Opinion

State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Apr 14, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.8%

“[W]hen a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review[.]”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]hen a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review[.]”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

04/14/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

March 18, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JONATHAN ELLERBASCH, ALIAS1

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 124373 Hector Sanchez, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2024-00915-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Defendant, Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court

to aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial

court imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Department of Correction. On

appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an

alternative sentence and in ordering a sentence of confinement. Following a thorough

review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

T. Scott Jones, Baylee M. Brown, and Jordan D. Davis, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Johnny Cerisano, Assistant Attorney

General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Sean Roberts, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

1

Throughout the record, Defendant is referred to alternatively as: “Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias”;

“Jonathan C. Ellerbusch, Alias”; “Jonathan C. Ellerbusch”; and “Jonathan Ellerbusch.” As is the policy of

this court, we will refer to Defendant by the name listed in his indictment—“Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias[.]”

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In April 2023, the Knox County Grand Jury issued an indictment, charging

Defendant with the following offenses:

Count Offense Classification

1 Attempted second degree murder Class B felony

2 Aggravated kidnapping Class B felony

3 Aggravated assault by strangulation Class C felony

4 Aggravated assault with serious bodily injury Class C felony

5 Domestic assault Class A misdemeanor

On March 6, 2024, Defendant pleaded guilty, as a Range I standard offender, to

aggravated assault as charged in count 4, with the length and manner of service of the

sentence to be determined by the trial court. The remaining counts of the indictment were

dismissed based upon Defendant’s plea to count 4.

At a sentencing hearing held May 23, 2024, the State introduced a copy of the

victim’s medical records from the University of Tennessee Medical Center and a copy of

Defendant’s presentence report. The presentence report contained the following factual

summary of the offense:2

On 10/07/2022 at [12:57 a.m.,] Officer T. Derr was dispatched to the

Willows of West Hills Apartments . . . in regard to an assault. Upon arrival,

Officer Derr contacted the victim . . . . [The victim] had a bloody nose, blood

around her mouth, a ripped shirt, red spots that appeared to be bruising on

her head, ear, and back, popped blood vessels in her left eye, blood coming

out of her right ear, and marks on her neck that appeared consistent with

strangulation. [The victim] stated she had been assaulted by her neighbor,

later identified as [Defendant,] inside and outside her apartment. [The

victim] said while hanging out with [Defendant] he accused her of stealing

his medications and later assaulted her. [The victim] stated she did not

remember being punched but [Defendant] was strangling her with his hands

around her throat and she believed she was going to die. [The victim] said

2

Although a transcript of Defendant’s guilty plea submission hearing was not included in the

appellate record, we conclude that the record is adequate for our review. See State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d

273, 279 (Tenn. 2012) (“[W]hen a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, the

Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a

meaningful review[.]”).

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as soon as she could get free and run from his apartment, she did and

[Defendant] followed her, again assaulting her in the grass area behind the

apartments. [The victim] stated the neighbors called the police and saved her

life as she was being beat up in the grass. [The victim] stated she believed

she lost consciousness during the assault and believed [Defendant] was going

to kill her. [The victim] stated her and [Defendant] have had a limited sexual

relationship in the past. A neighbor/witness advised he saw [Defendant]

assaulting [the victim] on the grass and called 911. [The victim] was

transported to Tennova Medical Center Turkey Creek via ambulance for

injuries resulting from the assault.

The presentence report stated that Defendant was forty-one years old; that he was a

college graduate; that he was currently employed; and that he resided by himself in

Knoxville. The report indicated that Defendant was single, had never been married, and

had no children. It stated that Defendant had no physical health conditions but had mental

health conditions, including depression and anxiety. The report indicated that Defendant

had a prior criminal record, including convictions for driving under the influence (first and

second offense), public intoxication, possession of drug paraphernalia, and various traffic

offenses. The report also showed that Defendant was arrested for violating a restraining

order approximately five months after the instant offense.

The presentence report also documented Defendant’s history of alcohol and illegal

drug use, noting that Defendant first used alcohol at age fourteen. Defendant reported that

he first used marijuana when he was fifteen years old; that he last used marijuana on

October 5, 2022; that he used cocaine “a few times” at age eighteen; that he had been

addicted to opiates for five years and “used daily” during that time; that he used heroin

daily in 2018; and that he used Xanax in high school and Xanax and psychedelics during

college. The report stated that Defendant successfully completed an alcohol and drug

inpatient program from October 10, 2022, to November 10, 2022, in Charlotte, North

Carolina. Further, the report indicated that Defendant successfully completed an alcohol

and drug inpatient program from December 26, 2019, to March 15, 2020, in Mendenhall,

Mississippi.

According to the report, Defendant was assessed with the Strong-R Risk and Needs

Assessment tool, resulting in a score of “low” with a “high need in the mental health

domain” and “moderate needs in the aggression and family domains.” The report stated

that the risk score was “intended to predict the general likelihood of re-offense when

compared to those with a similar history of offending” and that the score did not predict

“the specific likelihood that an individual offender will reoffend.”

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The victim’s father testified that the victim was released from the hospital within

twenty-four hours after Defendant’s assault. He said that he saw the victim two days later

and described the victim as an emotional and physical “wreck.” He said that she had

“obviously been assaulted” and “beat[en] up.”

The victim’s father testified that he took the victim to his home in Loudon County,

where he took pictures of her injuries. He identified photographs of the victim’s injuries,

and they were admitted as an exhibit to his testimony. He stated that he and the victim’s

mother were traumatized by viewing the victim’s condition. He explained that the victim

stayed at his house in the weeks following the assault. He said that the victim could “hardly

walk” and needed assistance. He testified, “I mean she had difficult[y] walking. She had

to walk with a walker as well as this device that -- they called it a clam device that had to

do with some injuries to her pelvis.” He said that she had to wear the clam device and use

the walker for approximately six months following the assault. The victim’s father said

that he and the victim’s mother had to drive the victim to doctors’ appointments, including

appointments with a psychiatrist and therapist.

Next, a statement prepared by the victim was read into the record by the victim’s

sister. In the statement, the victim explained that Defendant’s actions on the night of

October 7, 2022, affected her life “in countless ways.” She said that she would “never

forget the terror [she] felt” when she realized that Defendant was trying to kill her. She

explained that she ran from Defendant and tried to escape into her apartment but that he

caught her “by the ponytail, yanking [her] to the ground.” The victim said that Defendant

kicked the right side of her face, told her that he was going to kill her pets and then her,

and called her “a f***ing b***h.” She stated:

I wish I could forget how it felt when [Defendant] pinned me face

down on the floor with all his weight on my back and put his hands around

my throat until I could not breathe in or out. I will never forget the panic I

felt when I realized that I could not breathe and I thought I was going to die,

and how I started frantically kicking the floor of my apartment, praying my

neighbors below me would hear me and save me.

The victim said that Defendant dragged her out of her apartment and down several

flights of stairs, stopping occasionally to punch or kick her. She said that Defendant had

strangled her until “everything went quiet” and that she had thought she had died. The

victim described the injuries she suffered from the assault, including a brain bleed,

compression fractures on her spine, a fractured pelvis, a ruptured ear drum, and ruptured

blood vessels in both eyes. She said that she had a bruise on her back in the shape of

Defendant’s shoe print. The victim explained that, after she was released from the hospital,

she was physically unable to care for herself and needed to move in with her parents. She

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said, “The healing process has been slow and painful[,] and I have also suffered

complications from those injuries which still require ongoing medical attention.” The

victim stated that she had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that she

struggled “to feel safe or secure anywhere, including [her] own home.”

The victim said that Defendant had “no regard for human life” and that he “should

be punished to the fullest extent the law will allow[.]” She described Defendant as

“dangerous” and said that he had harassed her while out on bond in violation of the court’s

orders. She stated,

I have zero reason to believe he will follow the law, even after he’s

released from prison. No person is safe while he’s walking the streets.

People who commit crimes of this magnitude should go to prison. The

emotional and financial impact of [Defendant’s] actions will be felt by me

for years to come.

The victim said that Defendant had shown “a complete lack of remorse[.]” She stated,

“I’m afraid of [Defendant] and what he may try to do to me, my family[,] or another woman

in the future.”

Defendant made an allocution in which he apologized to the victim and her family.

He said, “I’ve never done anything like that before in my life. I’ve taken a lot of steps to

rehabilitate myself and to make sure that nothing like this ever happens again[.]”

Following Defendant’s allocution, he offered into evidence a copy of a “JIMS

report.” The report indicated that, on December 4, 2022, the victim struck two road signs

on Papermill Drive while driving back to her apartment. She was charged with failure to

exercise due care, DUI first offense, and a lane violation. Defendant also submitted a copy

of a Certificate of Completion dated May 10, 2024, showing that he completed an eight-

hour anger management class.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt

that Defendant was a Range I standard offender. Regarding enhancement and mitigating

factors, the court applied the enhancement factor that Defendant had a previous history of

criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the

appropriate range. The court noted that Defendant had “a lot of misdemeanor convictions

and driving offenses.”

