The opinion
[Cite as State ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2025-Ohio-1422.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Alphonso Mobley, Jr., :
Relator, : No. 22AP-541
v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Franklin County Board of Commissioners, :
Respondent. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on April 22, 2025
On brief: Alphonso Mobley, Jr., pro se.
On brief: [Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney,
Andrea C. Hofer, and Thomas W. Ellis, for respondent.
IN MANDAMUS
ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Relator Alphonso Mobley, Jr. who is incarcerated at Southeastern
Correctional Institution, has filed this original action in mandamus seeking a writ
compelling respondent Franklin County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) to comply
with his public records request made pursuant to R.C. 149.43. After Mobley filed this
action, the Board produced the records he requested. Although the Board’s action rendered
moot Mobley’s request for a writ compelling production of the records, Mobley seeks
statutory damages and court costs due to the Board’s delay in responding to his public
records request.
No. 22AP-541 2
{¶ 2} Mobley filed his petition for a writ of mandamus on September 7, 2022.
Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the matter
was referred to a magistrate. On October 17, 2022, the Board moved to dismiss, asserting
Mobley failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The Board asserted
Mobley’s claim was moot because it provided the requested records on October 5, 2022,
and because the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office had fulfilled an identical request on
July 6, 2022. The Board argued Mobley was not entitled to statutory damages because it
acted reasonably in denying his request as duplicative of an identical request previously
fulfilled by the prosecutor’s office and because Mobley did not suffer any loss of use from
the denial of his request. Mobley moved for default judgment on his claim for statutory
damages on October 27, 2022, admitting the underlying claim was moot because the Board
provided the requested records on October 5, 2022, but asserting the Board failed to answer
or otherwise defend against his claim for statutory damages. The Board filed a
memorandum in opposition to Mobley’s motion for default judgment, and on November 2,
2022, Mobley moved for leave to file a reply to the Board’s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 3} On January 10, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision, including findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommended this
court grant Mobley’s motion for leave to file a reply to the motion to dismiss, deny Mobley’s
motion for default judgment, and grant the Board’s motion to dismiss.
{¶ 4} On January 20, 2023, in an unrelated matter, the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas declared Mobley to be a vexatious litigator pursuant to R.C. 2323.52. State
ex rel. Mobley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2023-Ohio-3993, ¶ 6. Earlier that same
day, Mobley mailed his objections to the magistrate’s decision in this case; they were
received and filed on the docket on January 24, 2023. Id. On January 26, 2023, this court
sua sponte dismissed this case because Mobley filed objections to the magistrate’s decision
without filing an application for leave to proceed as a vexatious litigator. Id. On January 27,
2023, Mobley mailed a motion for leave to proceed under R.C. 2323.52(F)(2); that motion
was received and filed on the docket on January 31, 2023.
{¶ 5} Mobley appealed the January 26, 2023 dismissal order to the Supreme Court
of Ohio. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this court for consideration of
Mobley’s motion for leave. Id. at ¶ 17. Following the remand order, on November 28, 2023,
No. 22AP-541 3
Mobley moved for leave to proceed under R.C. 2323.52(F)(2) and filed a second set of
objections to the magistrate’s decision. On remand from the Supreme Court, this court
granted Mobley’s January 31 and November 28, 2023 motions for leave to proceed, and the
matter is now before us on Mobley’s January 24 and November 28, 2023 objections to the
magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 6} Mobley’s first objections were not clearly enumerated, but his memorandum
in support appears to set forth the following three objections:
[I.] Magistrate failed as a matter of law when it failed to
presume injury, where Respondent did fail to provide any
legal authority to support its denial, pursuant to R.C.
149.43(B)(3).
[II.] Magistrate opines that the two County Offices in the
instant case are in sufficient privity with one another as to
eliminate the need for both to respond to multiple requests for
the same public documents from the same requester. Relying
on State ex rel. Cushion v. City of Massillon, 2011-Ohio-4749
[(5th Dist.)].
[III.] Magistrate opines that Respondent reasonably relied on
State ex rel. Cushion, to deny Relator public records as a
duplicate request. Therefore, Respondent complied with R.C.
