Opinion

Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Court
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
Filed
Apr 23, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.9%

“[c]ourts have denied motions for Rule 2004 examinations when the purpose is to abuse and harass. . .”

How later courts described this case

  • “[c]ourts have denied motions for Rule 2004 examinations when the purpose is to abuse and harass. . .”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on April 23, 2025.

Peter D. Russin, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

In re:

Case No.: 22-17842-PDR

VITAL PHARMACEUTICALS,

INC., et al.,

Chapter 11

Debtors. Jointly Administered

/

OMNIBUS ORDER DENYING VARIOUS MOTIONS

FILED BY JACK H. OWOC AND MEGAN OWOC

This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 26, 2025, at 10:00

A.M. (the “Hearing”), upon the following motions filed by Jack H. Owoc, and with

respect to certain of them, joined by Megan Owoc: (i) Emergency Motion To Lift All

Confidentiality Orders And Disclose All Settlement Negotiations, Financial

Transactions, And Professional Fees To Allow Mr. And Mrs. Owoc To Properly Defend

Page 1 of 21

Themselves And Ensure Accountability To Creditors Introduction,1 (ii) Emergency

Motion to Waive All Court Fees and Costs Due To Financial Hardship Resulting from

Bankruptcy and Imminent Foreclosure Of Movants Family Home Emergency Relief

Requested,2 (iii) Emergency Motion to Require Electronic Filing Access for Pro Se

Litigants To Ensure Equal Protection Under the Law and Prevent Undue Burdens

and Prejudice,3 (iv) Emergency Motion for Immediate Return of Personal Property

Confiscated Without Due Process and For Relief from Unlawful Seizure Resulting in

Catastrophic Damages,4 (v) Emergency Motion and Supplemental Demand for Equal

Time, Fair Treatment, And Formal Apology for Systemic Judicial Bias And

Prejudice,5 (vi) Motion For Rule 2004 Examinations,6 (vii) Emergency Motion to

Reconsider Deadlines And Pause ESI Production Due to Due Process Violations,

Unlawful Confiscation, and Procedural Abuse,7 (viii) Emergency Motion For

Injunctive Relief To Halt Trustee's Fraudulent Scheme And Enjoin Lowenstein

Sandler And Bast Amron From Continued Depletion Of The Estate,8 and (ix)

Emergency Motion To Halt Trustee's Alleged Bankruptcy Fraud And Racketeering

Scheme: Looting The Estate9 (collectively, the “Motions”). The arguments in the

Motions are the latest in a pattern of repetitive and unsupported assertions meant to

disrupt the bankruptcy proceedings of Mr. Owoc’s former companies, Vital

1 Doc. 2820.

2 Doc. 2821.

3 Doc. 2822.

4 Doc. 2823.

5 Doc. 2825.

6 Doc. 2826.

7 Doc. 2837.

8 Doc. 2838.

9 Doc. 2839.

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its affiliates (the “Debtor” or “Vital”). For the reasons that

follow the Motions are denied.

I. Background

Jack H. Owoc founded Vital in 1993, serving as its sole officer and shareholder.

Under his leadership Vital experienced significant growth and success with its Bang

Energy drink brand. However, the company faced substantial legal challenges that

contributed to its financial difficulties. In one prominent case, Monster Energy

Company (“Monster”) sued Vital for false advertising related to the marketing of

"Super Creatine" in the company’s flagship product, Bang Energy drinks.10 The jury

determined that the claims were misleading since the drinks contained no actual

creatine, resulting in a $293 million damages award in 2022.11 This verdict was later

upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in April 2025.12

In a separate arbitration case, Vital was found liable for trademark

infringement against Monster and Orange Bang, resulting in a $175 million

arbitration award and a 5% royalty on future Bang Energy sales. 13 These significant

financial obligations placed immense strain on the company.

The Bang Energy drink, central to Vital’s success, was also the product at the

heart of these legal issues. Its misleading marketing claims and trademark disputes

called into question the long-term viability of the brand.

10 Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharms., Inc. et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-1882-JGB-SHK (C.D. Cal.

September 29, 2022).

