The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MARTIN J. BIBBS, Case No.: 1:24-cv-1323-BAM (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER FINDING PLAINTIFF MAY
PROCEED ON COGNIZABLE CLAIM
13 v.
(ECF No. 18)
14 CHRISTIAN PFIEFFER, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff Martin J. Bibbs (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil
18 rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, and Plaintiff was
19 granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is currently before the Court for
20 screening. (ECF No. 1.)
21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard
22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
28 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
13 Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), in Delano, California
14 where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names Dr. Devine as the
15 sole defendant.1
16 Plaintiff alleges right to medical care, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and
17 due process. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
18
I am an incarcerated person within the CDCR since July 1991, currently
19
housed at KVSP in Delano, CA. I suffer serious medical problems, with ambulation
20 difficulties. On 3/24/21 an MRI was done exhibit 1. It reveals severe spinal
abnormalities. In December 2023, my specialist neurosurgeon, M. Rahimifar (Ex. 2)
21 advised surgery. I agreed, he ordered pre-surgery diagnostics MRIs of neck and
lumbar. On April 18, 24, defendant Devine, without reviewing my previous MRI, or
22 consulting with neurologist, deliberately interfered with my medical treatment and as
deliberately indifferent to my serious medical issues, when without any exam she
23
cancelled my specialist’s pre-op MRI’s, order. She also cancelled upon her own my
24 neurologist follow-up and my back surgery. She also attempted to take away my
ambulation assistance devices, wheelchair, and walker. She further refused to assign
25 me safety rails in my cell, or to single cell me due to physical vulnerability of being
assaulted.
26
27 1 In the caption of the first amended complaint, Plaintiff lists the defendants as “Dr. Devine et al. at KVSP.” Plaintiff
does not identify any other defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P.10. Therefore, the Court will screen the first amended
28 complaint as to Dr. Devine only.
1 Plaintiff further alleges:
2
Dr. Devine knew my medical issues were very serious as I require a
wheelchair to get around and wheelchairs are not issued easy with the CDCR. They
3
must be seriously needed. So upon seeing me she knew my medical issues were
4 serious and she proceeded to cancel my treatment, diagnostics and specialist follow-
up her consultation was performed via telemed and entirely based upon me
5 transferring from wheelchair to examin table.
6
7 As remedies, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.
8 III. Discussion
9 Eighth Amendment - Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care
10 A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual
11 punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of
12 “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.
13 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate
14 indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure
15 to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and
16 wanton infliction of pain,’ ” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately
17 indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner
18 unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
19 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,”
20 Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391
21 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to
22 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439
23 F.3d at 1096.
24 Negligence or medical malpractice do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
25 Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
26 105-106). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
27 condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.
28
1 Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
2 prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th
3 Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious
4 medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Additionally, a
5 prisoner's mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate
6 indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
7 Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between
8 medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to
9 deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v.
10 Vild, 891 F.2d at 242, overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076,
11 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2012)) (citing
12 Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the
13 course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and
14 that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.”
15 Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff alleges an objectively serious medical need.
17 He alleges that he has a serious back abnormalities. Further, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim
18 for deliberate indifference. Again, liberally construing the allegations, as the Court must at this
19 stage, the cancellation of the treatment recommended (MRI and surgery) was medically
20 unacceptable under the circumstances. Plaintiff states a claim for the cancellation of treatment.
21 Injunctive Relief
22 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the
23 Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is
24 narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,
25 and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” In cases
26 brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must be narrowly
27 drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary
28 relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
1 Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that goes beyond
2 maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about issuing a
3 preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly favor the
4 plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.
5 1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984).
6 IV. Conclusion and Order
7 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April
8 10, 2025, states cognizable claims against the Defendant Dr. Devine for violation of the Eighth
9 Amendment, as discussed above.
10 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
11 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 10, 2025,
12 against Dr. Devine for violation of the Eighth Amendment for the cancellation of
13 treatment, and
14 2. A separate order will issue regarding service of the complaint.
15
IT IS SO ORDERED.
16
17 Dated: April 23, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28