affirming grant of directed verdict in the absence of evidence of a “causal connection between plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s failure to warn”
How later courts described this case
- affirming grant of directed verdict in the absence of evidence of a “causal connection between plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s failure to warn”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY Case No. 6:24-cv-01546-MTK
COMPANY, as subrogee of Barbara Walker,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendant.
KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. alleging product liability arising out of property damage
caused by an allegedly defective electric range. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Before the Court is
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. ECF No. 16 (“Def.’s Mot.”). For the
following reasons, Defendant’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff provides a homeowners insurance policy for Barbara Walker. Compl. ¶ 3.
Walker owned a model NE63T8711SS AA electric range manufactured by Defendant (“the
Range”). Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that, on February 2, 2023, the Range activated due to
“accidental/unknown contact while the power was off at [Walker’s] residence.” Id. ¶ 5, 7. When
the power returned, the activated range top burner ignited nearby combustible materials which
caused a fire that damaged Walker’s property (“the Property”). Id. ¶ 7. Walker subsequently
submitted an insurance claim to Plaintiff for the resulting property damage. Id. ¶ 8. On August 8,
2024, Plaintiff, acting as subrogee of Walker, filed this action against Defendant, asserting a
product liability claim under Oregon law.
STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The pleadings are closed for purposes of
Rule 12(c) once a complaint and answer have been filed. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058,
1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally identical”
to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the same standard of review applies to both
motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989).
“Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d
922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979
(9th Cir. 1999)). The court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe
those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, id., but the court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Id. at 570.1 A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court
to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
663 (2009). The factual allegations must set forth more than “the mere possibility of
1 Although Twombly dealt with a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), as noted above, the same
standard of review applies to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1192.
misconduct.” Id. at 678. The purpose of this pleading standard is “to give fair notice and to
enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and to “plausibly suggest an entitlement
to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of
discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
Oregon law defines a “product liability civil action” as:
[A] civil action brought against a manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor of a
product for damages for personal injury, death or property damage arising out of:
(1) Any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing or other defect in a product; (2)
Any failure to warn regarding a product; or (3) Any failure to properly instruct in
the use of a product.
Or. Rev. Stat. § (“ORS”) 30.900. This statute “‘embraces all theories a plaintiff can claim in an
action based on a product defect,’ including negligence and strict liability claims.” Brown v.
GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 323 Or. App. 214, 219 (2022).
Under the statute, “the manufacturer of a product is liable for injuries caused to the
product’s user [or to the user’s property] . . . if the plaintiff shows that the product is both
defective and unreasonably dangerous” to the user or to the user’s property. Purdy v. Deere &
Co., 311 Or. App. 244, 247 (2021); see ORS 30.920(1). To state a claim under ORS 30.920 for
strict liability, a plaintiff must allege the following elements:
(1) [T]he sale or leasing of a product by one engaged in the business of selling or
leasing such products; (2) a product that was expected to, and did, reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in condition; (3) a product that, when sold,
was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (4)
injury to the user or consumer, or damage to his or her property; (5) that was caused
by the product’s defective condition.
McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or. 59, 77 n.15 (2001).
Here, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege: (I) causation and (II) a manufacturing
defect.
I. Causation
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to plead that the Range’s allegedly defective
condition caused the fire that damaged the Property. Specifically, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s allegation that the Range “was activated by accidental/unknown contact” is
insufficient to satisfy causation at the pleading stage without additional facts concerning “who or
what activated the range, how [the range activated], or when [the activation occurred].” Def.’s
Mot. 7.
To satisfy causation, a plaintiff must plead that an unreasonably dangerous condition of
the product was a “substantial cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries. Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 185 Or. App. 444, 458 (2002). To adequately plead that a defendant’s product was a
substantial cause of an injury, a plaintiff must allege facts that causally connect the defect in the
defendant’s product to the plaintiff’s injury. See Gilmour v. Norris Paint & Varnish Co., Inc., 52
Or. App. 179, 185 (1981) (affirming grant of directed verdict in the absence of evidence of a
“causal connection between plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s failure to warn”).
Here, Plaintiff pled that the alleged manufacturing and design defects in the burner
control knobs on the Range “caused the range top burner to activate after minimal, accidental
contact with the burner control knobs” while the power was off, which in turn caused the Range
to heat and ignite nearby combustible materials, resulting in a fire that damaged the Property.
Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 13. These facts, at a minimum, are sufficient to allow an inference that the
alleged defective condition of the burner control knobs—together with the unknown “accidental
contact” with those knobs—activated the Range burner and ultimately caused the fire and
resulting property damage.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff is “guessing” at causation because the Complaint states
that the burner was activated by “accidental/unknown contact.” Def.’s Mot. 7; Compl. ¶ 7.
However, Defendant fails to cite any case law to support its contention that Plaintiff cannot plead
causation if it alleges a second unknown cause that also contributed to Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff
need only plead that the alleged defect was a substantial cause of the damage to the Property, not
that the defects was the sole cause. Here, the Court can infer from Plaintiff’s alleged facts that,
but for the alleged defects related to the burner control knobs, the range burner would not have
activated from the “accidental contact.” This is sufficient to plausibly allege a causal connection
between the defects and the resulting damage.
II. Manufacturing Defect
Defendant also challenges the adequacy of Plaintiff’s allegation of a manufacturing
defect because Plaintiff “simply parrots the legal standard” for manufacturing defects and “lacks
‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.’” Def.’s Mot. 8. To allege a manufacturing defect, a plaintiff must
plead facts sufficient to allow an inference that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous
condition, meaning the product was “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.” McCathern, 332 Or. at 77.
Here, Plaintiff alleged2 that the Range was “manufactured . . . in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition.” Compl. ¶ 11. The Complaint further specifies that the Range
was “defective by reason of its manufacture insofar as the product’s burner control knobs had
deviated in a significant way from otherwise identical units of the same product line.” Id. ¶ 13.
2 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings also relies on
Defendant’s recall notice for the NE63T8711SS AA range model to support its manufacturing and
design defect allegations. However, this recall notice is outside of the pleadings and is not
incorporated by reference in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court does not consider the recall notice
in its resolution of Defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff specifically identifies the Range’s allegedly defective component—the burner control
knobs—and alleges that the defect is due to a manufacturing issue that caused knobs on the
Range to significantly deviate from the knobs on identical ranges in the product line. Accepted as
true, these factual allegations are sufficient to put Defendant on notice of the factual basis of
Plaintiff’s claim and to allege a manufacturing defect under ORS 30.920.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 16)
is DENIED.
DATED this 22nd day of April 2025.
s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)
United States District Judge