The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KUANTAY REEDER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 22-4614
JASON WILLIAMS, SECTION: "A" (1)
in his official capacity as Orleans
Parish District Attorney
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motions are before the Court: Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony Concerning Lost Wages (Rec. Doc. 87) and Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony of Dane Ciolino (Rec. Doc. 88) filed by the defendant, Jason R. Williams,
in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney. The plaintiff, Kuantay Reeder,
opposes the motions. The motions, submitted for consideration on April 16, 2025, are
before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
I. Background
In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kuantay Reeder seeks damages
as a result of the violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) in conjunction with his
prosecution and conviction for murder in the 1990s. Although all of the tortious conduct
alleged against the OPDA occurred well before Jason Williams took office, as the
current district attorney, Williams, in his official capacity, is the proper defendant for the
§ 1983 claim.
In 1995, Kuantay Reeder, the plaintiff herein, was prosecuted by Orleans Parish
District Attorney Harry Connick, and convicted (following a prior mistrial based on a
hung jury) of second-degree murder in connection with the death of Mark Broxton. Earl
Price was the State’s sole testifying eyewitness. Reeder was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Reeder’s conviction was affirmed on appeal but Reeder continued to challenge
the validity of his conviction through post-conviction proceedings. In 2009, Reeder’s
post-conviction counsel discovered that Earl Price had a prior criminal conviction and
that the OPDA had withheld that information from Reeder when he was tried. Extensive
litigation on this Brady1 issue ensued in the following years but Reeder was denied relief
in both the state and federal courts. See, e.g., Reeder v. Vannoy, 978 F.3d 272 (5th Cir.
2020). The various courts were persuaded that Price’s undisclosed conviction was
relatively minor when compared to Price’s other several disclosed convictions and
therefore cumulative; Brady‘s materiality requirement was not met. Id. at 279.
Jason Williams, the current district attorney for Orleans Parish, took office in 2021
and instituted a Civil Rights Division in his organization for the purpose of redressing
past harms and injustices that the OPDA had caused to defendants under prior regimes.
The staff set out to identify cases that involved State misconduct, particularly those
involving wrongful convictions and extreme sentences. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 59).
The Civil Rights Division reviewed the prosecution’s original file in Reeder’s case, which
revealed the existence of “significant exculpatory evidence” that had never been
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation requires proof of three elements:
(1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) that it was favorable to the defendant, and
(3) that it was material. United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 574 (5th Cir. 2008)).
disclosed to Reeder or his counsel.2 (Id. ¶ 60). Specifically, during its review of the
original criminal case file, the Civil Rights Division discovered two sets of handwritten
notes, detailing that on two separate occasions Earl Price had notified prosecutors that
he had identified alternate suspect Berzeracque “Byrd” Johnson as Broxton’s shooter.
(Id. ¶¶ 63-65). In June 2021, Williams, through the Civil Rights Division of his office,
produced the previously-withheld information to Reeder’s attorney. (Id.). Even beyond
withholding the potentially exculpatory material, Reeder contends that the prosecutors in
1995 knowingly misled the jury because at trial they portrayed Earl Price as unwavering
in his identification of Reeder as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 68).
In August 2021, Reeder supplemented his state application for post-conviction
relief with the newly-disclosed exculpatory evidence. In response, the OPDA filed
stipulations acknowledging inter alia that Reeder’s conviction and incarceration were in
violation of the Constitution. (Id. ¶ 98). At a hearing held on December 6, 2021, three
remarkable things occurred: a state criminal judge vacated Reeder’s conviction for
second-degree murder, the OPDA immediately declined all charges against Reeder,
and Reeder walked out of Angola Penitentiary after being incarcerated for over twenty-
eight years. (Id. ¶ 100).
