SOUILLIARD v. HAWKEE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RENEE M. SOUILLIARD, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : No. 25-cv-1110

:

DISTRICT JUSTICE ROBERT :

HAWKEE,1 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Joseph F. LEESON, Jr. April 15, 2025

United States District Judge

Currently before the Court is a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Renee M. Souilliard raising

constitutional claims against District Justice Robert Hawke. (ECF No. 2.) Souilliard seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Souilliard leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

Souilliard alleges that on October 20, 2023, she was arrested and “illegally removed from

her home” due to an order signed by Judge Hawke. (Compl. at 6.) She claims that “a thirteen

1 Plaintiff spells defendant’s last name incorrectly. The correct spelling is Hawke. The

correct spelling will be used throughout this memorandum.

2 The factual allegations are taken from the Complaint (“Compl”) (ECF No. 2). The Court

considers the entirety of Souilliard’s submission to constitute the Complaint and adopts the

sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court quotes from

the Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up. The Court may

consider matters of public record when conducting a screening under § 1915. Castro-Mota v.

Smithson, No. 20-940, 2020 WL 3104775, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (citing Buck v.

Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)). The Court may also take judicial

notice of prior court proceedings. See In re Ellerbe, No. 21-3003, 2022 WL 444261, at *1 (3d

Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (per curiam) citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848

F.2d 414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that court may take judicial notice of the record from

previous court proceedings).

month long legal battle” presided over by Judge Hawke had concluded just three days prior.3

(Id.) The police involved allegedly “laughed and ridiculed” her, “did not obtain proof of

ownership by the accuser and proceeded to take [her] to be arraigned” by Judge Hawke, who had

“a big smile on his face, standing over [her] with hatred spewing out of his eyes.” (Id.) She

claims that Judge Hawke “proceeded to threaten, coerce, and intimidate [her] into signing papers

without an attorney or reading them. He whipped them out of [her] hands until [she] complied.

He threw the papers back at [her].” (Id.) She asserts that “the higher court released [her] one

week later, and following that, all charges were dropped.” (Id.) She alleges that she had

“permission to temporarily live on 1162 Stateside Drive by the owner,” and had witnesses. (Id.)

As a result, she claims that her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated because

Judge Hawke retaliated against, intimidated, threatened, and coerced her, and he “did not recuse

himself because of a thirteen-month case between [them] that just ended three days prior.” (Id.

at 5.) She further asserts Judge Hawke’s actions resulting in a crime because it is unlawful to,

inter alia, coerce, retaliate, intimidate a person who “assisted in an investigation.” (Id. at 3.)

She suffered “severe mental and emotional trauma, was “thrown in jail for nothing,” and her cat

died as a result of being “falsely arrested and incarcerated.” (Id. at 7.) Souilliard seeks money

damages and requests the Court to dismiss Judge Hawke “from the bench.” (Id. at 7.)

3 A review of public records indicates that Judge Hawke presided over a civil case brought

by Souilliard in 2021 against Cindy Reed and Camille Wiegand, which was dismissed by the

Court. Souilliard v. Reed, at al., MJ-03301-CV-0000139-2021 (M.D. Northampton). A further

review of public records does not indicate Judge Hawke presided over any other cases involving

Souilliard, but she did bring another civil case against Reed and Wiegand that resulted in a

default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, over which a different Judge had presided. Souilliard v.

Reed, at al., MJ-31202-CV-0000005-2021 (M.D. Lehigh). Defendants appealed the default

judgment. See id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Souilliard leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

she does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage

of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally

construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth,

115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Additionally, the Court is also obligated to dismiss any claims that seek monetary relief from an

immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). As Souilliard is proceeding pro se, the

Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

The vehicle by which Souilliard brings her federal constitutional claims is pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. at 5.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However, judges are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983

civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as

they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko

v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial

capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211

F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter

jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208

F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir.

1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without fear of incurring personal liability for their

actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally

incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are

taken as a result of a conspiracy with others. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Since it

is apparent that Souilliard’s § 1983 claims against Judge Hawke are based on acts he took in his

judicial capacity while presiding over cases for which he had jurisdiction to act,4 he is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity from Souilliard’s claims.

4 It also appears she alleges Judge Hawke committed federal crimes based on his actions

because it is unlawful to, inter alia, coerce, retaliate, intimate a person who “assisted in an

investigation.” (Compl. at 3.) Even if Judge Hawke was not entitled to absolute judicial

immunity here, which he is, any attempt to bring criminal charges against him also fails because

criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil liability. See Brown v. City of

Philadelphia Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Brown

alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most do not provide a private

cause of action.”); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,

511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a

criminal prohibition alone.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Souilliard leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court concludes that under the circumstances of this case, Souilliard

cannot cure the defects in her Complaint, so the dismissal will be with prejudice and she will not

be given leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir.

2002) (stating that complaints should be with leave to amend “unless amendment would be

inequitable or futile”). Because her Complaint will be dismissed, her request for Judge Hawke to

be “dismissed” from the bench is denied.5

An appropriate Order will be entered separately. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

58(a).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.__________

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge

5 “‘[A] request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action. . . . An

injunction is a remedy, not a separate claim or cause of action. A pleading can . . . request

injunctive relief in connection with a substantive claim, but a separately pled claim or cause of

action for injunctive relief is inappropriate.’” Slemmer v. McGlaughlin Spray Foam Insulation,

Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702

F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).