(PS) Andreyev v. Chatigny

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 EUGENE E. ANDREYEV, Case No. 2:24-cv-2651-TLN-JDP (PS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 DANIEL CHATIGNY, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff Eugene E. Andreyev alleges that his rights were violated when, in October 2023,

18 Placer County sheriff’s deputies unlawfully drew his blood, deprived him of his right to familial

19 association, and falsely arrested and detained him. ECF No. 5 at 10. The only named defendants

20 are Sheriff Wayne Woo and County Executive Officer Daniel Chartigny, both of whom are sued

21 only in their official capacity. Also sued are an unspecified number of unidentified John and Jane

22 Doe sheriff’s deputies. The amended complaint is too vague to raise a cognizable claim against

23 any defendant and is non-compliant with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I will

24 dismiss the complaint with leave to amend one more time; this will be plaintiff’s final opportunity

25 to amend before I recommend dismissal of this action.

26 Screening and Pleading Requirements

27 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed

28 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and

1 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

2 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

3 relief. Id.

4 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief,

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

6 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not

7 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

8 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

9 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not

10 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024,

11 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that

12 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264

13 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted).

14 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

15 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it

16 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

17 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).

18 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

19 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

20 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

21 Analysis

22 As before, plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and detained, that his blood was

23 drawn unlawfully, and that he was deprived of his right to familial association. ECF No. 5 at 10.

24 As an initial matter, it is unclear how the blood draw and the denial of familial association claims

25 are sufficiently related to proceed in the same suit. Plaintiff was advised of this deficiency in my

26 previous screening order, ECF No. 4 at 4, and the amended complaint has done nothing to remedy

27 the problem. Additionally, the only named defendants, Woo and Chartigny, are sued only in their

28 official capacities, ECF No. 5 at 7, and, thus, plaintiff effectively makes claims against Placer

1 | County itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ¢[An] official-capacity suit is, in

2 | all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). And here, I can discern

3 | no explicit claim that the violations alleged can be attributed to any policy or custom, official or

4 | unofficial, of the county. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 399 (1997) (To

5 | bring a section 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, “the plaintiff must identify a municipal

6 || ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the injury”). Finally, as to the unnamed “Doe” defendants,

7 | plaintiff has failed to distinguish between any of them or to attribute any of the alleged violations

8 | to any individual, unnamed defendant. Thus, the complaint cannot, as Rule 8 requires, put any

9 | defendant on notice of the specific claims against them.

10 I will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend so that plaintiff may have one final

11 || opportunity to remedy these deficiencies. As before, his amended complaint will supersede its

12 | predecessor entirely. The next amended complaint should be entitled “Second Amended

13 | Complaint.”

14 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

15 1. Plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 5 is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

16 2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended

17 | complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice.

18 3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may

19 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed

20 | with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

21 4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: _ April 24, 2025 q———

24 JEREMY D,. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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