Com. v. Carter, A.

J-S02014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

ARNETT F. CARTER :

:

Appellant : No. 819 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-1019501-1987

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2025

Arnett F. Carter appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying, without a hearing, his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

After careful review, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a new trial.

On February 3, 1989, a jury convicted Carter of first-degree murder 1

and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC). 2 On May 31, 1990, Carter

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502.

2 Id. at § 907.

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was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 3 Our Court

provided the relevant history of the matter as follows:

On September 11, 1987, [Carter], Derrick Williams[,] and Kim

Riddick were passengers in a Ford Bronco driven by Mark Casey.

William Crum was standing on the 200 block of East Haines Street,

talking to decedent[,] Michael Thomas, when the [car] driven by

Casey pulled up. Casey knew Crum from the neighborhood and

when he saw him on the sidewalk, he pulled over and three of the

men[—]Riddick, Casey and [Carter—]got out and began

assaulting Crum. When Thomas attempted to come to Crum’s aid,

[Carter] retrieved a gun from the truck, pulled Thomas aside[,]

and fired a single bullet at close range into the left side of Thomas’

head, killing him. Crum identified all three men as his assailants

from three separate photo arrays, and gave a statement to police

asserting that he saw [Carter] shoot Thomas, leading to [Carter’s]

arrest.

[On September 21, 1987, Riddick gave a statement to the police

that did not incriminate anyone in the shooting, but explained that

he arrived at the scene in the Bronco with Casey and Carter to

“meet [a friend named Boozer] because some[]body was

harassing him and beating him up.” Riddick stated that he and

Carter got out of the Bronco to talk to Boozer and then “guys

started arguing with [Casey] about [Casey’s] brother.” Kim

Riddick Statement, 9/21/87, at 2.]

At the preliminary hearing, [held on October 7, 1987,] Crum

testified consistently that he saw [Carter] shoot Thomas[.]

[H]owever, [at Carter’s first trial held in December 1988, Crum]

recanted both his [post-incident] statement [made to Detective

Paul Worrell] and his preliminary hearing testimony[,] . . .

claiming he was coerced by police into making the initial

statement[4] and threatened by members of [Thomas’] family if he

____________________________________________

3 Carter was also sentenced to a term of 12-60 months’ incarceration on the

PIC charge. All remaining charges were nolle prossed.

4 Crum specifically testified that Detective Worrell beat him, that he was

“confused” at the preliminary hearing, and that he thought he was supposed

to testify consistently with his statement. See Commonwealth’s Motion to

Dismiss, 11/2/21, at 4.

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failed to identify [Carter] as the killer. [Specifically, Crum testified

at the first trial that:

When this first happened, the first incident happened, I went

down to the family’s house, you know. See, I’ve been

beaten all night. Once I got home, the police homicide

[Detective] Worrell [] called my mother’s house. Okay? He

told me that he wanted to ask me questions, but I told him

I didn’t see nothing [sic], I was on the ground, and I was

fighting. Okay? But a certain guy, Ski[, Kim Riddick], the

small one, short one, okay - - once I got down there,

[Worrell] put me . . . in a room and beat me. I got knocked

out. When I woke up, this is what I had to do in order to go

home. I couldn’t make a phone call to nobody [sic].

* * *

Whole thing was made up by them, [Detective] Worrell and

his partner.

* * *

At the time [of the preliminary hearing] I was a little

confused, because I know the person’s—the guy’s family

pretty well, and I knew the other guys pretty well. This is

where I got mixed up. Okay? It was out of fear from the

beatings and threats, things, all that. I just couldn’t—I

hadn’t made up my mind until the incarceration, 14 months

I’ve been sitting in jail.

* * *

[] They caught me at a weak point. Okay?

* * *

Since that day I’ve been a little confused, and I was sorry

about what happened. If that bullet was meant for me, I’m

glad I’m still here. I’m not going to feel sorry for nobody

but myself at this time. Okay? []

* * *

You threatened—you did everything you had to do.

[Detective] Worrell and his buddy should be here; behind

the fact they beat me where I had to sign that, because I

couldn’t go on.

* * *

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The way you[, D.A. Campolongo,] and the homicide

detectives deal with things is wrong. Y’all need to be the

one[s] punished.

* * *

Answer was no [I did not see somebody get shot],

[o]kay, be[sides]the fact that after the fight broke out, we

was both—all three was on the pavement. Punches started,

we got in the street. Just that—the whole time this is

supposed to went [sic] on, and each time he asked did I

see a shot, did I hear a shot, I told him no. Okay? This

is when he puts in his parts, you know what I’m saying[?]

* * *

I want to tell the truth, right.

* * *

I’m the one that got beaten up. The cops beats me up. He

threatened me. What I’m supposed to do? I’m in court

now. I’m mad.

* * *

I don’t want to answer no more questions, because he

forced me and the DA forced me and homicide forced me to

do this.[5]

____________________________________________

5 See N.T. Jury First Trial, 12/12/88, at 7-8. The District Attorney continued

to question Crum at Carter’s first trial, asking him the following:

D.A.: By the way, was anyone beating you up in the

courtroom [during the preliminary hearing]?

Crum: No.

D.A.: The judge beat you up?

Crum: No.

D.A.: Did the DA beat you up?

Crum: No.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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* * *

[The trial judge permitted the Commonwealth to put

Detective Worrell on the stand to explain an exchange that

the detective had with Crum right before trial so that the

jury could assess] “whether or not [] Crum was lying with

regard to his recantation.” N.T. Jury Trial, 12/13/88, at 48.

[Specifically, Detective Worrell testified at the first trial that

right before trial, Crum told him that] “I not gonna [sic]

testify, I’m just not testifying in this case . . . I know you

can’t make me do it.” Id. at 40. [Detective Worrell then

testified that Crum told him he would not testify to the parts

of his statement that Detective Worrell ]“made [him] sign”

[and that Detective Worrell had] “made up some of [his]

statement.” Id. at 42. [On cross-examination, Detective

Worrell testified that when he first went to Crum’s house to

take his statement following the shooting, Crum told the

detective that] “he didn’t know what he could tell

[Detective Worrell] that was important.” Id. at 51.