149.43(B)(3) and Relator isn’t entitled to full statutory
damages.
{¶ 7} In his second set of objections, Mobley set forth the following five objections:
[I.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin County
Prosecutor and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners
are separate entities established by the laws of this state for
the exercise of a function of government, specifically Chapters
309 and 305 of the revised code. Therefore, both offices meet
the statutory definition of “public office,” pursuant to R.C.
149.011(A). State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ. Co. v. Bodiker,
134 Ohio App.3d 415, 423 [(10th Dist.)]. Moreover, the
General Assembly has apparently rejected such policy-based
preferences among public records custodians, in that R.C.
149.011(A) classifies as a public office “any” entity which
otherwise satisfies the statutory definition.
[II.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin
County Board of Commissioners may sue and be sued
pursuant to R.C. 305.12.
No. 22AP-541 4
[III.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the record
requested by Relator is by law received by the Franklin
County Board of Commissioners pursuant to R.C. 309.16, and
both meets the definition of record pursuant to R.C.
149.011(G) and is the property of the Franklin County Board
of Commissioners once received, pursuant to R.C. 149.351(A).
[IV.] The Magistrate failed to consider that the Franklin
County Board of Commissioners and the Franklin County
Prosecutor both have their own records retention schedules
created by the county records commission pursuant to R.C.
149.38.
[V.] The magistrate mistakenly invokes privity among the
Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office and the Franklin County
Board of Commissioner’s where neither the law or public
policy allows privity. See 149.43(A)(1) “Public record means
records kept by any public office.”
(Emphasis in original.)
{¶ 8} As explained above and in the magistrate’s decision, Mobley concedes his
mandamus claim is moot with respect to the records sought in his request. Therefore, only
his claims for statutory damages and court costs remain.
{¶ 9} All of Mobley’s objections relate to the magistrate’s conclusion that he was
not entitled to statutory damages because the Board’s initial refusal to provide the
requested records was based on reasonable reliance on case law. Therefore, we will address
all of Mobley’s objections together.
{¶ 10} The Public Records Act “allows a relator to recover $100 for each business
day during which the respondent failed to comply with the Public Records Act, beginning
on the date that the relator files a mandamus action to compel production of the public
records,” up to a maximum award of $1,000. State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr.
Inst., 2023-Ohio-1177, ¶ 47, citing R.C. 149.43(C)(2). The “ ‘requester shall be entitled to
recover’ statutory damages if (1) [he] submitted a written request ‘by hand delivery,
electronic submission, or certified mail,’ (2) the request ‘fairly describe[d] the public record
or class of public records,’ and (3) ‘a court determines that the public office or the person
responsible for public records failed to comply with an obligation’ imposed by R.C.
149.43(B).” Id., quoting R.C. 149.43(C)(2). However, the Public Records Act further
No. 22AP-541 5
provides that a court may reduce or not award statutory damages if it determines that
“based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law” as of the time of the
alleged failure to comply with an obligation imposed by R.C. 149.43(B) “a well-informed
public office . . . reasonably would believe that the conduct . . . of the public office . . . did
not constitute a failure to comply” and that “a well-informed public office . . . reasonably
would believe that the conduct . . . of the public office . . . would serve the public policy that
underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct.” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a)
and (b). “These provisions require that the [public office’s] ‘conduct’ in violating R.C.
149.43(B)(2) ‘had a reasonable basis in legal authority and public policy.’ ” State ex rel.
Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2023-Ohio-3382, ¶ 44, quoting State ex rel. Armatas
v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶ 28.
{¶ 11} The Board denied Mobley’s public records request on grounds it was a
duplicate of a request that the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office had fulfilled on July 6,
2022. Therefore, for purposes of determining whether Mobley is entitled to statutory
damages, the question is whether it was reasonable for the Board to believe it could reject
Mobley’s request of the particular record on that basis.1 The magistrate concluded the
Board could have reasonably relied on the decision in State ex rel. Cushion v. Massillon,
2011-Ohio-4749 (5th Dist.), in denying Mobley’s request.