The trial court stated that it considered the testimony from the victim’s father

regarding the victim’s physical and emotional condition after the assault, the photographs

of her injuries, and that her recovery took “at least six months[.]” The court said that it

-5-

also considered the information contained in the presentence report. It noted that

Defendant had a “limited criminal record”; the court stated, however, that it took “judicial

notice that [Defendant] was originally charged with attempted second-degree murder and

agg[ravated] kidnapping, aggravated assault, and domestic assault” and found that

Defendant received “a substantial break” under the plea agreement.

The trial court stated that it considered the “principles of sentencing” and arguments

as to alternative sentencing. The court found that the nature and characteristics of the

criminal conduct were “extremely aggravated.” The court stated that it was a “very

aggravated episode in which [the victim] was lucky to escape with the injuries that she did.

It could have easily gotten a lot worse and it could have ultimately cost her her life.” The

trial court said that it also considered statistical information from the administrative office

of the courts about “penitentiary overcrowding and other scenarios in which the courts need

to be mindful of when imposing sentences on cases.”

Regarding Defendant’s allocution, the court found that Defendant’s statement “was

genuine.” The court continued, “[T]here was some drinking involved and things got out

of hand rather quickly. Unfortunately, we’re still equally as responsible for our conduct

when we voluntarily ingest some sort of substance and then act out based on at least some

degree of consuming that substance.”

The trial court specifically stated that it considered Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-35-102—the purposes and intent of sentencing. The court noted that the

foremost purpose was for the court to “promote justice” in its sentencing. It noted that

Defendant pleaded guilty to a Class C felony, which is “presumed probatable.” The court

noted that the presumption “can be overcome based on . . . his criminal history” but pointed

out that “some substantial time ha[d] passed since [Defendant] was getting in trouble more

regularly or routinely, roughly ten or so years ago.”

The trial court next stated that it considered the principles of sentencing in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103. The trial court found that, in Defendant’s

case, confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.

Further, the court stated:

[W]hether or not confinement is particular[ly] suited as an effective deterrent

to others for similar crimes. I don’t think this matter garnered any sort of

media attention, but the attorney general’s office is in the practice of

releasing press releases, and does kind of show their statistics with regard to

conviction rates and things of that nature. So I think that does apply in a

limited respect.

-6-

Regarding Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the court found that Defendant was

amenable to correction and rehabilitation and gave this consideration “some weight as

well.”

The trial court ultimately found that the seriousness of the offense warranted

confinement. The court sentenced Defendant, as a Range I standard offender, to three years

with a one hundred percent service rate “minus the potential of a [fifteen] percent

reduction” and ordered Defendant to serve the sentence in confinement.

This timely appeal follows.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied alternative sentencing because he has shown remorse, is amenable to rehabilitation,

and cooperated with law enforcement. The State responds that the trial court acted within

its broad discretion by imposing confinement because the offense committed by Defendant

was “especially severe.” We agree with the State.

When an accused challenges the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence,

this court reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion

standard, granting a presumption of reasonableness to “within-range sentencing decisions

that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.”

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). This standard of review applies to

“questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.” Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at

278-79. This court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision “so long as it is within

the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in

compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-

10. Moreover, under those circumstances, this court may not disturb the sentence even if

it would prefer a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008).

The party appealing the sentence has the burden of demonstrating its impropriety. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sent’g Comm’n Cmts.; see State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169

(Tenn. 1991).

To determine “the specific sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing

alternatives,” a trial court must consider the following: (1) the evidence, if any, received at

the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of

sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics

of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on

enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information provided by the

administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in

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Tennessee; (7) any statement made by the defendant on his own behalf; and (8) the results

of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the department and contained in

the presentence report. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210(b). Additionally,

the sentence imposed “should be no greater than that deserved for the offense committed”

and “should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the

sentence is imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), (4). Ultimately, a trial court

should impose a sentence that is “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed”

and is “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence

is imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), (4) (2010).

Defendant was eligible for probation because the sentence imposed was ten years

or less and because the offense to which he pled guilty did not exclude him from eligibility.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). Under the revised Tennessee sentencing statutes, a

defendant is no longer presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing.

Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)). Instead, the

“advisory” sentencing guidelines provide that a defendant “who is an especially mitigated

or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony, should be considered as a

favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the

contrary[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A).

Although trial courts should automatically consider probation as a sentencing

alternative for eligible defendants, defendants bear the burden of “establishing suitability”

for probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b). “This burden includes demonstrating that

probation will ‘subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the

defendant.’” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting State v. Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354,

357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). Factors to be considered include the circumstances

surrounding the offense, the defendant’s criminal record, the defendant’s social history and

present condition, the need for deterrence, and the best interest of the defendant and the

public. State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). A trial court should

also consider a defendant’s potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation when

determining if an alternative sentence would be appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

103(5).

