Opinion

In the Interest of: M.P., Appeal of: B.P.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Apr 25, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Beck
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.9%

combining discussion of children’s needs and welfare under subsection (a)(8) and subsection (b) is permissible because “the third element of [s]ection 2511(a)(8) requires that the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt conduct an analysis similar to that required under [s]ection 2511(b)”

How later courts described this case

  • combining discussion of children’s needs and welfare under subsection (a)(8) and subsection (b) is permissible because “the third element of [s]ection 2511(a)(8) requires that the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt conduct an analysis similar to that required under [s]ection 2511(b)”
  • finding termination of parental rights supported under 2511(a)(8) and (b) where child was familiar with parent, but parent did not have a history of engaging in a caregiving relationship with child or taking responsibility for child over an extended period

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

J-S03036-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: B.W.P., FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 1194 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at

No(s): CP-02-AP-0000260-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: B.W.P., FATHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 1195 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at

No(s): CP-02-AP-0000261-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: APRIL 25, 2025

B.W.P. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered by the Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas (“orphans’ court”) granting the petitions to

terminate his parental rights to M.P., born August 2017, and K.P., born

December 2018, (collectively “Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §

J-S03036-25

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Because we conclude that the orphans’ court

did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights, we affirm.

The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”)

first became involved with the family in April 2019, after a Mercy Behavioral

Health caseworker observed M.P. put marijuana in her mouth. CYF identified

Father’s mental health, intimate partner violence between the parents, and

both parents’ substance use as concerns. CYF obtained emergency custody

of Children and placed them in a foster home in May 2019. After a shelter

care hearing in June 2019, the orphans’ court ordered Children to remain in

foster care.

CYF filed petitions for dependency, and after a hearing, the juvenile

court adjudicated Children dependent in July 2019. Father’s court-ordered

goals and Family Service Plan goals included, inter alia, participating in mental

health treatment, obtaining stable housing, completing a substance use

evaluation and a batterer’s intervention program, participating in coached

parenting, and engaging in supervised visits with Children. Father was also

ordered to sign release of information forms (“ROIs”), with his mental health

providers, comply with probation, and allow CYF to obtain information from

his probation officer. After numerous permanency review hearings, the court

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of mother, C.U.

(“Mother”). Mother has not appealed this decision.

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determined that Father had demonstrated only moderate compliance with his

goals.

Children had psychological and medical issues that led to some

complications with their foster care placements. Specifically, K.P. had an

ADHD diagnosis, for which she was receiving psychiatric care, and exhibited

aggressive behaviors as well as fits of rage. M.P. often took cues from K.P.’s

behavior and would engage in similar aggressive outbursts, though with less

frequency and severity. M.P. also had eye development issues that, according

to her treating optometrist, will eventually require a surgery and additional

medical care. In July 2021, CYF moved Children into a foster home with J.M.

and N.M. (“Foster Parents”). On December 22, 2021, CYF filed petitions to

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights. In the petitions, CYF noted

that Father has longstanding mental health issues, his progress and stability

in mental health treatment was unknown, and he did not maintain consistent

contact with Children.

In April 2023, CYF moved Children to a new foster home placement in

Mercer County after Foster Parents expressed concerns about their ability to

effectively address K.P.’s behavioral health needs. CYF and KidsVoice (acting

as the child advocate) noted their concerns regarding K.P.’s extensive

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psychiatric care2 during the Mercer County placement, which led CYF to

contact Foster Parents to see if they were again willing to serve as a placement

for Children. Foster Parents accepted and confirmed that they had additional

support in place to effectively address K.P.’s needs, and Children returned to

Foster Parents’ home in December 2023.

The orphans’ court held evidentiary hearings on the termination

petitions on June 6, 2024 and July 23, 2024,3 at which several CYF

caseworkers, two of Father’s medical providers, a child and forensic

psychologist, and Father testified.4 The orphans’ court issued separate orders

involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to M.P. and K.P. pursuant to

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Father filed a timely appeal and both he and

the orphans’ court have complied with Rule 1925 of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, CYF and KidsVoice were concerned that the foster parents in

that placement were overtreating and overmedicating K.P., who had been

seen by ten different psychiatric providers at that point.

3 The hearing on the termination petitions was originally to be held on January

19, 2022, but it was continued on multiple occasions because of Children’s

movement between foster homes.