11 Id. at Doc. 890.

12 Id. at Doc. 1083.

13 Orange Bang, Inc. et al. v. Vital Pharms Inc. et al., AAA Case No. 01-20-0005-6081 (April 4, 2022).

These judgments lead to Vital and its affiliates filing for bankruptcy in October

2022.14 Shortly after filing bankruptcy, Vital added independent directors to its

board. Ultimately, Vital’s board removed Mr. Owoc as an officer and director in March

2023.15

In February 2023, as part of the chapter 11 efforts to maximize estate value,

the Debtor, through its investment banker Rothschild & Co., engaged in a months-

long global marketing process. The Court entered its Order (I) Approving Bidding

Procedures, (II) Authorizing the Debtors to Provide Bid Protections, and (III) Granting

Related Relief,16 which set competitive bidding procedures for the sale of the

company. The Debtor, through Rothschild, contacted approximately 150 potential

buyers and entered into NDAs with over 45 interested parties. Despite this extensive

outreach and repeated extensions of bidding deadlines, only one Qualified Bid was

ultimately received for substantially all of the Debtors' assets—submitted by Blast

Asset Acquisition LLC, an acquisition vehicle formed by Monster. No other actionable

bids were received by the extended final bid deadline of June 26, 2023. Consequently,

the Auction was cancelled, and Blast was designated the Successful Bidder.

On June 28, 2023, Vital and Blast entered into their Asset Purchase Agreement,

resulting in the Court’s Amended Order (1) Authorizing and Approving (A) The Sale

of Substantially All of the Debtor's Assets Free and Clear of all Liens, Claims and

Encumbrances and (B) The Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory

14 Doc. 1.

15 See In re Vital Pharms., 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 2483, *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2023).

16 Doc. 854.

Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Connection Therewith, and (III) Granting Related

Relief (the “Sale Order”).17 Pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement, Monster

agreed to pay $362 million in cash, plus potential contingent consideration up to $10

million, and assume certain liabilities. The sale was also structured in tandem with

a comprehensive settlement of pending litigation and was subject to Hart-Scott-

Rodino clearance. Assertions by Mr. Owoc that a materially higher bid was

“suppressed” are not supported by any evidence in the record and are contradicted by

the extensive sale history and lack of alternative qualifying bids submitted during

the process.

Vital filed its Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (the

“Plan”)18 on September 15, 2023, and the Court entered its Order Approving

Disclosure Statement and Confirming Chapter 11 Plan (the “Confirmation Order”)19

on November 8, 2023. Mr. Owoc had the opportunity to appeal the Sale Order and

Confirmation Order but did not do so. The Confirmation Order established the

Liquidating Trust, with the purpose of holding and administering assets for the

benefit of the estate and its creditors.20

As relevant context for the Motions addressed in this Order, the Court notes

that the Liquidating Trust has filed an adversary proceeding against Mr. Owoc, Mrs.

Owoc, and various affiliated entities (the “Adversary”).21 In that lawsuit, the

17 Doc. 1658.

18 Doc. 1905.

19 Doc. 2258.

20 Doc. 1905, Art. VI.

21 See, e.g., VPX Liquidating Trust v. Owoc et al. (In re Vital Pharms.), Adv. No. 24-01009-PDR

(Bankr. S.D. Fla. filed Jan 18, 2024).

Liquidating Trust seeks to recover property and pursue claims for, among other

things, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, and unjust enrichment. The

Second Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Owoc, while serving as CEO and

fiduciary of Vital, caused the company to transfer substantial corporate assets,

including cash and intellectual property, for the benefit of himself, Mrs. Owoc, their

family members, and entities under their control, at a time when the company was

insolvent.22 These actions are alleged to constitute breaches of Mr. Owoc’s fiduciary

duties to the company and its creditors. The Complaint further asserts that Mr. Owoc

engaged in conduct that contributed to the company’s legal exposure and eventual

financial collapse, including the unauthorized use of the “Bang” brand and the

marketing of “Super Creatine” in violation of prior settlement agreements.

Mr. Owoc’s pending motions in this Court seek, in part, to halt or interfere with

the Liquidating Trust’s prosecution of that Adversary. The Court references the

existence of this litigation solely to provide context for the relief Mr. Owoc is seeking

in the present motions. The Court makes no findings as to the validity of the

Liquidating Trust’s allegations or the merits of the Adversary.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these matters under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334. The Court has statutory authority to hear and determine this proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and (b)(1). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1408.