Following his release, Reeder filed this civil action against Jason Williams, in his
official capacity, seeking to hold the OPDA liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
injuries and damages that Reeder suffered for being unconstitutionally deprived of his
2 Part of the impetus for the Civil Rights Division’s review of Reeder’s original case file was
that Reeder had sought review with the United States Supreme Court of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision affirming the district court’s rejection of his federal habeas petition. In connection
with that pending writ application the Supreme Court had ordered a response from the
Orleans Parish District Attorney.
freedom for more than half of his life (Mr. Reeder was 50 years old when he filed this
lawsuit), that deprivation having been caused by violations of his rights guaranteed by
Brady v. Maryland, supra. Reeder alleges that the OPDA violated his constitutional
rights by withholding favorable evidence, that at all times relevant the OPDA maintained
an unconstitutional policy with respect to the obligation to disclose favorable information
to the defendants that it prosecuted, and that the OPDA failed to properly train and
supervise its prosecutors with respect to Brady obligations.
Williams responded to Reeder’s complaint with a motion to dismiss grounded on
the contention that the actions that form the basis of Reeder’s claims are attributable to
the State of Louisiana—which is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983—and not to the
OPDA as an independent local government entity. On April 4, 2023, the Court denied
that motion. (Rec. Doc. 25, Order and Reasons); Reeder v. Williams, No. 22-4614, 2023
WL 2771481 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023). Williams then answered the complaint and a jury
trial was calendared for March 18, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 30, Scheduling Order). The Court
ultimately vacated the prior scheduling order and trial date at the unopposed request of
Reeder. (Rec. Doc. 47, Order). The parties then selected December 2, 2024, as the
new trial date. (Rec. Doc. 50, Scheduling Order).
Reeder moved for partial summary judgment in his favor on the element of his
claim under § 1983 that requires him to establish that he has been deprived of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution. (Rec. Doc. 31, Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment). More specifically, Reeder moved for partial summary
judgment on the claim that his Brady rights were violated because the OPDA failed to
disclose (prior to his trial) the exculpatory information pertaining to Earl Price’s
identification of alternate suspect Berzeracque “Byrd” Johnson as Broxton’s shooter. As
grounds for the motion, Reeder invoked the doctrine of res judicata (issue preclusion)
based upon the stipulations that Williams’s office filed in 2021 in response to Reeder’s
application for state post-conviction relief, and the judgment and findings of Judge
Rhonda Goode-Douglas, the criminal court judge who relied on those stipulations when
granting Reeder’s motion to vacate his conviction at the December 6, 2021 hearing. On
December 6, 2023, the Court denied that motion for partial summary judgment insofar
as Reeder sought to rely on nonparty res judicata to relieve him of his burden of proof in
this § 1983 case (Rec. Doc. 48, Order and Reasons); Reeder v. Williams, No. 22-4614,
2023 WL 8449261 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2023).
On November 14, 2024, over Reeder’s objection, the Court vacated the prior
scheduling order and entered a new Case Management Order in light of the complexity
of this case. (Rec. Doc. 78, Case Management Order). A jury trial has been scheduled
for September 15, 2025. (Id.).
II. Williams’s Motion to Exclude Evidence of Lost Wages
Williams seeks to exclude the evidence that Reeder intends to introduce at trial
pertaining to the lost wages that he claims to have suffered due to being incarcerated
for over 26 years. Specifically, Elizabeth Martina, Reeder’s vocational rehabilitation
counseler and life care planner, has surmised that absent being convicted and sent to
prison, Reeder would have become a highly compensated electrician. Reeder’s
accountant, Harold Asher, has used this premise to opine that Reeder should be entitled
to $2,286,663 consisting of past and future lost wages and benefits. Williams contends
that both experts’ evidence of lost wages/benefits should be excluded because it
completely ignores Reeder’s pre-incarceration employment, which was not impressive,
as well as his pre-incarceration criminal record, which was extensive. Instead, Martina’s
opinion is based on one aspect of Reeder’s post-incarceration employment (Asher’s
calculations are based on Martina’s theory), which Williams claims is not only highly
speculative but also contrary to binding Fifth Circuit precedent.3
The first point of contention is the legal question of whether the calculation of lost
income begins with the gross earnings of the injured party at the time of the injury as
noted in Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1983), which was a
maritime personal injury case. In fact, Reeder contends that all of Williams’s cases are
inapplicable because none of them are § 1983 cases, and according to Reeder, § 1983
cases are governed by a more liberal standard.