[After Detective Worrell explained he wanted Crum to look

at some photographs at the station, he took him down to

the police station where he took Crum’s statement about

what happened. Id. at 52. Detective Worrell testified that

Crum told him he had been drinking the night of the

shooting.] Id. at 54.

____________________________________________

D.A.: How about the court reporter?

Crum: No. But the police did beat me up.

D.A.: That’s what you say, sir.

Crum: That’s what I know for a fact. Fact, if I had a chance

to say it in court, I would have said it, because I’m

under oath. [Bec]ause I was a little scared. Then

things changed. This incarceration brings out the

best—if I got to be punished for telling the truth, I

rather get punished right now[.]

Id. at 20-21. When Crum refused to answer any questions posed by the ADA

regarding his statement, the court found him in contempt and sentenced him

to an additional six months less one day in prison. Id. at 56-58.

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* * *

In addition to Detective Worrell, David Lee testified at

Carter’s first trial. Lee testified that he was with the victim,

Crum, and two others when the Bronco pulled up. He

testified that the only person he knew in the Bronco was

Casey. Two of the three other individuals he described as a

“little 5’6” light-skinned guy” and a black male who was

“about six-two, six-three, [] medium-build.” N.T. Jury Trial

(First), 12/14/88, at 13-14. Lee then testified that the

victim walked across the street to break up a fight between

Casey and the rest of the guys from the Bronco. Id. at 16.

Lee testified that Carter (“the taller guy”) and “the light-

skinned guy started punching [the victim]” in the middle of

the street in front of the Bronco. Id. After that, Lee said,

“it’s like fights going on, people just punching, just going

crazy.” Id. at 17. At that time, Lee testified Crum was

fighting with Casey about 15-30 feet from the middle of the

street where the others were fighting. Id. Lee testified that

Carter, Ski, and the victim “started moving all around . . .

toward the corner on the other side of the street,” that a

“huge moving van came down the street,” and then “all you

heard was a pop.” Id. at 19. Lee testified that the moving

van blocked his view of the victim and Carter and Ski for

about five to ten seconds when he heard the shot. Id. at

20. Once the van passed by, Lee testified that he saw Carter

“walking off with [a small hand]gun in his hand” about ten

to fifteen feet from where the victim was slumped over after

he had been shot, but that he did not see where Ski was.

Id. at 21-22, 37-38. Lee said that Carter and the group he

arrived with got back into the Bronco and drove away. Id.

at 23. On cross-examination, Lee testified that on March

10[, 1988] an investigator showed him a picture of Carter

and that he told the investigator that “the individual in the

photograph bears no resemblance to the individual

that [he] saw with the gun in his hand immediately

following the shooting of [the victim].” Id. at 45, 47

[emphasis added]. Lee also testified that he never saw the

person in that photograph at the scene of the crime. Id. at

47. Finally, Lee testified that the picture was of Carter, “the

guy over there” sitting in the courtroom. Id. at 48.

* * *

Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Randolph Williams also

testified as a Commonwealth witness at Carter’s first trial.

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ADA Williams was the Commonwealth’s attorney at Carter’s

preliminary hearing. ADA Williams testified that he, Crum,

and Detective Worrell all met in the hallway of the

courthouse before the preliminary hearing. ADA Williams

asked Crum if he had gone over his statement that he had

given to detectives about the shooting and then proceeded

to “[g]o over the statement line by line with him.” N.T. Jury

Trial, 12/14/88, at 7. ADA Williams testified that at the

preliminary hearing Crum testified consistently with his

statement and that he pointed to and identified Carter, who

was sitting at counsel table, as the shooter. Id. at 9.

Finally, Williams testified that neither he nor any other

officers ever threatened or made promised to Crum or

intimidated him in any way. Id. at 10.

* * *

[Carter’s first] trial ended in mistrial [on December 22,

1988,] after the jury remained deadlocked.

* * *

[Carter] was retried weeks later [on January 18, 1989], but

this time [Riddick6 and] Crum[7] refused to testify [for risk

of perjury], invoking [their] Fifth Amendment privilege.

[Deeming Crum unavailable,8 t]he Commonwealth was

permitted to have Crum’s testimony from the first trial [9] and

____________________________________________

6 Although Riddick was granted immunity, he still refused to testify at Carter’s

second trial. See N.T. Immunity Petition Hearing, 1/26/89; N.T. Jury Trial,

2/2/89, at 440.

7 In a motions hearing prior to the commencement of Carter’s second trial,

the court accepted Crum’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See N.T.

Motions/Jury Trial, 1/25/89, at 23-24.

8 In its brief, the Commonwealth acknowledges that Casey “was similarly

determined to be unavailable” at Carter’s second trial, “though the reason is

not stated.” Appellee’s Brief, at 8.

9 Court reporter Bonnie Smith, who took down Crum’s testimony at the first

trial, read the notes of testimony into the record at the second trial. See N.T.

Jury Trial (Second), 1/27/89, at 18-29, 32, 35-36, 38-166. Moreover, court

reporter Gregory Romano, who transcribed Crum’s preliminary hearing

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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his preliminary hearing testimony read into the record] and

called [D]etective [Worrell,] who took Crum’s initial [post-

incident] statement[,] to testify that Crum [testified

consistently with his statement at the preliminary hearing—

that he saw Carter shoot the victim and that the] statement

was not coerced.[10] Additionally, the Commonwealth called

the A.D.A. Willliams, who questioned Crum at the

preliminary hearing, to testify that Crum did not complain

of any threats or indicate that his proposed testimony was

false. The [c]ourt then [] instructed the jury that the

preliminary hearing testimony could be used as substantive

evidence, while Crum’s testimony at the first trial, which

contained references to his preliminary hearing testimony,

was impeachment evidence [that] could only be used to

determine credibility.[11]

____________________________________________

testimony, read the notes of testimony into the record at the second trial. Id.,

1/31/89, at 295-327. However, Crum’s statement taken by Detective Worrell

following the shooting was not read into the record, but was admitted as a

trial exhibit. See id. at 178.

