officers violated a clearly established right where they did not warn or use alternative methods to stop 3 24-1864 a suspect who posed no threat to the public and had no opportunity to escape
How later courts described this case
- officers violated a clearly established right where they did not warn or use alternative methods to stop 3 24-1864 a suspect who posed no threat to the public and had no opportunity to escape
- a minivan moving slowly as it slipped through mud “could . . . gain[] traction at any time, resulting in a sudden acceleration in speed”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CORA J. WALLER, on her own behalf and No. 24-1864
as a personal representative of the estate of D.C. No.
Glen Ray Cockrum, Jr., 4:22-cv-00244-RCC
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
CITY OF NOGALES; ROY
BERMUDEZ; NICOLAS
ACEVEDO; GUADALUPE
VILLA; ROBERT GALLEGO; MARIO
LOPEZ; GERARDO BATRIZ; JOSE
PIMIENTO,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, JOSEPH
BUNTING, DAVID HATHAWAY,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 31, 2025
Phoenix, Arizona
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: HAWKINS, FISHER**, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, brought by Cora J. Waller,
individually and as a personal representative of the estate of Glen R. Cockrum, Jr.,
alleging excessive deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer defendants, holding they
were entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment, as well as its conclusions regarding qualified immunity,
de novo. Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017);
Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
This case is best resolved on the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis. See O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2021). Cockrum did
not have a clearly established right against deadly force such that the officers
knowingly violated the Fourth Amendment.
A right is clearly established where existing precedent places the
constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011). This case is different from our prior cases finding Fourth Amendment
violations for excessive force. Previous cases predominantly concern fleeing
**
The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 24-1864
vehicles that pose no threat to officers or third parties and those that are average-
sized and fast-moving. See, e.g., Villanueva v. California, 986 F.3d 1158, 1162–63
(9th Cir. 2021); Orn v. City of Tacoma, 949 F.3d 1167, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2020).
Further, a driver’s speed is not our only consideration. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Torres,
610 F.3d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2010) (a minivan moving slowly as it slipped through
mud “could . . . gain[] traction at any time, resulting in a sudden acceleration in
speed”).
Here, Cockrum engaged in likely felony assault; committed multiple traffic
offenses on crowded city streets and within high-risk, highway-construction zones;
intentionally struck other vehicles; disregarded orders to surrender; and triggered a
pursuit lasting over an hour through highways and suburban roads. Compounding
the danger, Cockrum was operating a semitruck—a vehicle that, even at reduced
speeds, presents significantly greater risk than an average-sized vehicle. The officers
were aware that the situation posed an immediate and ongoing threat to law
enforcement and to public safety, as details of Cockrum’s flight and noncompliance
had been reported through radio dispatch. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). The officers tried various
methods to stop Cockrum, but none were successful before resorting to deadly force.
Cf. Adams v. Speers, 473 F.3d 989, 991–94 (9th Cir. 2007) (officers violated a
clearly established right where they did not warn or use alternative methods to stop
3 24-1864
a suspect who posed no threat to the public and had no opportunity to escape).
Our sister circuits do not provide guidance, either, as there is no broad
consensus of cases clearly establishing a right against deadly force in like
circumstances. See Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 388 (9th Cir. 2023). The
factual differences are simply too vast, and there is a lack of precedent involving
chases with semitrucks. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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