4 At the hearing on June 6, Attorney Erin Krotoszynski of KidsVoice stated that

she had not identified a conflict that would prohibit her office from serving as

both guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel for Children. N.T., 6/6/2024,

at 8. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020)

(stating that “where an orphans’ court has appointed a GAL/[c]ounsel to

represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts

should review sua sponte whether the orphans’ court made a determination

that those interests did not conflict”).

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Father raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter

of law by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter

of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of

the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review regarding the involuntary termination of parental

rights is well settled:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the

decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard

employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the

trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences

or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,

we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law

or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a

different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will.

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted).

This Court’s review of termination of parental rights decisions involves

a bifurcated analysis as required by section 2511 of the Adoption Act. Id.

Initially the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence

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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory rounds for

termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to section 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citation omitted). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so

“clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. at 48-49 (citation omitted).

As noted above, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights

to Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). However, we “need

only agree with [the orphans’ court’s] decision as to any one subsection in

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114,

117 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We thus focus our analysis on

section 2511(a)(8).

To terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner

must establish that: (1) the child has been removed from the care of the

parent for at least twelve months, (2) that the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child still exist, and (3) that the termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Interest

of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 832 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted); see also 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). This subsection does not require an analysis of a

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parent’s “willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the

placement of the children.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 832. Instead, the inquiry

focuses on “whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied

and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of

the hearing.” Id.

The orphans’ court found that Father failed to remedy the conditions

that led to Children’s placement, which occurred approximately two-and-a-

half years prior to the filing of the termination petitions and more than five

years before the hearings on the petitions. Orphans’ Court Opinion,

10/3/2024, at 24. Specifically, the orphans’ court pointed to testimony

concerning Father’s “serious mental health,” his refusal to follow the

recommendations of his psychiatrist (including failing to take his prescribed

medication), his refusal to sign ROIs to allow CYF to gain access to his

treatment information, and his denial that he had a mental health disorder.

Id. at 14-18. The orphans’ court further observed that Father’s failure to

comply with mental health treatment resulted in his inability to maintain

housing and to address the many and varied treatment needs of Children, K.P.

in particular. Id. at 17-19, 21. Finding Father’s denials to lack credibility,

and crediting instead the testimony of the various mental health treatment

providers, the court found that Father’s continued failure to comply with

treatment will result in sustained and irreversible brain damage. Id. at 18.

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Father argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by

terminating his parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) because the

conditions that led to the removal of Children—namely, his mental health

concerns, substance abuse, and intimate partner violence—no longer exist.

Father’s Brief at 15. He contends that he had no contact with Mother up until

the termination hearing, eliminating the concern of intimate partner violence

between the two, and that there was no evidence at trial that Father’s mental

health “could not be controlled with proper medication.” Id.

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. There

is no question that Children have been removed from Father’s care for more

than twelve months N.T., 6/6/2024, at 72-73. Further, the conditions that

led to Children’s removal and continued placement continue to exist. The

primary conditions that led to Children’s removal were concerns about Father’s

mental health, intimate partner violence, and substance abuse. Id. at 73.

Dr. Sean Weldon, Father’s treating psychiatrist through UPMC Mercy Hospital’s

community treatment program, testified that he has been Father’s treating

psychiatrist since 2017. Id. at 33. Dr. Weldon indicated Father has been

diagnosed with schizophrenia and cannabis use disorder. Id. at 34. As part

of Father’s participation in this program, he saw Dr. Weldon once a month for

in-person appointments starting in 2017. Id. at 37. Father was prescribed

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and received injections of the antipsychotic drug haloperidol5 to treat some of

the symptoms of his schizophrenia at these appointments. Id. at 36-37.

Specifically, Dr. Weldon stated that haloperidol is intended to help patients

manage symptoms like auditory or visual hallucinations, disorganized

thinking, and difficulty communicating in a logical fashion. Id. at 37.

Dr. Weldon testified that when Father was taking his prescribed

medication consistently, “he did quite well,” and it was easier for Father to

have a working relationship with the community treatment team while he was

taking his medication. Id. at 38. Father was “intermittently adherent” to his

medication plan, in part because he believed he did not have a legitimate

mental health diagnosis and thus did not need medication. Id. at 35, 42. Dr.

Weldon stated that when Father was not taking his medication, Father’s

disorganization and delusional thinking worsened. Id. at 40.