10 Detective Worrell testified at the first trial that right before trial, Crum told

him that “I not gonna testify, I’m just not testifying in this case . . . I know

you can’t make me do it.” N.T. Trial, 12/13/88, at 40. Detective Worrell then

testified that Crum told him he would not testify to the parts of his statement

that Detective Worrell “made [him] sign” and alleged that Detective Worrell

had “made up some of [his] statement.” Id. at 42.

11 At Carter’s second trial, the court gave the following jury instruction, with

regard to how to consider Crum’s testimony at Carter’s first trial, preliminary

hearing testimony, and statement to police as follows:

In this case you heard the testimony of one William Crum from

another proceeding[, Carter’s first trial,] read into the record, and

in that testimony there were references to a statement that he

allegedly gave to Detective Worrell, and also a reference to

testimony that he allegedly gave at a preliminary hearing.

Now, insofar as the testimony of Mr. Crum that was read into the

record, that included those two items. That evidence, that

testimony in that evidence concerning the statement and the

preliminary hearing only in the testimony that was read all at once

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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* * *

[To show that Carter knew Casey, the trial court allowed the

Commonwealth to call Police Officer Alfred Baker as a

witness to testify that he had seen Carter and Casey

standing next to each other and behind three men who were

____________________________________________

from the two days, I think it was something like [160] pages of

testimony, that evidence may be considered by you for one

purpose only, that is, to help you judge the credibility and weight

of the testimony given by Mr. Crum as a witness in this case.

You may not regard the evidence concerning that testimony as to

the questions and answers put to him by counsel concerning what

the statement allegedly said and what his testimony was at the

preliminary hearing. You may not regard that evidence of a prior

inconsistent statement as proof of the truth of any matter asserted

in that statement or in the prior testimony at the preliminary

hearing.

Now, that ruling that I’ve given you does not apply to the reading

into the record of the testimony by itself that Mr. Crum is alleged

to have given in the preliminary hearing. If you will recall, there

was a separate reading of that testimony into the record beyond

what was done in the reading of his total testimony in another

proceeding. My instruction applies only to that total testimony in

another proceeding not to the testimony at the preliminary

hearing that was read separately. I hope that’s clear to you.

Now, that total testimony that was read separately, of course, you

may consider that, if you wish, as substantive evidence.

* * *

You will recall the witness’ testimony, that is, Mr. Crum’s

testimony, insofar as identification, where his previous testimony

in another proceeding was that he had been beaten, and the

identification was suggested to him, and he had been beaten,

that’s why he made whatever statement he made, and that’s why

he made whatever identification he made. That’s for you to

consider, if you feel that that in any way weakened his

identification.

N.T. Jury [Second] Trial, 2/3/89, at 584-88.

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sitting on the porch of a house, located at 2611 Roberts

Avenue in Philadelphia, approximately six weeks after the

instant shooting. N.T. Jury Trial (Second), 1/31/89, at 328-

29. Officer Baker, who was at City Hall to testify in the

instant matter, testified that on November 20, 1987, he saw

Casey in the hallway in City Hall tell Carter, as he left

courtroom 613, “Don’t worry, Brother. I’ll take care of you

and your family, and at that time Carter turned around and

smiled and grinned at Casey.” Id. at 331.]

* * *

Finally, Commonwealth witness Christopher Small testified

that he saw three individuals fighting and that the tallest of

the three pulled the victim behind the truck. He did not see

the shooting, but heard a gunshot moments later. [12]

* * *

Statement Biography forms for the three men show that Kim

Riddick is approximately 5’7" in height, Mark Casey is

approximately 5’6”, and [Carter] is 6’3”.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 2723 EDA 2008 (Pa. Super. filed April 15, 2020)

(unpublished memorandum decision), quoting Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/09,

at 2-3. No forensic evidence linked Carter to the crime and no weapon was

ever found.13 See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/14/88, at 100 (Officer McBride testifying

no weapon or projectiles were found at crime scene). On February 3, 1989,

____________________________________________

12 At Carter’s second trial, Small testified that he did

not see anyone “drag

Mike along the ground and shoot him.” N.T. Jury Trial, 2/1/89, at RR. 82-83.

13 Officer Anthony McBride of the Philadelphia Police Department testified that

he found the following physical evidence at the scene: two hats (a roll-up

type hat and a baseball hat); a white t-shirt; blood samples in front of different

buildings; a piece of white cloth; and three shirt buttons. See N.T. Jury Trial,

12/14/88, at 81-83.

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the jury convicted Carter14 of first-degree murder15 and PIC.16 Carter was

sentenced to life in prison.

On February 8, 1989, Carter filed a post-verdict motion, alleging: (1)

the verdict was contrary to the evidence; (2) the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence; (3) the verdict was contrary to the law; (4) the

Commonwealth did not prove murder and PIC beyond a reasonable doubt; (5)

the trial judge erred by permitting the Commonwealth to voir dire the jury on

the death penalty; (6) the trial judge erred by allowing Crum to invoke his

Fifth Amendment privilege. See Motion for New Trial, 2/8/89, at 1-2. While

the motion was pending, defense counsel filed a motion 17 for a new trial

alleging after-discovered evidence.

On March 22, 1990, the court held a hearing on Carter’s after-discovered

evidence and post-trial motions. Riddick, who refused to testify at either of

Carter’s trials18 or at the preliminary hearing, testified at this hearing that he

____________________________________________

14 The Commonwealth nolle prossed several charges, including carrying

firearm without a license, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, and

involuntary manslaughter. Carter was found not guilty of voluntary

manslaughter. See Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal

Docket (CP-51-CR-1019501-1097), at 4-5.

15 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).

16 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908.

17 Due to the state of this very old record, we are unable to determine the

exact date that this motion was filed.

18 In fact, Riddick absented himself prior to Carter’s first trial, which ended in

a mistrial, and was finally found and arrested following the mistrial. Id. at 3.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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saw Casey shoot the victim and that the only reason he gave statement

implicating Carter was because he “was scared for [his] life . . . [b]ecause []

Casey told [him] if [he] would have testified[,] that he was going to kill [him]

or do something to [his] family.” N.T. Post-Trial Motion Hearing, 3/22/90, at

7-8. At the hearing, Riddick denied ever having seen Carter get out of the

truck at the scene of the shooting, id. at 16, but admitted that [Riddick] had

gotten into a fight with Crum. Id. The court denied Carter’s post-verdict

motions and imposed the judgment of sentence on May 31, 1990.

