The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GERALD JONES, B13486, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-2804-DWD
)
ANTHONY WILLS, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Gerald Jones, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Menard Correctional Center (Menard).
In short, Plaintiff alleges he was assaulted upon arrival to Menard in late July 2023, and
he almost immediately engaged in acts of self-harm but was unable to secure needed
medical or mental health treatment. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on
the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Docs. 107, 111), Plaintiff responded
(Doc. 121), and one group of defendants replied (Doc. 123). Upon review of the written
pleadings, the Court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact about
the availability of grievance forms prior to the filing of the operative complaints, so the
matter was set for a Pavey hearing. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiff proposed five witnesses,
Defendants responded, and the Court narrowed the witness request to just one witness.
After a hearing on April 22, 2025, the Court now finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, so this lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
This matter began as two separate lawsuits—one about the alleged assault and
self-harm behavior, as well as Plaintiff’s immediate conditions of confinement (23-cv-
2804), and one about the alleged mental health treatment issues (23-cv-2889). In both
cases, Plaintiff received authorization to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee,
despite his status as an inmate who has accrued three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),
because the Court found he credibly alleged imminent danger at the initiation of the suits.
The Court ultimately consolidated the two cases (Doc. 55), and after consolidation
Plaintiff managed to identify eight “Jane Doe” defendants who he alleges denied him
adequate mental health treatment. The operative claims are:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant
Ramsey for allegedly beating Plaintiff upon his arrival to Menard
on July 29, 2023;
Claim 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force or deliberate indifference
claim against Defendant Kulich for observing Plaintiff bleeding
from self-harm and choosing to first mace him instead of
rendering immediate assistance;
Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference against Defendant
Quick for refusing medical or mental health assistance on August
3, 2023;
Claim 4: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment or conditions
of confinement claim against Defendant Maldonado for shutting
Plaintiff’s water off frequently to cause him distress;
Claim 5: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against
Defendants Garcia and Bent for verbally threatening Plaintiff;
Claim 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Warden
Wills for ignoring Plaintiff’s correspondence about his situation,
and failing to render aid;
Claim 8: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Overmann, Wilkes,
Buettner, Phillips, Carich, Winger, Salger, and Franklin for their
deliberate indifference to Jones’s serious mental illness and
related mental health needs from July 29, 2023, through August
21, 2023.
Claim 9: Illinois state law claim against Defendants Overmann, Wilkes,
Buettner, Phillips, Carich, Winger, Salger, and Franklin for their
intentional infliction of emotional distress on Jones from July 29,
2023, through August 21, 2023.
(Doc. 76). Other claims and parties were dismissed, and Plaintiff’s attempt to later amend
the claims and parties was rejected for a variety of reasons. (Doc. 112).
The mental health employees subject to claims 8 and 9 filed one motion for
summary judgment (Docs. 107, 108), and the Menard prison staff filed a second motion
(Doc. 111). Plaintiff filed a joint response to both motions. (Doc. 121). The mental health
employees replied. (Doc. 123). The parties agree that there are no officially documented
grievances that Plaintiff filed prior to initiating this lawsuit.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties agree that Plaintiff arrived at Menard on July 30, 2023. Plaintiff’s
complaint in case 23-cv-2804 was filed on August 15, 2023, and his complaint in 23-cv-
2889 was filed on August 21, 2023.
As the Court indicated in the earlier written ruling on summary judgment,
Plaintiff contended in his sworn response to summary judgment that he attempted to
transmit emergency grievances to Warden Wills and the governor of Illinois on August
8, 2023, and August 11, 2023, respectively. (Doc. 121 at 4, ¶ 6). He also claimed that prior
to filing grievances at Menard on September 6, 2023, he was not afforded access to any
grievance forms, and he was only able to file the September grievances by receiving forms
from a fellow inmate. (Doc. 121 at 4, ¶ 6).