Even if an offender satisfies the criteria for favorable consideration for alternative

sentencing and eligibility for probation, trial courts retain discretion to deny probation

entirely or to impose a sentence of full or partial confinement for other reasons, including

if the trial court determines that:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a

defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

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(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of

the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or

recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1).

At the conclusion of Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court considered: the

evidence presented at the hearing; the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct

involved; the information contained in the presentence report; testimony from the victim’s

father; photographs of the victim’s injuries; the victim’s medical records; the victim’s

impact statement; Defendant’s allocution; the results of the validated risk and needs

assessment; Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation; the purposes and principles of

sentencing; arguments as to alternative sentencing; factors supporting confinement,

statistical information from the administrative office of the courts about “penitentiary

overcrowding”; and the enhancement factor that Defendant had a previous history of

criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the

appropriate range.

Following its evaluation of each of these factors, the court imposed the minimum

within-range sentence of three years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(3). Regarding

the manner of service, the court ordered a sentence of confinement after finding that

confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(B). When “the seriousness of the offense forms the basis for

the denial of alternative sentencing, . . . the circumstances of the offense as committed must

be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an

excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors

favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn.

2006).

In finding that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of

the offense, the trial court characterized the circumstances of the offense as a “very

aggravated episode.” The court noted that, although Defendant was allowed to plead guilty

to a single count of aggravated assault, he was originally charged with attempted second

degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, and domestic

assault due to the criminal conduct involved in the incident. As noted by the State, when

weighing the seriousness of an offense, a trial court may look behind a plea agreement and

consider the true nature of the offense committed, as the court did in this case. See State

v. Hollingsworth, 647 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1983). The court stressed the severity of

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Defendant’s conduct, stating that the victim “was lucky to escape with the injuries that she

did” and that the assault “could have . . . ultimately cost her her life.” The court found that

the victim suffered severe physical and emotional distress because of Defendant’s attack,

noting that the victim’s physical recovery took “at least six months” and that she needed to

use a walker for months after the incident.

The trial court’s findings are fully supported by the record. The record reflects that

Defendant’s assault caused the victim severe physical injuries and that his assault on the

victim included strangulation. The victim explained that Defendant told her that he was

going to kill her pets and then her; she said that he kicked her in the face and dragged her

out of her apartment and down several flights of stairs, stopping occasionally to punch or

kick her. She said that Defendant had strangled her until “everything went quiet” and that

she had thought she had died. Regarding her injuries, the victim stated that she had suffered

“a brain bleed, compression fractures on [her] spine, a fractured pelvis, ruptured ear drum,

and ruptured blood vessels in both eyes[,]” and the responding officer observed marks on

the victim’s neck consistent with strangulation. After the assault, the victim could not walk

or take care of herself, and she had to move in with her parents. In addition to the victim’s

physical injuries, the victim was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and sought

treatment from a psychiatrist and therapist. Under these circumstances, the trial court

properly determined that the offense and injuries were particularly grave. See State v.

Webb, No. W2002-03048-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 47092, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 2,

2004) (emphasizing the severity of the victim’s injuries in affirming that the defendant’s

conduct was “especially violent and reprehensible”), no perm. app. filed.

Defendant argues that he is entitled to an alternative sentence because he cooperated

with law enforcement, sought drug and alcohol treatment after his arrest, completed an

anger management class before his sentencing hearing, and his risk and needs assessment

indicated he had a low likelihood of reoffending. Defendant also emphasizes that he has

shown remorse and expressed an interest in rehabilitation. However, there is no proof in

the record concerning Defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement. Additionally,

although Defendant completed a month-long drug and alcohol treatment program

following his arrest, the record indicates that Defendant had completed an inpatient drug

and alcohol program in 2020, and clearly, he had relapsed by the time of the instant offense

in 2022. Although Defendant received a score of “low” on the risk and needs assessment,

the report indicated that the score did not predict “the specific likelihood that an individual

offender will reoffend.” Furthermore, as noted by the State, the record suggests that

Defendant did not leave the victim alone following the attack. The victim stated that

Defendant harassed her while he was out on bond, and the presentence report notes that

Defendant was arrested for violating a restraining order about five months after his assault

on the victim. We agree with the State that “such behavior [would] undermine[]

Defendant’s claims regarding remorse, rehabilitation, and likelihood of recidivism.” In

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any event, the trial court considered each of these points but, nevertheless, concluded that

the nature of Defendant’s offense outweighed all factors favoring a sentence other than

confinement. See Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654.

Because the trial court imposed a within-range sentence and addressed all relevant

sentencing factors, the court’s decision to order a sentence of confinement is entitled to a

presumption of reasonableness. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 278-79. Defendant has not shown

that the trial court abused its discretion, and he is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

s/Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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