Carter filed a timely direct appeal on June 8, 1990. This Court affirmed

Carter’s judgment of sentence on July 8, 1991, concluding counsel had

abandoned Carter’s weight and sufficiency of the evidence issues on appeal.

See Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 1705 Philadelphia 1990, *5-*6 (Pa.

Super. filed July 8, 1991) (unpublished memorandum decision) (Court did not

reach merits of sufficiency and weight claims where Carter “failed to offer any

support for these contentions in the argument section of his brief”). 19 Carter

____________________________________________

Riddick was then remanded into custody, but invoked the Fifth Amendment

and refused to testify at Carter’s second trial. Id. Even after Riddick was

granted immunity to testify, he refused and was found in contempt and

sentenced to serve a prison term. Following Casey’s death, Riddick came

forward and claimed that Casey was the shooter. Id.

19 In its decision on direct appeal, this Court referenced Carter’s weight

argument in its entirety as follows, “Additionally, if you were to take away the

admittedly perjured testimony of William Crum, and its prejudicial harm,

it is abundantly clear the evidence at trial was insufficient.” Id. at *6

(emphasis added). Notably, at this time Detective Worrell’s “pattern and

practice” of coercing confessions in homicide cases had come to light. See

infra at 27-28, n.34.

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filed a petition for allowance of appeal that was ultimately dismissed as

improvidently granted. Id., 634 A.2d 612 (Pa. filed Dec. 8, 1993) (Table).

Carter filed his first PCRA petition, pro se, on January 23, 1996.20 The

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition seeking a new trial

alleging that there was newly-discovered evidence in the form of three

eyewitnesses to the crime. Specifically, attached to the petition were witness

affidavits averring that Barry Mallory, Derrick Williams (Derrick), 21 and Julian

Williams (Julian) were willing to testify that they saw Casey, rather than

Carter, shoot and kill the victim. Allegedly, Mallory and Derrick recognized

Carter in jail and told him that they saw the shooting and that the perpetrator

was Casey. Mallory and Derrick also allegedly informed Carter that Julian,

who was imprisoned in another facility, was willing to identify Casey as the

victim’s shooter. The court denied Carter’s petition, without a hearing, and

Carter filed an appeal.

On appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s PCRA order and remanded

the matter for an evidentiary hearing on his newly-discovered evidence claim,

concluding that “a hearing should have been conducted to determine the

merits of the proposed testimony of Julian Williams, Derrick Williams[,] and

____________________________________________

20 Carter’s first petition was deemed timely because his judgment of sentence

became final before the effective date of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545, the petition was

his first, and the petition was filed within one year of the effective date of

section 9545, or by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth v. Fenati, 748

A.2d 205, 206-07 (Pa. 2000).

21 At the time of the shooting, Carter did not know Derrick or Mallory.

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Barry Mallory.” See Commonwealth v. Carter, 742 A.2d 201, *8 (Pa.

Super. 1999) (Table).22 Following three days of hearings held in July, August,

and October of 2000, the PCRA court denied Carter’s petition on December

21, 2001, stating “Petitioner has not met the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]

§ 9543(a)(2)(vi) as to the unavailability of the exculpatory evidence which

would have changed the outcome of the trial.” Order, 12/21/01. 23

Carter filed an appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition and, on April

26, 2002, our Court entered a per curiam order dismissing Carter’s appeal due

to counsel’s failure to file a required Pa.R.A.P. 3517 docketing statement. See

Commonwealth v. Carter, 704 EDA 2002 (Pa. Super. filed April 26, 2002)

(per curiam order). In the dismissal order, our Court directed that “counsel

shall file a certification with this Court within 10 days of the date of this order,

stating that the client has been notified of the entry of this order.” Id. On

June 18, 2002, the docket reveals that the Superior Court Prothonotary

remitted the matter to the trial court, noting “no trial court record.” Id. This

____________________________________________

22 To make matters more complicated, with regard to the relevant procedural

and factual timeline, the docket entries in the certified record on appeal only

go back as far as September 8, 1999, when the case was reassigned to the

Honorable Willis W. Berry, Jr.

23 Seven and one-half years later, the trial court issued an opinion explaining

the reason it denied Carter’s petition was because it did not find the three

witnesses credible, as they gave “widely divergent accounts of what

happened[,]” even though they allegedly witnessed the “events from no more

than 15-40 feet away”. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/09, at 4. This Court is

unaware as to the reason for the significant lapse in time for the preparation

of the opinion.

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Court’s docket does not reveal that counsel filed the ordered certification

notifying Carter about the dismissal of his appeal.

On October 12, 2007, Carter filed a second PCRA petition in which he

sought reinstatement of his appellate rights from the denial of his first PCRA

petition, citing Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa.

2007), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (PCRA’s newly-discovered fact

exception), and alleging that counsel failed to notify him of the dismissal of

his collateral appeal.24 The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Carter’s

petition, claiming that because Carter failed to identify the exact date 25 he

____________________________________________

24 In Bennett, the defendant averred he was unaware that this Court had

dismissed his appeal until two months after the dismissal. On appeal, our

Court found subsection (b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA facially applied to the

defendant’s claim and remanded the case for a hearing where the defendant

had established he exercised due diligence in discovering the dismissal.

Instantly, Carter alleged that the trial court “directed counsel to file a

certification within 10 days of April 26, 2002[,] stating that [Carter] had been

notified of the entry of the Court’s order dismissing the appeal. However, the

docket of the Superior Court does not reflect that counsel complied with that

Order.” PCRA Petition, 10/12/07, at ¶ 8.

