A.K. v. COUNCIL ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

A.K., by and through her parent C.K., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 25-294

COUNCIL ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Pappert, J. April 17, 2025

MEMORANDUM

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act offers states federal funding to

help provide a free appropriate public education to children with disabilities. To be

eligible for funds, states must comply with a variety of statutory requirements. One

requirement provides that a FAPE must be “available to all children with disabilities

residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive,” unless this requirement

“would be inconsistent with State law or practice . . . respecting the provision of public

education” to children “aged 3 through 5 and 18 through 21.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).

The Plaintiffs — four students who qualify as children with disabilities under

the IDEA, and their parents — sued Council Rock and Central Bucks School Districts,

where the students attend school. Plaintiffs claim that Pennsylvania provides “public

education” that, under § 1412(a)(1), entitles the students to receive a FAPE from the

Districts until they turn twenty-two. Nonetheless, they allege, the Districts have

threatened to terminate their FAPEs at the end of the school years in which they turn

twenty-one. Council Rock and Central Bucks move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe, are barred by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and were not first exhausted in administrative

proceedings. The Districts also argue that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.

The Court grants both motions. Although neither Rooker-Feldman nor the

exhaustion requirement apply, no Plaintiff has alleged an injury-in-fact that supports

Article III standing or shown that their claim is ripe. The Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction and dismisses the Complaint without prejudice.

I

A

The IDEA is intended to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available

to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and

related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further

education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To that

end, the law provides federal funds to states that satisfy its requirements concerning

the provision of a FAPE to children with disabilities. Id. § 1412. One such requirement

is that a FAPE be “available to all children with disabilities residing in the State

between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive.” Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). However, this

requirement does not apply to children between three and five years old, and between

eighteen and twenty-one years old, if “its application to those children would be

inconsistent with State law or practice . . . respecting the provision of public education

to children in those age ranges.” Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i).

To demonstrate their funding eligibility, states must annually provide to the

federal Secretary of Education plans reflecting the implementation of “policies and

procedures” that satisfy the IDEA. Id. § 1412(a). State educational agencies (SEAs),

which include state boards and departments of education, see id. § 1401(32), are

charged with enacting such policies and submitting these plans, id. § 1412(a)(11).

SEAs are also responsible for disbursing money to local educational agencies, which are

eligible for federal funds if they submit plans to the SEA that are, inter alia, “consistent

with” the state’s IDEA-compliant policies and procedures. Id. § 1413(a).

The Pennsylvania Department of Education adopted the federal regulations

implementing the IDEA. 22 Pa. Code § 14.102(a); Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Mumin, 317

A.3d 1077, 1085 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024). Those regulations, inter alia, restate the

IDEA’s requirement that funding recipients provide a FAPE to children between the

ages of three and twenty-one, 34 C.F.R. § 300.101, the exception to that requirement for

children of a certain age, id. § 300.102, and the submission requirements for SEAs and

LEAs, id. §§ 300.100, 300.200. To help ensure that LEAs are meeting state and federal

standards for the education of children with disabilities, the Department created a

Model Policy to distribute to LEAs. Mumin, 317 A.3d at 1085–86. The Department

deems an LEA’s acceptance and adoption of the Model Policy to, in part, fulfill the

requirement of 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.200. Id. at 1086.1

Until 2023, the Model Policy stated that “[Pennsylvania] is required to make [a]

FAPE available to a child with a disability to the end of the school term in which the

student reaches his/her 21st birthday.” Mumin, 317 A.3d at 1087 (citation omitted)

(alterations in original) (hereinafter, the “Old Policy”). In August of 2023, pursuant to a

class action settlement, the Department agreed to rewrite the Model Policy to require

1 The Department’s current Model Policy is available online. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of

Ed., Individs. with Disabilities Ed. Act Part B Policies and Procedures under 34 CFR §§ 300.101–

300.176, (Rev. Aug. 30, 2023), https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/education/

documents/instruction/special-education/ideia-idea/ideab.pdf.

that children with disabilities be provided a FAPE until their twenty-second birthday.

Mumin, 317 A.3d at 1088 (hereinafter, the “New Policy”).

Shortly thereafter, the Pennsylvania Association of School Boards and several

individual school districts, including Central Bucks School District, sued the

Department, claiming that the New Policy “illegally requires Pennsylvania LEAs to

provide a FAPE until a student’s 22nd birthday” and that the Department’s

promulgation of the New Policy was improper as a matter of state administrative law.

Id. at 1090. On May 16, 2024, the Commonwealth Court held that because the

Department failed to promulgate the New Policy in the manner proscribed by state law,

the New Policy was void ab initio. Id. at 1106.