In February 2023, Father decided to stop receiving this medication

against medical advice. Id. at 35. Father also expressed that he no longer

wished to see Dr. Weldon, because he did not believe that he needed

medication or had a valid psychiatric diagnosis. Id. at 41. Dr. Weldon

testified that he has been able to meet with Father a few times since he

discontinued his medication, and that Father had become “sort of irrational

and difficult to maintain on point and express logical, reasonable thinking or

____________________________________________

5 Haloperidol is often referred to by its brand name, Haldol.

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ideas.” Id. Further, he stated that Father expressed “persecutory delusions”

about the community treatment team and its motives. Id. Dr. Weldon also

expressed concern that Father is no longer participating actively in the

community treatment program or receiving his prescribed medication. Id. at

42. He stated that in his professional opinion, Father’s risk of permanent loss

of degrees of cognitive function increases the longer that Father’s

schizophrenia goes untreated. Id. at 43.

Additionally, as the orphans’ court found, Father’s decision to reduce his

participation in the community treatment program has other consequences,

particularly regarding his ability to obtain stable housing. Todd Cobourne

(“Cobourne”), a registered nurse who is part of the community treatment

program, testified at trial about the non-medical assistance that the program

offers, including rental assistance. Id. at 55. The treatment team was able

to step in as Father’s payee and assist him in paying back approximately

$2,000 in delinquent rent that he owed to his landlord. Id. at 56.

Furthermore, as a participant in the treatment program, Father qualifies for

spectrum housing, a county program that covers a significant portion of

participants’ rent. Id. Cobourne testified to Father’s plans to discontinue

participation in the treatment program, which would result in the loss of access

to the housing assistance it provides. Id. at 57.

Father’s failure to comply with his mental health treatment has also

raised serious concerns about his ability to parent Children and to address

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their needs. N.T., 7/23/2024, at 28-29. Child and forensic psychologist Dr.

Patricia Pepe, who completed an evaluation with Father, noted that Father’s

lack of continuity and consistency in his use of medication for mental health

treatment poses a significant barrier to his ability to parent Children. Id. at

28. CYF caseworker Denise Washington (“Washington”) testified to similar

concerns, specifically that Father “may not have the patience or the skill set”

to address K.P.’s aggressive behavior due to his lack of mental health

treatment. N.T., 6/6/2024, at 102, 108. She noted that there were marked

differences in Father’s interactions with Children when he “was not actively

taking his medication,” particularly related to his ability to understand K.P.’s

behavior and effectively address it. Id. at 108. Washington concluded that

Father’s “lack of mental health treatment has been a continuous barrier in

terms of his goals and interactions with the children.” Id.

CYF also presented evidence demonstrating Father’s lack of cooperation

with its repeated requests for updated ROIs, through which it could obtain

updated documentation related to Father’s mental health treatment. Id. at

101. According to Washington, Father refused to sign the ROIs because he

did not believe that he had a mental health disorder. Id. Father continued

to deny that he had any mental health issues or need for mental health

treatment during his testimony. N.T., 7/23/2024, at 54.

Dr. Pepe testified that during her evaluation with Father, he denied that

he had mental health issues or diagnoses numerous times. Id. at 21. He also

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denied ever being prescribed medication at UPMC Mercy, though he confirmed

his involvement in the community treatment program. Id. Dr. Pepe

expressed concern about Father’s emotional reactivity during the evaluation,

as well as his indications of persecutory thinking and “concerning speech

patterns that would be reflective of psychotic functioning.” Id. at 21-22.

Further, she expressed concern that Father denied any responsibility for

domestic violence committed against Mother, as she believes that K.P.’s

behavioral issues may be related to the impact of witnessing domestic violence

in the home. Id. at 28.

Father testified that he did not have mental health problems. Id. at 70.

In response to a follow-up question about his participation, Father indicated

that his involvement in UPMC Mercy’s community treatment program was to

participate in recreational activities. Id. at 71; see also Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 10/3/2024, at 18 (noting the court placed very little weight on

Father’s testimony).

The record clearly establishes that the concerns regarding Father’s

mental health that led to the removal and continued placement of Children

continue to exist. Father discontinued his medication against medical advice

and is unwilling to engage in mental health treatment because he does not

believe he has a mental health disorder. This is creating additional barriers to

reunification including, inter alia, his ability to maintain stable housing.

Though Father reasonably asserts that the condition of intimate partner

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violence present at the time of Children’s removal no longer exists because he

is no longer in contact with Mother, he has not provided any evidence to

establish that the condition related to his mental health no longer exists.