25 In his memorandum of law in opposition to the Commonwealth’s motion to

dismiss Carter’s petition, Carter avers that “on July 8, 2004, [Carter] received

a letter from the Prothonotary of the Superior Court . . . enclos[ing] a copy of

the docket entries in the above matter.” Memorandum of Law in Opposition

to Motion to Dismiss PCRA Petition, 7/8/08, at 3. However, Carter claims that

because the law did not grant him relief at that time, and “the door did not

open until the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Superior Court [in

Bennett] on August 23, 2007, he filed his petition within 60 days of that date,

or on October 12, 2007. See id. at 4-5 (“[T]he present petitioner takes the

position that until August 23, 2007, there was no legal way he ‘could have’

presented his claim of abandonment of counsel to a PCRA court and expect

that such a contention would have been considered jurisdictionally

permissible.”).

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became aware of the dismissal of his collateral appeal, he did not qualify for

an exception to the PCRA time bar. See Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss,

6/23/08, at 6; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Following a hearing, the

court granted Carter his requested relief on September 11, 2008, and

permitted him to file a nunc pro tunc collateral appeal. See N.T. PCRA

Hearing, 9/11/08, at 17-19; see also 9/11/08 Criminal Docket Entry at CP-

51-CR-1019501-1987 by Judge Willis W. Berry, Jr. (“PCRA Appeal Rights

Granted Nun[c] Pro Tunc). However, on April 15, 2010, our Court quashed

the appeal, concluding Carter’s underlying PCRA petition was untimely filed,

that he failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA time bar, and,

thus, that the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to reinstate Carter’s

appellate rights. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 998 A.2d 1009 (Pa. Super.

2010) (Table). On December 29, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

denied Carter’s petition for allowance of appeal. See id., 12 A.3d 369 (Pa.

2010) (Table).

On September 30, 2020, Carter filed the instant PCRA petition raising

the PCRA’s newly-discovered evidence and governmental interference

exceptions, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii), based upon the alleged

misconduct of one of the investigating officers. Specifically, Carter alleged

that in October 2019 he became aware that Detective Worrell, to whom Crum

had given his statement implicating Carter as the shooter, has “engaged in a

pattern and practice of eliciting false confessions and witness statements.”

PCRA Petition, 9/30/20, at ¶ 6; see also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/23, at 4

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(“[I]n a series of cases . . . starting in [] 1990[-19]91, [Detective Worrell]

used coercion and intimidating beatings to elicit false confessions and false

witness statements.”). On October 27, 2020, October 6, 2021, and

September 19, 2022, Carter filed amended/supplemental PCRA petitions,

including an after-discovered evidence claim, as well as a Brady26 claim,

based upon Detective Worrell’s misconduct. On July 19, 2022, December 13,

2022, and January 23, 2023, the trial court held argument on the after-

discovered evidence and Brady issues. See N.T. Argument, 12/13/22, at 5-

6.

Following argument, the PCRA judge denied Carter’s petition on

February 3, 2023, acknowledging that Carter proved an exception to the

timeliness requirement of the PCRA, but concluding that he “cannot be

influenced that it’s after-discovered evidence that would have changed the

jury’s verdict because it cannot change the jury’s verdict if it hadn’t

existed yet. So for that reason I am denying your petition.” N.T. PCRA

Hearing, 1/23/23, at 13 (emphasis added). Despite the court noting that

“these things could have happened, and he may have been the first [to make

this claim,]” nonetheless the court denied relief stating, “I just can’t wrap my

hand [sic] around saying that [the] jury would have reached a different verdict

with no different evidence because it hadn’t happened yet.” Id. at 14

(emphasis added).

____________________________________________

26 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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However, more than three and one-half months later in his Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the PCRA judge stated that he denied Carter’s petition because

“there was enough independent evidence to uphold the jur[y]’s

decision” by relying on the testimony from defense witness Small, who

“provided testimony of defendant’s presence, position, and physical height

that confirms the conviction.”27 Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/23, at 3 (emphasis

added). But see N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/23/23, at 14-15 (PCRA judge

____________________________________________

27 The certified record reveals that the trial court dismissed Carter’s petition

on February 3, 2023, but did not issue Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to

dismiss the petition until eleven days later, on February 14, 2023. See N.T.

Hearing, 3/6/23, at 3-4 (court acknowledging “formal [Rule] 907 sent today”

and even though defense counsel had already filed notice of appeal from

court’s February 3, 2023 dismissal order, counsel would be “fil[ing] another

one just to be . . . safe”). We have previously held that notice of the intention

to dismiss under Rule 907 is mandatory and failure to comply with the rule is

reversible error. Commonwealth v. Wooden, 215 A.3d 997, 1001 (Pa.

Super. 2019). See also Commonwealth v. Feighery, 661 A.2d 437, 439

(Pa. Super. 1995) (mandating remand under Rule 907’s predecessor,

Pa.R.A.P. 1507, where court failed to issue mandatory notice of intent to

dismiss); Pa.R..Crim.P. 907(1) (“[T]he judge shall give notice to the parties

of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice the reasons

for the dismissal. The defendant may respond to the proposed dismissal

within 20 days of the date of the notice. The judge thereafter shall order the

petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended petition, or direct that the

proceedings continue.”) (emphasis added). Recently, in Commonwealth v.

Vo, 235 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2020), our Court reiterated that “service of any

notice of dismissal, whether in the form of a Rule 907 notice by the court, or

a Turner/Finley letter, must occur at least twenty days prior to a dismissal.”

Id. at 372, citing Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa. Super.

2009).

Because Carter did not raise the issue on appeal, it is waived. See

Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. Super. 2000);

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 2007) (same).

Nevertheless we caution the trial court in future instances to comply with the

mandatory notice provisions of Rule 907.

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acknowledging he “didn’t get to the prejudice analysis” when the district

attorney stated that “there is enough evidence to support the conviction”).

Specifically, in its Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court gave the following reason,

among others, regarding why it intended to dismiss Carter’s petition without

a hearing:

This [c]ourt must decide whether[,] discounting Crum’s

testimony, would the jury have come to a different adjudication.

This court looked [at] untainted trial evidence [that] establishes

defendant’s guilt. Most notably, defense witness [] Small, who

testified at the second trial where defendant was convicted,

provided testimony of defendant’s presence, position, and

physical height that confirms this conviction. Multiple witnesses

stated that the shooter was by far the tallest person at the scene.

