Buzz Seating, Inc. v. DCI, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BUZZ SEATING, INC., :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:24-cv-00555-JPH

:

vs. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

:

DCI, INC.,

:

:

Defendant.

:

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Buzz Seating, Inc.’s (hereinafter, “Buzz

Seating” or “Plaintiff”) Motion for Default Judgment (the “Motion”). Doc. 11. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Since October 8, 2012, Buzz Seating has engaged in various business transactions with

DCI, Inc. (hereinafter, “DCI” or “Defendant”). Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 12. The parties entered

into numerous contracts whereby Buzz Seating provided DCI with office furniture, chairs,

and a sundry of other products predicated on purchase orders generated by DCI. Id. ¶¶ 12,

13. Since the working relationship between the two companies began, DCI purchased

products from Buzz Seating in amounts totaling more than $1,900,000.00. Id. ¶ 16.

Under the terms and conditions of each purchase order, DCI was required to pay the

outstanding invoices Buzz Seating submitted on all products produced within 30 days of

purchase. Id. ¶ 17. For over ten years, Buzz Seating filled multiple purchase orders for

products it produced, and DCI timely paid all outstanding invoices on those orders without

incident. Id. ¶ 19. Buzz Seating alleges, however, that beginning in March 2023, DCI began

to place product orders, accept and retain shipments, but fail to pay invoices within the

contracted 30-day window. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Currently, DCI owes Buzz Seating on eight overdue

and outstanding invoices for products delivered in the total amount of $230,927.21. Id. ¶ 21.

On October 3, 2024, Buzz Seating sued DCI, asserting claims for breach of contract,

an accounting, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. See generally Doc. 1. To date,

Defendant has failed to appear or otherwise defend against this action.1 An entry of default

was entered in this case on February 12, 2025. See Doc. 10.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

There is a two-step sequential process for obtaining default judgment. See Allied Consol.

Enters. v. Aladwan, No. 2:20-cv-4561, 2021 WL 1572291, *2 (S.D. Ohio April 22, 2021). First,

a party must apply for an entry of default from the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a

party against whom a judgment is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that

failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). Then,

after a party obtains an entry of default, that party may request that default judgment be

entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This can happen two ways: by the clerk or by the court.

If the party’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that may be ascertained by

computation, the clerk may enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). In any other case,

the party must seek default judgment from the court. Id. When considering an application for

default judgment, the court will accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true but must

assess whether the factual allegations are legally sufficient to state the alleged cause of action.

The moving party may prove the existence of damages through detailed affidavits or

1 A summons issued to the Defendant was returned executed on December 26, 2025. See Doc. 7.

documentary evidence, or at an evidentiary hearing. Arthur v. Robert James Assocs. Asset Mgmt.,

No. 3:11-cv-460, 2012 WL 1122892, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2012).

For default judgment to be entered by a district court, the court must be satisfied that

it possesses both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the nonresponsive party.

Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009)

(“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every

case.”); Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Personal jurisdiction

over a defendant is a threshold issue that must be present to support any subsequent order of

the district court, including entry of the default judgment.”); Kuhlman v. McDonnell, No. 1:20-

cv-510, 2022 WL 407240, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2022). If the jurisdictional prerequisite is

met, then the court must weigh the factors articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Russell v. City of

Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002). Those factors are:

(1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the claims; (3) the

sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake; (5) possible

disputed material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect;

and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits.

See also Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

A. Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint properly invokes this Court’s jurisdiction.

This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete

diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiff and Defendant and because the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 8.

Furthermore, personal jurisdiction is proper here because DCI engaged in business with Buzz

Seating, a citizen of the state of Ohio, and has sufficient business contacts in Ohio. Id. ¶ 9.