III. Standard

22 Id. at Doc. 148.

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “[a] factual claim is frivolous when it has

no reasonable factual basis. A legal claim is frivolous when it has no reasonable

chance of succeeding.”23 “The bankruptcy court has authority to regulate vexatious

litigation pursuant to section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the All Writs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),” and have done so where parties engage in repetitive or harassing

filings.24 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk

of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the

institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these

resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”25

Although pro se litigants are granted leniency in procedural matters, they are

not immune from sanctions for abusive litigation conduct.26 “[O]ne acting pro se has

no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and

abuse already overloaded court dockets."27 Courts need not entertain every

nonsensical argument asserted by a pro se litigant and may reject them summarily

instead.28 A hearing is not required on patently frivolous claims or those which are

based upon unsupported generalizations, nor is a hearing required where the

petitioner's allegations are affirmatively contradicted by the record.29 Moreover,

23 Gulisano v. Cohen, 34 F.4th 935, 942 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524

(11th Cir. 1998).

24 In re Grp. Mgmt. Corp., 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3517, *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2022); See 11 U.S.C. §

105(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995).

25 In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989).

26 See Id.

27 Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A.,

808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.1986).

28 See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011).

29 Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989).

Courts may impose reasonable limitations on future filings to prevent abuse, so long

as the litigant retains some access to the courts.30

The Eleventh Circuit has likewise recognized that courts may fashion

appropriate injunctive relief to protect the courts and parties from vexatious and

abusive litigants.31 Such restrictions may include requiring leave of court before

further filings, provided the litigant is not completely foreclosed from access to the

courts.32

Considering the Owocs’ pattern of repetitive, frivolous, and harassing filings,

further restrictions may be warranted to preserve judicial resources and safeguard

the orderly administration of the estate.

IV. Analysis

A. The 2004 Exam Motion

Mr. Owoc’s Motion for Rule 2004 Examinations (the “2004 Exam Motion”)33

seeks 2004 discovery from a variety of individuals and entities including the Debtors,

Monster, and various professionals involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, including

his former counsel. The Motion asserts as its basis: “there is credible evidence that

certain financial institutions and advisors deliberately suppressed a $3.7 billion offer

from Keurig Dr. Pepper, thereby reducing the value of the estate and harming

creditors.” Although this is a consistent theme to the repetitive complaints by Mr.

30 In re Grp. Mgmt. Corp., 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3517 at 3 (citing In re Amir, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3915,

2013 WL 5302549, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2013)). Foley v. Orange Cnty., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS

18143, *6 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en

banc)).

31 See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074.

32 See Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993).

33 Doc. 2826.

Owoc, he has had every opportunity but has failed to present any such “credible

evidence,” or any evidence whatsoever. The Court finds Mr. Owoc’s repeated assertion

of a $3.7 billion suppressed bid to be entirely unsubstantiated and not credible.

Speculative or inflammatory claims—unsupported by any facts—do not justify

discovery under Rule 2004 or any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code.

It is also illogical to suggest that the Debtor through its board of directors, its

advisors, the unsecured creditors’ committee and various financial institutions, or the

secured creditors who were not paid in full, would have suppressed any higher or

better offer let alone such a dramatically higher and better offer. The motion appears

instead to be a forum for Mr. Owoc’s personal grievances and to assert potential

personal litigation claims rather than a genuine concern for the administration of the

estate. In addition, to the extent Mr. Owoc seeks discovery relating to issues in the

Adversary or any other proceedings,34 the discovery is more appropriately sought

there pursuant to the pending proceeding rule.35

Mr. Owoc has already taken depositions and received large document

productions; courts generally do not permit duplicative or harassing demands.36 To

the extent Mr. Owoc is using 2004 discovery in order to pursue a private cause of

action against the directors or professionals, the Plan’s Gatekeeper Provision bars

34 VPX Liquidating Trust v. Owoc et al. (In re Vital Pharms.), Adv. No. 24-01009-PDR (Bankr. S.D.

Fla. filed Jan 18, 2024); Vital Pharms, Inc. et al. v. Owoc et al. (In re Vital Pharms.), Adv. No. 23-

01125-PDR (Bankr. S.D. Fla. filed June 16, 2023).

35 See In re Sanomedics, Inc., 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 2187, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2018) (“[u]sing Rule

2004 to obtain discovery relevant to outside litigation is precisely the type of prejudice to the

discovery target that the pending proceeding rule is designed to avoid.”)