Thus, the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that one of the central

concerns that resulted in Children’s removal from Father’s care continues to

exist, and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding clear and convincing

evidence to satisfy termination under the first two prongs of section

2511(a)(8).

We next consider whether the record supports the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that CYF proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination

best serves Children’s needs and welfare pursuant to the third prong of section

2511(a)(8) and section 2511(b).6 Father contends that CYF failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights would

best serve the needs and welfare of Children. Father’s Brief at 15.

Specifically, he argues that the record demonstrates that Children have a

meaningful relationship with him “which should be preserved for the benefit

of the Children.” Id.

____________________________________________

6 Though they are separately enumerated, this Court has interpreted the

needs and welfare analyses required under subsections (a)(8) and (b) to

utilize the same legal standards and to be based upon the same evidence.

See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 448 (Pa. Super.

2017) (combining discussion of children’s needs and welfare under subsection

(a)(8) and subsection (b) is permissible because “the third element of

[s]ection 2511(a)(8) requires that the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt conduct an analysis

similar to that required under [s]ection 2511(b)”).

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Section 2511(b) provides:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Our analysis focuses on whether termination of parental rights would

best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of

the child. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[T]he determination of the child’s needs

and welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent

and child. The utmost attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the

child of permanently severing the parental bond.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). It is not enough that there exists a bond between parent and child

to avoid termination. See Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1109 (Pa. 2023).

Rather, the trial court must determine whether the bond is “necessary and

beneficial” to the child, such that “maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at 1105-06.

Focusing upon the “child’s development, and mental and emotional health,”

the trial court should assess whether severing the bond “is the kind of loss

that would predictably cause extreme emotional consequences or significant,

irreparable harm” to the child. Id. at 1110-11.

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Additionally, “the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection

(b) analysis[.]” Id. at 1113. The needs and welfare analysis must also include

the consideration of factors such as: “the child’s need for permanency and

length of time in foster care …; whether the child is in a preadoptive home

and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the

child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible

needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (citations omitted).

“These factors and others properly guide the court’s analysis of the child’s

welfare and all [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs.” Id.

Importantly, “[orphans’] courts have the discretion to place appropriate

weight on each factor present in the record before making a decision regarding

termination that best serves the child’s specific needs.” Id.

The orphans’ court found that CYF established by clear and convincing

evidence that though an emotional bond between Father and Children exists,

it is not necessary and beneficial to the children. Orphans’ Court Opinion,

10/3/2024, at 31. It further held that the bond between Father and Children

is “outweighed by Father’s inability to remedy the causation of placement, and

by the children’s need for permanence and stability.” Id. The court held that

Foster Parents had provided for Children’s needs and welfare, and that

Children had transferred their trust and emotional dependency to Foster

Parents, thus creating a strong bond with them. Id. at 31-32.

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The record supports the orphans’ court’s determination. Washington

testified that Children’s needs and welfare are best served by terminating both

parents’ parental rights. N.T., 6/6/2024, at 116-17. Specifically, Washington

pointed to CYF’s concerns that Father could not appropriately address

Children’s developmental and emotional needs, especially K.P.’s behavioral

challenges. Id. at 102. As noted above, she observed that it was particularly

difficult for Father to address K.P.’s behavioral issues when he was not actively

taking his medication, and that his lack of mental health treatment has been

a continuous barrier to his ability to care for Children. Id. at 108. Washington

additionally testified that Father has not participated in any of Children’s

medical or educational appointments despite receiving notice of the

appointments when they were scheduled. Id. at 105.

Washington acknowledged the difficulty that Foster Parents had during

Children’s first placement with them, but noted that Foster Parents had made

clear progress in their ability to handle K.P.’s behavior. Id. at 109-10, 114.

During her home visits, Washington noted that Children seemed relaxed and

acted like a family unit with Foster Parents. Id. at 110-11. She concluded

that Foster Parents were appropriately meeting Children’s educational,

psychological, and developmental needs. Id. at 116. Washington additionally

observed that Foster Parents have taken Children to the necessary

appointments and advocated for their medical and mental health needs. Id.

at 114.

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Bruce Goldhagen (“Goldhagen”), a visit coach for JusticeWorks Youth

Care assigned to work with Father, provided additional testimony regarding

Father’s capacity to address Children’s developmental and emotional needs.