The Defendants identified grievances filed in September of 2023 as the first
grievances Plaintiff filed at Menard after arriving in late-July. (Doc. 108-2 at 78-81).
Defendants also included Plaintiff’s cumulative counseling summary, which does not
indicate any grievances filed around August 8, 2023. (Doc. 111-2 at 1). However, a note
from September 6, 2023, indicates that when seen on tour Plaintiff asked the counselor
about a grievance form and the counselor reported that he told Plaintiff he “hadn’t heard
about any grievance he has sent.” (Doc. 111-2 at 1). The counseling log from September
19, 2023, indicated receipt of two grievances that Plaintiff marked as emergencies, but
that the Warden deemed as non-emergencies. (Id.).
The parties desired testimony from the same two individuals—Plaintiff and
counselor Sara Quick. On direct examination by the Defendants, Plaintiff testified that
from his July 30, 2023, arrival at Menard until about August 2, 2023, he was on suicide
watch. Immediately upon release from suicide watch to restrictive housing he began to
ask for grievance forms. He asked gallery officers, and he also asked Quick when he saw
her during rounds in his cellhouse. He claimed that she sometimes would skip his cell,
she would ignore his request for grievance forms, or she would redirect his queries solely
to medical staff. She would also allow escort officers to answer his queries instead of
directly answering his questions herself. Plaintiff estimated that he asked for grievance
forms every 2-3 days.
Plaintiff testified that he was able to get a pen, paper, and eventually grievance
forms from other inmates either by passing materials via inmate workers who freely
roamed the gallery, or by throwing strings from cell to cell. He testified that after this
lawsuit was filed, he was able to get a few grievance forms from a fellow inmate that he
filed in September of 2023. He also agreed that he had submitted a December 2023
grievance, and stated he was able to obtain the form for that grievance from a prison staff
member. Plaintiff testified that, to date, some gallery officers will supply him grievance
forms, but others refuse.
Specific to this case, he testified that given the lack of grievance forms, he
attempted to send letters to Warden Wills on August 9, 2023, and the Governor on August
11, 2023. He stated he had no handwritten copies. He sent the alleged grievance to the
Warden via institutional mail, and he testified that he paid postage to send the letter to
the Governor. He claims that he never got a receipt for the postage. Plaintiff testified
that he asked a counselor about his receipt on September 6, 2023, but that the counselor
did not fully reflect that interaction in the counseling notes. (Doc. 111-2 at 1). In addition
to sending these two documents, Plaintiff testified that on August 8, 2023, he filed a
document in the Rasho class action lawsuit pertaining to his issues.
Plaintiff also testified that he believed prison staff were supposed to respond to an
emergency grievance within 3 days of filing, although he could not point to a specific
source for this proposition.
Defendants then called Counselor Sara Quick. In August of 2023, Quick was a
correctional counselor II, whose job was to make rounds in Plaintiff’s cellhouse. She
testified that inmates could get grievance forms by asking a counselor, sergeant, or 5-day
officer. She stated that if she was asked for a grievance form she would either retrieve
one within the cellhouse and have an inmate worker walk it over to the inmate’s cell
while she watched, or she would send a grievance form via institutional mail. If an
inmate did not have a grievance form and instead submitted something to the grievance
office on plain paper, then the grievance office would return the document with a
grievance form attached so that the inmate could file the proper form.
By reference to the cumulative counseling summary, Quick testified that she saw
Plaintiff during her cellhouse rounds on August 3, 2023, August 11, 2023, and August 17,
2023. On each date, if Plaintiff had specific needs, she would note those in the counseling
summary. On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff requested bedding and medical attention, so she
relayed those needs to the sergeant and noted on the counseling summary what
transpired. She indicated that if Plaintiff had asked her about grievances, it would have
been noted because it is her custom and practice to note inmate requests that are
discussed on tour. She also testified that if an inmate was not in his cell during her tour,
she would make a point to see that individual a different day, and she would not simply
skip an individual during her tour.
