The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
ESTATE OF AARON D. STANTON by Douglas Case No.: 3:23-cv-01767-AN
Stanton, Personal Representative, and A.S., a minor,
by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Douglas
Stanton,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSHUA DYK and CITY OF PORTLAND,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Estate of Aaron D. Stanton and A.S., a minor, brought this action against
defendants Joshua Dyk and City of Portland (the "City"), alleging use of excessive deadly force in violation
of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants and wrongful death/battery,
wrongful death/negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress against the City only.
Plaintiffs move for an order prohibiting the City from taking the deposition of plaintiff A.S.
or, in the alternative, imposing certain safeguards to be implemented during the deposition. For the reasons
stated herein, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery as
follows:
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable."
Discovery is relevant if it is "'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'"
Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown Bag Software
v.Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press LLC, No. 2:21-cv-03010-SVW-MAR, 2024 WL 4005220 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 899951 (9th Cir. 2025). The court has "broad discretion" to
determine whether information sought is relevant for discovery purposes. Id.
A "court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). A protective order
may:
"(A) forbid[] the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specify[] terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the
disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescrib[e] a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(D) forbid[] inquiry into certain matters, or limit[] the scope of disclosure or discovery to
certain matters;
(E)designat[e] the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F)requir[e] that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;
(G)requir[e] that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requir[e] that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in
sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs."
Id. The party seeking a protective order must show "good cause" for the order "by demonstrating
[that] harm or prejudice [] will result from the discovery." Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063
(9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002)).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that on July 22, 2022, Dyk, a police officer with the City, shot and killed
Aaron D. Stanton while his then six-year-old daughter, A.S., was present. Compl., ECF [1], ¶¶ 1-3. As
relevant to this discovery dispute, plaintiffs bring claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, alleging that A.S. suffered severe emotional distress, including nightmares, anxiety, and grief,
because she was present at the shooting and because an officer at the scene who took her into custody told
her that "your father wanted to die." Id. ¶¶ 52-60.
Plaintiffs served tort claim notice on defendants on April 4, 2023, and filed the complaint
on November 28, 2023. Id. ¶ 34. A.S.'s grandfather, Douglas Stanton, was appointed as her guardian ad
litem. Order of December 18, 2023, ECF [11]. On February 2, 2024, defendants filed a motion to strike
portions of the complaint describing other incidences of Portland Police Bureau officers using deadly force
against people in mental health crises. Defs. Mot. to Strike Compl., ECF [12]. The Court denied that
motion, finding that the paragraphs at issue were relevant to plaintiffs' claims. Op. & Order of June 17,
2024, ECF [23].
Defendants filed an answer, ECF [26], and the parties began to engage in discovery. On
March 6, 2025, plaintiffs moved to prohibit the City from taking the deposition of minor plaintiff A.S. or,
in the alternative, for an order imposing safeguards during the deposition. See Pls. Mot. for Protective
Order, ECF [39].
DISCUSSION
The City intends to take the deposition of A.S., who is now nine years old. Decl. of J.
Ashlee Albies Supp. Pls. Mot. for Protective Order ("Albies Decl."), ECF [40], ¶ 3. Plaintiffs oppose the
deposition, arguing that it will substantially harm A.S. Id.; Mot. for Protective Order 2. They state that
A.S. continues to suffer serious emotional distress, nightmares, and emotional meltdowns, and will likely
be overwhelmed or re-traumatized by questioning. Mot. For Protective Order 4-5; see Albies Decl. Exs. 1,
2, 3; Decl. of Douglas Stanton Supp. Pls. Mot. for Protective Order, ECF [41]. Plaintiffs note that the City
counsel who would conduct the deposition does not have training in either trauma-informed interviewing
nor working with traumatized minors. Mot. for Protective Order 3, 5.
Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with any records of A.S.'s treatment, diagnoses, or a
declaration of a treating provider. Plaintiffs did, however, provide a letter from licensed clinical
psychologist Jennifer S. Harris. See Albies Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. 4. Harris, who has not examined or treated
A.S., explained that A.S. has likely "endured severe emotional and psychological trauma as a direct witness
to her father being fatally shot" and that "compelling her to participate in a formal deposition would likely
exacerbate her distress and potentially cause significant harm to her well-being." Id. at 1. She elaborated
that "recount[ing] such a traumatic event in a legal setting" could retraumatize A.S. or "interfere with her
healing process, disrupt her sense of stability, and lead to serious emotional and psychological
repercussions, including anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder[.]" Id. at 2. Harris
recommended that A.S. not participate in a deposition until she has met with a treatment provider and
developed a treatment plan or, if the Court determines that the deposition is necessary, that the Court require
certain accommodations consistent with those required in Galbreath v. Braley, 318 Ga. App. 111 (2012).
Id. at 1-3.
The City contends that it is necessary to take the deposition because plaintiffs allege that
defendants intentionally and negligently caused A.S. emotional distress in exposing her to the shooting and
because an officer told her that her father wanted to die. Def. Resp. Opp'n to Pls. Mot. for Protective Order,
ECF [43], at 3-4. The City states that plaintiffs have informed it that A.S. will not testify at trial and have
not provided any therapy records. Id. at 3. It argues that the deposition is necessary to identify the officer
who allegedly spoke to A.S. and learn what, exactly, was said. Id. The City states that it does not wish to
ask any questions about A.S.'s father's death or her emotional response. Id.
Plaintiffs have not shown good cause to entirely forbid the deposition. The deposition is
relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. A.S. was present at the shooting and is the only person
who can provide firsthand testimony regarding what was said to her by officers at the scene and her
emotional response to the events. This is particularly relevant to the intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims brought on A.S.'s behalf. The parties' relative access to relevant information also
weighs in favor of permitting the deposition; without A.S.'s trial testimony or records of her treatment,
defendant lacks access to information necessary to defend against the claims.
The deposition will undoubtedly be burdensome to A.S., a traumatized child, but the
burden does not outweigh the benefit of the deposition to this case. This is especially so because the Court
may reduce the burden by issuing a limited protective order specifying the terms, methods, and lines of
inquiry permissible at the deposition. Having weighed the parties' suggestions and analysis, the Court
orders that the following conditions are to be followed by the parties to avoid undue burden:
1. The deposition shall be limited to two hours, with breaks provided as requested by A.S. or her
counsel;
2. A.S.'s mother, guardian, or another trusted support person shall be permitted to attend the
deposition, with the understanding that only counsel may object to questioning;
3. The parties shall meet, confer, and agree upon a neutral location for the deposition;
4. The parties shall inform the Court of the date and time of the deposition;
5. The City's questioning shall be limited to A.S.'s recollection of the incident, including any
statements by police officers, and her emotional response;
6. Only counsel with training in trauma-informed interviewing or interviewing traumatized children
may conduct the deposition.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, ECF [39], is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Defendant City of Portland may take the deposition of plaintiff A.S. with the
safeguards and accommodations described in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of April, 2025. .
Adrienne Nelson
United States District Judge