[Carter] is by far the tallest person who was at the scene. In

addition, other witness testimony established that the other men

present were significantly shorter than [Carter]. At the second

trial, [] Small testified that the other two men with [Carter—

]Casey and [] Riddick[—]were about 5’ 7” and 5’ 4” tall. Small

referred to Riddick as “the little guy” during his testimony as well.

Although [Carter] was undoubtedly present during the 1987

murder and although he presumably knew exactly what happened

at the time of his 1988 and 1989 trials, he waited until [] Casey

died in 1990 to begin pointing the finger at him. There is no

credible evidence to support that allegation. This [c]ourt cannot

grant new trials to every defendant in a case that Detective

Worrell was involved with. [W]e must look to the other evidence

and ask [whether] the jury verdict [would] be different absent the

claims against Detective Worrell. Here, [t]his [c]ourt

determined that there was enough independent evidence

to uphold the jur[y’]s decision.

Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 2/14/23, at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 28

____________________________________________

28 The docket also reveals that on March 6, 2023, the court issued another

Rule 907 notice. Finally, on March 10, 2023, one week after Carter filed his

notice of appeal from the first dismissal order, the court entered a second

order dismissing Carter’s PCRA petition. We note that once Carter filed his

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Carter filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Carter presents

the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Did the PCRA court err in concluding that the after-

discovered evidence of Detective Worrell’s pattern and

practice of misconduct would not be likely to result in a

different verdict if a new trial were granted?

(2) With respect to [Carter’s] due process claim under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), did the PCRA court err in

concluding that there would have been no reasonable

probability of a different outcome at trial had defense

counsel been provided with the evidence of Detective

Worrell’s misconduct and had the opportunity to present it

to the jury?

(3) Did the PCRA court err in concluding that the

Commonwealth’s actions at trial did not violate due process

and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959),29 where

the Commonwealth presented false evidence at trial through

[] Crum’s police statement and preliminary hearing

testimony and Detective Worrell’s trial testimony?

(4) To the extent that it reached the merits, did the PCRA court

err by denying [Carter’s] actual innocence claim and

declining to find that the Pennsylvania and United States

Constitutions support a cognizable and freestanding basis

____________________________________________

notice of appeal on March 3, 2023, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to

“act further in the matter.” Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133,

1135 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis added).

29 It is well-settled that the Commonwealth violates a defendant’s right to due

process when it withholds evidence that is both favorable to the defense and

material to the defendant's guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see

also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (Commonwealth

violates Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence as well as evidence

that may be used to impeach prosecution witness). “When the reliability of a

given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure

of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.” Napue, 360

U.S. at 269.

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for relief in a case involving and individual who is actually

innocent of the crime for which he is convicted?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.

We review the decision to deny PCRA relief to determine whether the

decision “is supported by evidence of record and whether it is free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018).30

____________________________________________

30 Where, as here, a petitioner files an untimely PCRA petition, that petition

must invoke and the petitioner must prove a section 9545(b)(1) exception to

overcome the PCRA time bar. Here, Carter invoked, and the trial court found

he pleaded and proved, the “newly-discovered facts” exception, set forth in

section 9545(b)(1)(ii), raising the alleged corruption of Detective Worrell and

that the officer was responsible for eliciting Crum’s inculpatory statement.

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) provides that “the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)(ii).

Finally, a petition invoking one of these exceptions must “be filed within one

year of the date the claims could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).

In his petition, Carter asserts that he raised the issue of Detective Worrell’s

corruption within the required time frame of discovering it, when the

Commonwealth filed documents in an unrelated homicide case,

Commonwealth v. Veasy, No. 92-06-4252-4262 (Philadelphia County),

which involved Worrell’s misconduct. See PCRA Petition, 9/20/20, at 2-3.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Here, Carter has consistently contended that

he was innocent. As an inmate, Carter exercised due diligence in uncovering

the facts about the Commonwealth’s admission that Detective Worrell had

elicited false statements and/or confessions in other homicide investigations

where Carter was limited in resources and found the filings once they were

made public. Moreover, as has been repeatedly acknowledged by the PCRA

court in this case, Carter’s claim of Detective Worrell’s alleged misconduct in

his case appears to be, chronologically, the first documented case of

misconduct against this officer. Thus, this case represents the epitome of

“facts upon which [a] claim is predicated [that] were unknown to the petitioner

and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)(ii). Because the issue of whether he pleaded and

proved an exception is not raised on appeal and the Commonwealth does not

contest it, we need not analyze it further.

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Once jurisdiction has been properly invoked under the PCRA, see supra at

n.24, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the petitioner has raised a

cognizable claim. Section 9543 of the PCRA delineates seven categories that

are eligible for relief under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(2)(i)-

(viii). Instantly, Carter raises the after-discovered evidence claim, which

asserts “the unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has

subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the

trial if it had been introduced.” Id. at § 9543(a)(2)(vi).

In order to prove an after-discovered evidence claim, a petitioner must

establish that:

(1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not

have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable

diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being

used solely to impeach the credibility; and (4) it would likely

compel a different verdict.

Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa. 2004), citing

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 94 (Pa. 1998). Moreover,

where the after-discovered evidence takes the form of an officer’s undisclosed

misconduct, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of establishing a direct

“nexus” between the undisclosed misconduct and the petitioner’s case. See

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537-38 (Pa. Super. 2012). As

our Court has recognized, it is well-settled that “evidence of police misconduct

in an unrelated case does not qualify as after-discovered evidence, as it would

only be used for impeachment purposes.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 134

A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016). However, “evidence does not merely

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impeach credibility when it establishes an alternative theory of the commission

of the crime or contradicts the only link of the defendant to the offense.”

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 920 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 14, 2024)

(unpublished memorandum), citing Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270

A.3d 1171 (Pa. Super 2022); Commonwealth v. McCracken, 659 A.2d 541

(Pa. 1995).