DCI negotiated various contracts with Buzz Seating in Ohio, and Buzz Seating supplied

products to DCI for over a decade in amounts totaling nearly two million dollars. Id. DCI has

also allegedly failed to remit payment for numerous outstanding invoices to Buzz Seating,

thereby causing harm to Buzz Seating in Ohio. Id. Finally, venue is proper in this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)–(c) because a substantial part of the events and omissions

giving rise to Buzz Seating’s claims herein occurred in this District. Id. ¶ 11.

Having established that this Court has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal

jurisdiction over the parties, the Court will now weigh the factors set forth in Russell—starting

first with the second and third Russell factors regarding whether Plaintiff has asserted sufficient

and meritorious claims—and saving for later discussion the possible prejudice to Plaintiff.

1. Sufficient and Meritorious Claims

The second and third factors in Russell relate to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the

sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Like other courts, this Court will consider these factors

together. Plaintiff alleges four claims in the Complaint: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust

enrichment; (3) promissory estoppel; and (4) action on account. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory damages in excess of $230,927.21—DCI’s outstanding account balance—as

well as prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and expenses, and costs.

Id. at PageID 8. Taking the factual allegations as true, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s

Complaint states sufficient and meritorious claims against Defendant. However, as explained

below, certain of Plaintiff’s claims—those for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel—

would fail as a matter of law.

i. Breach of Contract and “On Account” Claims

Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of contract and “on account” for Defendant’s failure

to pay for the products. Doc. 1, ¶ 33–36. An action “on account” claim “simplifies pleadings

by allowing a party to advance, as one claim, claims for separate breaches of contract based

on a series of transactions.” Kwikcolor Sand v. Fairmount Minerals Ltd., 2011-Ohio-6646, ¶ 13

(8th Dist.) (citation omitted). The Court proceeds to review these claims together. See Oberer

v. Specialty Med. Care LLC, 2023-Ohio-2610, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Under Ohio law,2 a party has

stated a breach of contract claim where there is: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) performance

by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damage or loss to the plaintiff because of

the breach. Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-363, 2022 WL 836424, *8 (S.D. Ohio

Mar. 21, 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Delphi Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (S.D. Ohio 2003)).

It is well established that there are three categories of contracts under Ohio law:

express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law. Legros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 (1989). Express

and implied-in-fact contracts differ from contracts implied-in-law in that contracts implied-in-

law are not true contracts. Sabin v. Graves, 86 Ohio App.3d 628, 633 (6th Dist. 1993). The

existence of express or implied-in-fact contracts hinges upon proof of all of the elements of a

2 “Before considering the substance of the claims, the Court must first determine the applicable law.” Cabatech,

LLC v. Nextlight, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-59, 2024 WL 3740593, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024). In a diversity action

such as the instant case, a district court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Nat’l

Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 963 F.2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff did not attach an agreement or written

contract between the parties, nor did Plaintiff indicate whether the agreement or written contract had a choice

of law provision. See generally Doc. 4; Doc. 11. “Ohio choice of law rules mandate that the law of the state

with the more significant relationship to the contract should govern disputes arising from it.” N. River Ins. Co.

v. Emps. Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (S.D. Ohio 2002). In determining the “more significant

relationship,” Ohio has adopted the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188, which

includes consideration of: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of negotiating the contract; (3) the place of

performance; (4) the location of the contract subject matter; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place

of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. N. River Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (citing National

Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 963 F.2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1992)).

These factors weigh in favor of applying Ohio law here. The Complaint does not identify how or where the

parties negotiated and signed a written agreement. See Doc. 4. Defendant is a New Hampshire corporation,

and Plaintiff is an Ohio corporation. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. It is not clear where the products were shipped to, but DCI

“remitted payments for its purchase of products to Buzz Seating via payments (e.g., checks) sent to and

delivered in Ohio. Id. ¶ 9. As multiple states may be appropriate, this Court will apply Ohio law. See Dodge

Data & Analytics LLC v. iSqFt, 183 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (“If [] either state would be

appropriate, the court should apply the law of the forum state.”).

contract. Lucas v. Costantini, 13 Ohio App.3d 367, 368 (12th Dist. 1983). Express contracts

diverge from implied-in-fact contracts in the form of proof that is needed to establish each

contractual element. Penwell v. Amherst Hosp., 84 Ohio App.3d 16, 21 (9th Dist. 1992). In

express contracts, assent to the terms of the contract is actually expressed in the form of an

offer and an acceptance. Lucas at 368. On the other hand, an “implied contract is a contract

inferred by a court from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, making a reasonable

or necessary assumption that a contract exists between the parties by tacit understanding.”