{¶ 12} In Cushion, an individual sent identical public records requests to the law
director, auditor, and mayor of the city of Massillon. Cushion at ¶ 2, 13. Initially, the law
director and the auditor responded to the request by letter, but the mayor did not respond.
Id. at ¶ 14. After the requester filed a mandamus complaint, the law director sent a letter
indicating that his prior response was intended to be on behalf of all three offices. Id. at
¶ 16. The trial court concluded the offices had failed to produce certain records and
1 See State ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police Forensic Lab., 2021-Ohio-4487, ¶ 14 (“The question then, is whether
it was reasonable for the [respondent] to believe that it could reject the entire request for noncompliance with
R.C. 149.43(B)(8) without parsing the individual requests to see if any fell outside the scope of that
provision.”). In Ellis, the Supreme Court considered a public office’s assertion, as grounds for denying a public
records request, of R.C. 149.43(B)(8) which excuses a public office from having to provide a record when it
relates to a criminal proceeding. The court cautioned that a public office may not apply a “blanket rule that
an office or official may disregard an entire request when [only] a portion thereof is subject to [the grounds
for denial].” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 15. The court held it was necessary to “[parse] the individual
requests to see if any [fall] outside the scope [of the grounds for denial].” Id. at ¶ 14. We note that in the case
before us, our ruling addresses one particular document as described in more detail in paragraph 14 of this
decision.
No. 22AP-541 6
awarded statutory damages to the requester. Id. at ¶ 34-36. In relevant part, the requester
argued on appeal that each of the three offices had an independent obligation to respond
on its own behalf to the public records request, and that each of the three offices should
have individually provided the documents he sought. Id. at ¶ 81. The Fifth District Court
of Appeals rejected that argument, noting the law director’s letter clarifying that his original
response was meant to be on behalf of all three offices and concluding there was no case
law or other legal authority to support the assertion that each of the three offices had an
independent duty to provide the requested records. Id. at ¶ 85-86. The Fifth District’s
decision was appealed, but the Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction. 01/18/2012
Case Announcements, 2012-Ohio-136.
{¶ 13} In addition to the Cushion decision, we also note that the Supreme Court has
stated that “public offices are not required to respond to duplicative public-records
requests.” State ex rel. Adkins v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept., 2024-Ohio-5154,
¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v.
Summerville, 2009-Ohio-4090, ¶ 6.
{¶ 14} Mobley’s request to the Board sought a paper copy of the Franklin County
Prosecutor’s statement to the Board pursuant to R.C. 309.16 for the year 2020. That
statute, which subsequently has been repealed, required the prosecuting attorney to make
an annual statement to the board of county commissioners specifying the following
information:
(1) The number of criminal prosecutions pursued to final
conviction and sentence under his official care, during the year
next preceding the time of making such statement. In such
statement the prosecuting attorney shall name the parties to
each prosecution, the amount of fine assessed in each case, the
number of recognizances forfeited, and the amount of money
collected in each case.
(2) With respect to the offenses set forth in sections 2909.02
and 2909.03 of the Revised Code, such statement shall also
include the following information:
(a) The number of fires occurring in the county for which the
state fire marshal or an assistant state fire marshal has
determined there was evidence sufficient to charge a person
with aggravated arson or arson;
No. 22AP-541 7
(b) The number of cases under sections 2909.02 and 2909.03
of the Revised Code presented by the prosecuting attorney to
the grand jury for indictment;
(c) The number of indictments under such sections returned by
the grand jury;
(d) The number of cases under such sections prosecuted either
by indictment or by information by the prosecuting attorney;
(e) The number of cases under such sections resulting in final
conviction and sentence and the number of cases resulting in
acquittals;
(f) The number of cases under such sections dismissed or
terminated without a final adjudication as to guilt or innocence.
Former R.C. 309.16(A), repealed in 2021 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 16, Section 3.
{¶ 15} Thus, the record that Mobley sought from the Board was a report prepared
and submitted t0 the Board by the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office. Mobley does not
deny that he requested and received the same record from the prosecutor’s office a month
prior to filing his request with the Board. Mobley ultimately received the requested records
from the Board after filing this case and does not argue there was any difference between
the documents he received from the prosecutor’s office and those he received from the
Board.