The Department then appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see (Docket Sheet, Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Mumin, 39 MAP

2024 (Pa.)), resulting in an automatic supersedeas, see Pa. R. App. P. 1736. Central

Bucks filed a petition for relief from the supersedeas with the Commonwealth Court in

July of 2024, which is still pending. (Docket Sheet, Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Mumin, 409

MD 2023 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) at 14). In November of 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court granted oral argument on three questions. (Oral Argument Order, ECF No. 8-2.)

And in March of 2025, the Department published a notice inviting public comment on

revisions to the state plan and Model Policy to bring them into compliance with the

Department’s interpretation of state and federal law. 55 Pa. Bull. 2280–81 (March 22,

2025). That revision would “extend FAPE to students with disabilities until their 22nd

birthday, rather than ending services at the conclusion of the school term in which they

turn 21 years of age.” Id.

B

In January of this year, Plaintiffs — two students who attend high school within

Council Rock School District, two who attend high school within Central Bucks School

District, and the students’ parents — filed this lawsuit against their respective school

districts. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)2 The Plaintiffs allege that the Districts “adopted a

policy” of terminating students’ FAPE at the end of the school year in which the

students turn twenty-one, “attempted to cut off” services for A.K. and B.J. in

accordance with that policy, and “publicly and repeatedly” restated their position on the

IDEA’s requirements. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Districts’ policy

violates the IDEA and that their “actions will deprive Plaintiffs of up to a year of a

FAPE at a critical juncture of their lives,” thereby causing “severe, irreparable harm.”

(Id. ¶¶ 6–8, 13.)

All four Student-Plaintiffs have been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder

and other intellectual or learning disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 80, 86, 99.) They attend

specialized programs within the Districts that provide vocational training as well as

academic and life skills instruction aimed at helping students successfully transition to

post-school life. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 80, 87, 99.)

2 Rule 10(a) provides that “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(a) (emphasis added). Yet here, the Complaint’s caption names only the children, while the

body of the Complaint names both the children and their parents as parties. Compare (Compl. p. 1),

with, e.g., (id. ¶¶ 17, 21, 25, 29). The Court could therefore ignore any alleged plaintiff not named in

the caption. See Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2022). However, because “the

Complaint provided Defendants adequate notice that the parents were asserting their own rights in

addition to those of their children, Plaintiffs’ claims involving the rights of the parents are properly

before us.” Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 406 n.4 (6th

Cir. 2019) (“Errors in captions are common and need not be viewed as fatal defects. . . . Our

touchstone is adequate notice, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence a clear preference

to resolve disputes on their merits.”) (cleaned up).

A.K. attends a program in Council Rock and will turn twenty-two in May of this

year. (Id. ¶¶ 70–71.) Plaintiffs allege that after the Commonwealth Court released its

Mumin decision in May of 2024, Council Rock emailed A.K.’s mother, C.K., to notify her

that the decision “requires that your child graduate at the conclusion of the current

school term.” (Id. ¶ 72.) After the decision was stayed on appeal, Council Rock

allegedly sent C.K. another email, this time notifying her of the stay and stating that

the school district “will be working to ensure that your children will continue to receive

services through this time of uncertainty.” (Id. ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs state that if A.K. is

“age[d] out” of the program before she turns twenty-two, she “will experience disruption

and regression that will significantly impede her future.” (Id. ¶ 77.) They further

maintain that both A.K. and her mother have been “left . . . in a state of precarity and

instability,” with the uncertainty about A.K.’s FAPE eligibility “mak[ing] it extremely

difficult for A.K. to prepare for the transition and for C.K. to determine when

alternative supports and services need to be in place.” (Id. ¶ 78.)

V.S., also at Council Rock, will turn twenty-one in August of this year. (Id.

¶¶ 80–81.) Council Rock allegedly told S.S., V.S.’s parent, that her services “may be

terminated” after the current school year finishes. (Id. ¶ 82.) Plaintiffs allege the

“uncertainty” of V.S.’s continued education at Council Rock has “made it extremely

difficult for S.S. to plan for V.S.’s next steps and to explain to V.S. what the future holds

for her” and that S.S. “is becoming increasingly concerned about how to help V.S.

prepare for a sudden disruption” in support. (Id. ¶ 84.)

