Opinion

Lomack v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Apr 21, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.9%

noting the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) is “a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances,” not a constitutional right

How later courts described this case

  • noting the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) is “a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances,” not a constitutional right
  • saying a complaint must have enough facts to give the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (internal quotation omitted)
  • saying Title VI does not apply to titles under the Social Security Act or “direct benefit programs”
  • noting the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SAMUEL L.,1

Case No. 2:25-cv-00247

Plaintiff,

District Judge Douglas R. Cole

v. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Samuel L., an Ohio resident who proceeds pro se, brings this action against the

Social Security Administration. (Doc. 1). Previously, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed

in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). Now, the matter is before the Undersigned for an initial screen of

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and on his Motion to Appoint

Counsel (Doc. 7). For the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the

Complaint be DISMISSED and the DENIES his Motion for appointment of counsel.

I. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint, or

any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than

attorneys’ filings. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, “basic

1 Under General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, any opinion,

order, judgment, or other disposition in social security cases in the Southern District of Ohio shall refer to

plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials. Although Plaintiff did not file this case pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court refers to Plaintiff by his first name and last initial out of an abundance of caution.

pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). These

requirements are not burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and providing “the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (saying a complaint must have enough facts to give the defendant with “fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (internal quotation omitted)). At this stage,

the Court must construe Plaintiff’s Complaint in his favor, accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And

a complaint with only “labels and conclusions” cannot survive the pleadings. Id. at 678 (internal

quotation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

This action concerns alleged problems with Plaintiff’s social security benefits. In 2009, he

appealed the denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in this District under

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1-1 at 1 (discussing Case No. 2:09-cv-00395)). Another judicial officer

of this Court reversed the denial, and Plaintiff’s SSI application was remanded to the Social

Security Commissioner for further review. (Id. (saying his case was remanded under Sentence

Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))).

After that remand, Plaintiff seemingly received SSI benefits. (Id. at 1–2). Plaintiff also

says the Commissioner of Social Security awarded him “eight years of backpay”—apparently to

compensate him for the time that his SSI application was pending. (Id. at 1 (cleaned up); see also

id. (saying he first applied for SSI in 2004 but the appeal process took until 2012)). But Plaintiff

claims he never received that money. (Id. at 1–2).

Then, in early 2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) informed Plaintiff “that

he may be able to receive additional benefits” and “convince[d him]” to file another application.

(Id. at 2). Plaintiff seems to have believed that he was applying for survivor or widower benefits,

but he actually applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”). (Id. (saying he was

convinced to file for “Survival, Widower Benefits that actually turned out to be SSDI”)). Adding

to these issues, Plaintiff asserts his application was improperly handled, resulting in his SSI

benefits being “split up” and his owing money to the SSA. (Id.). All told, Plaintiff claims he is

not receiving the Social Security benefits to which he is entitled. (Id. at 3 (saying money was

“withheld” from him by the SSA); see also id. at 2–4 (discussing benefits for minors and survivors

of deceased spouses)).

Plaintiff filed this action on March 13, 2025, seeking five million dollars in damages. (Doc.

1; Doc. 1-1 at 4). He sues the SSA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; the Federal Fort Claims Act (FTCA), and Ohio Revised Code

§ 2913.01. (See Doc. 1-1 at 1–3, 5). Upon review, the Undersigned finds that all his claims should

be dismissed.

To begin, absent their consent, federal agencies like the Social Security Administration

enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages. Douglas v. Soc Sec. Admin., No. 3:23-cv-299,

2023 WL 7134589, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:23-cv-299, 2023 WL 7131891 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2023). To that point, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

contains the Social Security Administration’s limited waiver of immunity. El v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

No. 1:24-cv-526, 2024 WL 1885786, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2024). Under that statute, a

plaintiff may sue the Social Security Administration in federal court for one purpose—to seek

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Id. Since Plaintiff has expressly

told the Court that is not his aim (Doc. 6), the SSA is immune from this action. See El, 2024 WL

1885786, at *2 (dismissing claims brought under the FTCA against the SSA); Douglas, 2023 WL

7134589, at *2–3 (finding the SSA could not be sued under Section 1983); Ali v. U.S. Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 3:18-cv-289, 2018 WL 2193928, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 14, 2018) (same) (citing

Selden Apartments v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 785 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1986)); Doe

v. Office of Inspector General EEOC, No. 3:24-cv-1220, 2024 WL 4535979, at *4 (M.D. Tenn.