36 See In re Kelton, 389 B.R. 812, 814 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (“[c]ourts have denied motions for Rule

2004 examinations when the purpose is to abuse and harass. . .”)

him from doing so without first meeting specific thresholds.37 Mr. Owoc did not appeal

the Confirmation Order and the Plan’s Gatekeeper Provisions remain applicable. Mr.

Owoc has made no effort to comply with them.

Finally, the requests lack requisite good faith. The allegations of suppressed

bids or misconduct have already been addressed in the sale process and the Sale

Order.38 The Sale Order was entered on July 14, 2023, and the Confirmation Order

was entered on November 8, 2023, both of which established the sale of the Debtors

to Blast Asset Acquisition, LLC.39 Mr. Owoc did not appeal either order, and the time

to appeal has long since passed. A renewed “investigation” is unlikely to survive

scrutiny unless Mr. Owoc shows a reasonable basis for his repeated allegations, which

he has failed to do. Accordingly, the 2004 Exam Motion is denied.

Moreover, the Court finds this Motion to be both frivolous and vexatious. It is

both factually and legally frivolous, as it has no reasonable factual basis, is

unsupported by any competent evidence, and has no chance of succeeding. Mr. Owoc’s

conduct at the Hearing was also vexatious and inappropriate from any litigant. He

claimed that the Court forced his previous lawyers to resign “because of the pressure

in this corrupt Southern Florida bankruptcy community.”40 Mr. Owoc made

unsupported accusations including: “There was all kinds of fraud from the very

beginning. . . So all this nonsense and bankruptcy crimes that all of you committed,

37 See Doc. 1905, Art. VII, Sec. K.

38 See Doc. 1658.

39 See Id., Doc. 2258.

40 Hr’g Tr. Mar. 26, 2024, 27:5-10.

is vitiated.”41 He accused the Court, asserting that it was “blocking in allowing them

to commit fraud.”42 He threatened the Court and all of the parties involved, stating:

“Let me just tell you, [the President] passed new legislation, and I’ve been invited to

the White House, personally invited. You guys, you’re all going down. You’re not going

to get away with it.”43 He addressed the Court by saying “you’re a shill. You’re

blocking, and you’re aiding and abetting in a $3.7 billion crime. . .”44 As provided

earlier in this Order, being “pro se does not serve as an ‘impenetrable shield’, for one

acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with

meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets."45 Mr. Owoc clearly

harassed the Court and the other parties with his conduct at the hearing, and he is

clogging and abusing this proceeding’s docket with his frivolous and vexatious filings.

Mr. Owoc’s inflammatory statements lack any evidentiary support and further

undermine his credibility as a litigant in this matter.

B. The Apology Motion

Jack and Megan Owocs’ Emergency Motion and Supplemental Demand for

Equal Time, Fair Treatment, And Formal Apology for Systemic Judicial Bias And

Prejudice (the “Apology Motion”)46 accuses the Court of bias and unequal treatment

and demands, among other things, a formal apology. The Owocs ask the Court to: (i)

read every future Owoc filing aloud in open court and enter each verbatim into the

41 Id. at 27:22-25, 28:1-2.

42 Id. at 30:4-5.

43 Id. at 30:11-14.

44 Id. at 32:4-6.

45 Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A.,

808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.1986).

46 Doc. 2825.

record; (ii) grant oral-argument time “comparable” to that afforded the Trustee and

other parties; (iii) issue a formal written apology acknowledging alleged “repeated

instances of judicial misconduct;” and (iv) provide written justification for any future

difference in speaking time or procedural treatment. The Apology Motion asserts that

the Court has shown “persistent and egregious judicial bias,” claims the Trustee

received “hours” of argument while Mr. Owoc received “mere minutes,” alleges

“over 100 instances” in which the Owocs were “silenced” or “obstructed,” and cites

federal and Florida authority on due-process rights, impartial tribunals, and judicial

canons to argue that the Owocs are entitled to equal treatment and a written apology.

The Court finds these accusations to be wholly without merit and unsupported

by any credible evidence. Mr. Owoc has been afforded every opportunity to participate

fully in this bankruptcy. He has appeared at numerous hearings, filed a substantial

number of motions and objections, and has made oral arguments—often at length.

The record reflects that Mr. Owoc’s procedural access has not been denied but

expanded, with the Court routinely allowing him to be heard despite the repetitive

and often inflammatory nature of his remarks and filings.