B.J. attends a program in Central Bucks and will turn twenty-two in June of this

year. (Id. ¶¶ 87–88.) According to Plaintiffs, in March of 2024, B.J.’s Individualized

Education Program (“IEP”) team “agreed that [he] would remain [in Central Bucks]

until the end of the 2024-2025 school year,” but two months later, the school district

emailed his parent, J.J., to say that the Mumin decision “requires that your child

graduate at the conclusion of the current school year.” (Id. ¶ 89–90.) Then, several

days later, J.J. received another email from Central Bucks, stating that the stay “may

allow” the Department to enforce the New Policy and that B.J. “will not be exited from

special education services at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 school term as previously

communicated.” (Id. ¶ 91.) In support of the allegation that Central Bucks intends to

resume the Old Policy as soon as possible, Plaintiffs highlight Central Bucks’s

application for relief of the stay, which represented that absent relief, students could

“enter the 2024-25 school year with no idea of when their special education services

may end.” (Id. ¶ 95.) And Plaintiffs explain that B.J. “is still on the waitlist” for

appropriate adult day programs and that his reliance on the Central Bucks team “to

help him gradually transition” to such a program means that being “forced to exit

Central Bucks without any advance warning or preparation” would likely result in his

being “homebound and isolated.” (Id. ¶ 97.)

C.B., also at Central Bucks, will turn twenty-two in March of 2028, so under the

Old Policy, her services will be terminated following the 2026-2027 school year. (Id.

¶¶ 99–101.) L.B., C.B.’s parent, believes that the support she would receive “over the

next three years [is] essential to her post-school success” and is worried that if Central

Bucks terminates C.B.’s services “before she is ready, . . . she will experience significant

regression, isolation, and depression.” (Id. ¶ 102.) Plaintiffs further note that L.B.

“needs time” to identify future support services for C.B. but because of the uncertainty

surrounding the duration of her FAPE, does not know when those supports will need to

be in place. (Id. ¶ 103.)

II

The Districts moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). Because the Districts filed their motions attacking subject-matter jurisdiction

before answering the complaint or otherwise presenting competing facts, their motions

are a facial, not factual, attack. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358

(2014). A facial attack “considers the claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient

to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Id. In other words, a facial

attack “contests the sufficiency of the pleadings,” and the court applies the same

standard of review used for considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. (citation omitted).

The plaintiff “must assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the

pleader has the right” to jurisdiction, but in evaluating those assertions the Court

must, as it would in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, “accept as true all material allegations

set forth in the complaint, and must construe those facts in favor of the nonmoving

party.” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2012)

(citations omitted). A court deciding a 12(b)(6) motion may consider only the complaint,

exhibits attached thereto, matters of public record and “undisputedly authentic

documents” on which the claims are based. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d

Cir. 2010). The same limits apply to a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1). See Giovanni

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 433 F. Supp. 3d 736, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2020).

III

Before considering the merits of a suit, the Court must determine whether the

action constitutes a case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. See

Wayne Land and Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 959 F.3d 569,

573–74 (3d Cir. 2020). The case-or-controversy requirement is enforced via several

doctrines, including standing and ripeness. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866

F.3d 534, 539 (3d Cir. 2017). Standing and ripeness, while not identical doctrines, often

overlap in many respects. See, e.g., Presbytery of New Jersey Orthodox Presbyterian

Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is of course true that if no

injury has occurred, the plaintiff can be told either that she cannot sue, or that she

cannot sue yet.”) (citation omitted).

Although the parties’ briefing focused solely on the Third Circuit’s unique test

for ripeness in the declaratory judgment context, the Court will first address standing.

Cf. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (“[F]ederal courts

have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their

jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the

parties either overlook or elect not to press.”); Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Att’y

General, 825 F.3d 149, 167 n.15 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding ripeness satisfied where

standing was met because in that case both issues “turn on whether the threat of future

harm . . . is sufficiently immediate”); Aichele, 757 F.3d at 368 n.25 (holding that

ripeness was satisfied for the reasons discussed in the standing analysis).

A

For a plaintiff to have Article III standing, she “must establish three elements:

(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the

defendant, and (3) that is likely redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Yaw v. Del.

River Basin Comm’n, 49 F.4th 302, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2022). The burden of establishing

standing rests with the plaintiff, who must “clearly allege facts demonstrating each

element.” Id. at 311 (cleaned up).3

1

To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III, plaintiffs must allege an

injury that is “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (citations omitted). When plaintiffs request

prospective relief “in the form of a declaratory judgment or an injunction, they must

show that they are likely to suffer from a future injury” that is imminent — that is, the

injury “is certainly impending rather than just merely possible.” Id. at 318 (cleaned

up); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future

injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art[icle] III.”). The harm need not be “literally

certain,” meaning a “substantial risk” of injury can suffice. See Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013). But an alleged future harm that relies upon a

“‘chain of contingencies’ amounting to ‘mere speculation’” will not support Article III

standing. Aichele, 757 F.3d at 364 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410); see also Thorne v.

Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 893 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Thorne posits only

3 Insofar as the Third Circuit has created a distinct declaratory-judgment standing test, that

test has “often [been] framed . . . as part of the injury-in-fact analysis,” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 365 n.22,

and is, for the reasons discussed below, not satisfied here.

an infinitesimal increase in her chances of being injured . . . so any risk of harm . . . is

no more than speculative.”).

Plaintiffs can also base prospective relief on past exposure to illegal conduct, so

long as they allege current negative effects flowing from that past exposure. See Yaw,

49 F.4th at 319; O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). Past injury can also

be used to predict future injury. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 59 (2024) (citing

O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96). But a plaintiff does not have standing simply because she

has expended funds in response to, or expressed fear of, a future harm that is not itself

imminent. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416; Aichele, 757 F.3d at 364 & n.21.

Here, Plaintiffs request forward-looking relief in the form of both a declaratory

judgment and a permanent injunction. (Compl. ¶ 9.) To support this request, they

allege a single harm: the possibility that the Student-Plaintiffs will be denied a FAPE

to which they are legally entitled. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 13, 110; Pl. Resp. in Opp. to Mot. to

Dismiss at 2, 18, ECF No. 14.).4

a

A.K. and B.J. will turn twenty-two in May and June, respectively. Because of

the supersedeas, they are not currently being denied a FAPE, and under their own

interpretation of the IDEA, are not entitled to services beyond their twenty-second

birthdays. Thus, for A.K., C.K., B.J. and J.J.’s alleged future injury — the denial of a

4 The Plaintiffs also allege the students’ programs are crucial to successful post-school

transitions, without which they will regress, (Compl. ¶¶ 77, 83, 97, 102), and that the Districts’

policy has created uncertainty that makes it difficult for their parents to prepare them for the future

and plan their next steps, (id. ¶¶78, 84, 102–03). Insofar as Plaintiffs contend that these allegations

constitute current harms based on their fear of the future loss of a FAPE, see (Pl. Resp. in Opp. to

Mot. to Dismiss at 2, 6), they must still demonstrate that this alleged future harm is imminent. The

Court’s analysis thus focuses on that alleged future harm.

FAPE before A.K. and B.J.’s twenty-second birthdays — to be imminent, they must at

least allege facts that support the conclusion that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is

likely to affirm the Commonwealth Court’s decision before their next birthdays. They

have not done so, nor could they. Oral argument was granted in November but has not

yet been held, nor has the date even been set despite the release of argument calendars

for April and May.5 And although Central Bucks petitioned the Commonwealth Court

for relief from the supersedeas in July of 2024, B.J. and J.J. allege no facts from which

the Court could infer that the petition would likely be granted, let alone that it would

be granted before B.J.’s next birthday. In sum, because the risk of future harm turns

on “pure speculation,” these four plaintiffs have not alleged an injury that satisfies the

actual-or-imminent requirement.

C.B. and L.B. also fail to satisfy the imminency requirement. C.B. does not turn

twenty-two until March of 2028. Thus, a state supreme court decision adverse to C.B.

would not result in the denial of the FAPE to which she alleges she is entitled for at

least two more years. While L.B. understandably prefers to know the maximum

duration of C.B.’s FAPE as soon as possible and “believes that the comprehensive

services and supports C.B. receives . . . over the next three years are essential to her

post-school success,” (Compl. ¶ 102), the possibility that C.B. will be denied a necessary

FAPE two years from now is too speculative and remote to satisfy the actual-or-

5 The state supreme court calendar is available online. Unified Jud. Sys. of Pa., Calendar,

https://www.pacourts.us/courts/supreme-court/calendar (last visited April 17, 2025) (providing links

to PDFs of daily argument lists). Argument does not appear to be scheduled again until September.

See id. Although the court can add arguments, id., Plaintiffs do not allege, or even speculate, that

the court will do so in this case.

imminent requirement, see (id. (alleging L.B. is worried about what will happen “if”

Central Bucks terminates services “before C.B. is ready”) (emphasis added).6

b

V.S., who turns twenty-one in August, appears at first glance to present a more

compelling case for imminent injury. Under the Old Policy, V.S.’s services would be

terminated at the end of the current school year, but under the New Policy — the one

currently in force due to the supersedeas — they would continue throughout the

upcoming 2025-26 school year. In contrast to the other Student-Plaintiffs, it is

fathomable that the state supreme court will release its decision in Mumin during that

time, i.e., a time when V.S. alleges she is entitled to services, which would immediately

bring about the future harm she alleges in this suit. V.S. thus appears to be at greater

risk than the other Student-Plaintiffs, though the speculative nature of this risk could

still be fatal to V.S.’s standing. And the more-likely timeline ultimately raises a more

6 The Plaintiffs do not clearly argue that their “uncertainty” harms are the ongoing effects of

past illegal conduct. And it might be difficult for them to argue that they experienced past illegal

conduct. They do not allege that the Student-Plaintiffs were ever denied the FAPE to which

Plaintiffs allege they are entitled. They do, however, allege that the Districts attempted to age-out

A.K. and B.J. in 2024. And their briefing points to the IDEA’s transition planning and post-school

goal provisions, arguing that the Districts’ actions “have impeded Plaintiffs’ right to this transition

planning” because they “cannot identify post-school goals if they do not know how long they will be

able to continue receiving the services that make those goals possible.” (Pl. Resp. in Opp. at 19

(pointing to Compl. ¶¶ 77–78, 83–84, 97, 102–03).)