Quick was asked if she knew of any 3-day timeframe for processing grievances,
but she said she did not know of any such requirement. She testified that for emergency
grievances, if the warden was not available, an assistant warden could conduct that initial
review. Menard receives a high-volume of grievances, and she indicated grievances and
emergency grievances are always handled in the order they are received.
Plaintiff examined Quick both on cross-examination as to her testimony already
given, and on a broader scale because he expressed the desire before the hearing to call
her as a primary witness. He asked Quick if she was coached on her testimony or had an
incentive for the case to be dismissed. She indicated that although she was a defendant
in the case, her testimony was truthful and was not coached. Plaintiff attempted to
question Quick repeatedly about the contents of her alleged responses or replies to the
summary judgment briefing in this case, but she stated she did not have personal
knowledge of the specific contents of those filings.
Quick testified that she did not know if there was a policy that required counselors
to distribute grievance forms, but it was her personal practice to ensure an inmate got a
form if he asked for a grievance form. She also stated that if Plaintiff voiced needs to her,
it was her practice to document what he voiced in her counseling notes. In her time as a
counselor, she was aware of only a handful of times where inmates claimed that they
could not get grievance forms from staff, but in those instances, she either immediately
retrieved a form or would send one via institutional mail. When asked why she left
Plaintiff in need of medical care from August 3, 2023, until a later encounter they had on
August 29, 2023, she indicated she did not believe he needed medical aid for that entire
time-period. Specifically, she pointed to the face-to-face encounters she had with Plaintiff
on August 11 and 17, 2023, where he did not voice any concerns during her tour of the
cellhouse. (Doc. 111-2 at 1). She took this to mean that whatever medical referral she
made on August 3, 2023, was sufficient until he again requested care on August 29, 2023.
During his own direct examination, Plaintiff claimed that Quick refused him
grievance forms and left him bleeding in his cell in distress because he was transferred to
Menard for a staff assault. He claims Quick ignored his pleas for help to appease officers
that escorted her around the cell house. He further testified that he was aware of the
grievance process and had no reason not to follow it. He pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 10807 for
the proposition that as an inmate with imminent mental health needs, he was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies. He also repeated his argument that Quick’s
testimony at the hearing was inconsistent with the summary judgment briefs. He
specifically claimed that paragraphs 1, 12, and 15 of the statement of material fact did not
get responses or were inconsistent with her testimony.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine
issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could
[find] for the nonmoving part.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir.
2008). “The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear
the burden of proving.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and
appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take
each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at
1024. However, “if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or
otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting,” then the
grievance procedure becomes unavailable. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.
2006) (finding that an inmate who placed a timely ARB appeal in his chuckhole for
mailing, but whose grievance was apparently lost, did all that he could to follow
exhaustion procedures).
“When prison officials fail to provide inmates with the forms necessary to file an
administrative grievance, then administrative remedies are not ‘available.’” Kaba v. Stepp,
458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). In Hill v. Snyder, the Seventh Circuit held that
“exhaustion is not required when the prison officials responsible for providing grievance
forms refuse to give a prisoner the forms necessary to file an administrative grievance.”
817 F.3d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655–56 (7th Cir.
2004)). Evidence of the appropriate official's refusal to give a prisoner an available form
“is sufficient to permit a finding” that the administrative remedies were not available.
Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2022). If appropriate officials refuse to provide
a grievance form, Plaintiff is not required to go on a scavenger hunt to find another way
to file his grievance. See e.g., Hill v. Snyder, 817 F.3d at 1041.
As an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), Plaintiff must
follow the grievance process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). Under IDOC’s procedure, an inmate initiates a grievance
with his counselor, and he may then submit his grievance to a grievance officer at his
facility, and to the CAO at his facility. An inmate may also submit a grievance as an
emergency to the CAO if there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other
serious irreparable harm. 20 ILL. ADMIN CODE § 504.840(a). The CAO may either deem
the grievance an emergency, or the CAO may deem it a non-emergency and return it to
the offender for processing via the normal channels. Id. The Illinois Administrative Code
requires that grievances be filed on the proper form. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810. An
informal letter does not take the place of properly following the grievance process. Scott
v. Baldwin, 2020 WL 5500532 at * 5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2020).