The Court has reviewed the cases cited by both parties. On the one hand, the
maritime cases cited by Williams are not necessarily so narrow as to apply only in the
context of a personal injury lawsuit, based on maritime law or otherwise. But on the
other hand, the civil rights cases cited by Reeder do not suggest that in a § 1983 action
for wrongful conviction/incarceration, a lost wage claim ignores pre-incarceration
employment history. Reeder had an extensive criminal history prior to his allegedly
wrongful conviction and incarceration and he had a sketchy employment history at best.
He had no training whatsoever as an electrician and nothing in his pre-incarceration
past indicates that he would have ever pursued training as an electrician. Reeder’s post-
incarceration efforts have been laudable but arguably they provide a highly speculative
3 Williams is not seeking to exclude the experts’ opinions concerning projected future
medical expenses.
foundation for Martina’s theory of lost wages absent the wrongful conviction.
The sole question for the Court to decide is whether Martina’s (and therefore
Asher’s) opinions are so irrelevant and unreliable as to require exclusion pursuant to the
Court’s gatekeeping obligation under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny, or whether as Reeder suggests, the jury should be
allowed to decide whether Martina’s opinion—that Reeder would not have spent his life
as a drug dealer or in jail—but instead would have become more like how he is today
just much sooner. Reeder points out that Williams is free to cross-examine Martina at
length regarding her expert conclusions.4 The Court agrees.
There is a fundamental difference between a discrete injury to someone’s person
that prevents him prospectively from performing the employment that he had been
performing up until the time of an injury, and an injury like a wrongful conviction that for
every day the person is incarcerated in violation of his rights may have prevented that
person from making a positive life-changing decision to do something different, such as
becoming an electrician. In the personal injury scenario, the physical injury may
foreclose what the plaintiff had been doing for his livelihood leading immediately up to
the injury so it makes sense that the income stream should be based on pre-injury
income. But in the wrongful conviction scenario, the plaintiff may have been foreclosed
every day for decades from making a better life for himself, which people sometimes do
against all odds. Perhaps Reeder could have changed his life for the better had he not
4 And of course, Williams would be free to explore at length with Reeder his pre-
incarceration criminal history and poor employment record. Such evidence is relevant in
light of Reeder’s lost wage claim and cannot be excluded regardless of its potential
prejudice.
spent over 26 years in prison. The Court is persuaded that he should be allowed to
make his case to the jury.
But Williams also takes issue with the fact that Reeder’s lost wage/benefit
numbers are based on an injury date in 1991, when the allegedly wrongful conviction
did not occur until 1995. This of course, must be corrected as Reeder notes in his
opposition. Further, Williams takes issue with the fact that Reeder’s lost wage/benefit
numbers are based on straight wages only and do not account for expenses that
Reeder would have sustained had he been out of prison and working as an electrician.
To the extent the Reeder argues in his opposition (the Court is not clear on this point)
that such reductions are not applicable in constitutional tort cases where lost
wages/benefits are being sought, the Court does not agree. Reeder must have Asher’s
report amended to reflect not only an injury onset date of 1995 but also to reduce the
lost wages/benefits numbers by an appropriate discount for expenses that would have
been incurred. But in all other respects, the motion to exclude Reeder’s expert evidence
of lost wages is denied.
III. Williams’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dane Ciolino
Reeder retained Professor Dane Ciolino to offer expert testimony on whether the
standard of care regarding a prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory information was
breached in the prosecution of Reeder, and whether the OPDA policies in effect during
the prosecution breached the standard of care applicable in the supervision of
prosecutors. Ciolino produced a report in which he opined that the OPDA failed to
comply with the standards of care and conduct governing prosecutors and their
constitutional obligations to provide Brady material in the 1994 and 1995 prosecutions of
Kuantay Reeder, and that the OPDA Policy Manual in effect at the time of the
prosecutions was inadequate to convey those obligations to its staff. (Rec. Doc. 88-3,
Ciolino report at 27). Ciolino was later deposed regarding his report. (Rec. Doc. 88-4,
Ciolino deposition).