Assuming these claims suffice to demonstrate past illegal conduct, Plaintiffs still have not

alleged injury-in-fact. First, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not offer “clear evidence” of any IDEA-related

harm. The supersedeas was in place before the current school year began. Plaintiffs do not allege

that the Districts failed to comply with the New Policy. And they offer no facts explaining how the

Districts’ disagreement with the New Policy has actually impacted the Student-Plaintiffs’

instruction, IEPs, etc., or the actual steps Plaintiffs have or have not taken because of the Districts’

alleged conduct. Second, for the Districts’ alleged threats and prior attempts to terminate services to

support any subjective or self-inflicted current and ongoing harm, Plaintiffs would need to show the

Districts’ allegedly unlawful planned course of conduct was imminently likely to be implemented.

This, as explained above, they cannot do.

fundamental problem: neither V.S. nor any of the other Plaintiffs can rely on the

possibility of an adverse decision in Mumin.

The United States Supreme Court has long “been reluctant to endorse standing

theories that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise

their judgment.” See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413. The fact that an independent

decisionmaker is in some manner related to the case need not pose an insurmountable

hurdle. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019)

(“Respondents’ theory of standing thus does not rest on mere speculation about the

decisions of third parties; it relies instead on the predictable effect of Government

action on the decisions of third parties.”). But the Supreme Court has been particularly

skeptical of basing injury on litigation outcomes: “It is just not possible for a litigant to

prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.”

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 159–60; see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413–14 (citing this

statement in the context of decisions by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court).

And here, the risk of harm to V.S. and the other Plaintiffs turns on the actions of

the state supreme court. Specifically, the risk turns on that court deciding to affirm the

Commonwealth Court’s state-law holding and not deciding — or not deciding in

Plaintiffs’ favor — whether the IDEA requires Pennsylvania LEAs that receive federal

funds to provide services to children with disabilities until their twenty-second

birthday. Even if it the Court were permitted to surmise that the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court is likely to affirm the unanimous en banc Commonwealth Court on the

specific issues it decided, the Court cannot begin to guess whether, or how, that court

will address the IDEA interpretive question.7 Ultimately, despite the differences in

V.S.’s circumstances compared to the other Student-Plaintiffs, V.S.’s loss of a FAPE —

the future harm that she must show is clearly impending or substantially likely — is

also too speculative to support standing.8

2

The second element of standing requires a plaintiff to show that her injury is

“fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct. Aichele, 757 F.3d at 360 (cleaned up).

This causation requirement is not a high bar; concurrent causation does not defeat the

requirement, and even “an indirect causal relationship will suffice, so long as there is a

fairly traceable connection” to the defendant. Id. at 366 (citation omitted). Here,

7 The Commonwealth Court considered only questions of state administrative law and said

nothing about the requirements of the IDEA. See Mumin, 317 A.3d at 1106 n.39. But the parties’

briefing at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offers competing views on whether 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1) requires Pennsylvania LEAs to provide a FAPE to students with disabilities until their

twenty-second birthday. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 22–25, 30–34, Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Mumin, 39

MAP 2024 (Pa.); Appellees’ Br. at 7–25, Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Mumin, 39 MAP 2024 (Pa.). Part of

this dispute revolves around whether the New Policy is already required by 22 Pa. Code § 14.102(a)

(incorporating the federal IDEA regulations), a question on which the state supreme court said it

would hear oral argument. (ECF No. 8-2.)

8 The specific circumstances in Whitmore — the case in which the Supreme Court expressed

significant skepticism of predicting litigation results — required a particularly high degree of

guesswork: the petitioner needed to obtain federal habeas relief and be convicted again upon retrial.

495 U.S. at 159–60. Perhaps such extreme circumstances would permit a distinction here, where

there is a unanimous, en banc decision by the lower court. But Clapper made no such distinction,

nor has any circuit court relied on one. See, e.g., Daker v. Carr, No. 20-13067, 2022 WL 1398119, at

*2 (11th Cir. May 3, 2022); Tennille v. Western Union Co., 809 F.3d 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2015); see also

Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 78 F.4th 929, 944 (6th Cir. 2023) (applying this principle to a university

disciplinary process). Regardless, the possibility that the state supreme court will address the IDEA

interpretation question that the Commonwealth Court did not answer means the Court would be

engaged in mere guesswork.