{¶ 16} Under the circumstances in this case, where the Franklin County Prosecutor’s
Office created the records sought and submitted those records to the Board pursuant to a
statutory mandate, and where Mobley received a copy of the same records from the
prosecutor’s office only a month before submitting his request to the Board, the magistrate
properly concluded that Mobley was not entitled to statutory damages because a well-
informed public office could reasonably believe that denying Mobley’s request did not
violate the Public Records Act based on existing case law. See Cushion, 2011-Ohio-4749, at
¶ 85-86. See also State ex rel. Brown v. N. Lewisburg, 2013-Ohio-3841, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.)
(“Under the totality of the facts and circumstances in this case, we find it would not be
unreasonable for Respondents, the custodians of the records requested, to have believed
that Brown was not entitled to duplicative, voluminous copies of records to which the
testimony in this matter demonstrates she has access at each Village council meeting.”).
No. 22AP-541 8
Therefore, the magistrate did not err in recommending this court deny Mobley’s request
for statutory damages. Accordingly, we overrule Mobley’s eight objections.
{¶ 17} Upon review of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of the
record, and due consideration of Mobley’s objections, we find the magistrate has properly
determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law, except that we substitute
our analysis of the facts of this case for the magistrate’s analysis in paragraph 37 and find
that the magistrate need not have relied on the concept of privity in paragraph 38 when
concluding that the Board reasonably relied on Cushion to deny Mobley’s request. We
therefore overrule Mobley’s eight objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopt the
magistrate’s decision as our own, with the exception of paragraph 37 and the penultimate
sentence of paragraph 38, which states “Similarly, the two city offices in Cushion and the
two county offices in the present case are in sufficient privity with one another so as to
eliminate the need for both to respond to multiple requests for the same public documents
from the same requester.” Mobley is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, statutory damages,
or court costs. Accordingly, we grant Mobley’s motion for leave to file a reply to the Board’s
motion to dismiss, grant the board’s motion to dismiss, and deny Mobley’s motion for
default judgment.
Relator’s motion for leave to file reply brief granted;
respondent's motion to dismiss granted;
relator’s motion for default judgment denied.
EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-541 9
APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State ex rel. Alphonso Mobley Jr., :
Relator, :
v. : No. 22AP-541
Franklin County Board of Commissioners, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Respondent. :
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Rendered on January 10, 2023
Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se.
G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea C. Hofer,
for respondent.
IN MANDAMUS
ON MOTIONS
{¶ 18} Relator, Alphonso Mobley Jr., has filed this original action seeking a writ of
mandamus ordering respondent, Franklin County Board of Commissioners, to comply with
his requests for public records made pursuant to R.C. 149.43. Respondent has filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Relator has also filed an October 27, 2022,
motion for default judgment and a November 2, 2022, motion for leave to file reply to
motion to dismiss.
Findings of Fact:
{¶ 19} 1. Relator is a prisoner incarcerated at Southeastern Correctional Institution.
No. 22AP-541 10
{¶ 20} 2. The Franklin County Board of Commissioners is a governmental agency
that is the administrative head of Franklin County.
{¶ 21} 3. In his petition for writ of mandamus, relator alleges that respondent, in
bad faith, failed to produce public records pursuant to his request for "Prosecutor
Statement, pursuant to R.C. 309.16 for year 2020." Respondent received the request via
certified mail on August 15, 2022.
{¶ 22} 4. In his petition, relator alleges that respondent denied the request in a letter
postmarked August 19, 2022, for the reason that it was a duplicate of one that the Franklin
County Prosecutor's Office already fulfilled for relator on July 6, 2022.
{¶ 23} 5. On September 7, 2022, relator filed the present petition for writ of
mandamus, in which he claimed ODRC failed to comply with his public-records request
pursuant to R.C. 149.43.
{¶ 24} 6. On October 5, 2022, respondent provided the requested record to relator.
{¶ 25} 7. On October 17, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
{¶ 26} 8. On October 27, 2022, relator filed a motion for default judgment.
{¶ 27} 9. On November 2, 2022, relator filed a motion for leave to file reply to
motion to dismiss, which the magistrate hereby grants.