To the extent the Motion claims judicial bias based on the Court’s rulings or

case management, it is well established that “[j]udicial rulings alone almost never

constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”47 Nor does unequal argument

time, without more, establish a due process violation. The Court has a duty to manage

its docket efficiently and equitably and retains discretion to allocate time as

47 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

appropriate under the circumstances. Assertions that the Court has “never ruled in

Mr. Owoc’s favor” are not only incorrect, but legally insufficient to establish bias. As

the Eleventh Circuit has noted, a judge's decisions in the course of a judicial

proceeding do not constitute a basis for recusal absent a showing of pervasive bias.48

Despite the unfounded nature of the Owocs’ accusations, the Court has

consistently permitted their participation out of a commitment to procedural fairness.

But that right is not without limits. The Apology Motion, like the others addressed in

this Order, is legally frivolous and part of a pattern of vexatious conduct. Accordingly,

the Apology Motion is denied.

C. The Halt Motions

Mr. Owoc filed two duplicative motions: the Emergency Motion for Injunctive

Relief To Halt Trustee's Fraudulent Scheme And Enjoin Lowenstein Sandler And

Bast Amron From Continued Depletion Of The Estate,49 and the Emergency Motion

To Halt Trustee's Alleged Bankruptcy Fraud And Racketeering Scheme: Looting The

Estate50 (together, the “Halt Motions”). These Motions request nearly identical relief,

asking the Court to suspend billing by the Trustee and his attorneys and refer them

to federal authorities for potential bankruptcy fraud. The header of one section of the

second Halt Motion reads: “The Legendary Rico Conspiracy: A Case Study in

Collusion, Fraud, and Abuse of Power.” That section states:

What is unfolding in this bankruptcy is not just mismanagement-it is a

coordinated, multi-party fraud operation that bears all the hallmarks of

a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy.

48 Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002).

49 Doc. 2838.

50 Doc. 2839.

The Trustee, its law firms, and other complicit actors have engaged in a

pattern of behavior that strongly suggests collusion to commit financial

fraud under the protection of the bankruptcy court.

However, the confirmed Plan provides at Article VI.H(6) that post-

confirmation the Liquidating Trustee can compensate attorneys without Court

approval: "The Liquidating Trustee shall have the right, without Court approval, to

retain the services of attorneys, accountants, and other professionals and agents, to

assist and advise the Liquidating Trustee in the performance of his, her, or its duties,

and to compensate and reimburse expenses of such professionals in accordance with

the Liquidating Trust Agreement."51 These provisions reflect the post-confirmation

separation of powers established by the Plan: the Liquidating Trustee holds authority

to retain and compensate professionals in accordance with the Liquidating Trust

Agreement, without judicial approval. Any attempt to override these terms now

would contravene the final, binding nature of the Confirmation Order. If Mr. Owoc

wished to object to confirmation on these grounds, he could have done so and could

have appealed the Confirmation Order. The Court will not suspend the Liquidating

Trust from billing, as it is merely operating post-confirmation pursuant to the Plan

and the Confirmation Order.

Mr. Owoc’s continued filing of frivolous and inflammatory motions further

underscores the vexatious nature of his conduct. These filings impose additional costs

on the estate by requiring responses from the Liquidating Trust and its

professionals—the very expenditures Mr. Owoc purports to challenge. This pattern

51 Doc. 1905, Art. VI.H(6).

of conduct not only burdens estate administration but also undermines the integrity

of the judicial process. The Halt Motions are denied.

Mr. Owoc’s conduct at the hearing was likewise vexatious, claiming the

attorneys for the Liquidating Trust were “abusing the bankruptcy process for

personal enrichment.”52 The following excerpts from Mr. Owoc’s in-court statements

reflect conduct that the Court finds disruptive and unsupported by any evidentiary

basis: “You need to shut this down, Judge, because if you don’t, you’re aiding and

abetting this legal looting scheme that’s going on here.” Reading the Motions in open

court, he requested that the Court “refer – and this is very important – the matter to

the federal authorities for investigation into potential bankruptcy fraud, racketeering

activities, with the actions Lowenstein Sandler and the trustee may constitute

violations under 18 U.S.C. 1962, which is a RICO crime. . .”53 Mr. Owoc’s Motions and

repeated criminal accusations – unsupported by a single item of competent evidence–

are legally frivolous and procedurally abusive. Such conduct cannot be tolerated in

any court, particularly one tasked with protecting estate assets for the benefit of

creditors.