To be clear, the possibility that the state supreme court interprets the IDEA provision at

issue does not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction. While the state court’s specific holding could

raise non-jurisdictional issue preclusion questions, or jurisdictional mootness issues, there is no

jurisdictional bar to federal-court litigation of an issue pending before a state court. See, e.g., Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (“[P]endency of an action in the

state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having

jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).

regardless of the relationship between Plaintiffs’ alleged harm and the uncertainty

caused by the fact that Mumin is still pending, the risk the Student-Plaintiffs face is

ultimately due to the Districts’ alleged actions and policies, without which the students

would be assured of the continuance of a FAPE until their twenty-second birthdays.

Plaintiffs have thus satisfied the traceability requirement.

3

The redressability element requires a plaintiff to show that her injury “will be

‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111, 128 (3d Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted). “[T]o redress an injury-in-fact, a declaratory judgment must provide

conclusive resolution of a concrete controversy related to a prospective course of action

by one of the adverse parties.” Id. at 129.

Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning “prospective course[s] of action” are not robust.

B.J., J.J., C.B. and L.B. provide no hint as to what (if any) specific actions they are

currently taking in the absence of relief or would be taking were relief granted.

Nonetheless, at this stage, the Court can infer that the allegations concerning the

difficulties involved in both preparing A.K. and V.S. for an abrupt transition and

planning their next steps — which includes knowing when to implement alternative

services — mean that these students and their parents have plans that will be affected

by judgment in this case.9

9 Council Rock argues the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim because school districts cannot

provide them relief absent “policy guidance from [the Department],” which, as the party responsible

for supervising IDEA implementation and compliance in Pennsylvania, must be the party to provide

relief. (Def. Council Rock’s Mot. to Dismiss at 20–21, ECF No. 6.) These arguments are relevant to

the traceability and redressability elements of the standing analysis. See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri,

603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (“[I]t is a bedrock principle that a federal court cannot redress ‘injury that

results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.’”) (citation omitted); see

generally id. at 58–74 (discussing the problem of third-party conduct with respect to traceability and

redressability).

B

In evaluating whether declaratory judgment suits are ripe, courts apply a test

derived from Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.

1990), and examine three factors: “(1) the adversity of the parties’ interests, (2) the

conclusiveness of the judgment, and (3) the utility of the judgment.” Plains All Am.

Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 540 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).10 Plaintiffs

must clearly allege facts demonstrating the Court’s jurisdiction over a dispute. See

Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.

118, 127 (2007). Because no plaintiff here can satisfy the first ripeness factor, the case

is not justiciable.11

1

The first factor — adversity of interests — examines the plaintiff’s claim and

alleged harm. “[W]here harm will result if the declaratory judgment is not entered,”

But Plaintiffs allege the Districts have policies that, if implemented, would violate the IDEA,

and they are requesting individual, not statewide, relief. SEAs are responsible for overseeing IDEA

implementation and compliance, but that does not prevent IDEA beneficiaries from enforcing the

law against LEAs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing a private right of action against LEAs).

To obtain funding, LEAs must have policies “consistent with” SEA statewide policies, id.

§ 1413(a)(1), but they are not prohibited from going beyond those policies. Nor can they evade

responsibility under § 1415(i) for failing to comply with the IDEA by pointing to compliance with

SEA policies. Regardless of where the original error lies — with an SEA policy or an individual

LEA’s conduct — a court order directing an LEA to comply with the IDEA’s requirements would

redress its failure to do so.

10 The Third Circuit has explained that this test “differs in form” from the hardship-and-fitness

test in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) but amounts to the same inquiry. Plains,

866 F.3d at 540; see also NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 342 n.9

(3d Cir. 2001).

11 Whether the Step-Saver test enumerates factors rather than elements is unclear. Compare

Plains, 866 F.3d at 540 (using the label “factors” and noting that additional factors are sometimes

relevant) with Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local

Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If all three of these requirements are met, the

claim is ripe.”) (emphasis added). Absent caselaw providing guidance on how to weigh these three

issues relative to one another, the Court presumes all three are necessary for ripeness.

the parties’ interests are adverse. Plains, 866 F.3d at 541 (citation omitted). In

evaluating the plaintiff’s harm, the Court asks “[w]hether the claim involves uncertain

and contingent events, or presents a real and substantial threat of harm.” NE Hub

Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 342 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted). Although actions “based on a contingency” are unlikely to demonstrate

sufficient adversity, a plaintiff “need not suffer a completed harm” to establish

adversity because sometimes “present harms will flow from the threat of future

actions.” Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 1992).

