State of Tennessee v. Tony Brasfield

04/22/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

March 4, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TONY BRASFIELD

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 22-930 Joseph T. Howell, Judge

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No. W2024-00371-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Tony Brasfield, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of

violating the rules of community supervision for life, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating

the sexual offender registry for failing to register or report in person within 48 hours of

establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence, a Class E felony. On appeal,

the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction of

violating the sexual offender registry, arguing that a plain reading of the statute shows that

the State failed to prove the essential elements of the offense. We agree with the Defendant.

Accordingly, the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for violating community

supervision is affirmed, but we reverse and vacate his felony conviction for violating the

sexual offender registry.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

part, Reversed and Vacated in part

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

William W. Gill (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Division, Franklin,

Tennessee, and Parker O. Dixon (at trial), Assistant Public Defender, Jackson, Tennessee,

for the appellant, Tony Brasfield.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney

General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Michelle G. Pugh, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

In November 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, three

counts of incest, and three counts of rape. As a result, he was subject to community

supervision for life and was required to register and regularly report as a violent sexual

offender pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender

Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“Sexual Offender Registry Statute”). See

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 to 218. On November 28, 2022, the Madison County

Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment that charged the Defendant with violating

community supervision and with violating the sexual offender registry statute.

Specifically, count two of the indictment charged that the Defendant:

[On] or about March 9, 2019, in Madison County, Tennessee, and before the

finding of this indictment, did unlawfully and knowingly fail to register or

report in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or

secondary residence, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-39-

203(a)(1), all of which is against the peace and dignity of the State of

Tennessee.

At the Defendant’s January 10, 2024 jury trial, the State presented a single witness:

Tennessee Board of Correction Probation and Parole Officer Joe Rudolph, who testified

that his job was to monitor offenders on the sexual offender registry. He identified the

Defendant as a violent sexual offender whose rape and incest convictions placed him on

the registry and said that the Defendant, as a violent sexual offender, was required to

“register every three months” unless there were any changes in his information within those

three months. If there were any changes, the Defendant was required to update the

information on the registry.

Officer Rudolph testified that each time the Defendant registered, he signed the

report to acknowledge that he was the one who had updated the registry information. He

identified a certified copy of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s compilation of the

Defendant’s sexual offender registration records, which was admitted as a collective

exhibit. Referring to that exhibit, he identified a copy of the rules for the sexual offender

registry that the Defendant signed on October 19, 2018. He said “[t]he rule that [the

Defendant] violated was the 40-39-203, which is the 48-hour rule of registering his

whereabouts.” He stated that, according to the rules, the Defendant was required to register

in person.

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Officer Rudolph testified that he learned that the Defendant had changed his primary

address “[b]ased off [the Defendant’s] GPS that [the Defendant] had[,]” which “placed [the

Defendant] at Lawrenceburg, and . . . ended up placing him in Mississippi.” He stated that

the Defendant never reported a change of address to him.

Officer Rudolph agreed that the Defendant was “also subject to reporting pursuant

to community supervision for life[.]” which was a different registry from the sexual

offender registry. He then identified the community supervision for life certificate that the

Defendant had signed, which was admitted as an exhibit. He said that the Defendant

violated Rule Number 6 of the community supervision for life rules, which required him

to obtain permission from his probation officer prior to leaving the county or the state.

Officer Rudolph testified that he completed and filed a violation of parole report based on

the Defendant’s violations. He identified a copy of his parole violation report, which was

later admitted as an exhibit after the State attempted to redact portions that the Defendant

argued were prejudicial and irrelevant. Unredacted portions of the report state that the

Defendant “[o]n or about 3/9/19” “changed his primary residence of Madison Co., when

[he] left and went to Lawrenceburg, TN.” However, as the Defendant notes, and the State

agrees, the portions of the report that the State attempted to redact are still legible, with the

following statements, among others, visible to the naked eye: “On or about 3/21/19, the

offender committed the offense of Theft of Property (TCA 39-14-103) in Madison Co.

This occurred when offender removed GPS equipment and it could not be recovered[,]”

and “on 3/11/19, [the Defendant] also left the state of his residence and went to

Mississippi.”