The Court finds the Halt Motions legally frivolous and factually baseless. Mr.

Owoc’s escalating rhetoric, repeated unfounded accusations, and disruptive conduct

reflect a continuing abuse of process. The Halt Motions are denied in their entirety.

D. The Confidentiality Motion

52 Hr’g Tr. Mar. 26, 2024, 189:5-6.

53 Id. at 190:13-18.

Jack and Megan Owoc’s Emergency Motion to Lift All Confidentiality Orders

and Disclose All Settlement Negotiations, Financial Transactions, And Professional

Fees to Allow Mr. And Mrs. Owoc To Properly Defend Themselves and Ensure

Accountability to Creditors Introduction (the “Confidentiality Motion”)54 focuses

primarily on a purportedly confidential settlement agreement with Lloyd’s of London.

They assert: “[t]hese confidentiality restrictions have been weaponized to obstruct

due process, prevent transparency, and conceal the mismanagement, self-dealing,

and abuse of power perpetrated by the Trustee and their counsel, Lowenstein Sandler

LLP.” The Confidentiality Motion requests that the Court lift all confidentiality

restrictions and provide weekly billing reports of all money paid to professionals for

the estate.

The only purportedly confidential matter referenced in the Motion—the

Lloyd’s of London settlement—is not confidential and remains publicly available on

the docket.55 While the Liquidating Trust originally requested to file the motion

under seal (at the apparent request of Lloyd’s of London),56 the Court denied that

request.57 The Liquidating Trust filed its Amended Motion to Compromise

Controversy with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,58 disclosing the

settlement – Lloyd’s of London was to pay $1.25 million to the Liquidating Trust in

54 Doc. 2820.

55 See Doc. 2785.

56 See Doc. 2766.

57 Doc. 2788.

58 Doc. 2785.

exchange for the Liquidating Trust dismissing a suit in state court, which the Court

approved.

The only other potentially confidential agreement, as pointed out by the

Liquidating Trust in its Objection, is the Protective Order.59 However, this order was

merely designed to protect confidential material that may be produced during

discovery, and Mr. Owoc signed an agreement acknowledging that he consented to

and was bound by it.60 The Protective Order also provides procedures for Mr. Owoc

to seek the unsealing of confidential documents if he wishes to do so.61 Moreover, as

made clear in the Expedited Motion for Protective Order and Confidentiality

Agreement,62 the primary purpose was to shield confidential information from

Monster, who was engaged in separate litigation with the Debtors. Mr. Owoc has

continuously complained that confidential information might become available to

Monster and used against him, so if anything, the Protective Order was designed to

protect his interests.

The Confidentiality Motion is a good example of a frivolous motion having no

reasonable factual basis and no reasonable chance of succeeding. Accordingly, the

Confidentiality Motion is denied.

E. The Fee Waiver Motion

Jack and Megan Owoc filed an Emergency Motion to Waive All Court Fees and

Costs Due to Financial Hardship Resulting from Bankruptcy and Imminent

59 Doc. 823.

60 See Id.

61 See Id.

62 Doc. 775.

Foreclosure of Movants Family Home Emergency Relief Requested (the “Fee Waiver

Motion”).63 The Fee Waiver Motion claims that, due to financial losses and the

imminent foreclosure of their home, the Owocs are entitled to have future court fees

waived. It is unclear precisely what fees they are referring to. They cite 28 U.S.C. §

1930(f)(1), which applies only to filing fees for individual chapter 7 debtors;

inapplicable here.64 The Owocs provide no further explanation of the fees they seek

to have waived or the legal basis for doing so. The Fee Waiver Motion is another

example of a frivolous motion having no reasonable factual basis and no reasonable

chance of succeeding. Accordingly, the Fee Waiver Motion is denied.

F. The CM/ECF Motion

Mr. Owoc’s Emergency Motion to Require Electronic Filing Access for Pro Se

Litigants To Ensure Equal Protection Under the Law and Prevent Undue Burdens

and Prejudice (the “CM/ECF Motion”)65 requests access to electronically file motions

on the docket, claiming his inability to do so violates his constitutional rights.