In that case, the plaintiff must show “that the probability of that future event is real

and substantial, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant” a declaratory

judgment. Id. (cleaned up); see also Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020)

(“[T]he case must be ‘ripe’—not dependent on ‘contingent future events that may not

occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”) (quoting Texas v. United States,

523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)).

The fact that realization of Plaintiffs’ alleged harm (denial of a FAPE) rests on a

contingency (the outcome of Mumin) is not, alone, fatal. And the Plaintiffs’ argument

that the Districts will, if possible, enforce the Old Policy in the future, see, e.g., (Compl.

¶¶ 72, 90 (reproducing emails); id. ¶¶ 94–95 (discussing Central Bucks’s application for

relief)), weighs in their favor. Cf. Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 528 (3d Cir. 2006)

(finding that the disciplinary office’s refusal to tell the plaintiff he wouldn’t be subject to

penalties relevant to the adversity factor). But as discussed in Part III.A.1 above, the

Plaintiffs cannot show that a decision in Mumin is imminent or that there is a

substantial probability that the decision will not favor them. Without such a showing,

they cannot demonstrate the requisite adversity of interest.12

2

The second ripeness factor — conclusiveness of the judgment — concerns

“whether a declaratory judgment definitively would decide the parties’ rights.” NE

Hub, 239 F.3d at 344. It also concerns whether the decision would be aided by “further

factual development” or if the issue presented is instead “predominantly legal.” NE

Hub, 239 F.3d at 344; see also Plains, 866 F.3d at 543.

Here, judgment would be “sufficiently conclusive to define and clarify the legal

rights or relations of the parties.” Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648. Whether Plaintiffs are

entitled to a FAPE until they turn twenty-two is a purely legal question requiring

interpretation of federal and state law and no further factual development. Cf.

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412 (noting the need for a “concrete set of facts” and “factual

record” is less important for predominantly legal questions). Regardless of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ultimate decision on the pending issues in Mumin, a

judgment from this Court concerning whether federal law requires the Districts to

provide the Student-Plaintiffs a FAPE until their twenty-second birthdays would

conclusively determine the parties’ legal rights and relationship. Cf. NE Hub, 239 F.3d

at 344 (concluding the argument that the state regulatory process is preempted makes

the process’s possible outcome irrelevant for this factor); Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648

12 The Department’s decision to invite comment on a proposed change to the Model Policy has

no effect on the Article III justiciability analysis. If the Plaintiffs could demonstrate injury-in-fact

and adversity-of-interests absent that notice, the imminency of their harm would not be changed by

the fact that the Department invited comment on a change it could make at some point in the future.

(finding a judgment would not be conclusive because the parties would nonetheless

need to determine further legal issues).

3

The last ripeness factor — utility of the judgment — analyzes whether “the

parties’ plans of action are likely to be affected” by judgment and considers “the

hardship to the parties of withholding judgment.” Plains, 866 F.3d at 543 (quoting NE

Hub, 239 F.3d at 344–45); Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649. A case is not justiciable “unless

the court is convinced that by its action a useful purpose will be served,” and even

where judgment “would clarify the parties’ legal rights, it should ordinarily not be

granted unless the parties’ plans of action are likely to be affected” by the judgment.

Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 412 (cleaned up). Compare Plains, 866 F.3d at 544 (finding

plaintiff would take the same future steps regardless of whether judgment was

granted), with Surrick, 449 F.3d at 529 (crediting the district court’s findings that the

plaintiff had been deterred by the threat of government action and noting that

judgment would enable him to carry out his plans).

As discussed in Part III.A.3, the extent to which Plaintiffs’ future conduct would

be altered by judgment is unclear, and as indicated by the injury-in-fact analysis in

Part III.A.1, the Court cannot conclude that any plaintiff would suffer hardship absent

judgment. But again, at this stage, the Court can infer that A.K. and V.S.’s allegations

mean that these students and their parents will alter their conduct as a result of

judgment, supra Part III.A.3, thereby satisfying this factor. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v.

Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1155–56 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that “the record, at least

implicitly, reflect[ed]” that the counterclaimant, having lost on her claim that family-

provided services were compensable, would hire a professional to provide those services

instead if the court determined that was compensable).13

IV

The Districts also claim that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because of the Commonwealth

Court’s decision in Mumin. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits district courts from

exercising jurisdiction over a suit in which “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court;

(2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those

judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is

inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining &

Mineral Co. v. Fox Rotshchild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). The Districts’ argument fails for at least three reasons.