Hollis Towing v. Greene, 2003-Ohio-5962, ¶ 8.

The “[e]ssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, consideration,

[and] a manifestation of mutual assent. A meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of

the contract is a requirement to enforcing the contract.” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985,

¶ 16 (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff alleges that that the “terms and conditions governing orders

of product from Buzz Seating along with numerous purchase orders . . . between the parties

constitute valid and binding [c]ontracts.” Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 32. In support of its claim,

Plaintiff makes certain statements of facts in the Complaint but only attaches Defendant’s

account statement as Exhibit A—liberally referring to it as a “contract.” Id. Not so. All Exhibit

A expresses is a document on Buzz Seating letterhead purporting to show Defendant’s

outstanding account statement balance as of August 31, 2024. See Doc. 1-1, PageID 10–11.

There are no terms in the account statement, nor is there any offer or acceptance. Exhibit A

is simply an accounting of the amounts allegedly owed by Defendant to Plaintiff. Id. The

Court is therefore hard-pressed to conclude that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a breach of

an express contract because the account statement upon which Plaintiff relies for its breach-of-

contract claim has no explicit indication that there was “an offer, acceptance, consideration,

[and] a manifestation of mutual assent.” Kostelnik at ¶ 16.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently and meritoriously alleged a

breach of an implied contract between the parties. “To establish a contract implied-in-fact, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction make

it reasonably certain that an agreement was intended.” Stepp v. Freeman, 119 Ohio App.3d 68,

74 (2d Dist. 1997). One of the “most obvious example[s]” of an implied contract occurs where

“recovery is sought for services rendered or materials furnished[,] and the circumstances are

such that people expect to be paid and pay for such conduct.” Lucas at 369. Here, Plaintiff

alleges that over the course of the ten-year working relationship between the parties, DCI

“purchased products from Buzz Seating for over $1,900,000, including the unpaid invoices”

currently in dispute. Doc. 1, ¶ 16. Plaintiff claims that it “fulfilled multiple purchase orders

from DCI for products and [that] DCI paid its outstanding invoices for such orders without

issue.” Id. ¶ 19. Only in March 2023 did DCI begin to “accept delivery of the products” but

“fail[] to pay for such products.” Id. ¶ 20. Exhibit A supports this assertion by indicating,

beginning in March 2023, the “overdue and outstanding invoices for products ordered from

Buzz Seating and delivered by Buzz Seating [to DCI] in the total amount of $230,927.21.” Id.

¶ 21.

By failing to appear or otherwise defend this action, Defendant “has not denied that

the invoices were not paid[,] nor has it disputed the amounts billed.” Gen. Produce LLC v. Farm

Fresh Fruits & Vegetables, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00246, 2019 WL 2537655, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Apr.

30, 2019). Even if Defendant was to argue that the account statement does not reflect a

contract between the parties, the existence of an enforceable contract here may still be proven

“in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which

recognizes the existence of a contract.” Hocking Valley Community Hosp. v. Community Health

Plan of Ohio, 2003-Ohio-4243, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). Defendant’s previous timely payments of at

least $1.6 million for Plaintiff’s delivered goods is conduct indicating that Defendant sought

products from Plaintiff and expected to pay for such products. This past performance

demonstrates “circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction [that] make it reasonably

certain that an agreement was intended.” Freeman at 74.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has therefore stated sufficient and meritorious claims for

breach of contract and “on account” for Defendant’s failure to pay for the products currently

in dispute.

ii. Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiff also pursues an unjust enrichment claim, appearing to plead this count in the

alternative to the first breach of contract claim in the event that there was no enforceable

contract established between the parties. Doc. 1, ¶ 37–46. Unjust enrichment is an equitable

claim based on a contract implied-in-law, see Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 525–28

(1938), the purpose of which “is not to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or damage

suffered by him but to compensate him for the benefit he has conferred on the defendant.”