Conclusions of Law:
{¶ 28} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily
show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent
to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). However, relators in
public-records mandamus cases need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. State ex rel. ACLU of Ohio v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128
Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112
Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, ¶ 41.
{¶ 29} A "public record" is a record "kept by any public office." R.C. 149.43(A)(1).
R.C. 149.43(B)(1) provides that the public office must "promptly prepare" all records
responsive to a public-records request within a "reasonable period of time." The phrase
"reasonable period of time" is not defined in the statute, but the " ' "determination of what
No. 22AP-541 11
is 'reasonable' depends upon all the pertinent facts and circumstances." ' " State ex rel.
Stuart v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 11, 2020-Ohio-3685, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Kesterson v.
Kent State Univ., 156 Ohio St.3d 13, 2018-Ohio-5108, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati
Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-Ohio-8195, ¶ 23.
{¶ 30} When a public office withholds responsive records, it has the burden of
showing that the records are statutorily exempted from disclosure. State ex rel. Cincinnati
Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, paragraph two of the
syllabus. Denial of a public-records request is appropriate if the public record is fully
exempt from mandatory disclosure, but if a public record is fully exempt from mandatory
disclosure, the public-records custodian must provide the requester with an explanation,
including legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied. R.C. 149.43(B)(3).
Exceptions to disclosure are strictly construed against the public office withholding the
records. Id.
{¶ 31} A party who believes that a request for a public record has been improperly
denied may file a mandamus action in order to compel production of the record.
R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). See State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio
State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, ¶ 6. The requester must
establish by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the records and a
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide them. See State ex
rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 392, 2015-Ohio-974, ¶ 10.
R.C. 149.43(C)(1) permits a party aggrieved by the failure of the public office to promptly
prepare a public record to receive statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) in the amount
of $100 for each business day during which the public office failed to comply with the
obligation under R.C. 149.43(B)(1), beginning with the day on which the requester files a
mandamus action to recover statutory damages, up to a maximum of $1,000.
{¶ 32} However, a court may reduce or not award statutory damages if it finds
(1) that "a well-informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that the conduct * * *
that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation" imposed by R.C. 149.43(B)
did not constitute such a failure "based on the ordinary application of statutory law and
case law as it existed at the time of the conduct," R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), and (2) that "a well-
informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that [its] conduct * * * would serve the
No. 22AP-541 12
public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct," R.C.
149.43(C)(2)(b).
{¶ 33} In the present case, relator has admitted that respondent has now fulfilled his
public-records request, and, therefore, that issue is moot. However, relator contends that
he is still entitled to statutory damages, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2), because he made his
public-records request by certified mail, and respondent failed to make the public records
available to relator within a reasonable time.
{¶ 34} Respondent counters that relator is not entitled to statutory damages because
it complied with its obligation under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) by responding to relator's public-
records request and giving a reason for the denial, as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(3).
Furthermore, respondent contends that, even if it failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(1),
relator is still not entitled to statutory damages because its failure to initially provide relator
with the requested records─on the grounds that the request was duplicative of the identical
request fulfilled by the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office─was made upon a reasonable
reliance of case law, citing State ex rel. Cushion v. Massillon, 5th Dist. No. 2010CA00199,
2011-Ohio-4749.
{¶ 35} In Cushion, the requester sent identical public-records requests to the law
director, auditor, and mayor for the city of Massillon. The law director and auditor
responded. The requester filed a mandamus action, alleging the law director and auditor
did not fully comply with the request, and the mayor did not respond at all. The law director
then sent a letter to the requester clarifying that his original response was on behalf of all
three respondents. The mayor sent a letter indicating that he had none of the requested
documents in his possession, and the law director's and auditor's responses were on his
behalf. The court denied the writ of mandamus, awarded statutory damages for the
respondents' failure to promptly make certain records available, and denied the request for
attorney fees. On appeal, in pertinent part, the requester argued that the law director,
auditor, and mayor were each individually and independently required to provide him with
the documents that he requested. However, the court held that the three public-records
requests stated the same thing, there was no need for each office of the city of Massillon to
send the exact same documents, and the requester did not experience a "loss of use"
because the city officials provided the documents they possessed.