Here, Carter’s current PCRA petition and supplemental/amended

petitions specifically set forth information explaining exactly how Detective

Worrell committed misconduct in this case and how that misconduct affected

the statement obtained from the only eyewitness claiming to have seen

Carter shoot the victim. Cf. Commonwealth v. Presbury, 296 A3d 579, *7-

*8 (Pa. Super. 2023) (Table)31 (where petitioner, in supplemental/amended

PCRA petition, only alleged Detective Worrell “generally engaged in a practice

of forcibly coercing false confessions[, our Court agreed with trial court that

petitioner] failed to set forth any specific information or evidence that ‘the

detectives committed misconduct in this case’”) (emphasis added).

Notably, Detective Worrell was the only detective who interviewed and

obtained a statement from Crum—the only eyewitness that both identified

Carter and stated that he saw Carter shoot the victim. Moreover, Crum

testified at the first trial that he told Detective Worrell, immediately following

the shooting, that he did not see anything because he was on the ground

____________________________________________

31 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (non-precedential decisions of Superior Court filed

after May 1, 2019 may be cited for persuasive value).

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fighting at the time of the shooting; however, after Detective Worrell brought

Crum to the police station and questioned him for over two hours, Crum then

gave a statement identifying Carter as the shooter. 32 See McCracken, supra

(only eyewitness to identify defendant as shooter first told police he could not

identify person he saw enter and leave crime scene, then, three days later,

positively identified defendant, testified consistently with second statement at

preliminary hearing, testified consistently at trial that he saw defendant

commit crime, and then, when serving an unrelated sentence in New Jersey,

recanted testimony he gave in McCracken case stating he needed to “clear

his conscience” and that detectives had repeated defendant’s name to him

and “suggest[ed defendant] was perpetrator); id. at 547-48 (although only

eyewitness in shooting admitted to being beaten and threatened because he

testified in McCracken case and trial court found credible Commonwealth

witnesses who testified eyewitness had been threatened to recant, trial court

ordered new trial “because it was convinced that a different verdict would

likely result from the recantation testimony, [defense counsel’s] testimony,

and the evidence presented at [defendant’s] trial”).

With regard to identification evidence from others at the scene, neither

Lee, Riddick, nor Small identified Carter as the shooter; in fact, Riddick did

not even hear a gun shot at the scene. Lee testified that a moving van

____________________________________________

32 Moreover, several other interviews were conducted in Detective Worrell’s

presence.

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obscured his view of the shooting, but that “[a]fter the moving van got by[,]

I saw one of Casey’s friends carrying a gun in his right hand and Casey said

let’s get out of here and all 4 got back in the Bronco and drove up Haines

St[reet] toward Germantown Ave[nue].” Investigation Interview Record of

David Lee, 9/11/87, at 2. Lee identified “[t]he tall one [who] was about 6’2”

or 6’3” as the one who had the gun at the scene. Id. However, Lee stated

that he did not see the gun prior to hearing the gunshot and also did not see

anyone point the gun at the victim. Id. at 3; id. at 5 (“I just heard the shot

and seen [sic] the guy walking away with the gun.”); id. (Lee stating “maybe

10 seconds at the most” elapsed between hearing the shot and then seeing

man walking away with gun). See McCracken, 659 A.2d at 544 (other than

only eyewitness who recanted his testimony that he saw defendant commit

murder, remaining witnesses could only identify perpetrator by “[giving]

descriptions of the man and what he was wearing”).

In its opinion, the trial court concludes that the fourth prong of the after-

discovered evidence test—that the evidence “would likely compel a different

verdict”—was not proven because “there was enough independent evidence

to uphold the jur[y’s] decision,” primarily relying on Small’s testimony. See

also Appellee’s Brief, at 34 (Commonwealth claiming only Small’s testimony

from second trial necessary to sustain Carter’s verdict). Moreover, the court

states that there was “significant evidence, outside of Detective Worrell’s

contribution, which the jury used to convict [Carter] and enough that the

Superior Court affirmed.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/23, at 6 (emphasis

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added). Finally, the trial court states in its Rule 907 dismissal notice that in

order to analyze Carter’s after-discovered evidence claim, it “must decide

whether[,] discounting Crum’s testimony, [] the jury [would] have come to a

different adjudication.” Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 2/14/23, at ¶ 3.

In Small’s first statement made on the same day as the shooting, Small

says that “one of the guys from the Bronco [and the victim] moved behind

the moving truck . . . when he heard a loud gunshot [and that] the three guys

got in the Bronco and drove off and everybody else came from behind the

moving truck saying [the victim] got shot by the guys in the Bronco.”

Statement of Chirstopher Small, 9/11/87, at 1-2 (emphasis added). In

Small’s second statement taken by Detectives Worrell and Murray one week

later, Small says that “the big guy came after [the victim] and got behind

the van [and t]hat’s when [Small] heard the shot.” Statement of Christopher

Small, 9/18/87, at 2 (emphasis added). Small never identified Carter and,

most importantly, testified that he never saw the victim get shot or saw

anyone with a gun at the scene. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/1/89, at 376-419. In

fact, the Commonwealth admits that “as a defense witness, [Small] could not

definitively state that [Carter] was the tall man who was fighting with

decedent.” Appellee’s Brief, at 28.

With regard to the PCRA judge’s statement that there was “enough”

evidence to convict Carter, independent of anything procured by Detective

Worrell, we are mindful, in contravention of the statement by the trial court,

that on direct appeal our Court never addressed the sufficiency of the evidence

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on its merits, but, rather, found Carter’s sufficiency and weight of the evidence

issues “abandoned” due to counsel’s failure to develop the argument. See

Commonwealth v. Carter, supra at *5-*6.

Additionally, with regard to circumstantial evidence, as we previously

noted, there was no forensic evidence linking Carter to the murder. Cf.

McCracken, supra (even where gunshot residue found on defendant’s hand,

Supreme Court remanded for new trial, based on after-discovered evidence,

where state’s only eyewitness recanted her statement after trial). Finally, the

trial court’s statement that the after-discovered evidence consists of

discounting Crum’s testimony is inaccurate. Rather, the after-discovered

evidence proffered by Carter in the current PCRA petition is Detective Worrell’s

practice of compelling confessions, evidence that potentially buttresses

Crum’s reason for recanting his eyewitness statement and preliminary hearing

testimony.