Oct. 21, 2024) (saying federal agencies are immune from Title VI suits in federal court absent a

waiver of sovereign immunity).

Immunity issues aside, Plaintiff’s claims fail for other reasons. First, Plaintiff seeks to hold

the SSA liable under Section 1983 for allegedly violating his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1-1 at 1). Claims under this statute “may only be brought

against persons acting under color of state law.” Lillacalenia v. City of Louisville, No. 3:24-cv-

122, 2024 WL 1468704, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2024) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988)). As an agency of the United States, the SSA is not a person. Douglas, 2023 WL 7134589,

at *2. And it acts under federal, not state, law. Hernandez v. United States, No. 18-11019, 2018

WL 6571199, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 2018). So, Plaintiff cannot proceed under this statute.

See Douglas, 2023 WL 7134589, at *2; Lillacalenia, 2024 WL 1468704, at *2; Hernandez, 2018

WL 6571199, at *3.

Plaintiff’s claim under Title VI fares no better. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

states: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. While the

statute applies to programs that benefit from federal financial assistance, it does not “apply to

programs conducted directly by federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration.”

Anderson v. Sheely, No. 24, 00211 2024 WL 3297067, at *5 (S.D. Ala. July 3, 2024) (collecting

cases). Because Plaintiff’s claims involve the administration of Social Security benefits, a program

conducted by a federal agency, Title VI does not provide him an avenue for relief. Id.; see also

Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (saying Title VI does not apply to titles

under the Social Security Act or “direct benefit programs”).

Next is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). This statute requires a plaintiff to exhaust

his administrative remedies before filing suit against an agency in federal court. McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Specifically, “a plaintiff must first

present his claim to the appropriate federal agency, and the federal agency must have issued a final

denial of such a claim.” Hodges v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 1:20-cv-66, 2021 WL 949845, at *4 (E.D.

Tenn. Mar. 12, 2021). In his Complaint, Plaintiff offers no statements suggesting that he tried to

pursue his administrative remedies. (See Doc. 1-1). So, the Court cannot hear this claim either.

See Hodges, 2021 WL 949845, at *4 (finding the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an unexhausted

FTCA claim against the Social Security Administration); El, 2024 WL 1885786, at *2 (dismissing

an FTCA claim against the Social Security Administration upon an initial screen for the same

reason).

Finally, Plaintiff attempts to bring fraud and theft claims against the SSA under Ohio

Revised Code § 2913.01. (Doc. 1-1 at 1). This is a criminal statute. As a private citizen, Plaintiff

cannot sue anyone criminally. See Ohio Revised Code § 2913.01; Kelly v. City of New Phila., No.

5:11-cv-474, 2011 WL 3705151, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2011) (quoting United States v.

Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003)). And “[w]here a plaintiff has no private right of

action, a plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Flood v. Reed, No.

2:16-cv-778, 2017 WL 1021364, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2017) (citing Kafele v. Frank &

Woolridge Co., 108 F. App’x. 307, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, these claims should

also be dismissed.

All told, the Social Security Administration is immune from this lawsuit, and Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As a result, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that his Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED. The Undersigned further

RECOMMENDS that the Court (1) certify under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any

Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith, and (2)

consequently deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114

F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

Finally, because the Undersigned recommends that this action should not proceed, the

Undersigned also finds that the appointment counsel is not warranted. Lavado v. Keohane, 992

F.2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) is

“a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances,” not a constitutional right).

Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 7) is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED. (Doc. 1-

1). Additionally, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court (1) certify under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be

taken in good faith, and (2) deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

Finally, the Undersigned also DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 7).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 21, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.