B. Analysis
As the Court previously noted, this case comes down to a credibility
determination. The Defendants established and Plaintiff freely agreed that he was aware
of the grievance process and that he knew how to use the process. The sole question to
be resolved is if Plaintiff had access to grievance forms between July 30, 2023, and August
21, 2023. He filed his lawsuit containing claims 1-6 on August 15, 2023, and filed his
lawsuit against the mental health defendants on August 21, 2023. Thus, the defendants
must demonstrate that prior to this time he was able to access grievance forms.
Counselor Quick credibly testified that she did rounds in Plaintiff’s cellhouse
during the relevant time in August of 2023. During rounds, if Plaintiff made any requests
to her, it was her practice to chart those requests in the cumulative counseling notes. She
acted consistent with this practice on August 3, 2023, when she charted that he asked for
bedding and medical assistance. She relayed those needs to the sergeant. She has no
notation from visits on August 3, 11, or 17th, 2023, that Plaintiff ever asked her for a
grievance form. If he asked her for a grievance form she would have immediately
delivered one or watched an inmate worker deliver it, or she would have sent one via
institutional mail. In either instance, she would have noted the request and action in the
counseling notes. If an inmate did not have a proper grievance form, she also testified
that if he submitted a grievance on plain paper to the grievance process, he would have
received a response with a proper grievance form appended so that he could complete a
grievance submission.
Plaintiff attempted to attack Quick’s credibility, claiming that she had a motive to
secure the dismissal of this case though any means. Quick’s counsel filed a summary
judgment brief that did not include any statements of material fact directly about Quick’s
actions or knowledge. In response to summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted in his own
statement of material facts that that Quick refused to give him grievance forms so that he
could file an emergency grievance between August 4, 2023, and August 21, 2023, making
the grievance process unavailable to him. (Doc. 121, p. 5 ¶ 1). He further asserted it can
take months or longer to get grievance forms from other inmates because gallery officers
sometimes refuse the forms for months at a time. (Doc. 121, p. 7 ¶ 11). He additionally
claimed the Defendants conspired to refuse to give him grievance forms prior to the filing
of this lawsuit. (Doc. 121, p. 7 ¶ 12). In support of the statement about the conspiracy, he
cited Exhibit B—a September 19, 2023, written note from Counselor Olson that indicated
he did not personally distribute grievance forms. (Doc. 121 at p. 20).
At the hearing, Plaintiff attempted to fault Quick for either giving testimony
inconsistent with her summary judgment briefs, and/or for lying about her actions in
August of 2023. There are no factual statements about Quick in her primary summary
judgment brief (Doc. 111), and her counsel did not file a summary judgment reply, so she
cannot be faulted for contradicting either of those sources. It seems that Plaintiff was
attempting to impeach her for giving statements inconsistent with his own statement of
material facts, but this is not a viable strategy because there is no concrete evidentiary
proof to support his assertions in his statement of material facts that she denied him
grievance forms. The contradiction between his statement of facts and the Defendants’
statements was the whole reason for the hearing, and ultimately the dispute is an issue
of credibility for the Court to resolve, but it is not a basis for impeachment.
Plaintiff maintained that Quick refused him grievance forms, and he suggested
she did so out of animus for the alleged staff assault that led to him being transferred to
Menard. Although this theory is not wholly implausible, it is simply not supported by
the evidence. Quick testified she would have documented requests for grievance forms
and would have secured forms for Plaintiff. She also testified that if he submitted a
grievance on blank paper to the grievance process, it would have been documented and
returned with a proper form for re-submission. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he
had access to paper and writing utensils on or before August 8, 2023. Thus, he could have
submitted a grievance to the emergency grievance process the correct way on plain paper.