Hughes v. Oberholtzer, 162 Ohio St. 330, 335 (1954). Importantly, “[u]njust enrichment is an

alternative theory of recovery, which ‘operates in the absence of an express contract or a contract

implied in fact to prevent a party from retaining money or benefits that in justice and equity

belong to another.’” Cantlin v. Smythe Cramer Co., 2018-Ohio-4607, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (quoting

Gallo v. Westfield Natl. Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.)) (emphasis added).

Because Plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of a contract implied-in-fact, it

cannot simultaneously succeed on an unjust enrichment claim based on the exact same set of

facts and circumstances. See Ryan v. Rival Mfg. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-810032, 1981

WL 10160, *1 (Dec. 16, 1981) (“It is clearly the law in Ohio that an equitable action in quasi-

contract for unjust enrichment will not lie when the subject matter of that claim is covered by

an express contract or a contract implied in fact.”). Having established that Plaintiff has set

forth a sufficient and meritorious claim for breach of contract implied-in-fact, this Court

declines to enter default judgment on Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because these claims

are now impermissibility duplicative.

iii. Promissory Estoppel

Plaintiff also pursues a claim for promissory estoppel. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 47–56. “The equitable

doctrine of promissory estoppel is an alternative theory of recovery for a breach of contract

claim.” Waltherr-Willard v. Mariemont City Sch., No. 1:12-cv-476, 2013 WL 121970, at *3 (S.D.

Ohio Jan. 9, 2013), aff’d, 601 F. App’x 385 (6th Cir. 2015). “In other words, promissory

estoppel is not available as a remedy where the legal relationship between the parties is

governed by a valid and enforceable contract,” as is the case here. Id.

“Because . . . there was an implied contract here,” this Court declines to enter default

judgment on Plaintiff’s “alternative theory of promissory estoppel.” Truax v. Arora, No. 2758,

1993 WL 99893, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1993); see also Harwood v. Avaya Corp., No. C2-

05-828, 2007 WL 1574116, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 2007) (“[T]he doctrine of unjust

enrichment does not apply where a valid, enforceable contract exists.”).

2. Prejudice to the Plaintiff

Having found that Plaintiff has stated sufficient and meritorious claims, the Court

must next determine whether Plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the Motion was denied.

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in October 2024, and the alleged breaches specified in the

Complaint began to occur in March 2023. Taking the allegations as true, Defendant has been

in breach of the contract between the parties for more than two years. Defendant has made

no effort to appear or defend this lawsuit. To deny Plaintiff’s Motion would “render Plaintiff’s

effort at a civil resolution futile, while rewarding Defendant’s avoidance of this litigation.”

Evans Adhesive Corp. v. Golden State Adhesives, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-1801, 2023 WL 7130676, at *3

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2023). For these reasons, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor

of default judgment.

3. Amount of Money at Stake

Next, the Court considers the amount of money at stake. Plaintiff claims “damages in

excess of $230,927.21,” as well as “prejudgment interest, post-judgement interest, attorney’s

fees and expenses, [and] costs.” Doc. 1, PageID 8. This is an award appropriate to place

Plaintiff “in as good a position as [it] would have been but for the breach.” Walters v. Goddard,

127 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). Additionally, Plaintiff’s total award is likely to be

on the lower end of the range of awards in federal cases. See e.g., Iron Workers Dist. Council of

S. Ohio & Vicinity Ben. Tr. v. Hoosier Steel, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-458, 2012 WL 1122809, at *4 (S.D.

