McClane v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JENNIFER LEE MCCLANE, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-535

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Neary)

:

v. :

:

LELAND DUDEK, Acting :

Commissioner of Social Security,1 :

:

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 15) of

Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommending that the court affirm the Social

Security Commissioner’s decision to deny plaintiff Jennifer Lee McClane benefits.

McClane has filed objections. (Doc. 16). Finding no error after a de novo review of

the contested portions, the court will adopt the R&R and deny McClane’s appeal.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Magistrate Judge Carlson’s R&R thoroughly details the background of this

case, (Doc. 15 at 2-15), and therefore, the court will provide an abbreviated version.

McClane applied for disability insurance benefits on November 23, 2021,

alleging onset of her disability on May 6, 2021. (Id. at 2). She has a high school

education, and her prior work experience includes manufacturing, food

preparation, retail, and as a shipping clerk. (Id. at 3). In her application, she alleged

1 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on

February 16, 2025, during the pendency of this action.

that her ability to work is limited by bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, lung surgery,

depression, anxiety, and Crohn’s disease. (Id.)

Four medical sources opined on the disabling effects of McClane’s physical

impairments. (Id. at 6). Consultative examiner Dr. Ahmed Kneifati, M.D., assessed

McClane’s environmental work limitations, and opined that she could never be

exposed to unprotected heights, dust, odors, fumes, and other pulmonary irritants,

and could only occasionally be exposed to moving mechanical parts, operating a

motor vehicle, humidity and wetness, extreme cold, and extreme heat. (Id. at 7-8).

McClane’s treating oncologist, Dr. Pauline Go, M.D., opined that McClane should

avoid extreme heat and noxious chemicals. (Id. at 8). The other two medical sources

did not opine on environmental limitations. (Id. at 7).

The ALJ denied McClane’s application for benefits. (Id. at 10). The ALJ

found that McClane met the requirements of the Act and had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since May 6, 2021. (Id.) The ALJ further found that

McClane had the following severe impairments: lung carcinoid with partial

resection, carpal and cubital tunnel syndrome, Crohn’s disease, degenerative disc

disease, headaches, generalized anxiety disorder, and depression, but that none of

these impairments met or equaled an impairment under the Commissioner’s listing

criteria. (Id.) The ALJ then determined McClane’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”), finding that:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds

that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant can

frequently handle bilaterally and perform all postural activities though

she can occasionally ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She is further

limited to simple and routine tasks, involving only simple, work-related

decisions with few, if any, workplace changes.2

(Id.)

The ALJ found Dr. Kneifati’s opinion not persuasive, Dr. Go’s opinion

generally persuasive, and the other two medical source opinions persuasive. The

ALJ found that Dr. Kneifati’s opinion on McClane’s limitations were not supported

by his own medical findings. (Id. at 13). Despite finding Dr. Go’s opinion generally

persuasive, the ALJ did not include any environmental limitations when

determining McClane’s RFC and did not explain the omission those limitations. (Id.

at 14). The ALJ determined that McClane could not perform any past work, but also

concluded that, based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs

existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. (Id.)

The ALJ noted three occupations identified by the vocational expert that McClane

could perform: “Marker (DOT code 209.587-034), which has approximately 130,000

jobs nationally; Cleaner (DOT code 323.687-014), which has approximately 170,000

jobs nationally; and Inspector packer (DOT code 559.687-074), which has

approximately 6,000 jobs nationally.” (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ denied McClane’s

application. (Id.)

McClane appealed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, McClane argued that the ALJ’s RFC

determination was not supported by substantial evidence because he did not

properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence, specifically, that the ALJ did not

include any environmental limitations in her RFC despite finding Dr. Go’s opinion

2 The court notes that the ALJ appears to have omitted, unintentionally,

several words in this paragraph.

generally persuasive. (Doc. 9). Magistrate Judge Carlson agreed in his R&R that the

ALJ erred when he omitted environment limitations in McClane’s RFC without

explanation, but ultimately determined that McClane did not show she was

prejudiced by the error since none of the three occupations the ALJ identified

required her to be exposed to the relevant environmental conditions.