Instead, he claims he elected to send letters to the Warden and Governor. A letter sent
via the institutional mail, or the U.S. Mail, is not an adequate substitute for a formal
submission to the grievance process. This was not a viable alternative and did not satisfy
the grievance process. See, Scott v. Baldwin, 2020 WL 5500532 at * 5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2020)
(a letter does not take the place of following the institution’s grievance process); see also,
Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 Fed. App’x 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007) (inmate’s verbal and written
complaints that did not comply with the jail’s formal grievance process and were not a
substitute for proper exhaustion); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)
(an inmate must file a grievance in the time, place, and manner required by the prison’s
administrative rules.
He testified at the hearing that he also filed a document in the class action Rasho
lawsuit on August 8, 2023. Reviewing the publicly available docket sheet, the Court was
able to locate this filing in the Rasho case. Rasho v. Eleya, Case No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 8, 2023, docket entry 3725). In the Rasho case, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking
injunctive relief and set forth the same essential facts as he did in this case. Id. He claimed
that immediately upon arrival at Menard, he was seriously beaten. He then resorted to
self-harm cutting his arms. He claimed that as of August 4, 2023, he could not get needed
care. He made no mention of any attempt to initiate the grievance process, though he
stated he was able to fish for writing materials under his cell door from fellow inmates.
He dated the motion August 4, 2023. Plaintiff’s filing in the Rasho case does nothing to
bolster his position about the exhaustion of administrative remedies. If anything, the fact
that he had sufficient writing materials to file that motion and access to the E-filing
process to transmit it to the Court is evidence that staff was not preventing him from
seeking redress.
Plaintiff also argued at the hearing that per 42 U.S.C. § 10807, he was not required
to exhaust administrative remedies. He is right that § 10807 discusses the exhaustion of
administrative remedies as it pertains to imminent serious harm to an individual with
mental illness, but this section does not apply to inmates. Section 10807 indicates in full:
(a) Prior to instituting any legal action in a Federal or State court on behalf
of an individual with mental illness, an eligible system, or a State agency
or nonprofit organization which entered into a contract with an eligible
system under section 10804(a) of this title, shall exhaust in a timely
manner all administrative remedies where appropriate. If, in pursuing
administrative remedies, the system, agency, or organization
determines that any matter with respect to such individual will not be
resolved within a reasonable time, the system, agency, or organization
may pursue alternative remedies, including the initiation of a legal
action.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to any legal action instituted to prevent or
eliminate imminent serious harm to an individual with mental illness.
By the plain text, this section applies to actions filed on behalf of individuals that are
mentally ill, not to those filed directly by individuals who are mentally ill. Furthermore,
§ 10807 falls within the scope of laws designed to protect those with serious mental illness
who cannot advocate for themselves and cannot prevent abuse or neglect. See e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 10801, et seq (“Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act
of 1986, the PAIMI Act). The PAIMI Act creates funding for states to establish systems to
protect seriously mentally ill individuals. See e.g. Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services,
Indiana Family and Social Services Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing
the PAIMI Act). Plaintiff does not fall within the scope of the PAIMI Act. He may be an
individual with serious mental illness, but this is not a lawsuit about a state created
advocacy system. Thus, § 10807 does not excuse the grievance process as a precondition
to filing a lawsuit for him.
To the extent that Plaintiff pointed to a September 19, 2023, written exchange with
another correctional counselor about his access to grievance forms, this evidence is not
persuasive. Quick testified that it was her personal custom to ensure inmates got
grievance forms if they asked her for forms. The conduct of a different counselor has no
bearing on her own actions. Additionally, by the time Plaintiff made this request to the
other counselor he had already filed this lawsuit, and he had already secured and filed
grievance forms from other inmates. Whatever may have happened with respect to his
pursuit of grievance forms after August 21, 2023, is irrelevant.