Ohio Apr. 3, 2012) (awarding over $300,000); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio Laborers Bens. v.

Olive Leaf Landscaping, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-2799, 2023 WL 8031493, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20,

2023) (collecting cases). This factor therefore weighs in favor of default judgment.

4. Possible Disputed Material Facts

As for the next factor, Defendant has not placed any material facts in dispute because

it has failed to appear or otherwise defend against this action. See Doc. 7. Additionally,

because Defendant has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion, Defendant has

forfeited the right to dispute the allegations set forth therein. See Evans Adhesive Corp., 2023

WL 7130676, at *3. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

5. Excusable Neglect

Like the previous factor, this Court is unable to attribute Defendant’s default to

excusable neglect because Defendant has failed to appear or otherwise defend in this action

despite proper service of process. See Doc. 7. This fact is indicative of actual disregard rather

than excusable neglect. United States v. Intelligent Perimeter Sys., No. 2:21-cv-1913, 2022 WL

3348653, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2022). This factor therefore favors default judgment.

6. Preference for Decision on the Merits

As a final consideration, the Court must account for “the strong policy underlying the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472.

By its nature, default judgment conflicts with merits-based decisions. But in cases such as this,

where Defendant has shown no interest in pursuing a decision on the merits, it is appropriate

to consider the need for judicial efficiency and the needs of the litigants that have actually

appeared before the Court. There are no mitigating factors that Defendant has articulated in

this case that weigh against default judgment. Thus, the Court is compelled to resolve this

case through default judgment. Accordingly, default judgment shall be issued against

Defendant.

III. DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Having found Plaintiff entitled to default judgment, this Court now considers

Plaintiff’s request for damages. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 8. “Even when a default judgment is

warranted based on a party’s failure to defend, the allegations in the complaint with respect

to the amount of the damages are not deemed true.” Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x. 351,

355 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “The district court must instead conduct an inquiry

in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Id. (quotations

omitted). While “the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine damages, an

evidentiary hearing is not a prerequisite to the entry of default judgment if damages are

contained in documentary evidence or detailed affidavits and can be ascertained on the record

before the court.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. RPM Mgmt. Co. LLC, No. 2:11-cv-377, 2011 WL

5389425, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011) (citation omitted). Based on the evidence presented

in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, including the at-issue invoices and

outstanding account statement (Doc. 1-1), the affidavit of president and owner of Buzz

Seating Daniel O’Hara (Doc. 11-1), and the declaration of counsel Theresa L. Nelson (Doc.

11-2), the Court finds a hearing on damages to be unnecessary at this juncture.

Plaintiff requests an award of damages in the amount of $230,927.21, an award of

“interest at a rate of 1.5% per month as provided in the Contracts, as well as attorney[’s] fees

in the amount of $4,050.00 and costs in the amount of $405.00.” Doc. 11, PageID 40. The

Court will address each request in turn.

A. Monetary Damages

Plaintiff seeks compensatory “damages in the amount of at least $230,927.21 for DCI’s

outstanding account balance.” Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 60. The Court will review this request for

damages solely in the context of Plaintiff's breach of contract and “on account” claims

(Counts One and Four), to which Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment. As stated above,

“[t]he damages awarded for a breach of contract [under Ohio law] should place the injured

party in as good a position as he would have been but for the breach.” Walters v. Goddard, 127

N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has properly established that $230,927.21 is warranted because of DCI’s

breaches. See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 11-1; Doc. 11-2. As of August 31, 2024, Defendant has an

outstanding balance of $230,927.21 owed to Plaintiff, as demonstrated by the invoices sent to

and ignored by Defendant, Defendant’s statement balance, as well as an affidavit by Plaintiff’s

president attesting to the same. Doc. 1-1; Doc. 11-1; Doc. 11-2. Thus, an award of

$230,927.21 in monetary damages is appropriate to place Plaintiff “in as good a position as

[it] would have been but for the breach.” Walters, 127 N.E.3d at 326.