Williams moves to exclude Ciolino’s testimony arguing that most of Ciolino’s
opinions are not helpful to the jury because they concern “standards of care” that are
not relevant to the legal elements of a claim for a Brady violation. Williams argues that
other opinions offered in the report constitute impermissible legal conclusions that either
tell the jury what conclusion they should reach or usurp the Court’s role in determining
the law to apply and instructing the jury on that law.
The plaintiff seeking to recover for a Brady violation in a § 1983 lawsuit must
establish three elements: 1) that the State suppressed evidence by failing to disclose it
to the defendant; 2) that the undisclosed evidence was favorable to the defendant by
helping to show the defendant’s innocence or by impeaching an unfavorable witness;
and 3) that the nondisclosure prejudiced the defendant because it was “material,” i.e.,
there is a “reasonable probability” that the trial outcome would have changed if the
prosecution had turned over the evidence. Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov.,
No. 24-5061, 2025 WL 732838, at *5, -- F.4th -- (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2025) (citing Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
Ciolino’s thirty-page report contains the following succinct conclusions:
My opinion is that the OPDA failed to comply with the standard of care and
conduct governing prosecutors and their constitutional obligations to
provide Brady material in the 1994 and 1995 prosecutions of Kuantay
Reeder. In addition, my opinion is that the OPDA Policy Manual in effect at
the time of these prosecutions was inadequate to convey these obligations
to its staff.
(Rec. Doc. 88-3, Ciolino report at 27).
In response to Williams’s motion to exclude, Reeder clarifies in his opposition
that he will not seek to offer Ciolino’s opinions about whether a Brady violation occurred
in his case thereby rendering Williams’s concerns about Ciolino attempting to testify
about an “ultimate legal conclusion” to be moot. (Rec. Doc. 95, Opposition at 5-6).
Reeder contends, however, that Ciolino should be permitted to offer opinions relating to
the underlying facts of the case without offering a legal conclusion as to whether the
Brady standard was satisfied.
Ciolino is not a fact witness. And liability in this case turns on whether a Brady
violation occurred. The Court agrees with Williams that aside from whether a Brady
violation occurred in Reeder’s criminal prosecution, there is simply nothing left for
Ciolino to opine about.5 Aside from the aspects of the report that discuss the law
pertaining to Brady obligations and why Ciolino believes that a Brady violation did in fact
occur (which Reeder now concedes he will not attempt to elicit at trial), Ciolino’s
opinions are based on state law ethical standards and ABA opinions, that do not
constitute federal law. Reeder’s § 1983 claim is governed by federal law not state law.
The Court agrees with Williams’s contention that it would confuse the jury to allow
Ciolino to testify regarding state law ethical standards that will not govern liability in this
case.
Ciolino devotes a section of his report to opining as to why the 1987 OPDA Policy
5 To be clear, the Court is not suggesting that it would be acceptable for Ciolino to opine on
whether a Brady violation did occur. That issue is for the jury to decide based on the law
and the facts.
Manual fails to adequately set forth a prosecutor's Brady obligations, that the Policy is
vague, and simply inadequate. (Rec. Doc. 88-3, Ciolino report at 21-27). Williams
contends that this opinion is irrelevant because Ciolino does not know how the Policy
Manual was actually used or what other actions were taken to train or supervise
prosecutors. The Court agrees. Moreover, the Court is at a loss to understand how
Ciolino would offer opinions regarding the Policy Manual’s compliance with a
prosecutor’s Brady obligations under federal law without being allowed to testify as to
the legal standards that will govern this case. Those legal standards will be given to the
jury by the Court not by an expert witness.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony Concerning
Lost Wages (Rec. Doc. 87) filed by the defendant, Jason R. Williams, in his official
capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney, is DENIED as explained above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Reeder must amend his expert reports (Martina
and Asher) as explained above and produce the amended report(s) to the defense
within three (3) weeks of entry of this Order and Reasons.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of
Dane Ciolino (Rec. Doc. 88) filed by the defendant, Jason R. Williams, in his official
capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney, is GRANTED as explained above.
April 16, 2025 C |
U (rEp/6tk ES Seer JUD E
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