However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(3)(B)(i) provides that pro se litigants

“may file electronically only if allowed by court order or by local rule.”66 This Court’s

Local Rule 5005-4(B)(4) provides: “[c]urrently, pro se debtors and bankruptcy petition

preparers are ineligible to use CM/ECF to file documents electronically.”67

Accordingly, in this district unrepresented parties are not permitted to use the

63 Doc. 2821.

64 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1).

65 Doc. 2822.

66 Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(3)(B)(i).

67 Bankr. S.D. Fla. R. 5005-4(B)(4).

CM/ECF system. It is the Court’s understanding that this is the policy of virtually

every bankruptcy court in the country. The CM/ECF Motion claims that the Northern

District of Florida’s Electronic Document Submission Web Portal allows pro se

litigants to file online; however, that online portal clearly indicates: “[p]ro se litigants

may not file electronically.”68

The Eleventh Circuit addressed this precise issue in In re Castro, in which a

pro se litigant claimed the District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s

restriction on CM/ECF access violated his first amendment rights.69 The court

rejected his argument, providing: “Both the Federal Rules and the district court's

local rules clearly allow for the electronic filing restriction on pro se litigants that

Castro now challenges. Moreover, the district court had broad discretion to manage

its docket, the right of access to the courts is not absolute, and Castro has not provided

any authority supporting his position that the district court's electronic filing

restriction violates the First Amendment.”70

Mr. Owoc has likewise provided no coherent authority as to how his

constitutional rights have been violated. There is no constitutional right to electronic

filing, and courts are permitted to manage access to electronic systems in the interest

of administrative efficiency, consistency, and security.71 So long as a party has a

reasonable alternative method of access to the court—as Mr. Owoc has used

consistently in this case—there is no due process or equal protection concern. His

68 https://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/e-filing-cmecf-info.

69 In re Castro, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 8687 (11th Cir. 2023).

70 Id. at 3-4.

71 See Id.

inability to file electronically does not constitute a legal barrier to participation, but

rather reflects a uniform policy applied nationwide to pro se litigants.

Mr. Owoc has had no difficulty filing pleadings in this case. His motion appears

to reflect frustration with the inconvenience of physically filing documents with the

Clerk’s Office, rather than a genuine barrier to access or due process concern.

Accordingly, the CM/ECF Motion is denied.

G. The Computer Return Motions

Mr. Owoc filed two motions relating to the return of a computer in the

possession of Avalon Legal – Emergency Motion for Immediate Return of Personal

Property Confiscated Without Due Process and For Relief from Unlawful Seizure

Resulting in Catastrophic Damages,72 and Emergency Motion to Reconsider Deadlines

And Pause ESI Production Due to Due Process Violations, Unlawful Confiscation,

And Procedural Abuse73 (the “Computer Return Motions”). The process complained

of by Mr. Owoc has been set forth by the Court clearly throughout these proceedings.74

Mr. Owoc has been given every opportunity to comply with the requirements, but he

has instead chosen to consistently fail to do so. The Computer Return Motions repeat

the arguments by Mr. Owoc rejecting the process and are therefore another example

of frivolous motions having no reasonable factual basis and no reasonable chance of

succeeding. The Computer Return Motions have been denied by a separate order.75

V. Conclusion

72 Doc. 2823.

73 Doc. 2837.

74 See Doc. 2697; Doc. 2777.

75 Doc. 2881.

In sum, all nine of the Motions are denied. The Court finds that Mr. Owoc has

repeatedly failed to present credible evidence in support of his claims. His allegations

are either directly refuted by the record or entirely unsupported by any factual basis.

This pattern of conduct reflects a continued abuse of the judicial process and has

imposed unnecessary burdens on the estate and the Court.

Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have made clear, “[a]n injunction limiting a

litigant's filings is appropriate where necessary to prevent undue interference with

the orderly administration of bankruptcy proceedings.”76 Bankruptcy courts have

both statutory and inherent authority to curb vexatious litigation under 11 U.S.C. §

105(a) and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).77 Accordingly, should Mr. Owoc

persist in filing frivolous, duplicative, or abusive motions, the Court may decline to

set them for hearing and may impose reasonable filing restrictions, including

requiring prior leave of court.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. The Motions are DENIED.

# # #

Copies to: All parties in interest.

76 In re Grp. Mgmt. Corp., 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3517, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2022) (citing In re Amir,

2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3915, 2013 WL 5302549, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2013)).

77 Id. at 1.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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