B. Interest

Plaintiff also seeks prejudgment and postjudgment interest on its request for damages.

Doc. 11, PageID 39. In diversity cases such as here, “federal law controls postjudgment

interest but state law governs awards of prejudgment interest.” Est. of Riddle ex rel. Riddle v. S.

Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Court

will proceed to address each request for interest on damages in turn.

1. Prejudgment Interest

“Ohio law provides for prejudgment interest to the party that obtains a judgment on a

contract claim or counterclaim.” Cabatech, LLC v. Nextlight, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-59, 2024 WL

3740593, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(A)); see also Landis

v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 339, 341 (1998). “The award of prejudgment interest is

intended to compensate the plaintiff for the period of time between accrual of the claim and

judgment.” Persello v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011-Ohio-3230, ¶ 15. Under § 1343.03(A), “when

money becomes due and payable . . . upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial

tribunal for the payment of money arising out of . . . a contract or other transaction, . . . the

creditor is entitled to interest at the rate per annum determined pursuant to section 5703.47

of the Revised Code,” unless some other contractual rate applies. Ohio Rev. Code §

1343.03(A).

Here, because Plaintiff “has been granted judgment on an underlying contract claim

for money that is due and payable, [Plaintiff] is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of

law.” Kott Enterprises, LTD. v. Brady, 2004-Ohio-7160, ¶ 73. Although not attaching any

agreement or written contract, Plaintiff indicated that an interest rate of 1.5% per month is

“provided [for] in the [c]ontracts” between the parties. Doc. 11, PageID 39. Plaintiff shall file

a proposed judgment entry in which it calculates the amount of prejudgment interest that has

accrued from each breach to the date of this Order.3

2. Postjudgment Interest

Plaintiff is also entitled to postjudgment interest at the applicable statutory rate from

the date of this Order until the entire judgment is satisfied. As is relevant here, “28 U.S.C. §

1961(a) requires postjudgment interest to be paid on money awarded by district courts in civil

actions.” CAPSA Sols., LLC v. Concord Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-594, 2019 WL

4894038, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2019) (citations omitted). “The district court has no

discretion to deny postjudgment interest, as it is mandatory.” Id. (citing Caffey v. UNUM Life

3 This filing should also include as an attachment the written agreement or contract between the parties

purporting to reflect the agreed-upon 1.5% interest rate provision. See Doc. 11, PageID 39. If Plaintiff cannot

produce a document containing the 1.5% interest rate provision, “the standard rate set out in Ohio Revised

Code § 5703.47” would apply. See Cabatech, LLC, 2024 WL 3740593, at *4.

Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Such interest shall be calculated from the date

of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity

Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for

the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs totaling $4,455.00. Doc. 11, PageID 39.

However, “[i]t has long been the general rule in the United States that a prevailing party may

not ordinarily recover attorney’s fees in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract

providing for a fee award.” Williams v. ABX Air, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-833, 2007 WL 2886283, at

*7, (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007) (citing Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 18, 744

F.2d 1226, 1229 (6th Cir. 1984)). Because Plaintiff did not provide a copy of a written contract

between the parties or direct the Court to a statute providing for a fee award, Plaintiff is not

entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 11) is

GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s requests for (1) default judgment on

its breach of contract and “on accounts” claims (Counts One and Four), (2) monetary

damages, and (3) pre- and postjudgment interest are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s requests for (1)

default judgment on its unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims (Counts Two and

Three); (2) attorney’s fees, and (3) costs are DENIED.

As such, default judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff on its breach of contract

and “on account” claims. Plaintiff is hereby AWARDED against Defendant $230,927.21 in

damages, plus postjudgment interest at the applicable statutory rate commencing on the date

of this Order. Plaintiff SHALL FILE a proposed judgment entry reflecting the amount of

prejudgment interest that has accrued from the date of Defendant’s breaches to the date this

Order is entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 24, 2025

ery P. ins

United States District Judge

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