On cross-examination, Officer Rudolph testified that to record a change in address

for the purposes of the sexual offender registry, the Defendant had to personally appear at

the office within 48 hours of his change in address. When asked what the Defendant

changed his address to, he responded: “He changed his address when he left the state, when

he left the county, because he was gone longer than 48 hours.” He said the Defendant

never formally changed his address. When then asked if the Defendant would not have

been changing his address if he had returned within 48 hours, he replied, “No. He can’t

leave the state without permission, and then he can’t - - his address must be changed within

48 hours.” When pressed on whether the Defendant would need to report a change in his

address if he returned within 48 hours, he responded that the Defendant had to have

permission to leave, and that the Defendant’s failure to obtain permission to leave

constituted a violation. He agreed, however, that he was charging the Defendant with not

reporting a change in address within 48 hours, “[n]ot just moving about” without

permission. He stated that he did not know what the Defendant’s new address was and did

not conduct a home visit at the Defendant’s previously registered Madison County address

to check if the Defendant was still there. He testified that he wrote the violation of parole

report on March 9, and that it was filed on March 21. He explained that the report “has to

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go through a process” of sequential review up “the chain of command” before it was filed

and that the Department of Probation and Parole did not have the power to arrest anyone.

On redirect examination, Officer Rudolph referred to the language in the sexual

offender registration statute as he repeated that the Defendant was required to report a

change in address within 48 hours of “establishing or changing a primary or secondary

residence[.]” Officer Rudolph stated that, had the Defendant reported his change of address

within 48 hours, he would have had a report of it. He testified that the Defendant “was

found in Mississippi[,]” but he did not know what residence the Defendant had moved to

or why the Defendant was in Mississippi.

The Defendant elected not to testify and rested his case without presenting any

witnesses or other proof. Following deliberations, the jury convicted him of both counts

as charged in the indictment. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an effective

term of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony

conviction of violating the sexual offender registry, arguing that, under the plain language

of the statute, the State failed to show that he established a new primary residence in

Tennessee or a new secondary residence in Tennessee or Mississippi. We agree with the

Defendant.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the relevant question

of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or

jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of

fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Therefore, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the

evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. State v. Williams, 657

S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the

weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier

of fact. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

“A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant

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has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The guilt of a defendant, including any fact required to be

proven, may be predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination

of both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the

same whether the conviction is based on direct or circumstantial evidence or a combination

of the two. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011).

The Defendant’s felony conviction was based on his having “fail[ed] to register or

report in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary

residence, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-203(a)(1).” The

pertinent portion of the sexual offender registry statute provides as follows:

Within forty-eight (48) hours of establishing or changing a primary

or secondary residence, establishing a physical presence at a particular

location, becoming employed or practicing a vocation or becoming a student

in this state, the offender shall register or report in person, as required by

this part. Likewise, within forty-eight (48) hours of release on probation or

any alternative to incarceration, excluding parole, the offender shall register

or report in person, as required by this part.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203(a)(1) (emphasis added).

“Primary residence” is defined in the statute as “a place where the person abides,

lodges, resides or establishes any other living accommodations in this state for five (5)

consecutive days.” Id. § 40-39-202 (12). “Secondary residence” is defined as a place

where the person abides, lodges, resides or establishes any other

living accommodations in this state for a period of fourteen (14) or more

days in the aggregate during any calendar year and that is not the person’s

primary residence; for a person whose primary residence is not in this state,

a place where the person is employed, practices a vocation or is enrolled as

a student for a period of fourteen (14) or more days in the aggregate during

any calendar year; or a place where the person routinely abides, lodges or

resides for a period of four (4) or more consecutive or nonconsecutive days

in any month and that is not the person’s primary residence, including any

out-of-state address[.]

Id. § 40-39-202 (18) (emphasis added).

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“The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond

its intended scope.” State v. Curry, 705 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tenn. 2025) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). We give the words in the statute their natural and ordinary meaning

in light of their statutory context and avoid any “forced or subtle construction that would

limit or extend the meaning of the language.” Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 610 (Tenn.