Goldhagen testified that though the visits between Father and Children went

well in the beginning, they became more difficult after visits moved from

Father’s residence to Auberle. Id. at 169-70. He stated that Father became

angry that visits could no longer occur at his residence and began to have

difficulty dealing with both Children’s behavior. Id. at 170. Specifically,

Goldhagen stated that Father’s frustration regarding visitation in general

began to impact his ability to meet Children’s needs during visits, and that it

became impossible for Goldhagen to redirect Father out of this frustration and

anger. Id. at 170-71; see also id. at 170 (noting JusticeWorks discharged

Father from the coached visitation program in April 2024 because of these

challenges).

Dr. Pepe conducted individual evaluations with Father, K.P., and M.P.,

as well as an interactional evaluation with Children and Father. N.T.,

7/23/2024, at 9. Dr. Pepe diagnosed both K.P. and M.P. with post-traumatic

stress disorder, upbringing away from parents, child affected by parental

relationship distress, and a rule-out for child neglect. Id. at 15-16. She

recommended trauma therapy for both, along with an “in-home therapeutic

program to assist with [K.P.’s] explosive behaviors.” Id. Dr. Pepe also

testified regarding her observations during the interactional evaluation she

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completed with Father and Children, noting that Children were clearly happy

to see Father and that Father was affectionate and playful with them. Id. at

27.

Dr. Pepe also completed an interactional evaluation with Foster Parents

and Children, during which she observed that K.P. was very responsive to

Foster Parents’ efforts to address her behavior. Id. at 29-30. She further

noted that both Children looked to Foster Parents for help and sought physical

affection from Foster Parents. Id. at 29. Dr. Pepe additionally observed that

Children had formed a positive attachment to Foster Parents, and that Foster

Parents have expressed a commitment to caring for Children. Id. at 30. She

concluded by recommending Children’s adoption by Foster Parents, noting the

importance of developing and maintaining stability for Children’s ongoing

treatment and growth. Id. at 31.

Additionally, Auberle caseworker Cara Cornelius testified regarding

Children’s adjustment in Foster Parents’ home, stating, “[Children] seem very

happy and comfortable with the foster family,” and that Foster Parents

appeared to be meeting Children’s educational, medical, and general needs.

Id. at 185-86. CYF caseworker Renee Taddy, who took over Children’s case

from Washington in March 2024,7 also observed that Foster Parents “follow

the recommendations of [Children’s primary care providers] or providers that

____________________________________________

7 Before becoming the direct services caseworker for Children’s case, Taddy

was their permanency caseworker.

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have been able to complete evaluations.” Id. at 208. She added that Foster

Parents “are very active” in Children’s behavioral health care. Id.

Father testified to his ability to care for Children and provide for their

needs on his own. Id. at 52, 65. When the court asked Father whether he

knew what Children’s diagnoses were, he stated: “When they are with me,

they are fine, like, because like just period. That’s my dad type stuff.” Id. at

73.

Based on the record before us, we conclude that the orphans’ court did

not abuse its discretion in its determination that terminating Father’s parental

rights best served the needs and welfare of Children under section (a)(8) and

(b). Although the record reflects that Father and Children share an emotional

bond and Father loves Children, this bond is not necessary and beneficial to

Children, in large part because Father is not able to provide the level of care

that Children need as a result of his own mental health challenges. See In

re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also M.E., 283 A.3d at

839 (noting that orphans’ court does not have to consider the bond between

parent and child “over all other needs and welfare considerations”). Indeed,

Father does not understand Children’s needs, and his discontinuation of his

own mental health treatment and his expressions of persecutory thinking

regarding healthcare providers demonstrate numerous barriers to his ability

to appropriately provide for Children’s needs and welfare, as well as the

potential to impede Children’s further growth and development. See In re

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P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 852 (Pa. 2015) (finding termination of parental rights

supported under 2511(a)(8) and (b) where child was familiar with parent, but

parent did not have a history of engaging in a caregiving relationship with

child or taking responsibility for child over an extended period). Further,

Children have bonded with Foster Parents and that Foster Parents are able to

provide for Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. See

K.T., 286 A.3d at 1114. The court therefore appropriately concluded that

termination of Father’s parental rights best serves Children’s needs and

welfare.

As we have found that the orphans’ court’s determination pursuant to

section 2511(a)(8) and (b) has ample support in the record, we must affirm

the orders terminating Father’s parental rights to Children. See Matter of

L.C.J.W., 411 A.3d at 48 (noting that “absent an abuse of discretion, an error

of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the

decree must stand”).

Orders affirmed.

Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.

Judge Sullivan files a dissenting memorandum.

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J-S03036-25

DATE: 4/25/2025

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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