

provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,

wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” Sabur ex rel. Kessler v.

Brosnan, 203 F. Supp. 2d 292, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Const. Art. XI,

§ 1).

This provision, however, “does not create a private cause of action.” Id.

(citing Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443 (N.Y.

1979). According to the New York Court of Appeals, even a “terse reading of this

provision reveals that the Constitution places the obligation of Maintaining and

supporting a system of public schools upon the Legislature.” Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at

443. And “this general directive was never intended to impose a duty flowing

directly from a local school district to individual pupils to ensure that each pupil

receives a minimum level of education, the breach of which duty would entitle a

pupil to compensatory damages.” Id. See also Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d

335, 353 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It does not appear that this provision alone gives rise to a

‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ by ‘children of [the] state,’ because on its face it

requires only that the legislature maintain a public school system”) (quoting N.Y.

Const. Art. XI, § 1).

Accordingly, there is no likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim

under the New York State Constitution. See K.M. ex rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Cent.

Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 343, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Article XI does not create a

private cause of action”) (citing Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443); Schafer v. Hicksville

A7

Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-2531 JS ARL, 2011 WL 1322908, at *19 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 31, 2011) (same).

B. Irreparable Harm

The Court next turns to the irreparable harm factor. Plaintiffs argue that

the exclusion of A.C. from school “will cause A.C. irreparable harm, including loss of

educational access, emotional distress, social stigmatization, and academic

disruption.” See Dkt. 26-13 at 3. They further argue that the “cumulative impact of

A.C.’s exclusion from school creates an escalating harm that becomes increasingly

difficult to remedy over time.” Id. at 15.

31 Given the common nucleus of facts with Plaintiffs’ other claims, the Court has

supplemental jurisdiction over this New York constitutional claim. No enumerated

category under Section 1367(c) applies. And in light of its clear lack of merit, the

Court retains jurisdiction in the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity. See Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17CV05556JMASIL, 2020

WL 806715, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (“because all of those state law claims

are plainly meritless, the Court finds that it is appropriate to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over those claims and to dismiss them on the merits rather than subject

Defendant to additional frivolous litigation in state court”); Glendora v. Marshall,

947 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 129 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1997) (adopting

recommendation to “retain[] supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims “but

then [find] them deficient on the merits”); Garry v. McPhillips, No. 9:21-CV-172

(MAD/MJK), 2024 WL 4023890, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2024) (“the most prudent

course of action is to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law

negligence claim given the common nucleus facts and judicial economy”); Eng v.

City of New York, 715 F. App’x 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (rejecting

argument that, “even assuming the allegations are insufficient to make out prima

facie claims under [federal and state law] .. . the district court should have declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” reasoning that, because the federal and state

claims “all arise out of the same common nucleus of operative facts, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the

[state] claims”).

48

Irreparable harm is “certain and imminent harm for which a monetary award

does not adequately compensate.” Wisdom Imp. Sales Co., L.L.C. v. Labatt Brewing

Co., Ltd., 339 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). It exists “where, but for the grant of

equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of the action

the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied.” Brenntag

Intl Chem., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999).

Here, A.C. would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. Under

“circumstances similar to those presented here, school-aged children have been

deemed irreparably injured as a result of being excluded from attending classes.”

NM v. Hebrew Acad. Long Beach, 155 F. Supp. 3d 247, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). See

also Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 701 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2010),

affd, 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[the court is] satisfied that there would be

irreparable harm to this child entering school after [the start of the school year]”);

Check ex rel. MC v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-791 SLT LB, 2013 WL

2181045, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (because “courts considering this issue

routinely assume that a child prevented from attending school would suffer

irreparable harm, plaintiffs[’] application turns on her likelihood of success on the

merits”) (citing Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). And to avoid

exclusion from school, A.C. would have to receive the Tdap vaccination, which may

irreparably harm her health—as at least her doctor testified.

The irreparable harm factor favors Plaintiffs on this record.

49

C. Public Interest and Balance of Equities

The Court next considers whether a preliminary injunction is in the public

interest and whether the balance of equities tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. Plaintiffs

argue that “A.C. faces ongoing educational, emotional, and constitutional harm,

which far outweighs any inconvenience to the District in complying with the

requested injunctive relief.” See Dkt. 26-13 at 16. Defendants argue that “[p]ublic

health is a matter of state concern, and the State and District have a compelling

interest in the consistent and coherent administration of public health measures.”

Dkt. 32-1 at 31.

Here, the balance of equities tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. Absent an injunction,

Plaintiffs are harmed because A.C. must either receive the Tdap vaccine—contrary

to her doctor’s recommendation—or face exclusion from school. Defendants’

equitable counterweights, if any, are insufficient to deny relief on this record. The

District maintains an exceedingly high vaccination rate amongst its students. The

marginal increase in public health risk that might result from one student not

receiving a Tdap vaccine falls far short of the risk of irreparable harm posed to A.C.

absent an injunction.

D. Summary

All of the preliminary injunction factors favor Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Article-78 type claim due

to the District’s improper denial of their valid exemption request. This Court has,

and finds no grounds to decline, supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. Further,

50

Plaintiffs face irreparable harm absent an injunction, given that A.C. would have to

either receive the Tdap vaccine—which cannot be undone—or be excluded from

school. The minimal public health concerns that may result from an injunction, and

the balance of equities, do not justify denying relief on this record.

II. SECURITY

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) requires the Court to consider whether

it should require plaintiffs to post security and, if so, in what amount. See Dr. ’s

Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 186 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Rule 65(c) gives the

district court wide discretion to set the amount of a bond, and even to dispense with

the bond requirement [in certain situations]”).

On these facts, the Court will not require Plaintiffs to post security because a

bond requirement does not fit the fact-pattern and interests involved in this

case. See id. at 135-36 (affirming district court’s decision not to require security

where the district court “found that [defendants] would not suffer damage or loss

from being forced to arbitrate in lieu of prosecuting their state-court cases”). See

also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) (because no request

for a bond was ever made in the district court, and because, under Fed. R. Civ. P.

65, “the amount of any bond to be given upon the issuance of a preliminary

injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court”).

51

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction as follows: it is

ORDERED that Defendants are enjoined from excluding A.C. from school on

the basis of her not receiving the Tdap vaccine; and it is further

ORDERED that the District shall accept A.C.’s December 3, 2024 medical

exemption from Dr. Riccione as valid under New York Public Health Law § 2164(8):

and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants are enjoined from enforcing against Plaintiffs

any policy or practice that permits the substitution of the District’s or its medical

director’s substantive judgment for that of a licensed physician under New York

Public Health Law § 2164(8); and it is further

ORDERED that this preliminary injunction shall remain in effect pending

disposition of the case on the merits—or the conclusion of the current school year,

whichever is earlier; and it is further

ORDERED that no bond shall be required.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2025

Buffalo, New York .

/ —

bgt TAG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

52