2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, we apply the statute’s plain language in its normal and accepted use.” Id.

The Defendant asserts that, to the extent that the State sought to convict him for

failing to register or report that he had moved to a different state, it was required to indict

him for violating sections 40-39-203(a)(3) and 40-39-208(a)(9) of the statute, which

specifically address that course of conduct1, but that the evidence at trial was insufficient

to sustain a conviction for the offense for which he was indicted. Specifically, he argues

that the proof failed to show that he changed his primary residence in Tennessee or

established a secondary residence in either Tennessee or Mississippi. In support, he points

out that neither Officer Rudoph’s testimony nor the ineffectively redacted text of Officer

Rudolph’s parole violation report established that the Defendant resided for five

consecutive days at a place in Tennessee other than his primary residence, resided for

fourteen or more days within a calendar year at a place in Tennessee other than his primary

residence, or routinely resided for four consecutive or nonconsecutive days within a single

month in either Tennessee or Mississippi.

We agree with the Defendant. Officer Rudolph offered nothing but vague testimony

about the Defendant’s movements, testifying that he learned from the GPS data that the

Defendant went to Lawrenceburg and then to Mississippi, and that the Defendant was

found in Mississippi. He further testified that he did not know where the Defendant was

in Mississippi or why he had gone to that state. The parole violation report, including the

ineffectively redacted portions, add the information that the Defendant left Madison

County on March 9 and went to Lawrenceburg, left Lawrenceburg on March 11 and went

to Mississippi, and on March 21 committed theft of property in Madison County by

removing his GPS device.

1

The sexual offender registry statute provides that an offender who is registered in this State who

intends to move to another state must within forty-eight hours of either moving to another state or

“becoming reasonably certain of the intention to move to another state, register or report to the offender’s

designated law enforcement agency the address at which the offender will reside in the new jurisdiction.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203(a)(3). It further provides that “[f]ailure to timely report to the offender’s

designated law enforcement agency when the offender moves to another state” constitutes a violation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-208(9).

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The State asserts that “the State proved that the [D]efendant left his primary

residence in Madison County and never returned[,]” not only failing to report any of his

movements but also removing his GPS device, which evidenced “his refusal to comply

with his sex offender registry requirements and, more specifically, his reporting

obligation.” The State argues that “[f]rom these circumstances, a reasonable jury could

conclude that the [D]efendant intended to abandon and no longer reside at his primary

residence in Madison County after March 9, 2019, and thus, without timely reporting it,

either established or changed his primary residence to one in Lawrence County or

established a secondary residence in Mississippi.”

The State, however, did not introduce any GPS data at trial to show the Defendant’s

precise movements while he wore the GPS monitor or how much time he spent at an

address in Tennessee other than his registered Madison County address or how long he

spent in Mississippi. The only proof submitted by the State regarding moving to another

address in Tennessee was testimony from Officer Rudolph that the Defendant was in

Lawrenceburg for two days. Since the definition of primary residence requires that the

Defendant reside for at least five days at the in-state address, the State failed to establish

that the Defendant violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-203(a)(1). The

evidence at trial was similarly insufficient to show that the Defendant violated Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-39-203(a)(1) by establishing a secondary residence in

Tennessee or in Mississippi. There was no proof that the Defendant resided for 14 or more

days in the aggregate during any calendar year at a residence in Tennessee that was not his

primary residence, or that he routinely resided for 4 or more consecutive or nonconsecutive

days at a residence in Mississippi that was not his primary residence. As the State admitted

at oral argument, the Defendant could have also been indicted for violations of sections 40-

39-203(a)(3) and 208(a)(9), but the State chose not to charge or submit these alternative

theories to the jury. Since the indictment only alleged a violation of section 40-39-

203(a)(1), we must reverse and vacate the Defendant’s conviction in count two.

`

CONCLUSION

We agree with the Defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his felony

conviction of violating the sexual offender registry. Accordingly, we affirm the

Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for violating community supervision for life but

reverse and vacate his felony conviction for violating the sexual offender registry.

S/ JOHN W. CAMPBELL

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE

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