First, Plaintiffs do not complain of injuries caused by Mumin. The Plaintiffs’

claimed injury is the possibility that the Districts will deny them a FAPE. This injury

is independent of the state-court decision, which held only that the New Policy was void

ab initio and could not be enforced by the Department. The state court did not decide

what the IDEA’s age-related provisions demand in light of state-law public education

provisions, or require the Districts to follow either the Old Policy or the New Policy.

The decision thus did not prevent or resolve Plaintiffs’ alleged harm, but it also did not

13 This factor considers, to some extent, the utility of the judgment to defendants as well as

plaintiffs. See, e.g., Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 423 (“[A] declaratory judgment would have no significant

effect on either plaintiffs’ or defendants’ course of conduct.”); NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 345 (“The

Declaratory Judgments Act was enacted to clarify legal relationships so that plaintiffs (and possibly

defendants) could make responsible decisions about the future.”) (citation omitted). But Plaintiffs’

attempt to claim that “both parties’ plans of action would be directly impacted,” (Pl. Resp. in Opp. at

28) is unavailing here, as they have alleged no facts to support that statement, see (id.) (citing the

Complaint for effects on the Plaintiffs, but not the Districts).

cause it. Cf. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 167 (observing that a plaintiff

who brought a federal-court employment-discrimination suit after losing a state-court

suit on the same claims would be alleging harm from the employer’s conduct rather

than the state court’s failure to rule in plaintiff’s favor).

Second, Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to review and reject the

Commonwealth Court’s decision. They are asking the Court to determine a question

about obligations under the IDEA, an issue the Commonwealth Court expressly

avoided. Mumin, 317 A.3d at 1106 n.39 (“This Court does not decide whether the New

Age-Out Plan is necessary for the Department to comply with the IDEA, just that the

Department must promulgate the change in accordance with [state law].”).

Finally, “Rooker-Feldman does not apply when state proceedings have neither

ended nor led to orders reviewable by the United States Supreme Court.” Malhan v.

Sec’y United States Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 460 (3d Cir. 2019). Because Mumin

falls into neither category, Rooker-Feldman does not apply.

V

Finally, the Districts argue that the Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative

remedies precludes the Court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. But because

Plaintiffs fall within an exception to the exhaustion requirement, their failure to

exhaust would not bar the Court from hearing their claims.

A

The IDEA establishes an administrative process for addressing disputes about

IDEA compliance. T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 4 F.4th 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2021).

Plaintiffs must follow this process before bringing suit in federal court. Id. at 185.14

The IDEA’s emphasis on individualized education services “also underlies its

exhaustion requirement,” as the interactive nature of the administrative process makes

it more capable of addressing students’ specific needs than the courts. Id. at 191.

Nonetheless, a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the administrative process is excused

“where: (1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a

legal question; (3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; [or] (4) exhaustion

would cause severe or irreparable harm.” Id. at 185 (citation omitted). An additional

“systemic exception,” which “flows implicitly from, or is in fact subsumed by,” the first

and third exceptions, applies when plaintiffs “allege systemic legal deficiencies and,

correspondingly, request system-wide relief that cannot be provided (or even addressed)

through the administrative process.” Id. (citations omitted).

B

Exhaustion is required when “the peculiar expertise of an administrative

hearing officer is necessary to develop a factual record.” Pardini v. Allegheny

Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 192 n.13 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). However, if

“the factual record is fully-developed and no evidentiary disputes remain, the court can

and should decide legal issues.” Id. (citation omitted).

This case concerns the interpretation of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) and the effect of

Pennsylvania’s adult education laws on the Districts’ obligations under that provision.

Because this issue is a purely legal one that does not require a factual record developed

14 Although the Third Circuit has since cast doubt on its holding that IDEA exhaustion is a

jurisdictional requirement, it has not overturned that precedent. Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist.,

877 F.3d 125, 130 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2017).

by a hearing officer, Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust is excused. See id. (finding

interpretation of the stay-put provision in § 1415(j) a purely legal issue excusing

exhaustion); cf. Kristi H. ex rel. Virginia H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 628,

633 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (finding exception not satisfied where granting relief would require

addressing first a pure legal question and then a factual one); Old Bridge Bd. of Ed. v.

R.D. ex rel. D.D., No. 15-3886, 2015 WL 4464152, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 21, 2015)

(same).15

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.

15 Plaintiffs also claim to fall within the systemic-deficiency exception, (Pl. Resp. in Opp. at 23–

24), albeit without explaining how they satisfy T.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, 4 F.4th 179,

192–94 (3d Cir. 2021), the only reported Third Circuit opinion to provide an in-depth discussion of

that exception. But, because Plaintiffs satisfy the purely-legal exception, the Court need not address

this issue.