After a comprehensive review of the record, and correctly framing the

“after-discovered” evidence offered by Carter, we conclude that it would likely

compel a different verdict. See McCracken, 659 A.2d at 549-50 (only

eyewitness’s “recantation is not merely cumulative or corroborative given the

tenuous nature of circumstantial evidence connecting [defendant] to the crime

and the inability of any other witness to make a positive identification of the

perpetrator.” [W]here the only Commonwealth witness who identified the

perpetrator has recanted his testimony, such evidence cannot be considered

cumulative or corroborative because the defendant claimed that he did not

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commit the crime in question.”). First we do not find that the facts support

the PCRA court’s conclusion that there was “significant evidence” to support

Carter’s first-degree murder conviction independent of Crum’s statement and

preliminary hearing testimony. Aside from Crum, no one who heard the shot

or saw an individual with a gun in their hand at the scene ever identified

Carter. See McCracken, 659 A.2d at 545 (where victims’ descriptions of

perpetrators fit both defendant and other man and other man found in

possession of murder weapon, “jury must have placed considerable weight on

[only eyewitness’s] testimony” to return second-degree murder conviction).

Second, the court’s on-the-record statement that it “just couldn’t get

around the after-discovered evidence that didn’t exist at the time to tell the

jury,” is based on faulty reasoning and adds an element to the well-established

after-discovered evidence test.33 It is true that there can be no “pattern and

practice” of something that has not happened before. However, there must

be a first time for everything, including police misconduct. This may well be

the “first” documented case of a coerced confession by Detective Worrell,

especially given that the nefarious investigations conducted by homicide

officers in the Philadelphia Police Department, that led to the Commonwealth

discharging defendants, took place in the early 1990s—after Crum gave his

statement in September 1987. See Veasy v. City of Philadelphia, CV-

____________________________________________

33 The Commonwealth makes a similar claim in its brief, noting that “it cannot

be reasonably argued that [Carter] was denied a fair trial given the evidence

that was available at the time. The Commonwealth’s concessions of Worrell’s

pattern and practice related to events that occurred 2-3 years after [Carter]

was convicted.” Appellee’s Brief, at 28.

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05107 (E.D. Pa. 2020), Complaint, 10/15/20, at 1 (“[]Veasy’s conviction for

a crime he did not commit was neither an accident nor an isolated instance of

police misconduct. Rather, [he], like many other Black men from Philadelphia

in the period 1985-1995, was the victim of Philadelphia Police Department

homicide detectives who routinely engaged in investigative misconduct[.]”)

(emphasis added). See also The Philadelphia Inquirer, ‘The Wrong Man’

Series, 1/15/25 (article indicating Philadelphia District Attorney investigating

July 1988 murder conviction, where Detective Worrell was lead detective in

case, where witnesses say defendant was not in store where victim killed in

crossfire).

To shed light on the potential import of this evidence, even the

Commonwealth concedes in its brief that if the jury had been made aware of

the information about Detective Worrell during the pendency of trial, and if

Crum’s testimony were considered to be sufficiently discredited in light of

Detective Worrell’s misconduct in other cases, “the Commonwealth may not

have called Crum or Worrell as witnesses.” Appellant’s Brief, at 28. Without

Crum or Detective Worrell as witnesses, the jury would likely have returned a

different verdict, such as a lesser degree of homicide. See Commonwealth

v. Bonaccurso, 625 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding change in

degree of guilt is considered “change in outcome of trial” for purposes of after-

discovered evidence). See N.T. Jury (Second) Trial, 2/3/89, at 592 (court

instructing jury, “Now, unless you are returning a verdict of first[-]degree

murder, you may find [Carter] guilty of third[-]degree murder if you are

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satisfied that[:] the [victim] is dead; that [Carter] killed him; and . . . that

the killing was with malice[.]”); id. at 594 (judge instructing jury, “[u]nless

you are returning a verdict of murder, you may find [Carter] guilty of voluntary

manslaughter”).

In light of the foregoing and in the interests of justice, we conclude that

Carter is entitled to a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence.

Simply put, the trial court’s reasoning and factual basis do not support its

decision to deny Carter’s petition. Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d

1177, 1190 (Pa. 1994). Not only has Crum recanted, but Detective Worrell’s

credibility in taking Crum’s statement is now severely called into question and

may well prompt the Commonwealth to not call Detective Worrell as a witness

at a new trial due to his lack of credibility. Where Crum was the only

eyewitness who identified Carter and testified he saw Carter shoot the victim,

his recantation evidence is not considered corroborative. See McCracken,

supra (evidence not corroborative where Commonwealth’s only witness, who

identified perpetrator, recanted; limited evidence connecting defendant to

crime made recantation of such nature different verdict likely at retrial).

Moreover, if the jury were privy to the evidence of Detective Worrell’s

misconduct in coercing confessions,34 in light of his involvement in obtaining

____________________________________________

34 In the joint stipulations of fact in the Veasy case it is stated that Veasy’s

counsel obtained witness declarations and homicide investigative files in at

least three other cases involving alleged misconduct by Detective Worrell—all

occurring prior to Veasy’s conviction. Therefore, it is likely that incidents of

police misconduct occurring before Carter’s conviction may yet come to light

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the statement of the only eyewitness to the crime, and considering Crum’s

recantation testimony, it would likely compel a non-first-degree-murder

verdict. Bonaccurso, supra.

Order reversed. Case remanded for new trial. Jurisdiction

relinquished.35

Date: 4/24/2025

____________________________________________

due to the ever-vigilant work of the City of Philadelphia Conviction Integrity

Unit as well as “recent behavioral science research relating to memory,

questioning tactics, and compliance” with regard to witness investigations and

interrogations. Joint Stipulation of Fact in Commonwealth v. Veasy, CP-51-

CR-641521-1992, at 8-12.

35 Due to the disposition of Carter’s first issue, his remaining issues are moot.

We do note, however, that the Commonwealth “concede[s] that the

information about Detective Worrell should have been revealed during the

pendency of [Carter’s] original appeal [in 1990-1991],” when the pattern and

practice of Worrell’s misconduct had come to light in other cases. Appellee’s

Brief, at 27.

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