McClane objected to the R&R. (Doc. 16). The Acting Commissioner filed a

response. (Doc. 17). The matter is thus fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

II. Legal Standard

When objections are timely filed to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, the district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions

of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue,

649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may

rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.

Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing United States v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)). For those sections of the report and

recommendation to which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of

good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in

order to accept the recommendation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), advisory committee

notes; see also Univac. Dental Co. v. Dentsply, Intern., 702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469

(M.D. Pa. 2010) (citations omitted). Regardless of whether objections are made, the

district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); L.R. 72.31.

In reviewing a Social Security appeal, the court must determine whether

“substantial evidence” supports the ALJ’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hagans

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d

422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court defines “substantial

evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620,

86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explains

that “substantial evidence has been defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla;’ it means

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Hagans,

694 F.3d at 292 (quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427).

The court should not reverse the Commissioner’s findings merely because

evidence may exist to support the opposite conclusion. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that courts may not

weigh the evidence or substitute its own conclusion for those of the fact-finder);

Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (indicating that when an ALJ’s

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, courts are bound by those

findings, even if they would have decided the factual inquiry differently). In an

adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less

than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620.

III. Discussion

McClane objects to Judge Carlson’s determination that she was not

prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to include any environmental limitations in her

RFC, despite finding Dr. Go’s opinion that McClane avoid extreme heat and noxious

chemicals. McClane further objects because the ALJ did not include any

environmental limitations as opined by Dr. Kneifati. Both errors, McClane argues,

mean that the ALJ’s decision could not have been supported by substantial

evidence.

As an initial matter, the ALJ adequately explained why he did not find Dr.

Kneifati’s opinion persuasive, pointing to specific notes in his examination of

McClane and articulating why these notes did not support his conclusion.

Accordingly, the ALJ did not include Dr. Kneifati’s environmental limitations in

McClane’s RFC. McClane’s objection here is ultimately an invitation to re-weigh the

evidence to find Dr. Kneifati’s opinion persuasive, and thus find that it was error

not to include his environmental limitations in her RFC, which this court may not

do. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v.

Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).

Concerning the opinion of Dr. Go, the court agrees with Judge Carlson that

while the ALJ’s failure to include any environment limitations in McClane’s RFC

was error, it was harmless because the occupations noted by the ALJ that McClane

could perform do not require exposure to the relevant environmental conditions.

Courts may apply harmless error analysis in social security appeals when

assessing the sufficiency of an ALJ’s decision. See Seaman v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 321

F. App’x 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2009) (non-precedential); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.

396, 409 (2009) (applying harmless error rule that courts apply in “ordinary civil

cases” to administrative cases). Under the harmless error rule, an error warrants

remand if it prejudices a party’s “substantial rights.” An error implicates

substantial rights if it likely affects the outcome of the proceeding, or likely affects

the “perceived fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Sanders, 556 U.S. at 411-412. The holding applies to social security proceedings.

McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011); Watts v. Astrue, No. 12-4116,

2013 WL 2392909, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2013).

Here, Dr. Go opined that McClane could not be exposed to extreme heat and

noxious chemicals and the ALJ failed to include any of these limitations in his RFC.

None of the three occupations identified by the vocational expert and noted by the

ALJ, however, require exposure to these environment conditions. Thus, this case

presents a quintessential case of harmless error. Were the court to remand the case

for consideration of Dr. Go’s environmental limitations in McClane’s RFC, it would

have no effect on the outcome because she McClane would still be capable of

performing jobs in the national economy as contemplated now.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court will adopt the R&R in full and deny

plaintiff Jennifer Lee McClane’s social security appeal. An appropriate order shall

issue.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: April 16, 2025