No. 22AP-541 13
{¶ 36} Relator, here, counters Cushion by arguing that the Supreme Court of Ohio
has held that " '[n]othing in the text of the Public Records Act excuses a public office from
its duty to supply records upon a showing that the requester has obtained the record from
a third party.' " State ex rel. Horton v. Kilbane, 167 Ohio St.3d 413, 2022-Ohio-205, ¶ 21,
quoting State ex rel. Summers v. Fox, 163 Ohio St.3d 217, 2020-Ohio-5585, ¶ 39 (finding
that the fact that the relator may already have received some of the requested records from
another source does not render the requests moot).
{¶ 37} As explained above, respondent in the present case asserts that it complied
with its obligation under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) by responding to relator's public-records
request and giving a reason for the denial, consistent with R.C. 149.43(B)(3). However, the
magistrate finds that, even if respondent failed to comply with its obligation under R.C.
149.43(B)(1) and (3), relator is not entitled to statutory damages because respondent's
failure to initially provide relator with the requested records was made upon a reasonable
reliance of the case law in Cushion. The court in Cushion held when a requester requests
identical public records from different public offices within the same city, there is no need
for each office to send the exact same documents, and the requester experiences no "loss of
use." The present case presents an analogous scenario. That is, relator made a public-
records request to the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office, which fulfilled the request, and
then made the same public-records request to an office in the same county, the Franklin
County Board of Commissioners. Based upon an ordinary application of Cushion, a well-
informed public office could reasonably believe that if another county office has already
fulfilled an identical public-records request from the same requester, the public office is not
required to fulfill an identical request, and such would serve the public policy that underlies
the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct.
{¶ 38} The two cases relator relies upon, Horton and Summers, are inapposite to
Cushion and the circumstances here. In Horton, the two public offices (the city and the city
police chief) unsuccessfully argued that the requester did not suffer any delay in receiving
the public record because the law firm representing the requester had already received the
same public record pursuant to a request the firm sent on behalf of another
client/requester. In Summers, the two public offices (county sheriff and county prosecuting
attorney) unsuccessfully argued that the requester's request for public records was moot
No. 22AP-541 14
because the requester already had possession of the public record via another requester
who had obtained the same public record from the county prosecutor of a different county.
The situations in Horton and Summers are clearly different than those in Cushion and the
present case. In Horton and Summers, the "third party" that provided the requester with
the same public record as requested from the public office was a private party wholly
unrelated to the public office. In Cushion and the present case, however, the "third party"
who initially provided the requester with the public record was a public official from the
same governmental unit: in Cushion, the city; and in the present case, the county. The
Supreme Court has found that a requester is not entitled to multiple responses from the
same public office to duplicate requests made for the same records. See Bello v. Ohio Dept.
of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2020-00129PQ, 2020-Ohio-4559, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel.
Laborers Internatl. Union, Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 122 Ohio St.3d 1234,
2009-Ohio-4090, ¶ 6. Similarly, the two city offices in Cushion and the two county offices
in the present case are in sufficient privity with one another so as to eliminate the need for
both to respond to multiple requests for the same public documents from the same
requester. Therefore, Horton and Summers are distinguishable from Cushion and the
present case.
{¶ 39} For these reasons, the magistrate finds that relator is not entitled to statutory
damages pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C) because, even if respondent did not comply with its
obligation by responding to relator's public-records request and giving a reason for the
denial, as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(3), respondent's failure to initially provide relator
with the requested records on the grounds that the request was duplicative of the identical
request fulfilled by the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office was made upon a reasonable
reliance of case law.
{¶ 40} Furthermore, relator's motion for default judgment must also be denied
because Civ.R. 55(D) prohibits a court from entering default judgment against a political
subdivision unless the claimant establishes his right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court, and relator, here, has failed to do so.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, it is the magistrate's decision that the court grant respondent's
motion to dismiss relator's petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), deny
No. 22AP-541 15
relator's motion for default judgment, and grant relator's motion for leave to file reply to
motion to dismiss.
/S/ MAGISTRATE
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or
legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),
unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual
finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).