Tindall v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-122

Filed: April 17, 2025

JAMES W. TINDALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

James W. Tindall, Marietta, GA, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Bryan M. Byrd, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Elizabeth M.

Hosford, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Legal claims are singular verses, not choruses intended to be repeated. Res judicata is a

legally binding effort for courts to avoid unnecessary repetition. The United States moves to

dismiss Plaintiff James Tindall’s (“Mr. Tindall”) Complaint in accordance with the principles of

res judicata, claiming that he has asserted these same claims and failed. 1 (Def.’s Mot., ECF No.

7). This assertion is correct; Mr. Tindall’s claims are precluded. 2 Accordingly, the United States’

Motion is GRANTED. 3

1

Pursuant to RCFC 7.2(b)(2), a reply to a response may be filed within fourteen days after

service of the response. Compare RCFC 7.2(b)(1) (“a response or an objection to a written

motion must be filed within 28 days after service of the motion . . .”) (emphasis added). The

Court does not believe that supplemental briefing will assist in this matter, thus a Reply is

unnecessary.

2

Mr. Tindall’s first bite at the apple occurred in September of 2023 when he attempted the same

set of claims before the undersigned. Tindall v. United States, Case No. 23-757 (dismissed under

RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)); Tindall v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 440 (2023) (Tindall I), aff’d,

No. 2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 282 (2024).

3

While Mr. Tindall has since filed an Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl., ECF No. 8), the Court

finds that the amended pleading does not assert new facts or claims. The United States’

arguments, while specific to the initial Complaint, apply to the Amended Complaint as well.

I. Background

Following former President Biden’s declaration of a national emergency regarding

Russian activities and subsequent invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. Office of Foreign

Assets Control (“OFAC”) imposed sanctions prohibiting transactions in securities of specified

Russian entities, including a Russian majority state-owned banking and financial services

company (“Sberbank”). Exec. Order No. 14,024, 86 Fed. Reg. 20249 (Apr. 15, 2021) (“EO

14,024”). This directive affected owners of Sberbank shares, including Mr. Tindall. (See

generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 8).

Given the Executive Order, Mr. Tindall’s broker, Charles Schwab, informed him that he

had until May 25, 2022 to divest the Sberbank shares to non-U.S. persons, after which the shares

would be blocked in an escrow account accessible only with OFAC permission. (Am. Compl. at

8). In lieu of divesting the shares, Mr. Tindall vehemently protested, sending multiple letters to

President Biden, government officials, and Charles Schwab between April 2022 and February

2023. (Id. at 8–12). The overall tone of those letters was that blocking Mr. Tindall’s shares

constituted an unconstitutional taking of his property under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

(Id. at 8–9).

Unable to access his shares, Mr. Tindall’s primary desire was compensation. (Am.

Compl. at 9–11). His letters continued, initially offering the United States two purchase

options—a $25 per share (buyout) or $1 per share per week (rental). (Id. at 8–9). On the

government’s radio silence, Mr. Tindall later claimed the United States’ act of blocking the

shares constituted acceptance of his terms, and escalated his demands to $1,000,000, and then

$5,000,000 per violation, adding penalties and interest for non-payment. (Id. at 9 (“I value my

constitutional rights at $1,000,000 per violation, plus cumulative interest.”), 10 (“[T]he going

rate for each constitutional right is now $5,000,000/per violation.”)).

This is not the first time the Court is faced with these facts from Mr. Tindall. In May of

2023, Mr. Tindall came before the Court of Federal Claims with three claims. “First, he argue[d]

that the United States willfully violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Second, he

claim[ed] the United States knowingly breached an existing contract with him. And third, he

allege[d] that the United States’ actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of his property

without just compensation.” Tindall I, 167 Fed. Cl. at 444. The Court dismissed those claims in

September of 2023, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision the following March. Tindall

v. United States, No. 2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024). The Supreme Court

denied certiorari thereafter. 145 S. Ct. 282 (2024).

Undeterred from his prior failure, (Am. Compl. at 4–5 (acknowledging prior lawsuit)),

Mr. Tindall returned to this Court on January 21, 2025 and amended his Complaint on April 14.

(See Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl.). His renewed allegations, involving the same operative

facts, assert claims for: (1) breach of implied contract, (Am. Compl. at 13–18, 24); (2) 4,800

violations of the takings clause, (id. at 18–20, 25); and (3) 2,400 due process violations, (id. at

21–22, 25).

2

II. Analysis

The United States moves to dismiss Mr. Tindall’s claims under RCFC 12(b)(6) arguing

that they are barred by res judicata. (See generally Def.’s Mot. (citing Tindall I, 167 Fed. Cl.

440)). The Court agrees.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is

governed by Rule 12(b)(6). This rule requires dismissal when a complaint fails to state a “claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). At the pleading stage, the plausibility standard

does not impose a probability requirement; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations. Nalco Co. v.

Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Under Rule 12(b)(6) a claim must be

dismissed “when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay

v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

While the Court acknowledges that pro se plaintiffs are not expected to frame issues with

the precision of attorneys, Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987),

even pro se litigants must allege “plausible” facts sufficient to satisfy both the requirements of

subject-matter jurisdiction and the necessary elements of a claim as a matter of law for which

relief may be granted. See Stephanatos v. United States, 306 F. App’x 560, 564 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(stating that arguments should be “fleshed out.”). This standard necessarily implicates the

doctrine of res judicata. See Palafox Street Assoc., L.P. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 773, 780

(2014) (citing Chisolm v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 185, 193 (2008), aff’d, 298 Fed. Appx. 957

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that because “claim preclusion rests on a final judgment on the merits, it

can quite properly and naturally be raised via a merits-based RCFC 12(b)(6) motion[.]”)).

“Res judicata,” or “a matter already judged,” traditionally refers to two similar legal

effects: (1) claim preclusion and (2) issue preclusion, also called “collateral estoppel.” Baker v.

General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 n.5 (1998). “Application of both doctrines is central to

the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes

within their jurisdictions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Issue preclusion

typically pertains to a matter that was actually litigated, while claim preclusion forecloses

matters arising out of the same facts which should have been litigated but were not. See Migra v.

Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Here, while both doctrines

would apply, the Court only addresses the broader doctrine of claim preclusion.

“Claim preclusion applies when ‘(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the first suit

proceeded to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of

transactional facts as the first.’” Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1268 (Fed.

Cir. 2008) (quoting Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). It is

undisputed that the parties in both suits are Mr. Tindall and the United States. (See Compl. at 3

(“This [C]omplaint . . . is directly related to [Tindall I] because it involves the same parties[.]”);

Am. Compl. at 5 (“The amended 2025 complaint is related to the 2023 Complaint, because it

involves the same parties[.])). Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

3

As to whether Tindall I proceeded to final, valid judgment on the merits, the Court finds

that it did. Mr. Tindall’s claims were dismissed in Tindall I, and those findings were affirmed in

full. 167 Fed. Cl. 440; 2024 WL 960452. Specifically, the Court dismissed Mr. Tindall’s takings

and contractual breach claims, finding that he failed to present a facially valid claim upon which

relief could be granted. 167 Fed. Cl. at 445–47 (dismissal pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6)).

“Dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are judgments on the

merits, and, thus, entitled to res judicata effect.” eVideo Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 164,

169 (2018), aff’d 748 F. App’x 327 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v.

Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). Thus, the judgment as to Mr. Tindall’s breach and takings

claims were valid, final judgments.

As to Mr. Tindall’s prior assertion of a due process violation, Tindall I dismissed that

claim based on a failure to establish jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1). 167 Fed. Cl. at 445.

Jurisdictional determinations typically have a preclusive effect. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (“It has long been the rule that

principles of [finality] apply to jurisdictional determinations—both subject matter and

personal.”). While the Rules of this Court state that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not

operate as an adjudication on the merits, the finality of the judgment still applies. See Milgroom

v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779, 794 (2015) (citing RCFC 41(b)), aff’d, 651 F. App’x 1001

(Fed. Cir. 2016). That is, a jurisdictional determination may have a preclusive effect to bar

matters previously litigated if the plaintiff fails to allege additional claims to cure the

jurisdictional defect in a subsequent court action. See Lowe v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 218, 229

(2007) (“[A] prior dismissal does preclude the same action based on the same facts unless the

jurisdictional flaw that necessitated dismissal of the first suit has been cured.”) (citing New

Jersey Institute of Tech. v. Medjet, Inc., 47 Fed. Appx. 921, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). There is no

question that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment does not mandate the payment of

money. See Tindall, 2024 WL 960452, at *2 (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025,

1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Standing alone, a due process violation claim can never satisfy the

jurisdictional requirements in this Court. Accordingly, the jurisdictional defect has not been

cured. The finality of that decision renders the Tindall I judgment final and valid in totality.

The heart of Mr. Tindall’s claims lies with the deprivation of access to his Sberbank

shares. (See generally Am. Compl.). These were the same issues central to Tindall I. 167 Fed. Cl.

at 443–44. The inquiry into whether two claims involve the same transactional facts must be

conducted “pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related

in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their

treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.”

Phillips/May Corp., 524 F.3d at 1271 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 24(2)

(1982)). In identifying which facts are transactional, courts “have defined ‘transaction’ in terms

of a ‘core of operative facts,’ the ‘same operative facts,’ or the ‘same nucleus of operative facts,’

and ‘based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.’” Barajas v. United States, 154

Fed. Cl. 318, 323 (2021) (citing Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir.

2000). Here, using Mr. Tindall’s own original verbiage, “[t]his [C]omplaint . . . is directly related

to [Tindall I] because it . . . is based on the same claims[.]” (Compl. at 3). There can be no doubt

that this case arises out of the same transactional facts as Tindall I.

4

Mr. Tindall objects to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss in total, (Pl.’s Resp., ECF

No. 9), and submitted an Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl. at 1 (stating the document is filed

“in response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)”)). Mr. Tindall’s

primary addition is that this suit is different from Tindall I as it is intended to secure “relief from

defendant’s ongoing and continuing breaches of the implied contract between the parties for

defendant’s ongoing and continuing possession, control and use of plaintiff’s property, as well as

defendant’s numerous ongoing and continuing violations of plaintiff’s 5th Amendment

constitutional rights.” (Id. at 3–4 (emphasis in original)). Mr. Tindall attempts to distinguish

these claims as being based on the United States’ “incremental conduct” occurring separately

after his Tindall I complaint was dismissed. (Id. at 5). However, Mr. Tindall’s failure to show

that his new claims are based on new government action bars them from forming the basis of a

new lawsuit. Even if Mr. Tindall’s claims were not precluded, his Amended Complaint is not

based on new allegations and does not cure the defects contained in his original pleading.

The only “new” allegation seems to be a new theory of the United States’ acceptance to

form a contract. The Federal Circuit resoundingly affirmed Tindall I finding that the United

States’ actions did “not constitute acceptance of Mr. Tindall’s alleged offer[,]” which was fatal to

his breach of contract claim. 2024 WL 960452, at *2. He now characterizes the United States’

act of taking possession of his stocks as the moment of the United States’ acceptance. (Am.

Compl. at 14). Even were the Court to consider the merits of this argument, Mr. Tindall’s

reasoning is circular. For contract formation, acceptance must be in response to an offer. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (1981). Mr. Tindall learned of his shares being

blocked on April 26, 2022. (Am. Compl. at 8). His letters to the United States began the next

day. (Id.). The stocks were placed in escrow on May 25, 2022. (Id. at 11). Characterizing

blocking his Sberbank shares as formal acceptance from the United States ignores the

inevitability that blocking the shares would have happened with or without Mr. Tindall’s

“offers.” A plaintiff cannot assert that a pre-existing government action, which would have

occurred regardless of the plaintiff’s offer, constitutes valid acceptance necessary to form a

contract. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Tindall asserts no new governmental actions

occurred that may constitute acceptance or a separate contract.

Mr. Tindall’s entire argument hinges on a finding that the continuous holding of his

stocks occurred after dismissal of Tindall I and therefore qualify as new events. (Pl.’s Resp. at 4,

7). However, the continuous nature of Mr. Tindall’s allegations by themselves cannot constitute

a separate cause of action. In some cases, new and independent breaches by the government may

be treated as separate causes of action under the continuing claims doctrine. Westlands Water

Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 177, 212–13 (2013) (citing Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d

1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). For continuing claims, “the plaintiff’s claim must be inherently

susceptible to being broken down into a series of independent and distinct events or wrongs, each

having its own associated damages.” Wells v. United States, 420 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (citing Brown Park Estates-Fairfield Dev. Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed.

Cir. 1997)). But “if there was only a single alleged wrong, even though the wrong caused later

adverse effects . . . the continuing claim doctrine is not applicable.” Id. at 1345–46 (citing Hart v.

United States, 910 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). While the continuing claims doctrine is most often

applied to instances examining a statute of limitations question, the Court finds it illuminating

for Mr. Tindall’s claims.

5

The United States’ continuous, ongoing holding of his stocks is not a series of

independent and distinct events. Because Mr. Tindall continues to suffer adverse effects from

that singular action does not give rise to these new allegations. The same logic applies to Mr.

Tindall’s takings claim—the facts alleged cannot be broken down into separate events and

therefore do not constitute a separate cause of action. 4 See Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d

1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that multiple takings claims cannot be based on a single,

continuous government action). There is one government action giving rise to both cases—

blocking Mr. Tindall’s Sberbank shares. That the United States continues the same conduct

alleged to be wrongful in Tindall I cannot field the basis for a new cause of action. Stated

differently, Tindall I’s failure necessarily cannot give rise to a second phase of litigation. As each

new day dawns, with no other changes, Mr. Tindall cannot claim a new cause of action in

perpetuity.

Mr. Tindall’s Amended Complaint does not cure the defects contained in his original

pleading and his claims do not allege new causes of action. Having satisfied the three elements

for claim preclusion, res judicata precludes Mr. Tindall’s claims. Mr. Tindall seemingly wants

this Court to revise its earlier findings, an act that would require contradicting itself and,

importantly, the Federal Circuit. While Mr. Tindall may overestimate this Court’s power, the

Court does not possess the authority, nor the desire, to take such action.

III. Conclusion

Mr. Tindall’s Complaint is a chorus to Tindall I and his claims are precluded. The United

States’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), is GRANTED. Further, the Clerk is directed to

REJECT “Plaintiff's Notice of Directly Related Case - Declaration by Plaintiff” received on

April 14, as it is a duplicate of a previously filed Notice, (ECF No. 2). The Clerk SHALL enter

judgment accordingly. The Clerk is directed to REJECT any future submissions in this case

unless they comply with this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. 5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

David A. Tapp

DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

4

Mr. Tindall’s attempt to reassert a due process violation is also futile. As the Court has said, a

due process violation claim can never satisfy the jurisdictional requirements in this Court

because it is not money-mandating—despite Mr. Tindall’s rote contention that it is. LeBlanc, 50

F.3d at 1028; (Am. Compl. at 21–23).

5

This provision does not act as an anti-filing injunction or a sanction. Allen v. United States, 88

F.4th 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that courts must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice

and opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction). Plaintiff is not enjoined

from proper post-dismissal filings in this case, nor is Plaintiff required to seek leave before filing

future actions in this Court. See id. This provision is a mechanism to reject non-compliant filings

in the above-captioned action once it is dismissed.

6