Plaintiff also attempted to argue by reference to old grievances responses that he
would not have been able to get a merits-based response to a grievance from a counselor,
grievance officer, warden, or the Administrative Review Board. He tried to question
Quick on this, pointing her to a previous grievance response that he got from the ARB
deferring to treatment decisions of medical/mental health professionals. This line of
argumentation is irrelevant to the exhaustion issue in this case because Plaintiff did not
face unavailability in this case based on the lack of his ability to get a merits-based
response to a grievance. If anything, the sole unavailability he experienced was the
alleged inability to secure physical grievance forms.
Returning at last to Plaintiff’s ability to secure grievance forms prior to August 21,
2023, the Court finds that the Defendants credibly established that Plaintiff knew the
grievance process, and that he could have accessed forms from Quick or other gallery
staff. Even if he did not have forms, he could have submitted a handwritten grievance
on blank paper for emergency processing, and he would have been provided with a
proper grievance form. He has no evidence that he did this other than his own word that
he wrote letters to the Warden and Governor. Letters are not the same as a submission
to the grievance process. The Court finds that Quick’s account of things is more credible
than Plaintiff’s, and it establishes that the grievance process was available. Plaintiff did
not credibly rebut this showing via his sworn pleadings or his live testimony. Therefore,
the Court must grant summary judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit.
MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS
In a Motion filed December 23, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have
provided false and misleading records to the Court concerning his ongoing access to
mental health care. (Doc. 126). Specifically, he is challenging the veracity of status reports
that Defendants have been filing at the Court’s request to keep tabs on his mental health
care and medical care after earlier proceedings in this case on motions for emergency
injunctive relief. He challenges the substance of master treatment plans that mental
health professionals prepared and signed, claiming that they falsified his refusal or
inability to sign the documents himself. He claims substantively that the treatment plans
were ‘copycat’ duplications of previous plans with ineffective treatment modalities, and
that they were falsified to be submitted solely for this litigation.
The mental health defendants opposed his motion, arguing that he did not follow
the proper steps under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to seek sanctions, and that his
assertions are substantively unsupported. (Doc. 138). They supported their contention
that the mental health records were accurate by submitting declarations from the mental
health providers who prepared the reports attesting to their veracity. Plaintiff replied,
claiming that he had not received the response materials, and further contesting there is
a conspiracy to tender false evidence. He also argued in greater detail about alleged
problems with the substance of the records.
As far as the Court can tell, the mental health records contain only one potential
obvious error. In a treatment plan prepared by Ms. Nicholson on September 26, 2024, she
indicated that Plaintiff was taking Lexapro and was to continue as prescribed. It was the
Court’s understanding when making earlier rulings on the motions for injunctive relief
in this case that Plaintiff was uninterested in mental health medications. Many of the
subsequent treatment records that have been submitted to the Court are consistent with
the position that Plaintiff repeatedly refuses mental health medications. As such, it seems
Ms. Nicholson’s report contained either an accidental or intentional misstatement about
a potential prescription. Ultimately, this small detail does not matter in the grand scheme
of this litigation. The Court remained satisfied as this case progressed beyond the
motions for preliminary injunctive relief that Plaintiff was receiving adequate services for
his medical and mental health needs at Menard. Although Plaintiff certainly may desire
or need more comprehensive services, that was beyond the bounds of emergency
injunctive relief in this case because this case was concerned solely with the events from
late July to early August of 2023 that presented an imminent danger at the time the case
was filed. Thus, the Court finds no basis to grant any form of sanctions.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Adequate Relief (Doc. 145) concerns his alleged efforts to file
proof of service for a document in this case. There does not appear to have ever been a
dispute that Plaintiff failed to serve a document in this case, but even if there was such a
dispute, it is now irrelevant with the dismissal of this case.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT all claims in this case against all Defendants are
now dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and shall
close this case.
Plaintiff’s Motions (Docs. 126, 145) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 24, 2025
/s David W. Dugan
_______________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge